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China and the Insecurity of Development in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

DEVON CURTIS

This article analyses China's contemporary engagement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as an example of Chinese involvement in a resource-rich, conflict-affected country. Following a large 'minerals for infrastructure' agreement signed in 2008, China's activities in the DRC are often presented as an example of a departure from Western-led liberal peacebuilding and development, by providing 'corrupt' Congolese national elites with new sources of unchecked rents; or it is viewed as a positive alternative to Western approaches, by focusing on win-win development and reconstruction. Both these views are flawed. Rather than offering a marked alternative to a Western 'liberal' peacebuilding project, this article argues that Chinese interests have increasingly coincided with evolving Western interests in support of stabilization and market-driven economic activities. This, however, does not offer a clear pathway to security and development in the DRC. On the contrary, both Chinese and Western involvement in the DRC provide possibilities for continued insecurity, rather than any fundamental break from previous patterns and structures of politics.

Introduction

In June 2013, US President Barack Obama travelled to Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania in his second trip to Africa as US President. In Senegal, Obama remarked that 'History shows that governments that are more open and more responsive to citizens are more effective in delivering basic services. They're also more successful in attracting the trade and investment that creates jobs and lifts people out of poverty.'¹ Three months earlier, in March 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo, and said that 'China will ... continue to offer, as always, necessary assistance to Africa with no political strings attached'.²

Many commentators referred to China and the United States in familiar, adversarial terms as they compared the two presidential trips, and indeed the two statements above highlight different priorities in Africa.³ Typically, the comparison between Western donor countries and China in Africa is framed as a Western emphasis on liberal peacebuilding and development, including the promotion of good governance, democratization and anti-corruption measures, as opposed to Chinese emphasis on development through trade and 'no-strings-attached' economic exchange.⁴ The comparison often ends with an assessment of which of the two approaches is 'better' for African security and development.

One might expect that these divergent approaches would be accentuated with respect to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a mineral-rich, conflict-affected country. The high levels of violence and insecurity in the DRC and the

weakness of state structures would appear to make it a prime candidate for Western liberal peacebuilding intervention. The presence of extensive mineral resources in the country means that it is a likely site for Chinese trade and economic partnership and political non-interference.

Indeed, in 2008, amid growing trade and investment between China and many African countries,⁵ a consortium of Chinese companies signed an agreement with the government of the DRC. This was the largest of all Chinese 'infrastructure for minerals' agreements in Africa.⁶ The DRC is the world's largest cobalt producer, with a third of the world's reserves, and it is also one of the largest copper producers. Critics of the agreement voiced many of the typical concerns they associated with Chinese involvement in Africa: that the agreement was unfairly skewed to Chinese interests; that it ignored environmental and social consequences; and that it ignored good governance, corruption and other peacebuilding concerns under the guise of Chinese political 'non-interference'. On the other hand, supporters of the agreement believed that Chinese involvement in the DRC was indicative of a new approach to peacebuilding that focuses on win-win development and reconstruction. They argued that Western engagement in the DRC failed to bring peace or sustainable development to the country, whereas Chinese assistance for infrastructural development would offer the Congolese state a pathway to greater investment and growth, which would lead to peace.

This article, however, argues that these two ways of understanding Chinese involvement obscure many of the similarities between Western and Chinese engagement with the DRC. Claims from both critics and supporters of Chinese involvement are premised upon the belief that China behaves differently from other international actors. Whether Chinese involvement is seen as a threat or as an opportunity, it is constructed as an alternative to Western peacebuilding and development strategies. However, this emphasis on difference fails to capture important similarities in Western and Chinese approaches to peace and development in the DRC.

In particular, the article argues that both Chinese and Western approaches have converged upon stabilization policies and market-driven economic activities. In other words, Western donors and Western private interests are primarily concerned with stabilization and economic opportunities, rather than the more extensive 'liberal peacebuilding' goals that are sometimes articulated. Chinese government and Chinese private interests are also concerned with stability; they are not politically disinterested 'traders'. Stability, for both Western donors and Chinese interests, has become the desired 'end' in the DRC. With this goal in mind, Western donors have largely embraced a policy of 'stabilization'. China has increasingly participated in stabilization activities, both to safeguard economic interests in the DRC as well as to assert itself as a 'responsible' international power.

Nonetheless, the article concludes that Western and Chinese activities in support of stabilization and economic exchange is unlikely to lead to security and development in the DRC. Stabilization is premised on a number of core assumptions, widely shared by Chinese and Western actors. The state is seen as central to peace, there is a reluctance to criticize President Kabila and his

government, and military support and intervention are seen as necessary. However, when stabilization and economic activities interact with actual patterns of governance in the DRC, the result is a continuation of insecurity for many Congolese.

This article proceeds by first briefly highlighting the main features of Western engagement in the DRC, showing how stabilization has largely usurped 'liberal peacebuilding' as Western donors' perceived policy route to the desired 'end' of security and development in the DRC. Then, the article looks more extensively at Chinese involvement in the DRC. It argues that Chinese economic, political and diplomatic engagement in the DRC cannot be understood as either a threatening or a beneficial alternative to Western approaches, since it does not constitute a fundamental deviation. Like Western donors, Chinese actors are interested in stability. Lastly, the article shows that the Congolese have their own sets of interests, goals and politics that interact with Chinese and Western activities and initiatives. Existing patterns of Congolese politics limit the extent to which international stabilization policies and economic exchange can bring about security in the DRC.

The 'West', Peacebuilding and Stabilization in the DRC

Congo has always loomed large in the imagination of Western actors. It has long been constructed as a place of geopolitical importance and great riches, in need of moral uplifting. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the perceived darkness of the Congo reinforced European identities as the agents of civilization, despite the brutal European practices enacted on the Congolese, and the horrific systems put in place for the extraction of resources.

In contemporary DRC, there continue to be a large number of different kinds of Western actors with a variety of interests. Economic opportunities and private Western interests are still very important. There are large-scale and small-scale private commercial interests in different sectors of the Congolese economy.⁷ There are also many bilateral and multilateral donor agencies and diplomats, engaging in 'peacebuilding' and 'development'. While contemporary Western peacebuilding in the DRC is not characterized by the same kind of exploitation and abuse as earlier Western engagement in the Congo, it often shares a similar motivating language of protection and civilization. Western donors and diplomats sometimes assume that the DRC is in need of liberal enlightened rule. The brutal wars in the DRC since 1996, the weakness of Congolese state institutions, the porous borders, the desperate poverty and the enormous mineral wealth in the country would appear to make the DRC an important site for liberal post-conflict peacebuilding.

The peace process in the DRC that led to a transitional government in 2003 and democratic elections in 2006 involved Western donors and other external actors. Indeed, this peace process had many features of 'liberal peacebuilding', premised upon the notion that economic and political liberalization are conducive to peace.⁸ The 2006 elections were the first national democratic elections in 40 years in the DRC, involving 50,000 polling stations and large numbers of

international and national observers. Many Western donors heralded the elections as a success, and the Congolese conflict was declared over.⁹

A number of liberal reforms were launched during the transitional process, often at the insistence of Western donors. Many of these focused on political and institutional structures; for instance, reforms were initiated in the civil service, the security sector, the natural resource sector and justice sector. As discussed below, donors also promoted a number of economic reforms in this period. International actors formed the International Committee in Support of the Transition (CIAT), a mechanism to coordinate these donor programmes on institutional reform.

Some of these institutional reform programmes are ongoing, but the dominant focus among Western donors has shifted to stabilization. Stabilization is defined differently by different countries and by different agencies; thus, there is some conceptual confusion surrounding the term. Adding to the ambiguity, sometimes stabilization is described as a set of activities, and sometimes as a strategic objective. Often, however, stabilization involves pacification and political and military techniques (for instance, peacekeeping, policing or counter-insurgency) to create a safe and secure environment and to prevent or reduce violence.¹⁰

There are several reasons why Western donors shifted their emphasis from liberal peacebuilding to stabilization in the DRC. Firstly, the focus on stabilization in the DRC has occurred at a time when there are an increasing number of international interventions in 'fragile' states conducted under stabilization agendas. This can be traced to military-civilian operations in post 9/11 Iraq and Afghanistan, and thus stabilization is often closely associated to the war on terror and associated techniques.¹¹

Secondly, among many donors, there was the perception that liberal reform programmes were unsuccessful in the DRC, so ensuring stability and order should take precedence over administrative reform programmes. For instance, civil service reform was viewed as a failure and most donors withdrew from administrative reform support, except for the World Bank. Furthermore, the democratic transition had not brought order and stability to the country. Despite the declared end to the conflict, violence has continued in the DRC, particularly in the eastern part of the country. There has been a UN peacekeeping force in the DRC since 1999, but it has been unable to protect many Congolese civilians from violence. There are still over two dozen armed groups in the eastern Kivu provinces, many with connections to foreign parties. Thus, robust stabilization measures were deemed an important priority.

Thirdly, there were pragmatic reasons for the shift to stabilization by Western donors. The government of the DRC preferred a stabilization agenda rather than the promotion of liberal governance. Stabilization buttressed the power of certain ruling elites and the military, whereas liberal governance might check this power. Following the 2006 elections, President Kabila asked that CIAT be terminated. 'Stability' was something that both the Congolese government and Western interests could agree upon as a goal. It is difficult to be against stability, and private Western interests, for instance in the mining sector, would also benefit from a secure environment in which to do business. In addition, given the extensive

support and previous investment made by Western donors in the DRC, it was important for them to continue to be seen as doing something, rather than declaring the entirety of Western involvement as a failure.

Western stabilization programmes have not completely replaced liberal peace-building in the DRC, but they are increasingly important. From 2003–06, Western donors largely tolerated impunity, corruption and patrimonial politics, in order to ensure that the Congolese transition went forward.¹² Most Western donors turned a blind eye to allegations that the 2011 elections in the DRC were heavily flawed, as they preferred to see the well-known incumbent President Kabila in power, rather than opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, who many donors perceived as unpredictable.

Thus, the Congolese government as well as Western donor countries have adopted stability as a priority end goal, and stabilization as a set of practices deployed towards that end. In 2009, the Congolese government designed and implemented the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (STAREC). On 1 July 2010, the name of the UN peace-keeping mission changed from United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) to United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Earlier, the European Union gave military support to the UN on two occasions, by sending troops to Bunia in 2003 and to Kinshasa during the electoral period in 2006.¹³ International partners have also implemented an International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS), which supports STAREC.¹⁴ For Western donor governments, as well as the UN, stabilization has become the dominant approach to peace in the DRC, including building up the coercive capacity of the state, and supplementing this with external military force to pacify challenges to state authority.

Chinese Economic Engagement in the DRC

The claim that Chinese actors are fundamentally different from Western ones in the DRC is based on economic and political arguments. The Chinese government published its first China–Africa Policy White Paper in 2006. This policy paper emphasized the notions of win–win economic cooperation and political equality. Thus, China conceptualizes its economic development cooperation in Africa as ‘mutually beneficial’ (solidarity among southern countries), as opposed to what China calls the ‘self-interested’ approach of other international donors. Critics, on the other hand, see Chinese economic engagement in Africa as exceptionally self-interested, with disproportional benefits to Chinese parties compared to their African counterparts.¹⁵ Politically, China follows the principle of ‘non-interference’ in other countries’ internal affairs.¹⁶ The principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference have been central to official Chinese policy ever since Zhou Enlai articulated them at the 1955 Bandung conference of non-aligned countries. Advocates interpret this policy as an indicator of mutual respect and equality, while critics believe that this principle perpetuates bad governance and corruption.

Those who emphasize Chinese difference in the economic sphere point to the large 'infrastructure for mineral' deal signed by China and the DRC in 2008. The signing of this agreement followed years of efforts by Western donors to promote economic reform in the DRC. Joseph Kabila restarted discussions with the IMF and World Bank shortly after he became president following the assassination of his father in 2001. The IMF began a country programme in the DRC in 2002, and in 2003 the IMF and World Bank arranged a relief package under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative, which focused on macroeconomic stability. Later, there were further reforms connected to a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), and there were discussions to adopt an Investment Code, Mining Code and Forestry Code. However, the Congolese government never fully complied with these reforms. In 2006, the IMF terminated the PRSP due to budget misreporting, and negotiations between the Congolese government, the IMF and the OECD donors were at a low point. This is the context in which President Kabila and his advisers began negotiations on a major economic deal with the Chinese, which was therefore heralded by the Congolese political establishment as an alternative to Western development cooperation.¹⁷

Under the deal, Congolese minerals would pay for the financing of infrastructure projects.¹⁸ A first memorandum of understanding (MOU) was signed in September 2007, with the main agreement signed in April 2008. In exchange for access to mining rights, a Sino-Congolese joint venture (Sicomines) would be formed between the DRC's Gécamines (32 per cent stake) and a consortium of Chinese companies (68 per cent stake) including the China Railway Engineering Company (CREC), Sinohydro, Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt and the China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC). The consortium of Chinese companies would provide infrastructure projects in the DRC, with funding from the Chinese state-owned Export–Import (Exim) Bank. These projects would include the building or rehabilitation of 3,500 km of roads, 3,200 km of railways, and the construction of 32 hospitals, 145 health centres, 2 universities and 5000 houses. The credit line would also capitalize the mining operation (\$3.2 billion). Loans would be reimbursed by future profits from the mining ventures. After repayment, subsequent profits would be divided among the shareholders in the joint venture.¹⁹ The minerals could be sold to China, or elsewhere on the global market. In the initial agreement, the total budget for the infrastructure projects was US\$6 billion, to be implemented in two tranches.

The deal came under a huge amount of criticism. Some analysts claimed that the deal was part of the Chinese government's grand plan to secure access to Africa's natural resources. China's 2001 'Going Global Strategy' had encouraged companies to expand abroad particularly in the energy sector, although it was CREC that had initiated the Sicomines agreement in the DRC, not the Chinese government.²⁰ There were also claims that the agreement was unfairly skewed towards Chinese interests, and worries about transparency and accountability.²¹ International financial actors were particularly concerned about debt sustainability. They believed that the level of debt arising from the agreement was too large, especially since the agreement contained a guarantee that the loans to capitalize the mining operation and the loans for infrastructure would be reimbursed by

the Congolese state if the profits from the mining operation were insufficient.²² In response to pressure from the IMF, some aspects of the agreement were renegotiated in October 2009, and this revised agreement is currently under implementation.²³ The new agreement removed the Congolese state's guarantee and reduced the interest rate for the infrastructure loans.²⁴ The funding for the second tranche of infrastructure projects (estimated \$3 billion) was also cancelled, so only the first \$3 billion in infrastructure is going forward. After these amendments to the agreement, the IMF and DRC signed an extended credit facility arrangement in December 2009.²⁵ In 2010, the Paris club donors cancelled over \$7 billion of the DRC's debt.

When the 2008 agreement was signed, the Congolese government articulated the win-win narrative. For President Kabila, the deal offered support at a crucial time. Kabila's economic plans rest on the 'cinq chantiers' or five pillars for the reconstruction of the country, which were a key part of his election promises in 2006. The Chinese deal would boost these pillars (infrastructure, health and education, water and electricity, housing, and employment), particularly in the run up to the 2011 elections. Indeed, by the time of the elections, some infrastructure had been refurbished under the Sicomines deal, such as the main boulevard in Kinshasa, the Boulevard du 30 juin, which was done in time for the DRC's 50th anniversary of independence on 30 June 2010.²⁶

Despite critics' fears and supporters' optimism, however, the effects of the Sino-Congolese Sicomines agreement remain limited. There were disagreements between Congolese and Chinese parties about the price charged for some infrastructural projects, as the prices tend to be similar or slightly higher than the bids put in by Chinese companies for similar projects in open tender projects. Also, although US\$458 million worth of infrastructure projects had been implemented as of December 2012, there have been no new projects since financing from the Exim bank was withdrawn in early 2012.²⁷ Mining operations in Katanga had not yet begun in early 2013.

Thus, the agreement has not brought about its intended benefits, but its problems are not distinctive either. There are no provisions for infrastructure maintenance in the agreement, but this is the case in infrastructure projects funded by other development partners as well. While it is true that the deal and its negotiation were not very transparent, even critics acknowledge that it is no less transparent than many other mining deals signed by the Congolese government.²⁸ The 'deal of the century' is therefore not as exceptional as it first seems.

So, the claim that China is a fundamentally different kind of economic actor in the DRC faces important limitations. Furthermore, Chinese economic involvement in the DRC is not monolithic. Various Chinese actors are involved in decision-making *vis-à-vis* Africa, for instance the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the China Exim Bank. At the Chinese government level, there are various competing and changing priorities.²⁹

There are also a large number of private Chinese actors operating in the DRC, and this economic activity is not exceptional either. Many Chinese private entrepreneurs arrived in the mineral-rich Katanga province towards the end of the transitional period, mostly involved in mineral trading and processing.³⁰ These

companies were fairly heterogeneous from individual entrepreneurs to medium-sized companies, and many of the smaller companies left when copper prices fell in 2009. Some larger private Chinese companies in partnership with local Congolese companies remain,³¹ but these companies do not receive support from the Chinese state or from Chinese public financial institutions. There are also Chinese state-owned construction companies in the DRC such as Sinohydro. Sinohydro is part of the Sicomin deal, but it has also won other international tenders in the DRC. Other Chinese firms that are not subsidized by the Chinese state have received World Bank and African Development Bank contracts. They are sometimes criticized for building low quality or poorly maintained roads, but this has nothing to do with their Chinese identity and more to do with profit-seeking logics and/or Congolese local politics.³² Chinese telecommunications companies also operate in the DRC under market logics.³³ There are, therefore, diverse Chinese economic interests in the DRC, ranging from state-owned enterprises to private Chinese individuals. They are driven by market logics and the search for economic opportunities, rather than being part of a broader Chinese state economic conspiracy.³⁴ Many Chinese private individuals and smaller companies have little contact with the Chinese embassies in Kinshasa or Kigali.³⁵

This does not mean that the behaviour of Western and Chinese actors are identical. For instance, Chinese diplomats tend not to participate in donor coordination meetings, although in the last year Chinese companies and diplomats in Kinshasa, who had previously been relatively secretive about their bilateral dealings with the Congolese government, have started to attend open ceremonies and sectoral meetings.³⁶ There is also some cooperation between China, the EU and other international partners to promote the sourcing of the mineral trading.³⁷ Thus, China's economic activity in the DRC is not fundamentally anomalous, and there may be a trend towards increased convergence. The aid paradigm articulated at the Fourth High Level Forum on aid effectiveness in Busan South Korea in 2011 elevated the role of the private sector, re-centred economic growth and productivity to the core of development thinking, and included a widening of the concept of development financing.³⁸ This shift in thinking on aid has facilitated the building of partnerships between traditional donors and emerging powers, including China.³⁹

A Responsible Power: Stabilization and the DRC Peace Process

Chinese economic activities in the DRC are therefore based primarily on market logics and the pursuit of profit, and are not as exceptional as some critics and supporters claim. One might expect that Chinese difference would be more marked in the political realm, where Chinese policies of non-interference and respect for sovereignty are emphasized. Those who highlight Chinese difference express concern that China has a penchant for 'security free-riding' in Africa,⁴⁰ and that it prefers bilateral over multilateral diplomacy. Peacebuilding scholars have also emphasized Chinese difference. When discussing the risk of overestimating the power of liberal peacebuilding, Roger Mac Ginty points out that it

is 'important to underscore the power of regional and international powers (such as China and Russia) to provide alternative sources of coercion, incentives and tutelage.'⁴¹

Yet Chinese security, diplomatic and political engagement with the DRC share important features with Western counterparts, including an emphasis on stabilization. Since the 2000s, China has become an active contributor to conflict resolution efforts and to UN peacekeeping operations. This marks an important shift. In the 1990s, the Chinese government had taken a more critical view of what it saw as the improper use of Chapter VII in the UN Charter authorizing military intervention in the context of peacekeeping.⁴²

There are several reasons for this shift. China's economic involvement in Africa makes it sensitive to instability.⁴³ Chinese concern over the political situation in the DRC is unsurprising, given its economic interests in the country discussed above. Chinese embassies have become more proactive in issuing security guidance and organizing evacuations of its citizens, such as when gunmen attacked a construction site operated by Sinohydro in 2009 in eastern DRC.⁴⁴ Violence and instability make it difficult for the Chinese government to be indifferent, and there is some flexibility around Beijing's interpretation of political non-interference in favour of pragmatic engagement.⁴⁵ For the Chinese government, like Western governments, 'stability' is a desired outcome, in part to help make the DRC safe for economic operations.

Furthermore, alongside the language of non-interference and 'African solutions to African problems', there is a strong attempt by the Chinese leadership to present China as a global, responsible power. The Chinese White Paper on Peaceful Development released in September 2012 portrays China as a responsible stakeholder in a multi-polar world. China is increasingly conscious of its image in Africa. The recent shift from the language of 'non-interference' to 'constructive engagement' is indicative of this concern, though constructive engagement is explained as a respect for sovereignty and the ability of African countries to make their own decisions and choose their own partners.

As China has become increasingly preoccupied with becoming a responsible world power, it has intensified its activities with multilateral institutions. For instance, the fact that China agreed to the renegotiation of the Sicomines deal discussed above may be an illustration of China's ambition to play a greater role in the IMF. Johanna Jansson argues that China's own aspirations are changing, and she points out that the renegotiation of the Sicomines deal occurred during the global economic crisis when China was taking a more active role in the IMF.⁴⁶

Similarly, Chinese involvement in the peacekeeping mission in the DRC and its diplomatic contributions to the DRC's peace process are indicative of China's general shift towards increased multilateral engagement.⁴⁷ The UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC, MONUC, was established after the signing of the Lusaka Accords in 1999, eventually become a large and expensive mission with a mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. China first contributed troops to MONUC in 2003. By 2013, there were 221 peacekeeping personnel from China serving with MONUSCO.⁴⁸ This may not seem significant, since the overall number of uniformed personnel in MONUSCO was just under 20,000

in March 2013, with the largest troop contributions from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Uruguay and Nepal. Nonetheless, China is the only member of the UN Security Council P5 to contribute military personnel to MONUSCO, and it is the P5 member with the highest number of peacekeepers in UN missions overall.⁴⁹ China has not yet sent combat troops to any UN peacekeeping mission, but it has sent military observers, civilian police and medical, logistical and transport support teams.⁵⁰ These contributions raise China's profile at the UN and help project its identity as a responsible actor in international politics. They may also contribute to a positive identity at home, with the Chinese media praising a recent deployment to the DRC, saying that 'the Chinese peacekeeping engineers also spared no efforts to help local people by repairing roads, building schools, offering medical services and medicines, and teaching farming techniques to local residents ... winning high praise from local residents as well as the MONUSCO'.⁵¹

Chinese contributions to MONUSCO do not conflict with the Chinese government insistence on sovereignty and non-interference, since the peacekeeping mission is at the request of the Congolese government. Yet peacekeeping in the DRC is becoming increasingly robust. In March 2013, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2098, which extended the mandate of MONUSCO and authorized an Intervention Brigade in the DRC with the responsibility of 'neutralizing' armed groups and to make space for 'stabilization activities'.⁵² This followed a Peace, Security and Cooperation (PSC) Framework for the DRC, signed on 24 February 2013. China supported the Security Council resolution, including the Intervention Brigade. Standard references in both the PSC Framework and the UN Security Council Resolution 2098 to the DRC's sovereignty and territorial integrity were key to Chinese support. China pushed for some revisions in the draft resolution, including a clause emphasizing that the basic principles of UN peacekeeping would be observed, since there were some fears that the Intervention Brigade could set a precedent with its mandate to 'carry out targeted offensive operations ... either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner'. With reassurances that the resolution did not depart from UN peacekeeping principles, China supported Resolution 2098 because the request had come from the Congolese government, and because the AU, other regional organizations and the major international players all supported it.⁵³ This shows the importance of identity and responsibility in the articulation of Chinese policy, so long as the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity are upheld.

Perhaps the most interesting facet of Chinese engagement in the DRC has been its diplomatic involvement in the peace process. China's position *vis-à-vis* peace and diplomacy in the DRC is fairly similar to that of other international actors. It emphasizes 'African solutions to African problems', and has supported African regional mediation processes. At times, however, China has played an active diplomatic role. For instance, in 2008 there was a renewal of violence in eastern DRC between the Congolese army and rebel forces (the National Congress for People's Defense, CNDP) led by Laurent Nkunda, backed by Rwanda. The US and many European donors were reluctant to criticize President

Kabila's handling of the situation in the east and abuses committed by the Congolese army.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, Laurent Nkunda began to criticize the Sicomines agreement and said that China was promoting bad governance in the DRC.⁵⁵ The military situation was tense, and the CNDP was poised to take over the major eastern city of Goma.

Chinese diplomacy was proactive, with the result of helping to neutralize Nkunda as a political threat. In early December 2008, Chinese Special Envoy to Africa Liu Guijin went to Kigali, Bukavu and Kinshasa. In Rwanda, Liu Guijin encouraged talks between Rwanda and the DRC and emphasized that military means were not the solution. Liu Guijin recalls that the reception from his Rwanda hosts was positive, and from there he flew to Bukavu to meet with the Governor of South Kivu and peacekeepers from China, and then to Kinshasa to meet with President Kabila and other officials.⁵⁶

Liu Guijin believes that efforts by the Chinese in this period played a constructive role in facilitating an agreement between Rwanda and the DRC, although he was careful to emphasize that the role should not be exaggerated.⁵⁷ Still, the very fact that China appointed a special envoy to Africa in May 2007 reflects an adjustment in Chinese foreign policy, and an acknowledgement that China would be politically more proactive in Africa to help promote stability.

Since 2009, China has continued to play a modest but important role in the Congolese peace process. It has continued to support the initiatives of regional actors (particularly the African Union) and the UN in the DRC. In 2011, China provided some assistance to the Congolese elections committee, in the form of office equipment and computers. More generally, China's interest in peace and security issues in Africa shows no sign of abating. At the July 2012 Fifth Ministerial FOCAC meeting, China announced that it would launch a China–Africa cooperative partnership for peace and security, and would continue to support African capabilities for maintaining peace and security. In discussions with the EU, China has expressed interest in the African Peace Facility (APF). At the UN, China contributed \$5 million to the Peacebuilding Fund between 2006 and 2012.⁵⁸

This is not to say that Chinese diplomatic and political engagement with the DRC is always conducted multilaterally. Many countries provide bilateral military support and training to the DRC, including technical training by Chinese engineering troops in Kamina.⁵⁹ China has also provided material support and military equipment, such as military vehicles, ammunition, submachine guns and grenade launchers.⁶⁰ Yet, while Chinese military support has fuelled some concern among some international observers, the consolidation of military ties is not so different from the strategies of other countries. Generally, then, countries do not engage in coordinated action at all times in the DRC, and there is a wide range of international actors. Nevertheless, Chinese diplomatic and political activity in the DRC has increasingly become more proactive and multilateral, in support of the Congolese government and with the aim of helping promote stability and a secure environment for economic partnerships.

The Politics of Insecurity and Development

The discussion above has shown that China is not exceptional in its dealings with the DRC. Rather than understanding China as a 'rogue' actor blocking Western attempts to build peace in the country, or as an economic powerhouse providing incomparable opportunities for Congolese development, this article has shown that there are multiple Chinese actors and interests that share many features with Western involvement. Both Western and Chinese actors have contributed to stabilization initiatives for various reasons, including the desire for a secure environment for economic interests, as well as political and reputation reasons. However, even as Western and Chinese activities increasingly converge, they interact with Congolese politics on the ground, with results that are sometimes antithetical to security or development.

Economic activity and transnational economic relations do not necessarily lead to security in the DRC or elsewhere. There is no inevitable or causal pathway between increased Chinese trade and investment in the DRC, and security. Both historically and in contemporary DRC, insecurity has co-existed with international and regional economic exchange.⁶¹ The DRC is a product of violent globalization, and orders of peace and orders of war can both exist within regional and international political economies.

Chinese and Western economic engagement, as well as stabilization initiatives, are situated within existing patterns of governance in the DRC. Governance in the DRC is characterized by heavily networked, overlapping political alliances competing for power, economic resources and protection.⁶² President Kabila's inner circle of advisors, including family members and business associates, are very powerful. For instance, Augustin Katumba Mwanke was instrumental in brokering the Sicomines deal and was very influential in the mining sector, but he did not hold an official government position.⁶³ Understanding the shifting formal and informal alliances between various central and regional elites has been difficult for Chinese and Western actors. Many Congolese position themselves to take advantage of external rents and other economic and political opportunities, using violence when it serves their goals.

Congolese patterns of patrimonial governance are very resilient, and Chinese and Western involvement feed into these systems. Most of the DRC's economy lies outside of budgetary control, with the 2012 budget amounting to less than US\$8 billion.⁶⁴ For pragmatic reasons, some Chinese and Western actors at times interact with non-state Congolese interests. For instance, private Chinese actors working in mineral *comptoirs* and Chinese medical shops in eastern DRC often pay levies to armed groups, as do other private international actors. Even though Chinese government officials deal with the Congolese state, this does not prevent Chinese and other entrepreneurs from strengthening the positions of local strongmen and non-state actors. Chinese involvement, like other international involvement, contributes to existing systems of patrimonial networked, systems of governance and violence.

Notwithstanding the pragmatism leading some international actors to operate outside official state channels, international stabilization policies privilege the

Congolese state. International actors, including China, realize that the DRC is too important to ignore. As Denis Tull points out, President Kabila is aware that outsiders need the government as much as the government needs its outside supporters.⁶⁵ This has led to a policy of tacit accommodation, where external actors, including Western donors and UN officials, have been reluctant to put pressure on the Congolese government on various reform programmes. In turn, Congolese government officials use their positions to gain rents from outside. The policy of stabilization aligns Western actors with the Congolese state, with a focus on securing and promoting a centralized militarized state, rather than focusing on other areas of governance. This therefore coincides with the Chinese government preference for working with the Congolese state as a partner.

Privileging the Congolese state, however, does not necessarily lead to security for the Congolese population. Evaluations of the stabilization programmes in the DRC (especially the ISSSS) have been largely critical, saying that the efforts have made little meaningful progress towards the realization of their objectives.⁶⁶ Assessments have criticized the lack of consultation with beneficiary populations, and the corresponding disregard for the sources of insecurity that affect many local communities in eastern DRC, particularly when state officials are responsible for insecurity. Séverine Autesserre says that international programmes have tended to boost the capacity of an authoritarian regime to oppress the population, and Theodore Trefon argues that the Congolese state is a 'masquerade', where many government officials use public office to advance private interests.⁶⁷ For many local communities in the DRC, the state represents insecurity and predation, rather than security, although there are complex forms of accommodation in the relationships between state agents and citizens.⁶⁸ Thus, support for the state, whether from Chinese or other international actors, does not directly translate into greater security for Congolese.

The reluctance on the part of Western donors to criticize the Congolese state has led to an emphasis on material reconstruction rather than governance and accountability reforms. This brings Western donors in line with the Chinese government approach, but does not necessarily contribute to Congolese security or development. Under the framework of the ISSSS stabilization programme, the UN has rebuilt prisons, police stations, administrative buildings and courthouses. As shown above, China has also focused on material infrastructural development in the DRC. Material reconstruction, however, is also political, usually in support of the ruling party. When viewed in this way, it becomes easier to understand Laurent Nkunda's vocal opposition to the Sino-Congolese deal, or opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi's pronouncement ahead of the 2011 elections that he would renegotiate the agreement. Furthermore, any project that focuses on material reconstruction or stabilization is bound to encounter a volatile political context. For instance, as part of the UN stabilization programme in eastern DRC, Chinese engineers built new barracks for the Congolese army, the FARDC. This seemed to be an excellent example of cooperation, with funding from the Netherlands, and an ingenious design by the Chinese engineers for semi-durable barracks for three brigades. Yet political problems arose regarding who would live in the barracks, with the result that they remained empty long after construction.

Similar problems have occurred with some prisons and courthouses built as part of other international programmes.⁶⁹

Likewise, while Western donors and the Chinese government have supported building an effective Congolese military and security sector, these efforts interact with Congolese politics on the ground.⁷⁰ Formal and informal networks of political authority have hindered security sector reform. Despite the international attention on military training, the Congolese army remains fragmented and lacks coordination. The integration of various armed groups into the national army has led to the 'militia-zation' of the army, rather than the creation of a coherent, national army. Furthermore, the army itself has been responsible for human rights abuses, which has put international actors, including the UN mission, in the uncomfortable position of backing a military that is accused of abuses and predation against the civilian population.⁷¹ International efforts have not been able to end the dual command structures in the military, nor its predatory behaviour. Indeed, rents coming from outside actors have fuelled these divisions. The use of violence continues to be effective for both the state and for competing non-state armed groups in the DRC, which use violence as a bargaining tool in internationally sponsored peace talks, and as a technique for economic gain.⁷²

Faced with these difficult political realities on the ground, China and Western donors have emphasized the role of African regional actors and initiatives in addressing insecurity in the DRC. China has announced that it will grant RMB600 million for African Union activities over the next three years, and will set up a diplomatic mission to the African Union in Addis Ababa. Western donors provide extensive support to the AU and other sub-regional bodies for the Great Lakes. However, this is unlikely to offer a more promising path to security and development in the DRC. The strategies adopted by the AU towards insecurity in the DRC are similar to UN strategies, and do not provide alternative ways of thinking about economic, political and social relationships. Violence in the DRC is intimately connected to regional political economies, and thus any alternative to violence must involve the region, but viewing the region as the 'solution' glosses over the myriad of competing interests that are at play. Regional initiatives to bring an end to violence in the DRC, such as the ongoing Kampala talks under the auspices of the chairperson of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), have exposed these interests and have not brought the DRC closer to 'peace'.

Conclusion

The Chinese Ambassador to the DRC said that 'China is ready to continue to work together with Congo ... to support peace and stability in the DRC, to actively participate in the economic reconstruction of the country, and to intensify consultation and bilateral cooperation in international and African affairs'.⁷³ These are the uncontroversial words of a diplomat, but the deeper Sino-Congolese relationship is an illustration of both change and continuity in international politics. China is conscious of its image in Africa. As it increases

its investments, China is more sensitive to insecurity and volatility, and is more prepared to act multilaterally. Nevertheless, China is also a heterodox actor, like other international actors in the DRC. This article has shown that international engagement in the DRC should not be framed as a Western focus on institution-building, democracy and liberal peacebuilding versus a Chinese no-strings-attached economic partnership. This frame obscures important similarities. Western and Chinese approaches in the DRC have shifted and come closer together, both in response to politics in the DRC, as well as to global politics and interactions. While China says that the UN should refrain from imposing particular models of governance on African countries, the differences between Chinese and Western engagement are fairly minimal on the ground in the DRC.

Instead, Chinese and Western actors tend to focus on market-driven economic activities and stabilization efforts, where a central militarized government is seen as the solution to the problem of insecurity in the DRC.⁷⁴ While this suits the Congolese regime, this focus is of little benefit to the vast majority of Congolese, who often remain the target of predatory national and international actors. Low intensity insecurity, elite rent capture and low developmental redistribution in the DRC cannot be addressed through stabilization policies and economic exchange, regardless of the identities of the international interlocutors.

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NOTES

1. President Barack Obama, Joint press conference at the Presidential Palace, Dakar, Senegal, 27 June 2013 (at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/27/remarks-president-obama-and-president-sall-republic-senegal-joint-press-).
2. President Xi Jinping, speech at the Julius Nyerere Convention Centre, Dar es Salaam, 25 March 2013 (at: www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1025803.shtml).
3. See, for instance, Erin Conway-Smith, 'Obama in Africa: China 1, US 0', *Global Post* [online], 1 July 2013 (at: www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/south-africa/130630/barack-obama-africa-tour-china-xi-jinping); Solomon Dersso, 'Obama Finally Scrambles over Africa', *Al-Jazeera* [online] (at: www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/2013626144327559791.html), 30 June 2013; Edward Luce, 'Obama's Trip to Africa is Too Little and Very Late', *Financial Times* [London], 30 June 2013 (at: www.ft.com/cms/s/0/621a46dc-de93-11e2-b990-

- 00144feab7de.html#axzz2jPTcfuto); Ntandoyenkosi Ncube, 'US Trying to "Play Catch-up" with China's Strong Presence in Africa: Expert', *Xinhua news* [online], 26 June 2013 (at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-06/26/c_132486161.htm).
4. The 'West' is a nebulous term with unclear boundaries. In this article it is used to describe donor countries in Europe and North America, recognizing that it is an imagined category that disguises empirical differences within and between countries.
 5. Chinese imports from Africa are rising rapidly, particularly from resource-rich regions. See WTO, International Trade Statistics, merchandise trade (at: <http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Country=CN&c>). In 2008, exports to China from the DRC were 1024.8 and in 2010 they were 2160.5 (figures are in million new Congolese francs, f.o.b.). African Development Bank, quoted in *Africa South of the Sahara 2013* (at: www.europaworld.com).
 6. 'Infrastructure for minerals' loans involve the extension of credit lines for infrastructure, in exchange for access to minerals. In the last summit of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in July 2012, then Chinese President Hu Jintao pledged US\$20 billion in new loans for infrastructure, agriculture and manufacturing in Africa over the next three years (at: www.focac.org/eng/ltada/dwjbzjhys/t953114.htm).
 7. A detailed discussion of Western economic interests is beyond the scope of this article.
 8. For a discussion of liberal peacebuilding and associated debates, see Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty, Special Issue, 'The Liberal Peace and Post-War Reconstruction', *Global Society*, Vol.21, No.4, 2007.
 9. For a discussion of this period, see Filip Reyntjens, 'Democratic Republic of Congo: Political Transition and Beyond', *African Affairs*, Vol.106, No.423, 2007, pp.307–17.
 10. Aside from very broad objectives such as the creation and maintenance of a safe and secure environment, the specific ends and means of stabilization are disputed. See, for example, the UK Stabilisation Unit (at: www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk) and the US Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (at: <http://www.state.gov/j/cso/>).
 11. Earlier operations used the term, such as NATO's Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia from 1996, but the United Nations only began to emphasize stabilization in 2004, with the Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).
 12. Tshonda Omasombo and Rashidi Obotela, 'La dernière transition politique en RDC', in Filip Reyntjens and Stefaan Marysse, (eds), *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs: Annuaire 2005–2006*, Paris: l'Harmattan, 2006, pp.233–59.
 13. Catherine Gegout, 'The West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–2006)', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.16, No.2, 2009, pp.231–44.
 14. The ISSSS grew out of an earlier UN Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy. Implementing partners include UN agencies, international NGOs and MONUSCO, and most programme activities are in eastern DRC. The ISSSS is funded by UN mission resources and bilateral donors. Emily Paddon and Guillaume Lacaille, 'Stabilising the Congo', Forced Migration Policy Briefing 8, Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre, 2011.
 15. For instance, Dambisa Moyo uncritically presents Chinese engagement in Africa as an alternative to what she sees as problematic Western aid strategies. Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is not Working and How there is Another Way for Africa*, London: Penguin, 2009. On the other hand, for an extremely critical view of China's 'rise', see Peter Navarro, *The Coming China Wars: Where they Will be Fought and How they Can be Won*, Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 2008.
 16. The Chinese policy of non-interference encompasses the idea that China should not prescribe other countries' national policies, thus avoiding political conditionalities such as good governance and human rights provisions.
 17. This was not the first time that the Chinese had been involved in the Congo. Under the Mobutu regime, China built high-profile buildings, such as the football stadium in Kinshasa and the 'People's Palace'. Nonetheless, after the 2006 elections in the DRC, China began to play a much bigger role.
 18. The financing of this arrangement follows the basic structure of 'infrastructure for minerals'. For a discussion of other Chinese 'infrastructure-for-resources' deals in Africa, see Ana Cristina Alves, 'China's "Win–Win" Cooperation: Unpacking the Impact of Infrastructure-for-Resources Deals in Africa', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.20, No.2, 2013, pp.207–26; Theophile Dzaka-Kikouta, 'L'investissement chinois en Afrique centrale', *Outre-terre*, Vol.4, No.30, 2011, pp.207–26.
 19. The 2008 agreement can be accessed online (at: www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/China-DRC%20April%202008%20contract%20French%20and%20Chinese_0.pdf). For detailed explanations of the provisions, see Stefaan Marysse and Sara Geenens, 'Win–win or

- Unequal Exchange? The Case of the Sino-Congolese Cooperation Agreements', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.47, No.3, 2009, pp.371–96; Thierry Vircoulon, 'Autopsie d'une controverse internationale. Le partenariat sino-congolais sous le feu des critiques', *Les Temps Modernes*, janvier-mars, 657, 2010; Johanna Jansson, 'The Sicomines Agreement: Change and Continuity in the Democratic Republic of Congo's International Relations', Occasional Paper No. 97, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2011.
20. Jansson (see n.19 above), p.7.
 21. See Marysse and Geenen (see n.19 above); Global Witness, *China and Congo: Friends in Need*, March 2011.
 22. Other investors in the DRC's mining sector did not have this kind of government guarantee.
 23. The revised agreement can be accessed online (at: www.globalwitness.org/library/congo-china-agreement-publication-new-documents). For details, see Stefaan Marysse and Sara Geenen, 'Triangular Arm Wrestling: Analysis and Revision of the Sino-Congolese Agreements' in A. Ansons and S. Marysse, (eds), *Natural Resources and Local Livelihoods in the Great Lakes Region of Africa: A Political Economy Perspective*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp.237–48; Johanna Jansson, 'The Sicomines Agreement Revisited: Prudent Chinese Banks and Risk-Taking Chinese Companies' *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.40, No.135, 2013, pp.152–62.
 24. In the original agreement, the interest rate had been 6.6 per cent. Under the new agreement, the Chinese parties to the agreement will cover any interest amount in excess of 4.4 per cent. Jansson (see n.23 above), p.155.
 25. The renegotiation of the agreement was a condition to reach the completion point in the HIPC initiative, which enabled DRC to be eligible for debt alleviation. Marysse and Geenen (see n.19 above).
 26. For a list of completed projects, see Jansson (n. 23 above), p.156.
 27. For a discussion of the reasons for Exim Bank's withdrawal and its implications, see Jansson (see n.23 above), pp.155–8.
 28. Global Witness (see n.21 above), p.4.
 29. A number of authors point to the complexity of Chinese involvement in Africa. See, for instance, Deborah Brautigam, *The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; Giles Mohan and Marcus Power, 'New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese Engagement', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.35, No.115, 2008, pp.23–42; Bates Gill and James Reilly, 'The Tenuous Hold of China Inc. in Africa', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No.3, 2007, pp.37–52.
 30. See Johanna Jansson, 'Views from the "Periphery": The Manifold Reflections of China's Rise in the DR Congo', in X. Li and S.F. Christensen, (eds), *The Rise of China: The Impact on Semi-periphery and Periphery Countries*, Aalborg: Aalborg University Press, 2012, pp.182–3.
 31. Dzaka-Kikouta estimates that before the global financial crisis there were approximately 5,000 Chinese who were resident in Lubumbashi in Katanga. This figure went down to 1,000 by May 2009. Dzaka-Kikouta (see n.18 above), pp.217–18.
 32. Author interview with EU official, Goma, DRC, 13 January 2012.
 33. See Dzaka-Kikouta (see n.18 above), p. 214–15.
 34. As Jansson points out, even the Chinese Exim Bank, which uses credit lines to secure business for Chinese firms and facilitate the export of Chinese goods, has similar aims to other national export credit agencies. Jansson (see n.23 above), p.154.
 35. Author interview with Chinese Ambassador to Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda, 11 January 2012.
 36. Author interview with EU official, Brussels, Belgium, 27 March 2013.
 37. Unpublished internal EU document, 2013.
 38. Emma Mawdsley, Laura Savage and Sung-Mi Kim, 'A 'Post-Aid World'? Paradigm Shift in Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation at the 2011 Busan High Level Forum', *The Geographical Journal*, 2013, doi: 10.1111/j.1475-4959.2012.00490.x.
 39. For an argument claiming that China is not an exceptional actor in foreign aid, see Arjan de Haan and Ward Warmerdam, 'New Donors and Old Practices: The Role of China in the Multilateral System', in Hany Besada and Shannon Kindornay (eds), *Multilateral Development Cooperation in a Changing Global Order*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp.215–40.
 40. For instance, Jonathan Holslag and Sara van Hoeymissen say that on security issues 'there will be no convergence in terms of policies in the foreseeable future' and that China's contribution to UN peacekeeping missions provides China with an opportunity to gain military experience, collect intelligence and guard economic interests. Jonathan Holslag and Sara van Hoeymissen, *The Limits of Socialization: The Search for EU–China Cooperation towards Security Challenges in Africa*, Brussels: Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies, 2010. p.11.

41. Roger Mac Ginty, 'Hybrid Peace: The Interaction between Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peace', *Security Dialogue*, Vol.41, No.4, 2010, p.395.
42. Miwa Hirono and Marc Lanteigne, 'Introduction: China and UN Peacekeeping', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.18, No.3, June 2011, pp.250-1. See also Yin He, 'China's Changing Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations', Asia Paper, Institute for Security and Development Policy, July 2007; Stefan Stähle, 'China's Shifting Attitude towards United Nations Peacekeeping Operations', *The China Quarterly*, Vol.195, 2008, pp.631-55.
43. Mohan and Power (see n.29 above), p.37.
44. Author interview with Chinese Ambassador to Rwanda, Kigali, Rwanda, 11 January 2012. See also discussion in Jerker Hellström, 'China's Role in the Democratic Republic of Congo', unpublished paper, 2010.
45. See also Sarah Raine, 'China's Africa Challenges', Adelphi Paper, 49, p.404, 2009.
46. Jansson (see n.19 above), pp.16-17.
47. Hirono and Lanteigne argue that China's contribution to UN peacekeeping is related to how the Chinese government sees its international standing (see n.42 above), p.246.
48. This figure has remained reasonably constant since China began contributing to the UN mission in the DRC (at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml).
49. See also, International Crisis Group, 'China's Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping', *Asia Report* 166, 17 April 2009; Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, 'China's Expanding Role in Peacebuilding: Prospects and Policy Implications', SIPRI Policy Paper 25, 2009; Saferworld, *China's Growing Role in Peace and Security*, January 2011; Wu Zhengyu and Ian Taylor, 'From Refusal to Engagement: Chinese Contributions to Peacekeeping in Africa', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol.29, No.2, 2011, pp.137-54.
50. Former Chinese Special Envoy to Africa Liu Guijin believes that China may send combat troops to UN peacekeeping missions in the future. Telephone interview with the author, 10 May 2013.
51. Yan Meng and Yao Chun, '16th Chinese Peacekeeping Force to Congo (K) Sets Out', China Military Online, 9 August 2013 (at: <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90786/8358395.html>).
52. UN Security Council Resolution 2098 (S/RES/2098 (2013)), 28 March 2013.
53. See statement by Li Baodung, Representative of China to the Security Council (at: www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10964.doc.htm).
54. International Crisis Group, 'Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda', Africa Briefing, No.73, 8 April 2010.
55. 'Nkunda's Anti-Beijing Card', *Africa-Asia Confidential*, Vol.2, No.2, December 2008 (at: www.africa-asia-confidential.com/article/id/170/Nkunda%27s_anti-Beijing_card).
56. Interestingly, in recalling this meeting, Liu Guijin commented on the longstanding links between China and the DRC, noting that President Kabila was trained in China. This feeds into the Chinese narrative of well-established connections and solidarity between the two countries. Telephone interview with the author, 10 May 2013.
57. Negotiations between Rwanda and the DRC were already at an advanced stage. A few days after Liu Guijin's visit, Rwanda and the DRC reached an agreement. In March 2009 a peace agreement between the Congolese government and the CNDP was signed. Laurent Nkunda was removed as CNDP leader and placed under house arrest in Rwanda.
58. Oliver Richmond and Ioannis Tellidis, 'The BRICS And International Peacebuilding and State-building', NOREF Report, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, January 2013.
59. There are 24 Chinese military advisers in Kamina conducting training for the FARDC. China will train members of battalion 621 and 622 as part of broader security sector reform. The plan is that South Africa, the US, Belgium and France will conduct training for other FARDC battalions in other locations. EUSEC, Presentation on FARDC reform (Powerpoint slides), April 2013.
60. See Saferworld, (see n.49 above). See also UN Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2009 (S/2009/603). In 2010, China and the DRC announced a \$1.5 million military aid deal.
61. See for instance, Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, Heroism in Colonial Africa*, Boston, MA: Houghton, 1998; Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, *The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985; John Clark, 'Zaire: The Bankruptcy of the Extractive State', in Villalon and Huxtable (eds), *The African State at a Critical Juncture*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997; Michael Nest, with Francois Grignon and Emizet Kisangani, *The Democratic Republic of Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005.
62. See Timothy Raeymaekers and Koen Vlassenroot, 'Kivu's Intractable Security Conundrum,' *African Affairs*, Vol.108, No.432, 2009, pp.475-84.

63. Mwanke was also centrally important in negotiations between Congo and Rwanda. He died in a plane crash in February 2012, which some observers believe may have been a contributing factor to the re-escalation of tensions between Congo and Rwanda.
64. Theodore Trefon, 'Uncertainty and Powerlessness in Congo 2012,' *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.40, No.135, 2013, p.146. International donors have contributed approximately half of the entire state budget in recent years.
65. Denis Tull, 'Troubled State-building in the DR Congo: The Challenge from the Margins', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.48, No.4, 2010, pp.643–61.
66. See, for instance, Paddon and Lacaille (see n.14 above); International Crisis Group, 'Eastern Congo: Why Stabilization Failed', 4 October 2012.
67. Séverine Autesserre, 'Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended Consequences', *African Affairs*, Vol.111, No.443, 2012, pp.202–22; Theodore Trefon, *Congo Masquerade: The Political Culture of Aid Inefficiency and Reform Failure*, London: Zed Books, 2011.
68. Theodore Trefon, 'Public Service Provision in a Failed State: Looking Beyond Predation in the Democratic Republic of Congo', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.36, No.119, 2009, pp.9–21; Maria Eriksson Baaz and Ola Olsson, 'Feeding the Horse: Unofficial Economic Activities within the Police Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo', *African Security*, Vol.4, No.4, 2011, pp.223–41.
69. Author interview with official at UN mission, Goma, DRC, 13 January 2012.
70. See Baaz and Olsson's discussion of the police force (see n.68 above).
71. See, for instance, Human Rights Watch, *You will be Punished: Attacks on Civilians in Eastern Congo*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009.
72. Trefon (see n. 64 above), pp.141–51.
73. Author's translation from French. Ambassador Wang Yingwu, 1 January 2012 (at: cd.chineseembassy.org/fra/dszc/t892104.htm).
74. See also Timothy Raeymaekers, 'Why History Repeats Itself in Eastern DR Congo', E-IR info, 20 December 2012.