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**A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN PENETRATION AND AFRICAN REACTION IN
THE KASAI REGION OF ZAIRE, 1880-1908**

by

Daisy S. Martens

B.A., University of Manitoba, 1958

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department
of
History**

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ABSTRACT

A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN PENETRATION AND AFRICAN REACTION IN THE KASAI REGION OF ZAIRE, 1880-1908

The thesis examines the extent of European penetration into the Kasai area of Zaire during the Congo Free State period (1880-1908), as well as examining the effect of this penetration on an African society which had been politically, economically and socially affected by the long-distance trade across Central Africa, one branch of which reached into the Kasai. After examining the historical background to the creation of the Congo Free State, the thesis is divided into three parts: the first consists of a study of State penetration and the development of an administrative policy; the second examines economic development as a result of the intrusion of various trading companies; and the third deals with the extent and effect of missionary endeavors in the area. A final section draws the preceding three parts together to examine the consequences of their close association with one another and with Africans in a relatively small geographical area.

The principal issues raised in the thesis were investigated by means of archival work on the records of Government departments and Compagnie du Kasai files, both in Belgium and in Zaire. These basic sources were supplemented with various manuscript sources and oral evidence.

The thesis demonstrates that early administrative praxis was based on King Leopold's determination to secure short-term returns on the large sums of money he had invested in the Congo venture. Thus a return was sought through coercive and monopolistic policies, specifically by the State becoming a share holder in large companies such as the Compagnie du Kasai formed in 1901. To a certain extent the occupation of the Kasai area, therefore, became a joint project of the State and the C.K. The nature and impact of the missionary factor, as the third agency in the area, stemmed not only from its evangelizing effort, but also from its interaction with the State, the trading companies and other missionary societies.

The abusive practices of both the State and the C.K. drew the attention of the world to the Kasai where the Presbyterian missionary, William McCutchan Morrison, played a vital role in the fight to free the Congo from King Leopold's rule. This was accomplished, in part, with the assistance of the Congo Reform Association after its formation in 1904.

African response to the European presence in the Kasai was both receptive and resistant. Europeans received the support of African leaders either because the latter wished to increase their own power, as in the case of Kalamba, or because they required protection to maintain

their power for which they offered their services to the State in return, as in the case of the Zappo Zap. Resistance to Europeans was basically twofold. First, the advent of European trade from the north conflicted with the trade from the south, resulting in resistance to European occupation of the south; and second, Africans resisted European cultural impositions in areas where a stable African religious and political structure existed, as among the Bakuba.

Effective occupation of the area required military strength but, because there were more pressing demands on military personnel, such as the Arab campaign, the need to secure the Katanga, and Leopold's push towards the Nile, State forces in the Kasai remained small and relatively ineffective. As long as the occupation was ineffective, the riches of the area continued to pass through the southern trade routes. In general, African societies were able to accept the European presence where it served their interests, and were able to resist where it did not do so, a position which continued to exist beyond 1908.

Finally the thesis demonstrates that, while the Kasai in 1881 was responding to indirect European influence exerted along the trade routes, the European presence in the Kasai had little direct impact, even in the north, until 1885. From 1881-1895 the initial European presence and influence was highly circumscribed because of military weakness and more pressing problems elsewhere. After the revolt of the Lulubourg garrison

in 1895, and until 1908, European control became tighter with more direct influence being exerted in the north, while control and influence remained marginal in the south: indeed, European penetration was not fully effective in the latter region until the 1920s.

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I wish to thank Dr. Jan Vansina who provided the initial topic for this study and gave me generous advice; Mr. Nestor Mortier, the director of the C.K., who gave access to the company's archives; Dr. Peter Kup, under whose direction the thesis was begun; and to express especial thanks to Professor Philip Stigger for his suggestions, criticisms, analytical insights and constant moral support which brought the thesis to completion; the many Catholic and Protestant missionaries, in Belgium and Zaire, for their hours of discussion and travel assistance; and the many other people who have assisted me.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT AND FOOTNOTES

ABIR	:	Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company
A.E. (A.A.)	:	Archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo et du Ministère des Colonies (Archives-Africaines)
A.F.	:	Archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
A.I.A.	:	African International Association
A.I.C.	:	Association Internationale du Congo
A.P.C.M.	:	American Presbyterian Congo Mission
A.P.S.	:	Aborigines Protection Society
B.C.K.	:	Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga
B.M.S.	:	Baptist Missionary Society
C.F.S.	:	Congo Free State
Citas	:	Congo Transport Company
C.K.	:	Compagnie du Kasai
C.R.A.	:	Congo Reform Association
C.S.K.	:	Comité Spécial du Katanga
N.A.H.V.	:	Nieuwe Afrikaanse Handelsvennootschap
S.A.B.	:	Société Anonyme Belge pour le commerce du Haut-Congo
S.A.P.V.	:	Société Anonyme des Produits Végétaux
S.E.E.	:	Sanford Exploring Expedition
W.I.M.	:	Westcott Inland Mission

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines the first phase of the colonial intrusion into the Kasai District of Zaire, the former Congo Free State and the Belgian Congo. Although the study essentially deals with the years 1880-1908, which encompasses the Berlin West African Conference and the Belgian annexation of the Congo, those pre-colonial trade patterns spanning Central Africa, which extended into the Kasai and determined the pathway for the first European penetrations into the area are examined also, since Luso-African trade was a dominant factor in political and economic activity throughout the period.

The study area of the Kasai District lies in the southern part of Zaire below the 4th parallel, between the 21st and 24th meridian and extends to the Angolan border. In physical geographic terms, it is the area drained by the Kasai and Sankuru Rivers and their tributaries (see Map 1). The hydrographic system of the Kasai was one of its most important features since it provided a potential northern access route to compete against the southern trade route. The population ranged from the highly centralized and largely self-sufficient Kuba people, occupying the area between the Sankuru and Lulua Rivers, to the decentralized Luba and Lulua who lived in small chiefdoms or under independent clan groupings. Further south, and extending into Angola, were the Lunda who, ironically enough,

became an object of European interest at a time when the Lunda kingdom was being overruled by Cokwe invaders from Angola. These same Cokwe, along with other peoples in the Kasai, resisted eventual European occupation well into the 20th century and, indeed, for a further two decades beyond the time-period for this study.

The microcosmic approach, or the study of a specific area such as the Kasai, has some particular advantages over the study of the Congo as a whole. Since it is a border area which shared a boundary with Portuguese Angola, it is possible to examine the effect that the arbitrary fixing of boundaries had on African populations divided by European action. The Cokwe peoples, who had moved into the Kasai in the second half of the nineteenth century, subsequently found the boundary to be to their advantage in trading with the peoples of the Kasai, and showed a total disregard for European statesmen's paper divisions of territory.

Study of the Kasai area per se also reveals how complex were relationships between competing groups, all vying against one another to achieve their own interests. Africans were zealously guarding their lucrative trade in slaves, guns and other articles between the Kasai and Angola while, to the east, Arabs and their African allies under Ngongo Lutete were attempting to break into the gun trade with the Cokwe, once Ngongo's eastern sources were cut off by German activity in the Mrima opposite Zanzibar. The threatened Arab advance stimulated

European colonial activity specifically by the establishment of a post at Lusambo in the Kasai in order to drive the Arabs back and move into the Katanga. Thus, in the Kasai, Europeans became a buffer between the Cokwe and the Arabs, and earned the praise of the western world for a successful campaign against the Arab slave trade, particularly since the western world was not interested in the quality of the Congo State's administration in the 1890s.

A further advantage to this type of study is that it provides an opportunity to examine the interaction of European groups, and the reactions of African groups to them. Representatives of political, commercial and religious organizations all arrived in 1886 and all three were to exert influence on the region. However, each intruding European group was weak and extended its influence by a series of local actions, provoking local African responses. The opportunity is thus provided, through examination of these incidents, of studying African reactions at a local level which, in all probability, was the only way in which most Africans could view most incidents. The European intrusion, for such Africans, required a reaction by them to the dealings of State officers, traders and missionaries, not to the policy conceived by Leopold II and his administrators in Brussels. This study, therefore, focuses on the three-fold penetration of the Kasai by political, commercial and religious representatives, against a background of pre-colonial trade and its impact on the political and economic life of the peoples of the Kasai.

4

A further advantage to studying micropolitics in a district is that it helps to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the Congo Free State under Leopold, and to bring them into sharper focus. Leopold's desire to establish a colony in Africa, manifested when he created the African International Association, became an urge to acquire the Congo Basin only after Stanley arrived at the Congo mouth in 1877. This led to initial, and limited, State involvement in the Kasai. However, real State interest in the Kasai developed only when it became necessary to use the Kasai as a springboard to secure the Katanga against both the Arabs and the British South Africa Company and, simultaneously, to divert trade in the Kasai away from Angola and towards Boma.

The Kasai was, therefore, effectively occupied in the sense that sufficient control was exercised over the district to permit the Congo Free State to consolidate its position in the Katanga and to check trade penetration from Angola. The State was too weak to do more than to establish officials, supported by small military garrisons, at Leubo, Luluabourg and Lusambo initially and, throughout the period under study, it was unable to exert its influence throughout the district. Since its influence was limited, it was equally unable to redirect trade completely towards Boma: while some progress had been made by 1908, the links with Angola were not severed until the 1920s, for only then was the central government powerful enough to overcome African opposition.

The military weakness of the State, combined with the strength of local African opposition to its policies, forced the State to seek allies wherever it could find them. This meant that the State was compelled to make extensive use of African auxiliaries and to be diplomatic in its relations with cohesive African groups, while allowing such Africans, and others, consciously or unconsciously to manipulate its officials to subserve African ends. At the same time, military weakness also forced the State to seek assistance from European commercial and missionary interests which were, in many respects, as ineffective as the State.

European companies came into the Kasai, a designated free trade zone, because they were attracted by rubber. The wealth which might be drawn from this resource, in the market conditions which existed in the early years of this century, attracted Leopold as the financial problems of his sovereign State multiplied. The result was that the companies were amalgamated in 1901 to create the Compagnie du Kasai, an enterprise in which the State not only held a half-interest but over which it exercised managerial control. The advantage to the C.K. was that it acquired a de facto monopoly. However, it is doubtful whether the State benefitted for, on the one hand, while the State was able to use the C.K. to extend its influence over a wider area and, where State posts did not exist, to employ the company to collect tax on its behalf; on the other hand, the State reaped the ill-consequences of the C.K.'s trade practices, which led Africans to murder central government servants and, in the case of the Bakuba, provoked a major rebellion against the State.


Catholic and Protestant missions came to the Kasai to harvest souls and to establish an indigenous Church: both missions, therefore, established permanent stations in 1891, the Catholics at Luluabourg and the Protestants at Luebo. The Catholic Scheutists were in many respects the religious arm of the State, since they were actively encouraged by the State to assist it in carrying out its civilizing mission which, in the period under review, involved causing Africans to produce exports or to provide the State with labour. Scheutist centres in particular were also expected to reinforce the administrative control, however limited, of the State and of its later alter ego, the C.K. The State did not entertain such high expectations of the American Presbyterian Congo Mission, but still relied on that body for assistance in civilizing the Kasai and controlling its population. The State's reliance on missions was both limited and variable, while the missions benefitted according to the State's assessment of the value of any one specific mission's assistance. This ensured that a mission acquired slavers' captives to convert and mission sites on which to place them.

Yet another advantage to be gained from a micro-study of the Kasai is that the Congo Reform Movement also is brought into sharper focus, for it is not only possible to indicate the range of local factors which attracted international attention to the Kasai, but also to demonstrate that some elements which provoked external concern arose from the fundamental weakness of the State and its allies. The State had to use the C.K., which

had to rely on the Scheutists, who had theological differences with the Presbyterians. The Presbyterians were inextricably involved in Kuba dynastic problems, while theologically hostile to the Scheutists and therefore suspicious of their rivals' relations with the State and the C.K., to whom the Kuba were hostile.

There are thus three major reasons why it is advantageous to undertake a micro-study of the Kasai District. Firstly, such a study relates European political, commercial and religious penetration to local indigenous African conditions in an area where the impact of pre-colonial trade had been considerable while, incidentally, establishing relative European weakness and equally relative African strength. Secondly, it then becomes possible to identify how European weakness forced the State to resort to expediency, thereby allowing Africans to manipulate intruding European agencies. Thirdly, one can then identify how the expedients, which were adopted by the State, generated local European and African responses which impacted upon the international movement for reform, and led ultimately to Belgian annexation. What emerges most forcefully from this study, however, is that European penetration was gradual, for European control was an illusion before 1886: it was limited to certain areas in the north by 1901 and, even by 1908 when part of the south was effectively dominated, large areas were still not even influenced by the State, let alone controlled by it.

The story of the Kasai, related in the ensuing chapters, is essentially a tale of limited and uncertain European penetration, rather than an imperialistic epic, and it suggests that the wider story of the Congo in this period was essentially the same.



1. ZAIRE AND LOCATION OF STUDY AREA

CHAPTER I

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONGO FREE STATE

The colonial ambitions of King Leopold II of the Belgians began in the early 1860's but his role as constitutional monarch prevented him from fully realizing them. By 1875 his attempts to gain territorial possessions in the Far East had failed and his attention was directed to the possibility of acquisitions in Africa.¹ Consequently, in 1876 Leopold summoned the Brussels Geographical Conference which brought together Europeans prominent in the fields of politics, exploration and humanitarianism, as well as representatives from various European Geographical Societies.² Under Leopold's leadership the conference established the African International Association which had as its aim the opening of the unexplored area from the mouth of the Congo to the Great Lakes by providing a chain of commercial and scientific stations from Luanda to Zanzibar.³ Although the African International Association undertook several expeditions from the east coast of Africa⁴, it was Henry Morton Stanley's successful descent of the Congo River that drew Leopold's attention specifically to the possibility of opening the Congo Basin.⁵

Stanley led an expedition, in Leopold's service, sponsored by the Comité d'Etudes du Haut-Congo which the king created in 1878 with a view

to investigating the commercial possibilities of the Congo Basin and, more particularly, the possibility of constructing a railway around the cataract area between Stanley Pool and the coast at Matadi.⁶ In 1882 the Comité was replaced by the Association Internationale du Congo (A.I.C.) which was not international at all, but it served as a convenient instrument for Leopold to achieve his ambitions. With other European powers competing in the Congo area and with Germany's recent entry into the race for African colonies, the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 provided an opportunity for Leopold to play an unthreatening role as a result of his talk of the free trade and philanthropic intentions of the A.I.C.⁷ The A.I.C. emerged from the Conference as the Congo Free State (C.F.S.) or Etat Indépendant du Congo (E.I.C.) with Leopold as its sovereign, while the Congo Basin was recognized as a free trade region open to all nations.⁸

The frontiers of the new State were not totally assured by the Berlin Conference and, in the next few years, Leopold set about acquiring as much territory as possible both by making agreements with other European powers and by exploration. Most of the king's energies were directed towards establishing stations between the lower Congo and the great lakes in order to thwart French ambitions. Although the northern and eastern frontiers were settled in a series of agreements between 1885 and 1906 with England and France⁹, there were internal problems involved in meeting the obligations of the Berlin Act which included effective occupation by the

State and the ending of the Arab slave trade. In order to achieve the latter sufficient manpower was required, which the State could not obtain in its early years. Furthermore, the Berlin Act gave very little opportunity for raising revenue through taxation, which caused initial expenses to be borne by Leopold. Necessity, therefore, demanded co-operation with the Arabs who traded in the eastern third of the Congo with a centre at Stanley Falls.¹⁰

Thus it was that Tippu Tib, an Arab slave and ivory trader, entered the employ of the C.F.S. as a paid governor at Stanley Falls in 1887 in exchange for stopping the slave trade.¹¹ Although Tippu Tib served the State well in providing a period of calm in which time Leopold could gather resources to conduct expeditions into the interior, he was not successful in ending the slave trade. By 1890 he had lost much of his Arab support as a result of his pro-European position and he withdrew to the east coast. By this time additional State expeditions had resulted in establishing several posts and Arab assistance was no longer necessary. In fact, the Arab presence was undesirable because of the competition it provided in the ivory trade.¹²

With more European settlement in the Arab area by 1892 and the establishment of a State monopoly over ivory in order to meet financial obligations, open warfare became inevitable.¹³ When hostilities did break out in 1892, several Arab leaders defected to the C.F.S. in return for protection. One of these was Ngongo Lutete, who had his headquarters at

Ngandu on the Lomami River. At the end of the 1880s, Ngongo's advance to the west prompted the establishment of a State post at Lusambo on the upper Sankuru River in the Kasai area in 1890.¹⁴ Ngongo submitted to the State in 1891, but in September 1893 he was executed on charges of treason.¹⁵ The incident increased the warfare, but State reinforcements resulted in the final defeat of the Arabs in 1894. Ngongo's death was, however, an important factor in the soldiers' revolt in the Kasai in 1895.¹⁶

While the conflict with the Arabs was in progress the State hastened to the Katanga in order to ward off the British South Africa Company.¹⁷ Captain Paul Le Marinel, commander of the Lusambo post, led an expedition to the Katanga in 1890-1891 when, in his haste to reach the Katanga, he missed an opportunity to establish friendly relations with the Kaniok people which could have helped in the occupation of the Kasai area.¹⁸ All in all, it took two years and three other expeditions before Leopold secured the Katanga. In order to finance the Delcommune, Stairs and Bia expeditions, Leopold in 1891 granted proprietary rights to a private company, the Compagnie du Katanga, which became the Comité Spécial du Katanga in 1900.¹⁹

The king's strategy was successful. In the process of claiming the territory his agents killed Msiri, the Nyamwezi ruler of the area, who had earlier declined an invitation to place his territory under the protection of the British South Africa Company. With Msiri dead, Stairs

declared the territory annexed to the Congo Free State.²⁰

When France and Portugal recognized the A.I.C. in 1885 the territorial limits had included the Katanga and the Kasai regions. As has been noted, when the Katanga became threatened, Leopold moved to occupy it. As far as the Kasai was concerned, the treaty was vague in defining the border because of the absence of natural boundaries and insufficient European knowledge of the geography of the area.²¹ Until 1886 the Congo Free State had no reason to fear Portuguese intrusion into the southern area and besides, Leopold was too busy consolidating his power on the upper Congo to be unduly concerned about the Kasai. The posts of Luluabourg (1884) and Luebo (1885) had been established in order to penetrate the south, but that was all.²²

In the meantime Portuguese expeditions pushed further inland into the region of the upper Kwango River and as far east as Msiri's domain. The most prominent explorer in the Kasai area was Major Henrique Dias de Carvalho who travelled to the Lunda capital, intending that the area would come under Portuguese sovereignty. As a result of these expeditions, the Portuguese government decided it could claim the Lunda area, since the Congo Free State had not achieved effective occupation south of the sixth parallel. Leopold took advantage of Portugal's weak bargaining position and, in 1890, he sent Lieutenant Dhanis into the Kwango area to create the new district of East Kwango.²³ Dhanis then moved toward the Lunda area where a small Portuguese expedition

could not prevent him from claiming the area for the C.F.S.²⁴ The boundary agreement between the C.F.S. and Portugal was signed in 1891 and gave Portugal the area west of the Kasai while the area to the east was secured by the C.F.S.²⁵

Although the Kasai area fell under C.F.S. control, there was no effective occupation for some time to come. The border agreements with Portugal were essential in order to allow Leopold to make his claims on the Katanga. Limited personnel did not allow the State to occupy a relatively unimportant area like the Kasai when the rumoured mineral-rich Katanga was in danger of passing under British control. Furthermore, the campaigns against the Arabs and the need to establish State posts in the upper Congo area also diverted personnel and funds away from the Kasai.

Leopold's administration of his new State was shaped by two conflicting objectives. At the Berlin Conference his declared aim was to end the slave trade, to allow free trade and to spread Christianity throughout the area. These humanitarian goals became clouded by the harsh realities of the need for funds to extend the State's occupation and influence. Because of financial difficulties, and because the State belonged to Leopold, the administrative structure was relatively simple at the outset. As time passed changes were effected by decree but all powers remained concentrated in his hands until 1908 when the State became a Belgian colony. Every aspect of the new State's policy was directed from

Brussels, where the central government consisted of three departments: Foreign Affairs and Justice under Baron Edmund Van Eetvelde; the Interior under Colonel Strauch; and Finance under Hubert Van Neuss. Each head of department was an Administrator-General until September 1891, when they became Secretaries of State. Three years later, in September 1894, the organization was changed and Van Eetvelde became the only Secretary of State with a Secretary-General, over each of the three departments, under him. When Van Eetvelde resigned in 1901, the Secretaries-General, acting together, became directly responsible to Leopold.²⁶

Local administration in the Congo was controlled from Boma where a Governor-General resided after 1887.²⁷ The Governor-General executed the decrees and decisions of the central government in Brussels while having the power to issue temporary laws or ordinances to meet emergencies. He was assisted by a Deputy Governor-General, a State Inspector, four Directors in charge of specific departments, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Force Publique. As territory was acquired, so the Congo was divided into administrative districts.²⁸ Each district was headed by a Commissaire du District representing the Governor-General who also appointed him. One or more assistants were appointed to help each Commissaire. The Commissaire's responsibilities were extensive and at the end of each month he was expected to submit a detailed report to the Governor-General on the political, commercial and missionary activities in the district. The maintenance of peace and order required that a Commissaire should first

establish friendly relations with local Africans and then induce them to submit to the State and to obey its laws. This involved much travelling and ultimately required the creation of secteurs, each under a chef de secteur, and, eventually, the subdivision of secteurs into postes, each under a chef de poste, all of whom were Europeans.²⁹ However this ideal pattern was rarely achieved because of staff shortages. To facilitate the work of the chef de poste, a decree of 1891 established the chefferie system by providing that invested chiefs, that is, chiefs or African leaders whose authority over certain peoples was recognized by the State, might provide such assistance as the chef de poste required.³⁰

The judicial system was simple and involved two branches. The first branch, was the Tribunal of First Instance at Boma, until 1906 the only body competent to deal with civil and criminal cases involving Europeans. This tribunal consisted of a judge with several assistants and a court clerk. The other branch involved territorial tribunals, theoretically established in each of the districts with jurisdiction over the district concerned. The Court of Appeal for the territorial tribunals was located at Boma: it consisted of a president, two judges, a State prosecutor and a court clerk and heard appeals from the territorial tribunals and the Tribunal of First Instance. The State prosecutor conducted cases before this court at Boma whereas, in the territorial appeal courts, there were deputy public prosecutors. All judicial officials were appointed by the Governor-General.³¹

Although these courts were intended for Europeans, they were theoretically, also the proper courts for African criminal cases. However, in areas where European tribunals did not exist or were located at centres far removed from the scene of the crime, it was legitimate to allow the accused to be dealt with by his chief or the local chef de poste. In civil matters the same conditions applied. In theory Africans could take their complaints to the European court, however, the absence of a local legal system in many cases prevented this and the cases were taken to African chiefs. Sometimes these chiefs were outsiders imposed on the people and justice was meted out according to the wishes of the local State official.³²

To enforce law and order, the State required a military police force and the Force Publique was provided for by decree in October 1885, but it was not fully organized until 1888, when Captain Léon Roget became its first commander. In the beginning, it was difficult to find Congolese willing to serve as soldiers, so men were recruited from other parts of Africa. In 1885 an attempt was made to recruit among the Bangala although, by 1889, about 100 Congolese soldiers were in the Force Publique.³³ The numbers increased rapidly so that by 1891 there were 702.³⁴ Its numbers were further augmented by recruits from the captives and slaves the Arabs left in their retreat, who were chiefly members of the groups surrounding the area the Arabs had dominated. For the Kasai district soldiers were supposed to be trained at Kinshasa, one of the

Congo's three training camps; however, the campaigns against the Arabs decimated the troops and local training became necessary. The district had a garrison in both administrative centres, Lusambo and Luluabourg.

By a decree of 1891, recruitment by both voluntary engagement and conscription was provided for. In practice, a local chief was obliged to supply a certain number of recruits, which the European officers added to by recruiting redeemed slaves, prisoners taken in expeditions and captives freed by them. Those sent to training camp remained there for 18 months and then served for five years, followed by two years in the reserve.³⁵ Pay was twenty-one centimes a day, with a third held back until discharge.³⁶ At the end of their service, soldiers were repatriated at the State's expense, and then frequently settled in villages formed near European settlements.³⁷

The financing of the Force Publique and the other projects which King Leopold envisaged led to serious financial problems. Leopold regarded the Congo simply as a financial investment and himself not only as its sovereign but as its owner. Free trade had been guaranteed by the Berlin Conference and traders were encouraged to locate on the upper Congo where land grants were made from lands considered vacant; that is, land not occupied by Africans at the time, although the term "vacant" was never clearly defined. By 1890 the king's personal resources were exhausted and he needed new sources of revenue to combat Arab expansion in the eastern Congo, to advance further into unoccupied areas, and to

construct the Matadi - Stanley Pool railway in order to draw off the country's riches. Although there were no attempts to create a State monopoly before 1890, an English missionary noted in May 1890 that State agents had begun to collect ivory and to receive a commission on the amount obtained.³⁸

Further financial strains caused Leopold to issue a secret decree in September 1891 reserving the districts of Aruwimi and Ubangi-Uele for exclusive exploitation by the State.³⁹ A few months later, in 1892, circulars were sent out stating that Africans in those areas were prohibited from trading with commercial companies and from selling any products of the areas so defined. A further decree of October 1892 divided the Congo into three zones: the first, the Domaine privé, about half the area of the State, where the State had a monopoly of exploitation; the second, an area nominally open to free trade; the third, an area closed to free trade with trading rights restricted to specific companies.⁴⁰ In 1896 Leopold set aside an additional area, called the Domaine de la Couronne, around Lake Leopold II. Both the Domaine privé and the Domaine de la Couronne were exploited by the State with the profits from the former going to the benefit of the State government and the profits from the latter going directly to the king, with which he sponsored an extensive public works programme in Belgium.⁴¹

In the second area, which was nominally open to free trade, private companies and traders took advantage of these provisions to establish trading

stations or factories. The Kasai basin was the only part of the Congo to which this free trade designation applied. When competition between the companies and the State agents proved to be to the latter's disadvantage, the companies were induced to amalgamate in 1901 to form the Compagnie du Kasai, in which the State owned a half share.⁴²

The remainder of the Congo was developed mainly through concessionary companies in which the State owned at least half the shares. In 1892 the Anglo-Belgian India Rubber Company (A.B.I.R.) under the direction of an Englishman, Colonel North, was granted rights to exploit the land in the basins of the Lopori and Maringa. In the same year a concession was granted to the Société anversoise du Commerce du Congo (Anversoise) in the basin of the Mongala.⁴³ In the Kwango area the Comptoir Commercial Congolais received a concession in 1895. Other concessions included those granted to railway companies such as the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Congo, to construct the lower Congo railway; in 1902 the Compagnie des Chemins de Fer du Congo supérieur aux Grands Lacs africains was formed to construct a railway between Stanley-Falls and the upper lakes and in 1906 an agreement was signed with the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo au Katanga (B.C.K.) to build a railway from the Katanga to the lower Congo via the Kasai. For the Katanga itself, the Compagnie du Katanga was formed in 1891.⁴⁴ This commercial enterprise resulted in a rapid rise in revenue. Excluding the Kasai, general C.F.S. production increased from 240 tons of rubber worth 964,000 francs in 1893 to 6,000 tons worth 44 million francs in 1901.⁴⁵

Although the King's financial problems were eased, the concessionary system required African labour. In order to compel the African to work, a labour tax or corvée was imposed in 1892 requiring each male adult to pay from six to twenty-four francs annually which, due to the absence of money, was paid in labour. The labour included collecting rubber, supplying foodstuffs, clearing land and doing whatever the local officials demanded. Each official or trader (in areas where company officials administered as well as traded) had the authority to determine the amount of labour required to meet the monetary imposition. Frequently armed Africans were employed to supervise the gathering of rubber and, with their almost unlimited power, they became tyrants.⁴⁶

A decree of 1903 introduced a new labour law whereby Africans were obliged to work forty hours a month for the State for which they were supposed to be paid at the market wage. The Commissaire du District was authorized to determine what labour was to be performed. In some cases it consisted of collecting rubber, where the time spent going to and from the forests was not included in the working time; in other cases it consisted of supplying foodstuffs where the value allotted to the produce was low in order to ensure an abundant supply to the State.⁴⁷

If the labour allocations were not met by Africans, State officials frequently punished whole villages by demanding an additional quota of rubber or produce, or in some cases, arresting the village leader and keeping him as a hostage until the demands were met.⁴⁸ For the African,

these labour requirements meant almost continuous servitude and deprived him of time to tend his own fields or look after his own domestic needs.

It was only a matter of time before rumours about proceedings in the Congo reached Europe and the United States. As early as 1890, British and American missionaries in the Congo sent home reports of cruelties being practised upon Africans, although members of the British Baptist Missionary Society were initially reticent about condemning State action, since Leopold had favoured that mission in particular and members of its executive were on good terms with him.⁴⁹ By 1895 B.M.S. missionary, George Grenfell, reported that African soldiers employed by State agents were responsible for burning villages and attacking villagers.⁵⁰ Grenfell was then certain that the State would correct the abuses and therefore recommended silence for the time being.

British interest in Congo affairs was stirred with the execution of Charles Stokes, an English merchant in the Congo,⁵¹ and the writings of H.R. Fox Bourne, secretary of the Aborigines Protection Society.⁵² A prominent liberal Member of Parliament, Sir Charles Dilke, supported the A.P.S. and raised the Congo question in the British House of Commons in 1897; however, the government did not respond.⁵³ As it turned out, it was neither Fox Bourne nor Sir Charles Dilke who were able to force the British Government to act, but Edmund Dene Morel.⁵⁴ Morel was suited to the task. As a clerk in the Liverpool office of Elder-Dempster for some time, he

had become familiar first with West African affairs and later with Congolese affairs. After reading the reports of maladministration and studying the Congolese trade statistics, he became convinced that Africans were getting very little in return for the resources leaving the country. Early in 1903 he began writing articles which publicly criticized the Congolese administration. Later the same year, the House of Commons debated a motion that the British Government should consult with the other signatory Powers of the Berlin Act with a view to taking some action to end abuses in the Congo. This marked the beginning of the Congo reform campaign, as the British Government sent a circular to the other signatory Powers on the question, and conducted its own official inquiry.⁵⁵

The evidence was supplied by Roger Casement who arrived in Congo in 1900 as the first British consul.⁵⁶ In December 1903 he returned to England with a report which detailed the atrocities of the Congo State administration and which made a deep impression in England when it was published in February 1904. Together with Morel, Casement formed the Congo Reform Association in March 1904 to influence all mankind against the Leopoldian system. Morel travelled extensively in the interest of the new Association and in 1904 he visited the United States, where he was assisted by William Morrison, a Presbyterian missionary from the Kasai area, in establishing an American branch of the C.R.A. in Boston.⁵⁷


Increased international agitation and severe criticisms from certain sectors within Belgium itself forced the king to appoint a Commission of Enquiry to report on conditions in the Congo between October 1904 and March 1905.⁵⁸ From the outset, there was suspicion among the king's opponents that an unbiased report would not result from the Commission's work. However, when the commissioners returned, they confirmed Casement's findings and made recommendations for reform in all aspects of administration in the Congo.⁵⁹

Leopold responded to the report by announcing a series of decrees in June 1906 designed to implement the Commission's recommendations. The decrees provided for the recognition of African chiefs and the establishment of chefferies along traditional lines as much as possible. It further prohibited the use of armed soldiers for the collection of taxes and restricted military operations to the suppression of revolts. Although money was to be introduced, payment in barter-goods was to continue. Concessionary companies were no longer to be allowed to levy and collect taxes. Provision was made for the number of State inspectors to be increased to supervise the execution of the decrees and to protect the population.⁶⁰

On paper, certain abuses were eliminated, but the foundation of the rubber system did not change. The African was still obliged to work forty hours a month to produce rubber or whatever else was demanded. Furthermore, money had not yet been introduced into the interior of the

Congo so that the tax of not less than 6 francs and not more than 24 francs per person could be paid only in kind, while the Commissaire du District was responsible for deciding the equivalents in produce or labour.⁶¹

International concern and the resulting publicity, was a major contributory factor in the annexation of the Congo by Belgium in 1908. The Congo Reform Association had played a vital role in both the takeover and the eventual amelioration of conditions in the Congo. By the time British recognition was given to Belgian annexation in June 1913, the C.R.A. was satisfied that policies in the Congo had changed and, in July 1913, the C.R.A. disbanded.⁶² The extent to which the reforms and decrees generally affected the grass roots level will be noted in the subsequent chapters, with particular reference to the Kasai area. In the meantime, however, it is necessary to set forth the pre-colonial trade pattern which existed in Central Africa and eventually drew both Europeans and Africans into the Kasai Basin.



III. THE CONGO FREE STATE DIVIDED AMONG CONCESSIONARY COMPANIES

Source: Robert Cornevin, Histoire du Congo (Paris, Editions Berger-Levrault, 1970), p. 165.

FOOTNOTES

1. Auguste Roeykens, Les débuts de l'oeuvre africaine de Léopold II (Bruxelles: Académie Royale des Sciences Coloniales, 1955), pp. 36-37, 259; Roger Anstey, Britain and the Congo in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp. 57-58. Belgian interest at this time did not extend beyond her European borders. She was now anxious to preserve her independence through neutrality, and so avoided the international involvements of a colonial power. Leopold's interests had been aroused by following the accounts of explorers like David Livingstone as in his account in Explorations dans l'intérieur de l'Afrique australe et voyages à travers le continent. De Saint-Paul de Loana à l'embouchure du Zambèze. De 1840 à 1856 (Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette et Cie., 1859); Verney Lovett Cameron from his writings of Across Africa (London, 1877), and others.
2. Anstey, p. 58; Alphonse J. Wauters, Histoire Politique du Congo Belge (Bruxelles: Pierre van Fleteren, 1911), pp. 14-15.
3. Emile Banning, L'Afrique et la Conférence Géographique de Bruxelles (Bruxelles: Librairie Européenne de C. Muquardt, 1878), p. 104; Auguste Roeykens, Leopold II et la Conférence Géographique de Bruxelles, 1876 (Bruxelles, 1956), pp. 28-29.
4. Lieutenant-Colonel Liebrechts, Léopold II, Fondateur d'Empire (Bruxelles: Lebaque, 1932), pp. 14-16. In total the A.I.A. sent out five expeditions between 1876-1883 which resulted in the founding of Karema and Mpala on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. The great loss of life and the minor accomplishments of these expeditions caused this effort to be abandoned in favour of the new prospects opened up by Stanley's journeys.
5. Henry Morton Stanley, the American journalist who became famous for finding David Livingstone, crossed the continent from Zanzibar to the Congo mouth in 1877. In 1878 Stanley agreed to enter the service of Leopold II for further expeditions on the Congo River, having failed to arouse British interest in his Congo undertakings. Ruth Slade, King Leopold's Congo: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Congo Independent State (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 21-37.

6. Anstey, Britain and the Congo, pp. 66-67, 79-80. Leopold called together representatives of financial interests in England, France, Germany, Belgium, and Holland and persuaded them to form the Comité d'Etudes du Haut-Congo to which large sums of money were subscribed. By the end of 1879 Leopold returned all non-Belgian subscriptions in a move designed to increase his commercial and political control of the Comité's activities.

7. Anstey, Britain and the Congo, pp. 66, 103-104, 158-169, 183-185; Ruth Slade, King Leopold's Congo (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 38-39. With France and Portugal as rivals in the Congo area, Leopold needed absolute power in order to realize his colonial aims. In the 1880s the British attempted to use the Portuguese to obtain dominance in the Congo by recognizing Portugal's claims to the mouth of the Congo River. However, the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1884 which detailed Portugal's claims was never ratified by England because of the opposition of British trading interests and English missionaries. France was active in the area around Stanley Pool where the French explorer, Count Savorgnan de Brazza, was making treaties with African chiefs. To counter these advances Leopold needed recognition for the A.I.C. Through the influence of Henry S. Sanford, a former American Ambassador in Brussels who was sympathetic to Leopold's projects, the U.S.A. recognized the flag of the Association (the gold star on the blue field) on April 22, 1884. France gave its recognition on April 23-24, 1884 in exchange for the opportunity to purchase the Association's lands and stations if Leopold were forced to sell them. Germany recognized the A.I.C. on November 8, 1884, just prior to the opening of the Berlin Conference. This left Britain as the only other major power withholding recognition and, on December 16, it was granted on the realization that, because of her own African involvements, Britain needed to remain on good terms with the major powers.

8. This was the Congo Basin as defined by the treaty signed at the Berlin Conference.

9. Arthur Berriedale Keith, The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1919; reprint ed., Westport, Connecticut: Negro Universities Press, 1970), pp. 101-110.

10. Slade, King Leopold's Congo, pp. 92-93. See Map 11 for the approximate limits of Arab expansion.

11. Ibid., pp. 88-89, 94-95; Anstey, Britain and the Congo, pp. 212-220. Tippu Tib was an Arab half-caste born at Zanzibar about 1830. In his youth he went to Tabora with his father and later travelled independently to various parts of central Africa. During one of these journeys he met

Stanley and in 1876 accompanied Stanley down the Congo, as far as Stanley Falls where he remained to trade in ivory and slaves. During the 1870s Tippu Tib became a powerful leader in the area between the Lomami and Lualaba Rivers.

12. Slade, King Leopold's Congo, pp. 97-98.

13. Ibid.

14. Lusambo also served as a supply post for the occupation of the Katanga in 1891.

15. Jan Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), pp. 240-241. Ngongo Lutete was a member of the Tetela people and a former slave of Tippu Tib. He was overlord over a large area extending as far west as the upper Lubilash. When the State defeated him in 1890 he realized that he needed additional arms since his Arab sources were dwindling, so he advanced to the west hoping to trade with the Cokwe or the Lulua chief, Mukenge Kalamba, both hostile to the State. However, he was unable to do so and consequently sided with the State.

16. See Chapter III below on the Luluabourg revolt.

17. Slade, King Leopold's Congo, pp. 129-130. On October 29, 1889 the British South Africa Company was granted a royal charter with powers over a large undefined area. There were rumours that the company was planning to move into C.F.S. territory.

18. The incident will be described more fully in Chapter III below.

19. Bruce Fetter, The Creation of Elisabethville, 1910-1940 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), pp. 16-20. The Alexandre Delcommune expedition had originally been funded by the Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie. With the creation of the Compagnie du Katanga in 1891 the W.G. Stairs and the Lucien Bia expeditions, as well as the Delcommune expedition, were financed by it.

20. Ibid. Legal arrangements were completed in 1894.

21. Keith, Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act, pp. 73-74. The treaty with Portugal and France in 1885 had defined the border as being the parallel of Noki (about 6th parallel) to its intersection with the Kwango River, then the course of the Kwango.

22. The Kasai River proved unnavigable above its confluence with the Lulua. Attempts made by De Macar to move into the south from Luluabourg were halted by Cokwe hostility. See Chapter III below.

23. Edouard Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 36-38. Portugal sought recognition from the Congo Free State of its territorial rights over the area between Angola and Mozambique because of the threat of British penetration from the south by the newly-created British South Africa Company (1889). The C.F.S. agreed to recognize Portuguese claims in exchange for the recognition of C.F.S. rights over a large area "extending from Lake Bangweulu to the western bank of Lake Nyasa (Malawi) between 11° 40' south latitude and the southern border of German East Africa." These exorbitant terms were not acceptable to Portugal but served as a stalling tactic while Dhanis moved into the Kwango. In the meantime, in 1889 Great Britain proclaimed a protectorate over the Shire River region, an area which Portugal had considered was within her sphere of influence. These developments placed Portugal in a poor bargaining position.

24. Ibid., p. 39.

25. Ibid., p. 40.

26. A.-J. Wauters, L'Etat Indépendant du Congo (Bruxelles: Librairie Falk Fils, 1899), pp. 435-437.

27. The first Governor-General was Camille Jansen, replaced in 1892 by Baron Wahis.

28. F. Cattier, Droits et Administration de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo (Bruxelles, 1898), pp. 173-175. A decree of 1888 created eleven administrative districts; in 1890 the number increased to twelve and in 1895 to fifteen.

29. Recueil Administratif, Etat Indépendant du Congo, Département de l'Intérieur (Bruxelles: Imprimerie F. Vanbuggenhoudt, 1903), pp. 70-88.

30. Cattier, Droits et Administration, pp. 225-227. For an African to be recognized by the State provided an extension of his traditional or assumed power. One of his functions was to recruit Africans for the gathering of rubber and for service in the Force Publique.

31. A.-J. Wauters, L'Etat Indépendant du Congo, pp. 456-459. The State Prosecutor was in charge of court proceedings and acted as prosecuting magistrate in the Court of Appeal and the Tribunal of First Instance, The deputy public prosecutor functioned similarly in the territorial tribunal.

32. Keith, Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act, pp. 118-119. Although it was illegal for a State official to assume the power of imprisoning or flogging an African, it did occur. The imperfect legal system made it difficult to secure punishment of criminal actions by State officials.

33. Slade, King Leopold's Congo, p. 173. The total number then in the Force Publique was about 700, including the Congolese recruits.

34. F. Flament et al, La Force Publique de sa naissance à 1914 (Bruxelles: Institut royal colonial belge, ARSOM, 1952, p. 49.

35. R.P. Marcel Storme, La mutinerie militaire au Kasai en 1895 (Bruxelles: Académie royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques, N.S., XXXVIII - 4, 1970), pp. 35-37. In 1900 the service time was raised to seven years.

36. Flament, La Force Publique, p. 50.

37. Slade, King Leopold's Congo, p. 173.

38. Sir Harry Johnston, George Grenfell and the Congo, Volume I (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1908), p. 445.

39. A.-J. Wauters, Histoire Politique, pp. 91-92.

40. Ibid., pp. 93-95. See Map III.

41. Keith, Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act, pp. 121-122; F. Cattier, Etude sur la situation de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo (Bruxelles, 1906), p. 62. The areas enclosed in both the Domaine privé and the Domaine de la Couronne comprised some of the richest rubber and Ivory areas of the Congo. These areas were exploited by agents who were chosen by the king and who wore the official State uniforms.

42. A.-J. Wauters, Histoire Politique, pp. 210-217. A total of fourteen private companies formed the new Compagnie du Kasai. Further information on the organization and operation of the company will be presented in Chapter VII below. See Map III.

43. Ibid., pp. 165-167. These companies also administered their trading areas.

44. Ibid., pp. 205-209; S.J.S. Cooley, Britain and the Congo Question 1885-1913 (New York: Humanities Press Inc., 1968), pp. 10-16. The railway companies were given land concessions and mining rights over a large area. The Compagnie du Katanga assisted in the occupation of the Katanga for which the State granted the company one-third of the land with mining rights for ninety-nine years. The remaining two-thirds of the land was reserved for the State. Dividing the land proved impossible, so an agreement was reached in 1900 whereby the land placed "in division" under the control of a new body called the Comité Spécial du Katanga (C.S.K.) which was entrusted with all administrative functions in Katanga. One-third of the profits went to the Compagnie du Katanga and two-thirds to the State.

45. Heinrich Waltz, Das Konzessionswesen im Belgischen Kongo (Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1917), p. 8.

46. Keith, Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act, pp. 123-124.

47. Ibid., pp. 124-125; Cooley, Britain and the Congo Question, p. 94.

48. Wauters, Histoire Politique, pp. 241-242. This was a frequent practice of the Compagnie du Kasai. See below Chapter VII.

49. Ruth Slade, "English Missionaries and the Beginning of the Anti-Congolese Campaign in England," Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire, vol. XXXIII, 1 (Brussels, 1955), pp. 37-38.

50. Ibid., p. 41.

51. Anne Luck, Charles Stokes in Africa (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972), pp. 142-154. Stokes was executed by a Belgian officer after being accused of trafficking in guns with the Arabs. The Belgian officer was not punished.

52. William Roger Louis "Roger Casement and the Congo," Journal of African History, V, 1 (1964), p. 99. While Fox Bourne campaigned other missionaries, including the American, J.B. Murphy, began reporting to the press the manner in which rubber collecting was conducted and how Africans were shot, or their hands cut off, if insufficient rubber was collected. Murphy's story created a stir throughout England and the Continent.
53. Dilke's suggestion was that a new conference of the powers which had met in Berlin in 1885 be convened to discuss the state of the administration in the Congo.
54. There were frequently strained relations between Morel, Dilke and Fox Bourne. Dilke supported both Morel and Fox Bourne but there was tension between him and some of Morel's supporters. Fox Bourne disapproved of Morel's Congo Reform Association, formed in 1904, because he feared it would detract from his own A.P.S. William Roger Louis and Jean Stengers, E.D. Morel's History of the Congo Reform Movements (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 173.
55. Slade, King Leopold's Congo, pp. 184-185.
56. Casement had nearly twenty years of administrative experience in other parts of Africa before arriving in the Congo. Although his experience suited him for the position as consul, he was the type of person who became intensely involved in whatever he did. Sometimes this led to exaggerated statements and considerable exasperation on his part if others did not believe him. After his time as consul expired in 1903 he joined Morel in the Congo Reform Movement until 1913. With the outbreak of the war Casement became involved in attempting to enlist Irish prisoners of war in Germany to fight the British. He was hanged for high treason in 1916. Louis and Stengers, E.D. Morel's History of the Congo Reform Movement, pp. xii, 174.
57. Stanley Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1970), pp. 95-96. Morrison's involvement in the reform campaign will be discussed in Chapter IX below.
58. Cookey, Britain and the Congo, pp. 122-124.
59. Ibid., pp. 145-149.

60. Ibid., pp. 159-160.
61. Waltz, Das Konzessionswesen, pp. 80-81.
62. Slade, King Leopold's Congo, p. 191.

CHAPTER II

PRE-COLONIAL TRADE IN THE KASAI AND SURROUNDING AREAS

The prospect of trade was a major reason for a European presence on the Atlantic coast of Africa. The Portuguese first arrived at the mouth of the Congo River in the last years of the fifteenth century and established relations with the existing Congo kingdom. Although Portuguese influence declined early in the seventeenth century and her presence was restricted to the colony of Angola¹, her impact was sufficient to be responsible for the development of long-distance trade routes which eventually connected the Atlantic and Indian Ocean trade, one branch of which extended into the Kasai basin. Long-distance trade benefitted from the various local trade networks already in existence by uniting them to expand commercial relations over vast stretches of territory.

The trade products varied through the years with a most significant change occurring about the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1834 the Portuguese abolished the slave trade and, at the same time, the royal monopoly on ivory². Although the overseas slave trade was over³, the Portuguese introduced a plantation economy in parts of Angola which required labour and resulted in an active trade in indentured workers which continued into the twentieth century. The trade in human beings

was largely to satisfy local needs in Angola: the overseas slave trade was replaced by trade in wax and ivory and, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, by rubber.

African societies were involved in various aspects of the trade throughout Central Africa. By the 1700s long-distance trade had become dominated by the Imbangala traders whose capital at Kasanje near the Upper Kwango became a trading centre.⁴ From this location they organized caravans to the Lunda capital of Musumbain the Upper Kasai-Lulua River area in search of slaves and ivory in exchange for cloth, tobacco, guns and gunpowder. By mid-century this trade route extended to the people of Kazembe, who provided the connection with the trade routes from the east coast.⁵

In the face of opposition from the larger and better-equipped Ovimbundu caravans from Bihe, the Imbangala lost their trade monopoly on the Lunda route about 1850. Consequently their trade was diverted northward to the people of Mai Munene, a Lunda dynasty established in the seventeenth century on the right bank of the Kasai River. From the Lunda capital, Ovimbundu trade extended into the Upper Kasai valley where they traded in slaves, ivory and wax in exchange for guns, cloth and beads.⁶ By the 1860s the Ovimbundu and Imbangala were challenged by the Cokwe from the central Angolan highlands who began to compete for trade from the Kasai area.

The long-distance traders stimulated the existing local trade in the Kasai basin, settled by three main groups of people: the Luba, the Lunda and the Kuba.⁷ The Kuba and related peoples occupied the area enclosed by the Sankuru, Kasai, Lukulu and Lulua Rivers. Organized under a king,⁸ they became the strongest political and cultural group in the Kasai after the middle of the seventeenth century, a position which they maintained until the European occupation in the early twentieth century. Their political system provided the security necessary for an elaborate market system. Traders coming from outside the kingdom were restricted to markets like Kabao, located on Kete territory,⁹ where the Kete acted as middlemen in the market structure.

The Kuba carried on trade with their neighbors in the pre-colonial period. From across the Sankuru River they obtained ivory in exchange for raffia cloth. To the south of the kingdom, the Kuba traded with the Luba who exchanged amulets, pottery and slaves for camwood, ivory and the much-coveted Kuba cloth.¹⁰ Before the middle of the eighteenth century this regional trade with the Luba peoples was light, but it was stimulated when long-distance trade extended into the area, bringing with it a demand for ivory and slaves.

The Luba were probably the most mobile people in Central Africa in early times. The Luba Empire, which existed in the vicinity of the Lualaba Lakes as early as 1500, extended its domination over various adjacent peoples. A slow movement towards the west took place in the

eighteenth century by individual groups, because of internal wars or a desire to escape from the political control of the Luba kingdom and, in later years, in search of trade advantages. Some Luba spread into the Kasai valley and benefitted from trade with the Kuba and possibly also with the Kaniok, who lived west of the Lulua River. This Kasai Luba population was later referred to as Bashilange by the European explorers, but as Lulua by the Cokwe because they lived in the Lulua River valley.¹¹ The designation of Lulua given to the Kasai Luba remained and later differentiated them from the Luba who came into the Kasai in the 1890s from the southeast to escape Arab slave raiders. The Lulua were organized into small chiefdoms or independent clan groupings with the leader usually being a senior member of the clan.

The light regional trade of the Kuba and the Kasai Luba (Lulua) probably did not lead to direct trade contact with the Lunda Empire located in the area between the middle Kasai and Kwango River area until about the middle of the nineteenth century. The Lunda Empire was established over a period of time during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a result of a series of migrations from the east.¹² The empire was ruled by a king, or Mwata Yamvo, and reached the peak of its power by approximately 1850 when the Cokwe invasions began.¹³

Lunda demands upon tributary chiefs led to payments to the Mwata Yamvo of salt, copper, slaves and ivory in return for gifts of imported cloth, beads and luxury goods. These gift items arrived at the court as a

result of commercial contacts with Imbangala and Ovimbundu traders who were following the southern trade routes from the Atlantic coast to the interior from the beginning of the nineteenth century. At about the same time, the first Portuguese traders reached Lunda territory and, by 1811, this contact had resulted in representatives of the Lunda court travelling to Luanda,¹⁴ the Portuguese capital. By the middle of the century, Ovimbundu traders had reached Musumba, the Lunda capital, while Imbangala traders arrived at Mai Munene.

By 1860 Ovimbundu traders had reached the Katanga, where they met Msiri who was himself occupied with trading to both the east and west coasts. Also in Katanga the Ovimbundu formed an alliance with the Luba king, Kasongo Kalombo, whom they assisted in raiding his own subjects until the latter rebelled. From the Luba capital raiding parties were sent to the Kaniok settlements to the north where Ivory was plentiful.¹⁵ Consequently, by the 1860s long-distance trade extended into the Kasai from both the west and the east.

The trade products varied with the times. When the royal Portuguese monopoly over ivory ended, prices soared and there was a greater interest in procuring it. The ivory trade moved northwards, as the elephant retreated. The Ovimbundu and the Cokwe were the main suppliers of Ivory to the Portuguese and competed with each other for the Kasai trade. While the Ovimbundu travelled in large well-armed caravans, the Cokwe went out in small hunting groups. In their homeland on the Upper Kwango,

Kwilu and Kasai Rivers¹⁶ the Cokwe were known as excellent hunters and wax-collectors. Since they were also skilled blacksmiths, they had little need for European products such as knives and other small metal items. The wax and ivory they procured were sufficient to purchase the guns they needed for hunting. The availability of elephants in the Cokwe homeland as late as 1840 indicates that ivory was not a major trade item until that decade and served chiefly to replenish their supply of guns.¹⁷ Since they were capable blacksmiths, they could keep their guns in good repair which made it possible for them to accumulate an arsenal of firearms before they engaged in the long-distance trade.

There were several reasons for Cokwe expansion about the mid 1800s. As long as slaves dominated the long-distance trade the Cokwe were not extensively involved in it since it was not their practice to sell their own people into slavery. The abolition of the overseas slave trade and the royal monopoly on ivory gave the Cokwe an opportunity to become wealthy through hunting elephants and then trading the ivory. The lure of richer hunting grounds is probably one of the reasons for the Cokwe pushing out of their traditional homeland. In the early part of the nineteenth century, they were located around the eleventh parallel south and, even by 1840, they were still south of the tenth parallel. By 1850 the limit of elephant-hunting grounds had receded to the ninth parallel "and it continued to retreat toward the equator at the approximate rate of one degree latitude per decade."¹⁸ By the late 1850s groups of

Cokwe were to be found at the ninth parallel and by 1865 they had advanced to the eighth parallel and into the area between the Kasai and Lulua Rivers.¹⁹

Cokwe expansion can also be attributed in part to their social structure which allowed for the integration of other people, particularly women, into their group. This was done through a system of pawnship whereby the transfer of rights was possible from one lineage to another. Slave women incorporated into Cokwe society were treated very well, in some cases better than in the society from which they had been taken. Their children by Cokwe husbands received full lineage membership. Under such a system the acquisition of women and the subsequent population increase added to the need to expand into new areas.²⁰ The new settlements followed the trails of their hunting and trading parties so that small villages were established in new regions. Thus Cokwe expansion, through conquest and migration, was possible because of their numbers, mobility and effective military methods through the use of guns. In trade they became the middlemen between the peoples of the Kasai and traders from Angola.

In the history of the Kasai region, Cokwe expansion is of prime significance. Although the Ovimbundu and Imbangala caravans were at Mai Nnene by the 1850s and at Kabao in Kuba territory by the 1870s, it was the Cokwe intrusion into the huge Lunda empire and the Cokwe advance into Lulua territory which brought the Kasai into direct trade relations with the people of Angola.

The Cokwe took advantage of hunting opportunities in the huge Lunda empire which was at the peak of its power in the mid-1850s. The Lunda, who had traded mainly in slaves before the abolition of the trade, now needed the skills of the Cokwe in order to sustain their supply of trade articles such as guns for hunting. Both Lunda and Cokwe initially benefitted from the latter's settlement in Lunda territory. At first the Cokwe accepted the authority of the local chief and even acknowledged a tribute obligation to the Mwata Yamvo. This tribute, when it was paid, amounted to one elephant tusk from each animal killed. The other tusk was retained by the Cokwe and, in all probability, both Lunda and Cokwe traded their ivory to the Imbangala caravans.²¹

The Cokwe extension into Lunda territory and their subsequent move northward were assisted by an event in 1865: guns and gunpowder were introduced into the middle Kasai basin. A Cokwe hunter wandered across the Kasai River into Lulua territory where he met Mukenge Kalamba, an ambitious Lulua leader, whose curiosity had been aroused by the noise of the hunter's gun.²² This introduction to firearms resulted in an alliance between the Cokwe and Kalamba which opened the middle Kasai to trade through Kalamba's village which served as the central market place: at the same time Kalamba seized the opportunity he desired to establish a new political power base to strengthen his position among his peoples.²³ Kalamba's ambition to make himself a political leader among the Lulua had led him already to invent his own religious cult, the lubuku, but

he was quick to realize that the guns the new Cokwe alliance provided would be of greater advantage.²⁴ This chance encounter benefitted both parties. When the Cokwe hunter arrived at Kalamba's village he must have been certain he had found a bonanza since the "residence was fenced with elephant tusks for fear of nightly attack of the larger beasts of prey."²⁵ The resulting trade was to bring Kalamba into prominence well into the colonial period in the Kasai area.

Cokwe expansion down the Kasai River was accomplished both by the migration of entire villages, which settled in areas already occupied by other peoples, and by conquest. As trade brought more guns into their possession, expansion by conquest became common after 1875. In their move northward they defeated Mai Munene and Mwata Kumbana, Lunda chieftainships, north of the seventh parallel between the Loange and Kasai Rivers. By the end of the 1880s the Cokwe were in control of a vast area west of the Kasai, but their advances to the north were finally stopped in 1892 by the combined forces of the Pende, Mbun and Njembe.²⁶

Meanwhile, the Cokwe were becoming more powerful in the Lunda Empire proper. Succession disputes in the Lunda empire after 1875 caused Lunda pretenders to recruit Cokwe men to back up their claim in return for territory which they could plunder for slaves. With this reward for assistance the Cokwe made such inroads into the empire that by 1885 the Lunda were defeated. The region became settled with a mixture of Lunda and Cokwe peoples.²⁷ Thereafter the Cokwe raided into the territory of

the Luba, in the southern Kasai, and the Kete, between the Lulua and Bushimaie Rivers, by 1888 causing the Luba to flee into Lulua and Kaniok territory.²⁸ To the north of the Lunda empire the Mbala and Sala Mpasu peoples had effectively been able to resist the earlier expansion of the Lunda, but now in the 1890s their former military tactics were no match for Cokwe guns, and the combined Cokwe and Lunda raids succeeded in imposing Lunda political structures on them. This invasion, however, resulted in an economic advantage for the Sala Mpasu in that they began an energetic trade with the Lunda and Cokwe.²⁹ This trade alliance was effective in causing the Sala Mpasu to recognize the advantage of an alliance with their southern neighbors in order to resist Europeans in the early colonial period.³⁰

The Kaniok were not only attacked by the Cokwe but also by the Afro-Arabs from their location on the Lomami River. Their raids extended into Tetela and Songye territory to the north and east of the Sankuru River without crossing the river. In the 1880s Tippu Tip's representatives, Ngongo Lutete and Lumpungu, together with a slave of his father's, Mpania Mutombo, devastated the area along the Lomami River. It was during the raids on the Been' Ekiiye that a remnant of that group under Zappo Zap fled to Luluabourg in 1887 where the Congo Free State offered them protection.³¹ Ngongo Lutete, in possession of a large number of guns which he had received from Tippu Tip, raided over a vast area from Bena Dibebe on the Sankuru, south to the upper Lubilash and into Luba and Lutete.

Kaniok Country.³² In the years 1885-1889 it seemed as though the entire Kasai area would be overrun by the Cokwe and Ngongo Lutete and his associates. However, in 1890 Lusambo was founded to stop the Arab advance and State forces defeated the Arabs in 1894 with Ngongo Lutete's son and successor, Lumpungu, then going over to the European side.

The Cokwe threat remained for a much longer period of time. By 1895 Cokwe strength was being challenged by a reunited Lunda front under the leadership of the deposed Mushidi and his brother Kawele. The Cokwe were forced to retreat but the brothers were not able to take advantage of their victory since at this time C.F.S. officers arrived and chose to support a different leader.³³ Although the Cokwe experienced reverses from African groups, they were a threat in the Kasai for at least another two decades, causing frequent European expeditions to be led against them.³⁴

From the time the first Imbangala, Ovimbundu and Cokwe traders entered the Kasai in the mid 1800s to the end of the century, the trade items they sought changed. These traders were constantly in search of new sources of ivory which resulted in the rapid disappearance of the elephant. In addition to this, traders were able to capitalize on local needs which also involved them in the local or regional trade. For instance, by about 1875 the Ovimbundu had appeared at the large Kuba market of Kabao where they received ivory for slaves they had purchased

from Mukenge Kalamba.³⁵ The Cokwe, likewise, were able to capitalize on local demands. The desire for slaves, especially women and girls in Cokwe society complemented the demand for male slaves in Angola.

"Caravans of slaves bound for Bihe or Kasanje would stop and sell their females to the Cokwe for wax and ivory which the male slaves would then carry to the coast."³⁶

Kalamba supplied many of these slaves in exchange for guns. The Cokwe, Ovimbundu and Imbangala all carried on a flourishing trade with Kalamba and the Kuba market at Kabao.

Kalamba's village became the major market place in the Kasai with Cokwe trade dominating it, although Ovimbundu and Imbangala also traded there. The Cokwe were willing to pay as much as one large tusk of ivory for a woman. Miller quotes other prices by saying:

Children sold for four or six to the tusk and men for even less, although prices varied greatly according to the skill of the individual trader. Other 'typical' prices included a girl sold for a musket or twenty-four yards of calico, a woman for a four-pound keg of powder plus eight yards of calico, and an eight or ten-year-old child for sixteen yards of calico.³⁷

In the area to the southeast of Kalamba's village, where ivory was scarce, the trade items included cloth and croisettes, (copper crosses) from the Katanga. Frequently only a very limited number of slaves was sold in order to keep the prices high. A girl was worth from five to eight mats (used for clothing), a boy six mats. A woman sold for ten croisettes.³⁸

Although the overseas slave trade had ended, slaves were still in great demand both for the plantation economy of Angola and for local needs of various peoples. Kalamba's market together with several other smaller markets carried on a thriving business. The Kuba to the north needed slaves in their society because of class distinctions which allowed a large segment of the population to be idle.³⁹ Since the Kuba also had ivory, Kalamba's market acted as a focal point from which slaves were taken into Kuba territory in exchange for ivory. Other slaves who provided portage for the ivory, were taken to Angola in exchange for guns.

The local slave trade also included Mpania Mutombo from the northeastern Kasai area. He traded women to Tshikunga, a Lulua clan leader, for guns by selling ten women for one gun and five women for a small keg of gunpowder. Tshikunga, in turn, traded these slaves to the Cokwe usually obtaining a better price because of the Cokwes' desire for women.⁴⁰ In his book, Lubuku, Dias de Carvalho states that a keg of powder in that area weighed a kilogram. He further describes the dealings of the Ovimbundu in the Kuba market at Kabao as follows:

These banditti do not carry to Kabau one single cowrie, one single bead, their sole commodity to barter for ivory being numerous gangs of slaves whom they sale to the Bakuba at exceedingly low prices.

To form an idea of this disgraceful trade suffice it to say that they give a slave for a small tusk of ivory weighing 4 pounds; two slaves for one of

10, six for one of 20, ten for one of 30; for a tusk weighing from 50 to 60 pounds they will give twenty slaves, in fine they gave fifty-four slaves for a piece weighing 92 pounds.⁴¹

Part of the reason for the extensive slave trade to the Kuba was that these people did not accept trade articles like cloth or beads for ivory. They produced their own woven fabric which they considered superior to European cloth. The most favoured trade item of the Kuba was cowrie shells which were introduced into the kingdom in the eighteenth century. The cowries were used for currency and ornaments. The price of a slave at Kabao was five thousand cowries.⁴²

Besides slaves, ivory and guns, there were also other articles of exchange in the Kasai, among which salt and copper were significant. The salt mined in Kisama, Angola, was of a desirable quality and proved a valuable product for Imbangala traders to take into Lunda, Cokwe and Lulua areas in exchange for ivory, slaves and rubber (after 1874).⁴³ Salt from the Katanga also reached the Kasai area. Trading parties visited the salt-pans around the Katanga lakes and transported the salt to Kaniok country, along the Lulua River and into Kuba country.⁴⁴ Undoubtedly the imported salt was superior in quality to the alkaline salts produced by the Kuba and Kete.⁴⁵

Copper was also available from the Katanga and was probably more valuable than salt. It reached the Kasai in the form of croisettes (crosses) or bars which were exchanged for ivory and slaves. Copper had

a double advantage as it could be melted down and fashioned into arm and leg bands, copper wire and long hat pins for Kuba headgear. Although most of the salt and copper came via the Lulua area, the latter was also used as a trade article north of the Sankuru River among the Tetela and Songye.⁴⁶

Some of the lesser articles of exchange were beads, cowrie shells and cloth. The beads used among the Kuba were a black and white striped oval glass bead called Almandrilla in Angola.⁴⁷ As with the cowries, the beads were important for ornamentation. Most of the cloth imported into the Kasai was of the West African variety of cotton cloth or calicot. This cloth was acceptable as an exchange article south of the Lulua River, but the Kuba considered their own woven fabrics superior to it.⁴⁸


A very important trade article after 1874 was rubber. The rubber was procured from creepers by cutting through them and allowing the liquid to drain into a container or onto the ground. It solidified when exposed to the air and could be formed into balls for trade. When a business transaction was agreed upon, the small balls of rubber would be counted out according to the decimal system. For instance, 1,000 small balls were required to purchase a female slave: these were laid out in rows of ten balls in each row, which were then assembled into a pile of one hundred when ten rows had been counted out. This continued until the appropriate number was obtained.⁴⁹ In 1876 eight to eleven

balls made a kilogram, but by 1882 the size of the balls had been reduced so that forty balls made a kilogram.⁵⁰ For the Cokwe the trade in rubber was an important inducement and a further motive for moving north, where the rubber plants were more plentiful along the Kasai River and in the higher grassland areas.⁵¹ In Cokwe society women and children did the tapping and gathering of rubber while the men hunted, consequently entire villages moved into new territories through the use of guns and in search of rubber.

By the early 1870s, the entire Kasai area had been drawn into long-distance trade through contact, to some extent, with east coast but, primarily, with west coast traders. The implications of this were both political and economic as the rise of Kalamba shows. Kalamba's fortuitous encounter with the Cokwe hunter in 1865 assisted Cokwe expansion northward by providing them with an ally and a trading partner in Kalamba who, likewise, benefitted in that his acquisition of guns allowed him to realize his ambitions and attain the leadership of a large Lulua following. By 1881 he had a total of 150 guns and, as long as he could maintain his market as the most profitable one for trading caravans, he could assure his own superior political position against rivals such as Tshingenge, another clan leader, who had accumulated 100 guns.⁵²

The Cokwe advance into the Kasai was possible, not only because of the decentralized Lulua population, but because of the internal conditions in the Lunda empire which made Cokwe intervention possible, both at the

capital itself and in the Lunda chieftainships of Mai Munene and Mwata Kumbana. With the Cokwe migration into the Kasai, and Kalamba's receptivity to foreigners⁵³ from various regions of Angola, a flourishing trade, involving Ovimbundu, Imbangala, Cokwe and Ambaquiste,⁵⁴ existed between the Kasai area and Angola with exports going into Angola in exchange for guns. None of these groups however, were able to penetrate the Kuba kingdom beyond the markets at Kabao where they traded slaves for ivory which was taken to Angola. This southern trade route also became the access route followed by the first Europeans into the Kasai area.



VI. MAXIMUM COKWE EXPANSION, c. 1890

Source: Joseph C. Miller, "Cokwe Trade and Conquest in the 19th Century," in Pre-Colonial African Trade, ed. R. Gray and D. Birmingham (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 199.

FOOTNOTES

1. Anstey, Britain and the Congo, pp. 40-41. Portugal's limited resources in men and wealth, caused in part by the necessity of maintaining her trading empire in the East, were responsible for her loss of influence over the Lower Congo.
2. Ibid. Portugal's slave trade existed mainly to exploit the mineral and agricultural wealth of Brazil. When Brazil became independent in 1822, there was no longer the demand for slaves and Portuguese trade turned to ivory and other products.
3. Edouard Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule, The Politics of Ethnicity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 25-26. At first the decree was unenforced, but by 1844 Portugal had installed a prize court at Luanda to stop the export of slaves to South America.
4. See Map IV for all locations referred to in the discussion on trade.
5. Jan Vansina, "Long-Distance Trade Routes in Central Africa," Journal of African History III: 3 (1962), pp. 382-383.
6. Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule, pp. 24-27.
7. In his book, Kingdoms of the Savanna (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), on page 20, J. Vansina has listed the following peoples with each of the groups as they pertain to the Kasai area: Luba-Luba Kasai, Lulua, Northern Kete, and Kaniok; Lunda-Mbagani, Lwailwa, Mbal, Sala Mpasu, Southern Kete, Cokwe, Lwena, and Ndembu; Kuba-Lele. Migrations into the Kasai area in all probability occurred as short moves by family groupings. See Map V for location of Kasai peoples.
8. According to C.T. Wharton, a Presbyterian missionary to the Kuba, the Bakuba word for king is "Nyimi," the same word in the Baluba language (Tshiluba) is "Lukenga." They are used interchangeably. Conway T. Wharton, The Leopold Hunts Alone (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1927), p. 25.

9. The Kete were an ethnic group who considered themselves to be a part of the Kuba people: Jan Vansina, The Children of Woot, A History of the Kuba Peoples (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) pp. 4-5.

10. Ibid., pp. 193-194.

11. Zaire, Luebo Archives of the Commissaire du District, Rapport sur les Baluba by Vallaey, 1921. Vallaey was the Territorial Administrator of Dibaya Territory in 1921. The European explorer was Hermann von Wissmann who travelled in this area in the 1880s. The Lulua River was named by the Sala Mpasu, Kete and Lunda peoples previous to the arrival of the Luba migrants.

12. Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule, p. 10.

13. Ibid., pp. 2, 3, 10.

14. Ibid., p. 14.

15. Vansina, "Long-Distance Trade Routes," p. 384; Philip Curtin et al., African History (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), p. 435. Msiri was a ruler of a centralized state. In his earlier years he had accompanied his father, a Nyamwezi trader, to the Katanga and eventually remained there. Together with a group of Bayeke he gradually gained control of the region from the Lualaba to Lake Moero and the Luapula, and from the Luvua to the Congo-Zambezi watershed: Slade, King Leopold's Congo, p. 119.

16. See Map VI.

17. Joseph C. Miller, "Cokwe Trade and Conquest in the Nineteenth Century," in R. Gray and D. Birmingham, Pre-Colonial African Trade (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 176-177.

18. Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule, p. 27.

19. Henrique A. Dias de Carvalho, Lubuku (Lisbon, 1889), pp. 9-10. See Map VI.

20. Miller, "Cokwé Trade and Conquest," pp. 181, 190.
21. Ibid., pp. 179-180.
22. Dias de Carvalho, Lubuku, p. 11.
23. A. Van Zandijcke, Pages d'histoire du Kassayi (Namur: Collection Lavigerie, 1952), pp. 16-17.
24. Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna, p. 220. J. Vansina gives an explanation of the lubuku cult as follows: "Adepts smoked hemp - a trait which had probably infiltrated from Angola earlier - and then dreamed. During this dream, they saw their bajangi or ancestors, who promised them peace and plenty and gave them spiritual direction. The cult was supposed to unite the small Luba Kasai groups into a brotherhood, and, once this was done, the ancestors would come back and take over the leadership of the renovated society."
25. Dias de Carvalho, Lubuku, p. 11.
26. Emil Torday, Camp and Tramp in African Wilds (London: Seeley, Service and Co. Limited, 1913), p. 253. Map VI illustrates Cokwe expansion.
27. Miller, "Cokwe Trade and Conquest," pp. 196-198.
28. William F. Pruitt, Jr., "An Independent People: A History of the Sala Mpasu of Zaire and Their Neighbors" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1973), pp. 263-264.
29. Ibid., pp. 312-313. See Map V for the location of the Mbala and Sala Mpasu.
30. Ibid., pp. 269-271. This resistance was effective until 1928-9 when Alfred J. Baerts led an expedition into their territory and caused their submission.
31. Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna, p. 240.

32. Thomas Edwin Turner, "A Century of Political Conflict in Sankuru (Congo-Zaire)" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1973), p. 78. These attacks caused many of the Luba to seek protection from Europeans at Luebo and Luluabourg.
33. Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule, pp. 47-48; Jean-Luc Vellut, "Notes sur le Lunda et la frontière Luso-Africaine (1700-1900)," Etudes d'Histoire Africaine, III (1972), pp. 158-160. The new pretender bolstered by the Free State was Muteba, son of a previous Mwata Yamvo. This European intervention in Lunda affairs will be discussed in Chapter V below. The Lunda empire was never completely rehabilitated.
34. Out of twenty-seven military campaigns occurring in the Kasai between 1892 and 1911, eleven were directed against the Cokwe. A. Gilliaert et al., La Force Publique de sa naissance à 1914 (Bruxelles: IRCB, 1952), p. 530.
35. Vansina, "Long-Distance Trade Routes." p. 384.
36. Miller, "Cokwe Trade and Conquest," p. 182.
37. Ibid., p. 183.
38. Kananga (Luluabourg), Kananga Archives, Dibaya, July 5, 1934, "Notes relatives au diverses formes d'asservissement dans la chefferie Bakwa Tshilundu (Lulua)," a report by N. Meers, Territorial Administrator for Dibaya.
39. Jan Vansina, "Du royaume Kuba au 'territoire des Bakuba,'" Etudes Congolaises, Vol. 12 (April-June, 1969), pp. 4-5; Jan Vansina, "Trade and Markets among the Kuba," Markets in Africa (Urbana: Northwestern University Press, 1962), pp. 190-211.
40. Kananga, Kananga Archives, Report by N. Meers.
41. Dias de Carvalho, Lubuku, p. 47. These are 1886 prices.
42. Ibid. Dias de Carvalho writes that this was a fixed price throughout the area "so that whoever wishes to buy a tusk similar to the one sold for forty five slaves, must give two hundred and twenty five thousand cowries, the equivalent of 225 kilograms weight....[the cost of] buying of such a tusk would amount to...about 35 pounds sterling." Additional prices and trade information is available in Ntambwe Luadia-Luadia, "Les Luluwa et le commerce luso-africaine (1870-1895)," Etudes d'Histoire Africaine, VI (1974), pp. 75-92.

43. David Birmingham, "Early African Trade in Angola and its Hinterland," in Pre-Colonial African Trade, p. 169.
44. Vansina, "Long-Distance Trade Routes," p. 386.
45. Charles S.L. Bateman, The First Ascent of the Kasai (London: George Philip and Son, 1889), p. 72. Salt was produced by collecting a certain kind of grass found in lagoons, drying it and burning it to ashes. These ashes were mixed with the ashes of another plant and together mixed with water, boiled and skimmed until the water had evaporated. The sediment was the salt.
46. Hermann von Wissmann, Im Innern Afrikas (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1888), pp. 250-252. After 1890 State officials collected some of their taxes in croisettes.
47. Ibid., p. 226.
48. Ibid., Bateman, The First Ascent of the Kasai, pp. 84-85. He considered this cloth worthless, the value in England would be less than one penny per yard. The Kuba cloth was made of fibres taken from the raphia palm and woven on a loom which the Kuba had invented.
49. Paul Pogge's report to the Afrikanische Gesellschaft in Hermann von Wissmann, Unter deutscher Flagge quer durch Afrika, von West nach Ost (Berlin: Globus Verlag, 1888), pp. 353-354.
50. Miller, "Cokwe Trade and Conquest," p. 185.
51. Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule, p. 30.
52. Wissmann, Unter deutscher Flagge, p. 90.
53. Wissmann, Im Innern Africa, p. 163. Kalamba had appointed a Bangala to be his principal advisor.
54. Ambaquiste traders came from the region of Ambaca, northwest of Malange.

CHAPTER III

INITIAL EUROPEAN PENETRATION 1880-1901

The first wave of the European intrusion into the Kasai area took place along the Angolan route established by the traders from Bihe which went by way of Malange, Mona Kimbundu, either to the Lunda capital or to Mai Munene.¹ Malange became a commercial centre about 1850 when the Portuguese brothers, Saturnino and Antonio de Sousa Machado settled there. From this location European trade extended to the Lunda court, reached by a Portuguese trader by about 1849. This early Portuguese penetration was commercial, and no attempt was made to extend political authority over the interior, either in the Lunda empire or elsewhere.² By 1880 a Portuguese trader had arrived at Kabao, the Kuba market in the Kasai.

The second wave of European penetration occurred from the north as a result of the discovery of the navigability of the Kasai and Sankuru Rivers. This penetration in 1886 resulted in the simultaneous entrance into the Kasai of the three agencies: State, Commerce and Missions, each prompted by motives which were not always dissimilar. The State's main concern was twofold: to open the Kasai by the northern route with the intention of reversing the existing trade pattern by which trade

flowed to the south and to use the Kasai area as a springboard to serve the Katanga by defeating the Arabs who were threatening to advance into the Kasai district. Both concerns prompted the Europeans to definite offensive moves, in the first instance to establish Luluabourg and Luebo and secondly, to establish Lusambo on the upper Sankuru River. Since none of this European penetration would have been possible without the collaboration of a segment of the local African population, the intent of this chapter is to examine European penetration into the Kasai in light of the reaction of local African peoples.

The year 1875 marked the beginning of a series of explorations prompted by a new form of interest in that area of Central Africa. Even though the German Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, was personally not interested in overseas expansion until a later date (1884), the Berlin Geographical Society and the German section of the African International Association cosponsored several expeditions with the intention of establishing trading connections and, possibly, territorial occupation at a later date.³ Dr. Paul Pogge's first expedition in 1875-76 began at Luanda from where he and his companions intended to cross Africa: however, illness and Cokwe resistance prevented Pogge from proceeding beyond Lunda territory before returning to the coast in 1876.⁴

There were, however, several significant results of Pogge's initial journey. While at the home of the Machado brothers in Malange he met

Kalamba Mukenge who led a trade caravan from the Kasai area in order to establish trade connections with Malange.⁵ Pogge was consequently fully aware of the open route to Kalamba's village and the trade possibilities this provided. Of significance also was the observation that the Kasai River had a northerly course. The geographic question was where did the Kasai empty itself? Henry M. Stanley, in his journey up the Congo River in 1879 watched carefully for openings of any rivers which might suggest a navigable water route to the interior of the Congo Basin.⁶ One of the largest openings was that of the Kwa River; however in following its course Stanley took the northern tributary at Mushie and arrived at Lake Leopold II instead of taking the southern branch and exploring the broad waterways of the Kasai River.

While Pogge was preparing for a second journey to Africa in 1880 a Portuguese trader, Silvo Porto, became the first European to reach the market at Kabao in Bakuba country. Silva Porto arrived with a large Ovimbundu caravan to trade in ivory, salt and cowrie shells.⁷ The success of this trading mission became known to Pogge when he returned to Malange in 1881, accompanied by Lieutenant Hermann von Wissmann, who later became governor of German East Africa.⁸ The purpose of the Pogge and Wissmann expedition was to set up a scientific station in Lunda territory and to explore the area to the north of the Lunda in the interests of the African International Association of Germany.

With the aid of guides and porters from the Malange area⁹, Pogge and Wissmann, accompanied by the Portuguese trader, Saturnino de Sousa Machado, travelled to Mona Kimbundu where they learned of the leadership struggle taking place in the Lunda empire, and consequently decided to travel north into Lulua territory instead of east through the Lunda region.¹⁰

Both explorers were impressed with Kalamba Mukenge's power and influence among his people as a result of his trade with the Cokwe¹¹ and, therefore, chose his village as a good location for their inland station. Having established a location, Wissmann continued his travels to Zanzibar while Pogge constructed Pogge-Station, the first interior post of the African International Association of Germany.¹² Lack of support forced Pogge's departure from Kalamba in November 1883, to return to Luanda where he died on March 17, 1884.¹³ On his way to the coast Pogge had met Wissmann who had been in Europe and was returning on his second expedition in November 1883.

Pogge and Wissmann's first expedition indicated that any future travellers into the Kasai area would receive a friendly reception, but it did not supply information on the full course of the Kasai River and its tributaries. Wissmann's second journey into the Kasai, under the auspices of the German branch of the African International Association was financed by Leopold II of Belgium, but Wissmann and his German

associates considered themselves working in the interests of Germany. The purpose of this expedition was to determine the course of the Kasai River and establish further scientific stations.¹⁴ Travelling the now familiar route via Malange and Mai Munene, Wissmann's huge caravan¹⁵ entered the Kasai area towards the end of 1884. While Wissmann relocated Pogge-Station and named it Luluabourg¹⁶, his German associates explored the navigability of the river systems.

During their seven months' stay in the Kasai area the European explorers traversed a region extending from approximately 20°E to 24°E longitude and north to 5°S latitude. It was learned that the Kasai River, the most important in the region, was navigable between the Pogge Falls (upstream from Mai Munene) and the Wissmann Falls (about 5° 30'S) and then for an as yet, undetermined distance downstream. It was found that two other significant rivers drained the Kasai area, emptying into the Kasai; the Lulua and Luebo Rivers, the latter flowing into the former. The Lulua was found to be navigable for about 55 kilometres, that is, from its mouth to the junction with the Luebo. Having completed these discoveries, Wissmann and Wolf, accompanied by Kalamba and some of his followers, descended the Kasai River.¹⁷ In spite of several unfortunate incidents, the entire distance, from the point of embarkation to the mouth of the Kasai at Kwa, took forty days.¹⁸ At Kwa the Kasai flowed into the Congo and Wissmann and his party followed the now familiar route to Leopoldville.

The successful descent of the Kasai River made Leopoldville the head of a complete network of navigable waterways running through the heart of the continent. Furthermore, it opened a second and entirely new access route into the Kasai region with its potential for trade. Wissmann recognized the new possibilities this presented and urged the Belgian monarch to hasten the establishment of State posts to forestall Portuguese traders using the southern access route through Angola.¹⁹ Until this time Leopold's main interests and energies had concentrated on the establishment of stations between the lower Congo and the great lakes, with very little interest in the Kasai area. However, the discovery of the northern route into the Kasai as well as the increased Portuguese exploration and trade into the Kwango and Kasai areas made the establishment of State posts an immediate necessity.

Within the next year two expeditions left Leopoldville for the Kasai area. The first was conducted by Wolf and Mueller to return Kalamba and his followers; to explore the Sankuru River, which was found to be navigable to the Wolf Falls above the present location of Lusambo; and to establish a new post, Luebo, at the confluence of the Lulua and Luebo Rivers. Together with Wolf and Mueller was Charles S.L. Bateman who, in the service of the C.F.S., was assigned to construct the new station of Luebo.²⁰ The stern-wheel steamer Stanley, and the steam-launch En Avant, provided transportation to the new site, where the party arrived on November 7, 1885.²¹ The second expedition arrived in April 1886 aboard

the Baptist Missionary steamer, Peace, and the Stanley. The new arrivals included Wissmann who, en route to the east coast, had returned to hand Luluabourg over to the Belgian officers, Captain Adolphe de Macar and Lieutenant Paul Le Marinel. Other European newcomers included Baron Guido von Nimptsch, a former Prussian officer and now Deputy-Governor of the Congo Free State; Meinheer Greshoff, an agent for a Dutch trading company; and Rev. and Mrs. George Grenfell, of the British Baptist Missionary Society.²² The arrival of State, Commerce and Mission representatives marked the beginning of permanent European penetration which would have a considerable impact on local African politics.

Local African politics dictated the site of Luluabourg, the first European centre. At the time of Wissmann and Pogge's first entry into Lulua territory in 1881, they regarded Kalamba Mukenge as the most powerful Lulua leader. His village consisted of about 800 huts and was the largest market-place in Lulua territory. As a result of the hemp-smoking cult,²³ Kalamba had succeeded in gaining a considerable following from among other clan leaders so that, in some cases, he was collecting tribute payments from them. One of his main contenders for paramountcy among the Lulua was Tshingenge who, through trading with the Colons, had accumulated about 100 guns to Kalamba's 150.²⁴ Both Africans considered that an alliance with the Europeans contained a promise of more guns and, therefore, prestige and power among the local peoples.

However, once Wissmann and Pogge were agreed that Kalamba was the most powerful leader among the Lulua, all other clan leaders were forced to submit to him and acknowledge his leadership through tribute payments.²⁵ Wissmann's friendship and alliance with Kalamba had been assured in 1884 by the drinking of kigila, a mixture of hemp oil and cognac. By this time Tshingenge recognized that his strength lay, not in resisting the combined force of the Europeans and Kalamba, but rather in supporting it. He consequently joined in a pledge to assist the European settlement in the area in exchange for Wissmann's support of Kalamba as chief among the Lulua and himself as Kalamba's assistant.²⁶ Most of the other Lulua clan leaders were powerless to resist the combined force of Wissmann's Krupp canon and Kalamba's guns. Some tried without success including Chief Katende of the Bakosa Muaza, who had acquired a few guns from the Colu and attempted to challenge Kalamba's right to demand tribute, but Katende was temporarily induced to submit to Kalamba and spent four months as a prisoner at Luluabourg.²⁷

While Wissmann was occupied with strengthening Kalamba's political base, Wolf was travelling through Bakete territory to the north of the Lulua River and into Bakuba country. His purpose in part was to establish friendly relations with the Bakuba and Bakete for trading purposes, and in part to protect his line of communications because these peoples lived along the Kasai and Lulua Rivers which the Europeans intended to use as a passageway to and from the Kasai. At Ibénche Wolf was assured

of the Bakuba's desire for trade and informed that Europeans would receive a friendly welcome at the Bakuba capital.²⁸

Until 1884 the only post in the Kasai area was Pogge-Station, located in Kalamba's village, and abandoned by Pogge in 1883. During his second journey to the area Wissmann relocated Pogge-Station on a site about ten kilometres north of Kalamba's village, Mukenge.²⁹ The land for the new post, called Luluabourg,³⁰ was ceded by Kalamba who also offered Wissmann the services of the Bena Kiniama, a community of people near the new site, to assist in the construction work. Bugslag remained in charge of the new station while Wissmann, Wolf and Kalamba and some of his people descended the Kasai River. From the European point of view the second expedition had been successful, a station had been established and they had gained the support of a large and powerful group of Africans. Some Africans, and Kalamba in particular, had also benefitted by having their authority among their own people recognized and supported by Wissmann.

This mutual support made the establishment of Luebo possible at the end of 1885. The location of Luebo was not only at the junction of two rivers, but also at the meeting point of various ethnic groups including the Bakete to the north and the various Lulua peoples to the south. Europeans enjoyed a friendly reception from the local people, who provided assistance in constructing the station which resulted in the following tribute from Bateman, the post's first director:

Upon the whole, I found that we had every reason to congratulate ourselves at Luebo on our proximity to these people, whom I was able to employ in a variety of ways and to trust as it would have been dangerous to trust few indeed of the native tribes. They were in every sense excellent neighbours and kind friends and well-wishers to the European state.³¹

The establishment of Luluabourg and Luebo marked the first collaboration between Europeans and Africans in the Kasai to achieve divergent goals. Bateman summed it up when he stated: "the course which sound policy dictated to us was nevertheless extremely simple. Calamba's [sic] authority must be upheld by us in union with our own...." The limited European personnel available for the Kasai area meant that Europeans required the support of African allies. In 1885 the Luluabourg post had 25 soldiers³² while Bateman at Luebo had brought 15 more with him to Luebo.³³ Some of these soldiers were Zanzibaris and others were Ambaquistas. In spite of the military weakness of the European Kalamba sensed that, in the future development of the Kasai, the European would play a vital role and it would, therefore, be profitable to be his ally.

When Wissmann returned to the Kasai for the last time in 1886 he was accompanied by Adolphe de Macar and Paul Le Marinel, Belgian officers who became the first administrators in the Kasai area. Wissmann's instructions were to organize the territory by inviting Kalamba and the Lulua clan leaders to the Luluabourg station to recognize the rule of the Congo Free State.³⁴ Kalamba was to receive full State recognition and a

welcome at all State establishments.³⁵ September 10, 1886 was set aside for the leaders to come to Luluabourg, submit to the C.F.S., as well as to Kalamba, and agree to pay a modest annual tribute to Kalamba, to supply warriors for any campaigns, labourers for road-clearing and porters.

The fact that fifty African leaders came to Luluabourg and submitted to Kalamba was indicative of the chief's political strength among his people. Kalamba's court consisted of his step-son and successor, Kalamba-Muana; his sister, the high-priestess of the hemp smokers, Sangula Meta; and Tshingenge, who had become his first vassal.³⁶ Through the hemp-smoking cult he had gained followers who had visions of a better future under his leadership. However, not all of the local clan leaders smoked hemp nor did they submit to Kalamba's authority. Kilunga Messo, leader of the Bena Mgukangalla, was a member of the Chipulumba peoples, meaning non hemp-smokers, and hoped to gather more followers to his group. His efforts to gain European support were futile and he was brought, a prisoner, to Kalamba's hut where he submitted to him in a hemp-smoking ceremony.³⁷ Katende's submission in 1885 which Kalamba gained with Wissmann's assistance, had resulted in Katende's crops being destroyed and his own imprisonment;³⁸ but the submission was never genuine and in later events he did not support Kalamba.³⁹

With Katende's submission, Wissmann was satisfied that the Lulua area was relatively secure under Kalamba's chieftainship and de Macar's single direction until Le Marinel returned from accompanying Wissmann to Nyangwe. Even though Kalamba had become a powerful chief among the Lulua the European position was not as secure as Wissmann thought it to be. Kalamba's village was still a market place where Cokwe and Bihé caravans carried on an active trade in slaves and guns. Until 1890 there were never more than two or three State officers in the area including both Luebo and Luluabourg. This placed the State in the position of having to depend on Kalamba, who, in turn, had gained power as a result of being supported by the State.

While de Macar was alone at Luluabourg in 1886-1887, he was shocked by the extent of the slave trade which was still practiced in the area. The early explorers into the Kasai region encountered slave trading and condemned it. Wissmann made a practice of redeeming slaves from slave dealers on the basis that they would have a better lot with him than with the dealers. This was only the first instance where slaves were freed in order to be used for labour. Wissmann employed them in the construction of Luluabourg paying them in clothes and maintaining them. After a time, depending on the quality of their work, they were paid full wages and eventually freed. Most of these ransomed slaves built their own villages near the protection of the State post, not wishing to hazard the long trip home.

In 1887 de Macar reported that he was "unable to go outside my station without meeting chained people."⁴¹ Consequently he relentlessly followed slave traders and freed slaves whom he resettled around Luluabourg. De Macar did succeed in breaking the link between traders from the east and those from the south, but he was frequently frustrated by his inability to do more to stop the practice.⁴² In some of de Macar's efforts to maintain order in the Luluabourg area he received the assistance of two Portuguese traders, Saturnino de Souza Machado and Antoine Lopes de Carvalho, who followed Wissmann into the Kasai in 1884. Their original intention had been to trade with the Bakuba, but because of a quarrel with the people of Kabao they were forced to trade elsewhere. In 1886 Carvalho established a factory and began canoe building at Luebo, while Saturnino settled near Luluabourg.⁴³

When Le Marinel returned from Nyangwe in 1887 he brought Zappo Zap and his followers with him to Luluabourg where they received State protection and eventually became the State's allies. The Zappo Zap were, however, not involved in a campaign against the Cokwe to the west of Luluabourg in 1887 when de Macar, Le Marinel, Saturnino and a detachment of Kalamba's soldiers attempted to intervene in the Cokwe slave trade. In the ensuing conflict, de Macar and his men were vastly outnumbered by the 3,000 Cokwe and Kalamba's soldiers fled in fear, leaving the Europeans to retreat in defeat.⁴⁴ The Cokwe, realizing that their markets in Kalamba's territory were being threatened, began to move further into the

area hoping to unite the Lulua who had not joined Kalamba, for the purpose of driving out the Europeans.⁴⁵

It may have been partially as a result of this battle that the relationship between Kalamba and the State became less friendly. The African leader could not have failed to note that the white man's strength did not lie in his numbers since de Macar's military strength consisted of about five or six Zanzibari soldiers with a few inefficient breech-loading rifles.⁴⁶ Furthermore, de Macar's term was over early in 1888, (Le Marinel left at the end of 1887) and his replacement, Léon Braconnier, seemed more preoccupied with the construction of new buildings and with tending the plantations⁴⁷ than with strengthening the State's relations with Kalamba. He did, however, comment on the "hostile attitude of the population" surrounding the station who were nervous at the arrival of more Europeans whom they considered as trading competitors.⁴⁸ It would appear that about this time Kalamba began forging a military alliance with the Colowe. European aid had provided him with leadership among his people, but it had not made him rich. A Colowe alliance would supply military strength in addition to the trade wealth which the Europeans were threatening. The European now found himself on the horns of a dilemma. Having supported Kalamba in establishing his authority over the Lulua population, the State now faced the possibility of having Kalamba use his strength to defy the power that had given it to him.

It is impossible to be precise over the events which caused Kalamba to be alienated from the State, but when Charles Liénart succeeded Braconnier at Luluabourg in 1890⁴⁹ there were already indications that Kalamba was following an independent course of action. By this time Kalamba had become very rich in ivory, rubber and livestock since most of the tribute collected by him in the name of the State was no longer passed on to the authorities at Luluabourg. The State was in no position to take punitive action against Kalamba at this time, since Luluabourg was the only State post in the Lulua area and had less than 100 soldiers.⁵⁰ The post of Lusambo was established in 1890 but its function was to stop the Arab advance from the east and to act as a springboard for the occupation of the Katanga and not to play a major role in the control of the Lulua area.

A Commissaire du District and an assistant were posted at Lusambo with jurisdiction over the entire Kasai area. In 1890 the assistant, Cyriaque Gillain, made a tour of the Luluabourg area and noted the first outward sign of hostility between Kalamba and the State. These difficulties have never been completely explained. However, in 1890 when Braconnier demanded that Kalamba return the mother of Zappo Zap to her own people after she had been living with Sangula Meta, the chief responded by throwing pepper into Braconnier's eyes and having the limbs of Liénart's interpreter broken.⁵¹ Kalamba's insolence to the State was obvious proof that he had already allied himself to the Colons. Consequently Gillain's

attempts at reconciling Kalamba to the State were unsuccessful and between 1890 and 1891 Liénart led a campaign against him and his Cokwe allies which resulted in Kalamba's village of 800 huts being devastated. Kalamba and his followers sought refuge to the south of Luluabourg.⁵² The State's victory was accomplished with the aid of the Zappo Zap at Luluabourg who owed their escape from the Arab slave traders to the State. When Gillain returned to the area in October 1891 he noted that the State had erred in favouring the Zappo Zap at the expense of coming to terms with Kalamba. He said "If at that time he (Liénart) had made an alliance with Kalamba and had allowed him to relocate on a favourable site...he would have received whatever he wished from the Bachilanges."⁵³

In some ways Kalamba's alliance with the Cokwe was to his disadvantage since, after 1891, the State considered it necessary to reduce Kalamba's strength in order to conquer the Cokwe. The State could not accomplish this without allies, which presented the Zappo Zap and the Angolans with an opportunity which they grasped.⁵⁴ Both African groups wished to reduce Kalamba's trading power by taking advantage of their own favoured position to incite Kalamba to rebel. The incident illustrates the State's weak position in that it was forced to allow itself to be manipulated by one African group after another in order to maintain its own position, even though by 1891, the Zappo Zap had become active slave traders throughout the Kasai. The American Presbyterian Congo Mission (A.P.C.M.), which opened its work in the Kasai area in 1891,

accused the State of closing its eyes to the violence and crime committed by the Zappo Zap,⁵⁵ which in actual fact, the State had no choice but to do. For the next three years Kalamba remained in obscurity at a location near the Roman Catholic Mission station established at Mikalayl at the end of 1891.⁵⁶

Between 1891 and 1894 the State's actions concentrated mainly on preventing the Arab advance from the east and not in carrying out campaigns against Kalamba and the Cokwe in the Kasai. The consequence was that the Cokwe slave raids continued unabated and extended into Kaniok territory to the south and east of Luluabourg. To the east of the Kaniok were the Arabs and to the west the Cokwe: both had caused divisions in the population since some of the Kaniok had entered into trade agreements with the Cokwe in competition with those Kaniok who were not as strategically located. There was, however, a semblance of unity in 1891 when Paul Le Marinel, accompanied by three other Belgian officers, E.G. Descamps, Edgard Verdick and Legat, at the head of an expeditionary force of over 500 soldiers and porters, sought passage through Kaniok territory en route to the Katanga. King Musembe of the Kaniok had carried on an active trade with the Cokwe and the Angolans, but Cokwe slave raiders had devastated Kaniok territory and left Musembe cut off from his southern markets.⁵⁷ Musembe, therefore, entreated Le Marinel to buy his large supply of ivory with guns to enable him to protect his territory against Cokwe warriors. Le Marinel refused to trade claiming

he had no trade goods, and, furthermore, he was in no position to waste time bartering with Musembe since he had orders from the Congo Free State to proceed to the Katanga in advance of a British expedition representing the British South Africa Company.

Musembe's tactic then was to refuse to sell supplies to the expedition and to offer no assistance in crossing the Lulu River. Le Marinel retaliated by punishing him,⁵⁸ probably burning his villages and crops, before continuing on his way. Even after Le Marinel left, Musembe sent a messenger to him stating his willingness to submit, but Le Marinel's only reply was to command him to explain his wishes to the Commissaire du District at Luluabourg.⁵⁹

The incident reveals how preoccupied the State was with its interests in the Katanga and not with its occupation of the Kasai. Le Marinel missed an opportunity to gain the support of the Kanlok which might have prevented several tragedies later and might also have hastened the occupation of the south by the State. As it was, the Colore benefitted from the situation by pillaging more of Musembe's villages.⁶⁰ In desperation, Musembe presented himself to the State officials at Luluabourg, who had been forewarned by Le Marinel, and he therefore was immediately arrested. Together with his followers he was exiled to the Catholic mission at Mikalayl. A minor chief, Mutonju wa Kanda Kanda, who had assisted Le Marinel's expedition, was declared chief of the Kanlok.⁶¹ Some of the exiles became Christians and remained at Mikalayl even after Musembe

escaped in 1893 to return to his own area, where he was assassinated almost immediately by his enemies, after having been betrayed by Kanda Kanda.

Kanda Kanda's rise was due to the support which the European officers at Luluabourg gave him.⁶² Kanda Kanda could not win the support of most of the Kaniok, which may be why he remained in his village while Kalenda, Musembe's brother, gathered a large following. Kanda Kanda strengthened his position by giving Musembe's nephew charge of Musembe's village. However, shortly after Musembe's death the nephew was replaced by Musembe's brother, Tshipama Matenga.⁶³

From 1893 to 1894 the Kaniok were split with Kanda Kanda, Tshipama and Kalenda vying for leadership. The Colwe bands were quick to take advantage of the disunity and attack; however, they did not count on Tshipama and Kalenda joining forces, thus causing a Colwe defeat. This success gave Kalenda confidence to lead an attack against Kanda Kanda, who immediately requested assistance from the European officers at Luluabourg.⁶⁴

In August 1894, Mathieu Pelzer, commander of the Luluabourg garrison, and Lieutenant Florent Cassart left for Kanda Kanda with about 100 soldiers. Pelzer was delayed by problems with the Catholic mission at M'rode-Salvator,⁶⁵ which allowed Kalenda time to increase his strength.⁶⁶ Kalenda succeeded in gaining considerable support from among his Colwe allies since the State was a common enemy to both because of its support

of Kanda Kanda. Their combined effort led to Pelzer's defeat and return to Luluabourg.⁶⁷ At the beginning of 1895 Pelzer led his second expedition to Kanda Kanda with orders to vanquish Kalenda and bring a peace to the area which would be satisfactory to the Europeans. The expedition lasted from April to June 1895. Pelzer accompanied by two officers, Luc Dehaspe and Martin Böhler, who were to remain in the south to establish a new State post. Pelzer, who was brutally harsh with his troops, promised them great rewards for Kalenda's head. This was accomplished but the promised rewards were not forthcoming.⁶⁸

With the elimination of Kalenda, the Kaniok were divided into several chiefdoms under State-invested chiefs; namely Kayeye, Kanda Kanda, Mamfoi and Musembe.⁶⁹ The Kaniok had made their peace with the State and the region had become calm enough to allow for the establishment of a mission station. The State had been able to take advantage of a division among the people to subdue them and impose European supported chiefs. This satisfied the needs of Leopold's military forces, but it did not provide a solution for the Kaniok since the Colwe raiders could continue to take advantage of a divided people for another decade until State strength was able to curtail some of their activities.

The problem with the Kaniok was not an isolated incident in the Kasai. By 1894 the Arab campaigns were over and the State was able to redirect some of its efforts into strengthening its position in the Kasai. Kalamba's withdrawal in 1891 and Pelzer's defeat in 1894 emphasized the

State's weakness and its vulnerability should African groups unite against it. The constant presence of Cokwe slave raiders in the vicinity of Luluabourg kept Cassart occupied in campaigns against them in 1894. The only State posts with European personnel at this time were Lusambo and Luluabourg. The fear of a joint Kalamba-Cokwe attack resulted in the establishment of a State post at Mukabwa, about 80 kilometres south of Luluabourg, in July 1894. The post was located on a hill as a defense against invasion, but as late as February 1895 there were still only 40 soldiers under the command of a young officer, Albert Lapière, who had had no previous experience in Africa.⁷⁰ In October, Kalamba and the Cokwe attacked and devastated the post despite the assistance Cassart gave Lapière in attempting to defend it.⁷¹ Cassart was injured in the combat and in March 1895 left for Leopoldville to receive medical help. He returned in June, just in time to be inadvertently involved in the July revolt of the Luluabourg garrison.

In the meantime Mukabwa was reoccupied by Lapière in November 1894 with 30 soldiers. In February 1895, Kalamba again threatened the post, the garrison of which was reinforced by 50 more soldiers to a total of 80.⁷² The garrison of Luluabourg consisted of about 100 soldiers, about half of whom were members of the Batetela tribe. These men had been in the service of Ngongo Lutete and joined the State forces when Ngongo was condemned to death in September 1893.⁷³ Luluabourg was the second largest State post in the Kasai area by 1895. The only other State post to the

west of the Lulua was Wissmann Falls which was established as a trading centre for the Compagnie De Bergeyck in 1894 and then transferred to the Domaine Privé in 1895 with 33 soldiers posted there,⁷⁴ of whom at least 8 were Batetela, while most of the remainder were Baluba.⁷⁵ The post at Lusambo had the largest contingent of soldiers. Here there were 550 soldiers, at least 180 of whom were Batetela. In total, the Kasai area had 1088 soldiers of whom almost half were Batetela.⁷⁶

Besides the Batetela there were also the Baluba. Before Wissmann left on his expedition to the east in 1887, he recruited 58 Baluba to a four-year term of service in exchange for their freedom. Some of these men he took with him, the remainder were sent to the soldiers' training camp at Leopoldville.⁷⁷ These Baluba, together with others, came from the Lubilashi River valley and yearned to return to their homeland, but instead they were posted throughout the Kasai. When Pelzer made his campaign into Kaniok territory in 1895, he established a new post at Kayeye (Kabishi) to protect Kanda Kanda from the Colwe, and manned it with thirty-five Batetela soldiers and fifteen Baluba.⁷⁸

Those regular soldiers in the Force Publique in the Kasai who were not Batetela or Baluba were foreigners. Some of these were volunteers from the West Coast of Africa, for instance, two Hausas were killed in Luluabourg at the time of the revolt.⁷⁹ Other foreigners were volunteers or prisoners from the Arab campaigns, and included Manyema soldiers, Babouilles (or Babul) from the Kabambare/Luama River area, former soldiers

of Rimaliza⁸⁰ and Angolans or Bimbadi who had been recruited by Wissmann. In addition to these regular soldiers, there were also auxiliary forces, notably the Zappo Zap in the Luluabourg area.

The posts at Lusambo, Luluabourg, Mukabwa, Wissmann Falls and Kayeye constituted the bases for the State's occupation of the Kasai area outside of the Bakuba kingdom. From the first ascent of the Kasai River in 1886, traders had entered and established factories along the Kasai and Sankuru Rivers.⁸¹ The Bakuba found themselves encircled by foreigners while they were losing their position as middlemen in the trade between the riparian peoples of the Sankuru and those of Kabao and Luebo⁸² because of the presence of European traders. In 1893 a State post was temporarily established at Badinga on the right bank of the Sankuru west of Bena Dibebe for a few months only since Albert Lallemand, the officer in charge, together with the 150 soldiers posted there, was sent against the Arabs in December 1893.⁸³

In 1894 a State post was established on the left bank of the Sankuru by Michaux at Iyenga. It was intended as a frontier post, and was sited in Bakuba territory among a population which was suspicious of the traders and their Baluba workers.⁸⁴ It was hoped that from this post the State would be able to control the trade between the Bakuba and the Basongye. Gillian was never at ease about the post because of the hostility of the population surrounding it and probably, to a certain extent, the instability of Fisch, the officer in charge. To reassure himself, Gillian sent another

officer, E. Van Lerberghe, to support Fisch. However, in an attempt to collect taxes in ivory and rubber from the Bakuba, Fisch was attacked and killed by a poisoned arrow at the beginning of 1895, whereupon Van Lerberghe closed the post and withdrew to Lusambo.⁸⁵

In March 1895 Bollen led a punitive expedition against the Bakuba of Iyenga in which most of the chiefs of the surrounding villages were murdered and the death of Fisch was avenged. When returning to Lusambo Bollen established a new State post at Bena Dibebe on the right bank of the Sankuru.⁸⁶ There was scarcely time to get the post built before the soldiers' revolt at Luluabourg and again diverted European manpower into other areas. The State's impact on the Bakuba on the northern limits of their kingdom was, therefore, almost negligible until 1901.

The events leading to the revolt of the soldiers at Luluabourg in July 1895 had their beginning early in 1895. Kalamba's threatened attack on Mukabwa in February 1895 caused Lapière to send a message to Gillain for assistance, whereupon Michaux was immediately despatched to Luluabourg together with another officer, Joseph Korings, and 120 soldiers.⁸⁷

By the time they arrived at Mukabwa, Kalamba and his Cokwe allies had fled. A second threat by Kalamba brought Michaux into action again with 100 soldiers, supported by Chief Zappo Zap with 300 armed men. In spite of the fact that the campaign lasted from April 28 to June 21, 1895, it can hardly be termed successful even though 9,000 cartridges had been expended and both sides experienced losses.⁸⁸

Just prior to another campaign against Kalamba, in July-August 1895, the Luluabourg garrison mutinied on July 4, 1895, which caused State action to be directed against the rebel soldiers as well as Kalamba. The immediate cause of the revolt included harsh treatment by European officers and delays in pay. The underlying cause was an effort to avenge the death of Ngongo Lutete.⁸⁹ At this time there were about 1088 regular troops of the Force Publique in the Kasai area. The leaders of the revolt, Kandolo and Kimpuki, were members of Ngongo's former body guard, who were joined by many of the Baruba and all of the Batetela in the Force Publique.

The existence of such a large number of soldiers from one tribe in the forces stationed in the Kasai had been a matter of concern to Gillain when he became Commissaire du District in 1893. At that time he wrote to the Governor-General stating the necessity of a militia consisting of personnel from districts further removed.⁹⁰

The soldiers in revolt were aware of the hostile attitude of Kalamba and his following towards the European. On the day of the revolt, Captain M. Pelzer, commander of the Luluabourg garrison, was killed and one of his ears was cut off and sent to Kalamba as an indication that the domination of the white man was over.⁹¹ For many of the Lulua the resentment against the European dated back to Wissmann's policies in 1886. Various African leaders objected to their loss of prestige and humiliation by being subjected to Kalamba's authority. But with Kalamba at odds with the State, he provided a rallying point to incite an

anti-European revolt. Other leaders resented being required to pay heavy taxes in ivory and rubber and to supply labourers for the fields and roads. Tshingenge, Kalamba's ally by 1886, lived on the left bank of the Lulua but sometime before 1894 he relocated his village on the right bank to make himself more inaccessible to the State.⁹²

In the light of this situation it is not surprising that Cassart feared a union of all the Lulua and an attack on Europeans immediately after the revolt. The attack never came although Kalamba returned to the State post at Mukabwa, since Lapière had fled when his soldiers joined the mutineers. From here Kalamba's followers pillaged what was left of the Luluabourg supplies.⁹³ Along the entire route from Luebo to Luluabourg the population, which in 1887 had submitted to the State flag, now saw its opportunity to be free of State impositions. Thanks to the auxiliary Zappo Zap and Baluba forces, Konings arrived safely from his post at Wissmann Falls, while at Kayene the revolt resulted in the death of Dehaspe, one of the European officers.⁹⁴

For a period of time in 1895 the population of the Kasai, apart from the Zappo Zap, was either unconquered or in revolt. Why, then, did the Lulua uprisings fail to drive out the Europeans? The main reason is possibly that the Lulua remained disunited. Kalamba's power had come mainly from the European, and African leaders who resented this refused to unite with him. In the past, Kalamba had depended on the Cokwe for assistance, but in the last campaign the State had led against him in

April through June 1895 the Cokwe had experienced such heavy losses that they withdrew their support, so that by the end of July 1895 Kalamba was still alone.⁹⁵

A major factor in the State's ability to defend itself was that it could rely on the assistance of the Zappo Zap, volunteer Baluba groups and the Angolans in the area. These people were themselves foreigners and needed the European as much as the European needed them. And, lastly, the quick, clear-headed action of Cassart who was not afraid to take the offensive, was also a factor in avoiding an area-wide revolt. Cassart's immediate attack on Chikenge, also called Gongo, led to the latter's flight, at which Cassart burnt his villages and took his women captive.⁹⁶ Chikenge had been Kalamba's ally. Michaux, who became Commissaire du District in November 1895 found that one of his first tasks early in 1896 was to make a tour of the district to reward leaders who had supported the State during the difficult months of 1895 and to punish those who had supported the mutinous soldiers.⁹⁷ Gongo, a rebel, was killed and his ally, Bwanya, became a State prisoner.⁹⁸ The followers of both leaders submitted to the State.

Michaux was not so successful with Kalamba. In fact, it was Cassart's view that Michaux should have left Luluabourg immediately to follow the Batetela soldiers⁹⁹ while he, Cassart remained to deal with Kalamba. Cassart was certain he could negotiate a peace settlement with Kalamba¹⁰⁰ since he felt Kalamba had been abused by the European.¹⁰¹

However, Kalamba had fled and Cassart did not have another opportunity. By the middle of 1896 Kalamba was no match for the State troops, even though he was again assisted by the Cokwe and by Konings' Batefela soldiers who had arrived at Luluabourg too late to follow the others to the east. Kalamba fled to the Kasai River where he remained.

The revolt also served to reveal the sentiment of some of the population ruled by State-appointed chiefs. An example of this was Moamba Gufulu of the Bena Kalende whom Pelzer had recognized as chief of the Bajila Kasange in 1893.¹⁰² Moamba Gufulu had accompanied Wissmann to Zanzibar and returned via the Cape and Banana. He benefitted from his long acquaintance with the European by being made chief although his subjects never fully accepted him as was evidenced by the fact that when the 1895 revolt occurred three-fourths of his people joined Kalamba.¹⁰³ It was these deserters to Kalamba whom Michaux forced into submission in February 1896. Gufulu, however, could not maintain the support of his followers and Kamwena Zapo, his rival, led a significant number of them to the Catholic mission of Hemptinne where they received shelter.¹⁰⁴

For the Kasai area, the most significant result of the soldiers' revolt was the impossibility of making any military force available, for purposes other than the suppression of the mutiny in the Kasai, for some time. This weakened condition of the State made it possible for the area west of the Lulua to revolt. The invincibility of the European had been destroyed. This area included the unconquered Cokwe and Kalamba together

with one faction of the Batetela soldiers who moved into the southern area of the Lunda plateau as marauders.¹⁰⁵

Although the political reports of 1897 indicated that the Kasai was peaceful, the Cokwe threat remained. The need to secure at least some of the southern area resulted in the opening of a post at Kanda Kanda in 1897. This was located just slightly north of the former post of Kayeye, and was designed to protect the chiefs recognizing the State from Cokwe raids. In February 1898 the Chef de Secteur, Lt. De Cock, led an expedition against the Cokwe but, with only 50 soldiers, he was no match for the more numerous Cokwe and was forced to retreat. Reinforced by 125 soldiers and two Europeans from Luluabourg De Cock compelled the Cokwe to retreat, although they returned to the attack in August.¹⁰⁶ Each time a Cokwe band was sighted an expedition was sent against them, but often the State forces arrived after villages had been devastated and inhabitants taken as slaves. To bring peace, Charles Van Bredael, Commissaire du District in 1899, recommended the establishment of a State post at Mai Munene on the Kasai River, but this was not accomplished until 1903.

The State also made some inroads into Bakuba territory but not without difficulty. By 1895 the only State post on the Sankuru, besides Lusambo, was Bena Dibebe; however, some European trading factories stretched along the Sankuru. In 1899 the new Nyimi of the Bakuba was called to Luluabourg to acknowledge the State, and, undoubtedly, to pay

the necessary tax. His refusal to appear led to a punitive expedition in which Edmond Dufour, the military commander of Luluabourg, sent his faithful auxiliary troops, the Zappo Zap, to invade the kingdom and demand the payment of tribute. The bloody assault upon the Pyaang resulted in the death of eighty to ninety chiefs, villages were burnt and many of the victims were eaten.¹⁰⁷ The A.P.C.M. sent one of its missionaries, W.H. Sheppard, to the area and he wrote a report on what he saw,¹⁰⁸ including eighty-one hands being dried over a low fire. The Zappo Zap leader, Mlumba Nkusa, stated that the right hand was always cut off to give to the State as evidence that the mission had been accomplished.¹⁰⁹ The result of the expedition was that the eastern Bakuba, the Pyaang and Ngeende, began paying tribute to the State. When missionaries objected to the violence of the incident the State imprisoned the Zappo Zap leader for six months but acquitted Dufour.¹¹⁰ The State could not afford to take strong measures against the Zappo Zap since they had supported the State at the time of the soldiers' revolt in 1895. Also the Zappo Zap far outnumbered the State troops and any reprisal would probably have resulted in the annihilation of State forces. Two more military operations were made against the Bakuba in 1899 according to a report appearing in the Congressional Record, April 19, 1904 as given by Rev. William M. Morrison of the A.P.C.M. at Luebo. These attacks appear to have been made from the State post at Isaka, established in 1899 on the Sankuru.¹¹¹ Undoubtedly the Zappo Zap assisted, together

with a trader named Drion. The result was the final conquest of the capital and the conquest of the Bakuba.¹¹²

By 1901 the scope of the State's penetration into the Kasai area was still very limited. Because of the concentration of troops in the eastern fringes of the district, to combat the Arabs and move into the Katanga, this region was occupied first and became fertile ground for the Catholic missionaries. In spite of the establishment of several mission posts to the south of Luluabourg and the establishment of a State post at Kanda Kanda the south remained unoccupied until after 1901. The State post at Kanda Kanda did not have sufficient strength to move against the Cokwe but served basically to keep peace among the local population.

The most extensive unoccupied area by 1901 was located between the Kasai and Lulua Rivers. The posts at Wissmann Falls and Mukabwa were not reopened after the 1895 revolt, and the only State presence in the area was through an occasional tour made by officials from Luluabourg. Kalamba, who at the outset of the first European contact had been an ally of the State now occupied a village on the Kasai River and traded with his Cokwe allies. This entire area was devoid of any European post.

Although the Kuba had been successful at resisting a European presence in their kingdom, except for the A.P.C.M. station at Ibanché, trading companies had posts on the river systems surrounding them and

the Kuba were forced by 1899 to recognize the State, in a manner which had repercussions several years later.

The State's strength in these early years rested with its African allies, the Zappo Zap and the Baluba. The scores of Baluba refugees who fled into the area, to escape from Arab slave-raiding, found shelter with the Europeans. They became the agricultural workers, the converts to Christianity, the recruits to the Force Publique and the traders whom the Europeans needed. They also represented the formation of an elite group, located near European settlements and accepting the European standards. In many cases they were resented by their fellow Africans and regarded as foreigners.

VII. EUROPEAN SETTLEMENTS IN THE KASAI AREA 1885-1901

FOOTNOTES

1. See Map IV.
2. Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule, pp. 22-25.
3. Only those directly relevant to the Kasai area will be mentioned here.
4. Paul Pogge, Beiträge zur Entdeckungsgeschichte Afrika's (Berlin: Verlag von Dietrich Reimer, 1880), pp. 95-97; Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule, pp. 31-32. Pogge, 1838-1884, had studied law but became more interested in travelling than in establishing a law practice. In 1864 he went on a hunting trip to South Africa (Natal) which sparked his interest in African travels. He stayed in Lunda territory for two years, then returned to Germany to write his book, Im Reich des Mwata Yamvo. He returned to Africa in 1880 accompanied by Hermann von Wissmann.
5. Paul Pogge, Im Reich des Mwata Yamvo (Berlin: Verlag von Dietrich Reimer, 1880), p. 50.
6. In the expeditions undertaken by David Livingstone in 1854 he referred to the Kasai and Sankuru Rivers in the marshes near Lake Dilolo, about 110S. David Livingstone, Explorations dans l'intérieur de l'Afrique australe et voyages à travers le continent de Saint-Paul de Loanda à l'embouchure du Zambeze. De 1840 à 1856 (Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette et Cie., 1859), p. 371.
7. Vansina, "Du royaume Kuba," p. 5.
8. Wissmann, Unter Deutscher Flagge, pp. 5, 40. The Association was interested in the Lunda plateau as a prospective market for German trade. After establishing a station in Kasai, Wissmann had orders to travel to the east coast.

9. Ibid., p. 12. The caravan included Ambaquiste traders from the region of Ambaca, north-west of Malange; sixty-five porters from Kimbundu; and two interpreters, Germano de Jose Maria and Kaschawalla (Caxavalla). Germano had been in the service of Portuguese officers in Lisbon; he had also been a trader in Angola and had accompanied Pogge on his journey into the Lunda Empire. Kaschawalla came from Angola where he had attended a Jesuit school and learned to read and write. He had previously accompanied Saturnino to Lunda territory.

10. Ibid., pp. 41, 90.

11. At this time Kalamba had about 150 guns, while his nearest rival, Tshingenge, had 100. Ibid., p. 90.

12. Van Zandijcke, Pages d'histoire du Kasayi, pp. 22-23.

13. Ibid., p. 56.

14. Hermann von Wissmann, Im Innern Afrikas (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1888), pp. vii-ix. The aims of the German expeditions were not clear. On the one hand they were undertaken on behalf of the African International Association with Leopold's support; but, on the other hand they were acting on behalf of German interests and the possibilities of gaining markets for Germany. In spite of the fact that Wissmann was hired by Leopold for this expedition he considered himself to be travelling in the interests of Germany and when he handed Luluabourg over to the agents of the Congo Free State he reportedly told the Lulua that they would now be dealing with a different type of people who would not look on them as favourably as he (Wissmann) had, they were, furthermore, poor with "only one pair of pants where we Germans have two." Van Zandijcke, Pages d'histoire, pp. 33-34.

15. Wissmann, Im Innern, pp. viii, ix, 23, 24; Mouvement Géographique (Brussels), April 5, 1885, No. 7, p. 256. The caravan consisted of 320 porters, many of whom, (such as Kaschawalla, Germano and Joachim Mwanda), had been with Wissmann's previous escort. The equipment included 500 guns and one canon donated by Friedrich Krupp; a collapsible steel boat large enough to carry sixteen passengers; and trade articles purchased at Malange. The personnel consisted of Dr. Ludwig Wolf, an anthropologist and a military physician with experience in Togo; Captain Curt von François, a geographer with experience in South-West Africa; Lieutenant Franz Mueller, a photographer and meteorologist who died at Luluabourg in February 1885; his

brother, Lieutenant Hans Mueller, a zoologist and botanist; Bugslag, a shipbuilder who had descended the Kwango with Major von Mechow in 1880; a mechanic and a gunsmith. The latter died at Malange without ever reaching the Kasai.

16. See p. 70 below.

17. Mouvement Géographique (Brussels), October 4, 1885, no. 21, p. 81a. The fleet consisted of Wissmann in the lead in the "Paul Pogge," 10 large pirogues for merchandise and armed personnel, and 10 smaller pirogues for passengers. The passenger list included more than 200 people: 150 Lulua, including 30 women and children, and 48 Ambaquistes from Angola. Bugslag remained at Luluabourg with 25 soldiers.

18. Van Zandijcke, Pages d'histoire, pp. 68-73. The C.F.S. had a post at Kwa, under the direction of Burton and Swinburne, two English officers in the service of the C.F.S. At Kwa Wissmann learned that the C.F.S. had been created at the Berlin West Africa Conference and that the German post within the Kasai area was in C.F.S. territory.

19. A.E. (A.A.) 501 (338), Leopoldville, August 2, 1885, Wissmann to King Leopold.

20. Charles Bateman, an Englishman, entered the service of the A.I.A. shortly before it became recognized as the Congo Free State. He had spent several years on the South-West coast of Africa where he represented a Liverpool trading firm. In 1884 he accepted service with Lt. Hurt, R.N., in a survey of the Kwilo-Niadi region following which he proceeded to the camp d'instruction at Lutete in the lower Congo. Here he met Dr. Wolf and subsequently was assigned to construct the Luebo post.

21. Charles S.L. Bateman, The First Ascent of the Kasai (London: George Philip and Son, 1889), pp. 60-62.

22. Ibid., p. 100; Sir Harry Johnston, George Grenfell and the Congo, Vol. I (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1908), p. 149.

23. See above p. 59, fn. 24.

24. Wissmann, Unter deutscher Flagge, p. 96.

25. Ibid., pp. 82, 87-89.

26. Wissmann, Im Innern, pp. 167-168. When Wissmann returned in 1884, Tshingenge was Kalamba's prisoner and it was only through Wissmann's intervention that he was freed on the condition that he would support Kalamba.
27. A.E. (A.A.) 501 (338) Leopoldville, August 2, 1885, Wissmann to King Leopold. See page 72 above.
28. Ibid.; Wissmann, Im Innern, pp. 227, 236.
29. Ibid., pp. 40, 149. There were several reasons for not establishing a permanent post at Mukenge. The post needed to be easily defended from hostile peoples, especially the Imbangala and Cokwe who feared the intrusion of white traders into their well-established and profitable trading areas. Furthermore, the new site needed to be located near a water source.
30. A.E. (A.A.) 326, Luluabourg Station, December 1, 1884, Wissmann to King Leopold. The name, Luluabourg, was initially recognized almost exclusively by the Europeans alone. Wissmann's caravans were comprised chiefly of Ambaquistas from the Malange area of Angola and, in a moment of homesickness, they referred to the new settlement as Malange, also called Malandji, or Malandi. With the construction of the railway Luluabourg was moved to the right bank of the Lulua River in 1933. In 1972 it was renamed Kananga.
31. Bateman, The First Ascent of the Kasai, p. 73. Some of these Bakete assisted in the construction work as did several of Kalamba's Lulua followers and the Zanzibari soldiers Bateman had brought with him. All rations were paid in cowrie shells. Ibid., p. 77.
32. Mouvement Géographique (Brussels), October 4, 1885, no. 21, p. 81a.
33. Bateman, The First Ascent of the Kasai, p. 3.
34. A.E. (A.A.) 325, Brussels, January 25, 1885, Strauch to Wissmann.
35. A.E. (A.A.) 325, Brussels, June 3, 1885, Strauch to Wissmann.
36. Wissmann, Through Equatorial Africa, p. 86.
37. Ibid., p. 132; Bateman, The First Ascent of the Kasai, pp. 116-121.

38. Wissmann, Im Innern, pp. 172-186; A.E. (A.A.) 501 (338), De la Louloua II Station, Tchirla, May 20, 1885, Wissmann to King Leopold.

39. In 1892 when the State was in pursuit of Kalamba, Katende did not support him and considered the Bakwa Muaza to be independent. He did, however, support the State and was recognized as customary chief although he was not invested until the 1920s. Vallaëys, Rapport sur les Baluba, p. 25.

40. Hermann von Wissmann, My Second Journey Through Equatorial Africa from the Congo to the Zambezi in the years 1886 and 1887 (London: Chatto and Windus, Picadilly, 1891), p. 144. The practice of slave redemption by the State and, later, by the missionaries and commercial societies will be considered in more detail in chapter IX.

41. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Extracts from a letter dated December 20, 1887, De Macar to the Department of the Interior.

42. In his frustration de Macar took it upon himself to address a severe letter to the Governor of Malange in which he enclosed a list of the Angolans practicing slave trading and explaining his actions of freeing the slaves and sending the traders away. The Governor of Malange never did reply, but the Governor-General at Boma, Camille Janssen, and the Administrator-General of the Department of the Interior, Colonel Strauch, expressed their shocked concern at de Macar's independent action. Henceforth District Commissioners were informed that matters of an international nature were outside their realm of authority. There is no evidence that the Congo Free State shared de Macar's repulsion for the slave traffic sufficiently to take action against Portugal. A.E. (A.A.) 65; Luluabourg, June 30, 1887, De Macar to the Governor of Malange; *ibid.*, Brussels, November 30, 1888, Vantvelde to the Governor-General.

43. Dias de Carvalho, pp. 34, 46-48; Bateman, The First Ascent of the Kasai, pp. 139, 168. Undoubtedly these traders dabbled in slave trading also, but they couldn't compete against the volume of trade carried on by the people from Bihé and the Cokwe.

44. Mouvement Géographique, March 25, 1888, no. 8, pp. 30c-31a.

45. Dias de Carvalho, Lubuku, pp. 57-59. Dias de Carvalho suspects that the reason the Europeans were able to keep Kalamba faithful to them at this time was that any prisoners the State had would be turned over to him. He in turn, would exchange them for ivory from the Bakuba which would go to the State for more prisoners. In effect, the State was exchanging slaves for ivory.

46. R.P. Marcel Storme, Konflikt in de Kasai-Missie (Bruxelles: Académie royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques, N.S., xxxi-1, 1965), p. 378. Luluabourg did not have a significant military force until 1892 and even then there were only 180 soldiers, mostly liberated slaves.

47. Ibid., p. 379. These plantations consisted of manioc, maize and rice. Most of these products were used as rations for the workers at the post, or sent to various European posts.

48. L. Braconnier to his son Carlos, Luluabourg, February 15, 1888, Mouvement Géographique, May 20, 1888, no. 12, p. 48a. The hostile population probably refers to Kalamba and allies. The whites Kalamba feared were Albert Thys and Le Marinel who were passing through on a scientific mission. Thys visited various parts of the Congo at this time in order to explore its commercial possibilities. His chief interest was the construction of the Matadi-Leopoldville railway.

49. Liénart was not a man to be trifled with. He had had experience in dealing with hostile peoples in the Ubangi River region, and he was not afraid to deal with Kalamba. Biographie Coloniale Belge, Volume II (Bruxelles: Avenue Marnix, 25, 1951), pp. 627-629. Gillain described Liénart as being "intransigent, a man who had never bowed, but wished everyone to bow before him." Storme, Konflikt, p. 334.

50. The Luebo post did not have a European officer from 1888, the year Bateman left, until 1890 or 1891. The State gave the site to the Société Anonyme Belge pour le commerce du Haut-Congo in 1888. R.P. Marcel Storme, La mutinerie militaire au Kasai en 1895 (Bruxelles: Académie royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, Classe des Sciences Morales et Politiques, N.S.; xxxviii-4, 1970), p. 35; Oscar Michaux, Au Congo, Carnet de Campagne (Bruxelles: Librairie Falk, 1907), p. 88.

51. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 44; Samuel P. Verner, Pioneering in Central Africa (Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication, 1903), p. 394.

52. Van Zandijcke, Pages d'Histoire, p. 92. From 1891-1895 there were two Commissaires du District, one at Luluabourg and the other at Lusambo.

53. Storme, Konflikt, p. 334.

54. These were Angolans whom Wissmann had brought with him. They were now acting as interpreters, guards and special emissaries for the Europeans. They were settled in a village to the south-west of Luluabourg where they were actively engaged in commerce besides serving the State and the Roman Catholic Mission founded at Mikalayi in 1891. These Angolans were also referred to as Bimbadi (meaning civilized or evolved) or Baptistas.

55. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, pp. 77-79; Verner, Pioneering in Central Africa, pp. 351-352. By 1891 a group of Zappo Zap's followers were in business at Luebo where they brought rubber to a European trader.

56. Storme, Konflikt, pp. 382-383. Kalamba's stepson, Kalamba-Muana, had attempted to make amends for his father's actions towards the State by an offering of gifts and a request to relocate. But Kalamba himself did not make overtures of peace.

57. Edgard Verdick, Les premiers jours au Katanga (1890-1903) (Bruxelles: Comité Spécial du Katanga, 1952), p. 25.

58. Van Zandijcke, Pages d'histoire, p. 176.

59. Verdick, Les premiers jours, pp. 26-27.

60. Ibid.

61. Van Zandijcke, Pages d'histoire, p. 176.

62. These officers were L. Rom, the Commissaire du District and his assistant, Doorme. Gillain states that this was done to display power and armed strength since they were jealous of Lusambo's growing importance. Storme, Konflikt, p. 334; Biographie Coloniale Belge, II, p. 823.

63. Storme, Konflikt, pp. 187-188.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., p. 209; see Chapter IV below for details.

66. Ibid., p. 237. Père Cambier states that Kanda Kanda had been killed just prior to Pelzer and Cassart's arrival. However, this must have been a rumour since no verification appears in subsequent reports and a chief Kanda Kanda was invested as a Kaniok chief at a later date.

67. Ibid., p. 334.

68. Gillain Papers, Tervuren Museum, Luluabourg, August 5, 1895, Report on the Luluabourg revolt by Felicien T. Nobre, Charpentier de Luluabourg, to Gillain.

69. R.P. Marcel Scheitler, "Histoire de l'Eglise Catholique au Kasai," undated manuscript at the Mikalayi mission at Mikalayi, Zaire, examined through the courtesy of R.P. Stappers, p. 68. Musembe was a descendent of the former Musembe and had been educated and baptized at the mission at Mikalayi in January 1897 where he received the Christian name David.

70. Oscar Michaux, Au Congo: Carnet de Campagne (Bruxelles: Librairie Falk Fils, 1907), p. 263. See Map VII for location of State posts.

71. Storme, Konflikt, pp. 253-254.

72. Storme, La mutinerie militaire, pp. 38-40.

73. Ibid., pp. 46-49.

74. Ibid., p. 12, 46-49.

75. Gillain Papers, Luluabourg, July 20, 1895, Konings to Gillain.

76. Storme, La mutinerie militaire, p. 49.

77. Mouvement Géographique, March 27, 1887, no. 7, p. 28c.

78. Storme, La mutinerie militaire, pp. 38-39.

79. Gillain Papers, Luluabourg, August 5, 1895, Cassart to Gillain.

80. Ibid., undated report to Governor-General by Gillain. Rumaliza was an Arab chief located at Ujiji who controlled a large area west of Lake Tanganyika and around the northern end of the lake. After his defeat in 1894 some of his men joined the Congo Force Publique.

81. See pp. 108-116.

82. Vansina, "Du royaume kuba," p. 12.

83. Storme, La mutinerie militaire, p. 17; Vansina, "Du royaume kuba," p. 12.

84. Gillain Papers, March 22, 1894, Gillain to Colonel Fisch.

85. Gillain Papers, Ienga, January 12, 1895; E. Van Lerberghe to Gillain; Storme, Konflikt, pp. 391-393.

86. Gillain Papers, Bena Dibele, March 21, 1895, Bollen to Gillain.

87. Michaux, Au Congo, p. 263; Storme, Konflikt, pp. 362-363.

88. Michaux, Au Congo, pp. 264-278.

89. Several thorough studies on the revolt have been made. Among these are: Marcel Storme, La Mutinerie Militaire au Kasai en 1895; A. Van Zandijcke, Pages d'Histoire au Kasai, includes two chapters on it; O. Michaux, Au Congo, Carnet de Campagne, gives Cassart and Lapière's accounts. It is generally agreed that among the chief causes of the revolt were: a) a desire to avenge the death of Ngongo Lutete, b) the severity of their commander, Pelzer, and his frequent use of the chicotte (Hippo whip), c) poor living conditions, insufficient rations especially while on a campaign, and d) Pelzer's failure to keep his promise after the campaign against the Kaniok.

90. Gillain Papers, July 12, 1895, Gillain to Governor-General: Ngongo Lutete had been executed by State officers in 1893 on charges of treason.

91. The ear was severed by a warrior of Moana Mai (Kalamba's ally). Both were captured and put in chains. The chief was replaced and Cassart warned them that he would cut off both their ears and then kill them. He adds,

"They understand that I will do this." Gillain Papers, Luluabourg, August 11, 1895, Cassart to Gillain.

92. Storme, La mutinerie, pp. 114-115.

93. Gillain Papers, July 10, 1895. Cassart to Gillain. The Catholic mission at Mikalayî also feared an attack by the Lulua. Père Emeri Cambier feared a revolt among the Kaniok peoples since a group of Kaniok to the south of the mission had followed the soldiers. The revolt did not occur. The arrival of the Zappo Zap averted a Lulua attack.

94. Ibid., Luluabourg, July 20, 1895, Konings to Gillain. After pillaging the State post at Kayeye, the mutineers moved back towards Ngongo Lutete's former area of dominance in the northern Katanga where they were defeated at Dibwe on 6 November, 1895. They then regrouped, only to be routed as a cohesive force late in 1896 at Bena Kapwa. Storme, La mutinerie militaire, pp. 80-89; Isolated Batetela then continued to resist the State, in the Katanga until 1905 and in the Kasai until 1907. These men stimulated resistance in those areas, just as other Batetela did further north after a separate mutiny by other Batetela in 1897. Turner, "A Century of Political Conflict in Sankuru," pp. 86-89.

95. Ibid., St. Trudon, July 31, 1895, Père Sanden to Gillain.

96. Ibid., Luluabourg, August 8, 1895, Cassart to Gillain.

97. Michaux, Au Congo, p. 327.

98. Ibid., pp. 359-361.

99. Gillain Papers, Luluabourg, August 11, 1895, Cassart to Gillain.

100. Ibid., August 8, 1895, Cassart to Gillain.

101. Cassart was convinced that Kalamba wanted peace, but that he failed to convince Liénart because the Belgian officer had been led into error continually by the Angolans at Luluabourg to whom Kalamba was a cause for anxiety in their commerce. Gillain Papers, Tervuren Museum, Luluabourg, August 2, 1895, Cassart to Gillain.

102. Vallaeys, Rapport sur les Baluba, p. 18.

103. Ibid., Storme, Konflikt, pp. 383-386.

104. Vallaëys, Rapport sur les Baluba, p. 19. Gufulu, who had differences with the Catholic mission by 1902, gave his support to the A.P.C.M. The differences between Gufulu and Kamwena Zapo were not resolved until 1913 after it had involved missionaries, State officials in the Congo and the home Government in Brussels.

105. They were finally captured in 1907.

106. A.F. -1 -1 2nd series 1876-1903, Rapport l'année 1897 du District du Lualaba-Kasai.

107. Vansina, "Du royaume kuba," p. 16.

108. This marked the beginning of the conflict between the A.P.C.M. and the State. The incident will be considered in the light of the Reform Campaign in Chapter IX.

109. H.R. Box-Bourne, Civilization in Congoland: A Story of International Wrong-Doing (London: P.S. King and Son, 1903), pp. 259-261.

110. Vansina, "Du royaume kuba," p. 16.

111. A.E. (A.A.) 524 (345) contained a copy of the Fifty-eighth Congress, Second Section, Washington, Tuesday, April 19, 1904. In Correspondence from Dr. Jan Vansina, February 16, 1976, concerning these attacks, he stated: "The Kuba have forgotten the first of these (I suspect it went along the Lubadi) and attribute the second to troops coming from the South or Southeast. There is some memory though about an attack from 'Lusambo' which is in this context probably Isaka."

112. Vansina, "Du royaume kuba," pp. 18-19.

CHAPTER IV

THE INITIAL PENETRATION OF THE KASAI BY TRADING
COMPANIES AND MISSIONARIES 1886-1901

Initial State penetration opened the way for further European penetration by allowing trading companies and missionary societies to establish their interests in the Kasai under State protection since, by virtue of the Berlin Act of 1885, the whole Congo basin was designated as a free trade area which was also open to scientific, religious and other charitable groups. Throughout much of the Congo, colonial rule was established through the three parallel hierarchies of the State, commercial companies and the Church. The Kasai area is a particularly appropriate example of this communion, especially since representatives of each group entered simultaneously at Luebo in 1886.

The previous chapter outlined the State's early advances into the Kasai region where, by 1901, it was in control of Lusambo, Lulubourg and, to a lesser degree, several smaller posts such as Kanda Kanda and Bena Dibele. Limited manpower, however, presented the State from occupying the greater part of the Kasai area. Despite this, because Zairian African communities displayed a desire to trade, within the first fifteen years a variety of trading companies entered the area, primarily seeking rubber. These companies, establishing factories which extended along the

navigable water routes, found they could depend on the State for protection and, for the most part, survived on their ability to appease the economic demands of the local African population. They were helped by the completion of the Matadi-Leopoldville railway in 1898, which allowed goods to be imported and exported more cheaply while resulting in increased competition through the entry of more companies.

The first permanent missionaries entered the Kasai in 1891 when both Catholic and Protestant missionaries established their first stations. Limited personnel and difficulties with the State kept the American Presbyterian Congo Mission small and, by 1901, it had only two stations. On the other hand, the Catholic Scheut Congregation advanced more quickly and by the same year had established five mission stations.¹ The State supported the Catholic mission by making sites readily available and by supplying potential converts in a manner which was to provide the seeds for later friction between Catholic and Protestant missionaries. Both missions shared the same goal: to establish an indigenous African church. However, the Protestants regarded Romanism as a hindrance to true Christianity because of its alleged idolatry and superstition, while the Catholics regarded the Protestants as unconsecrated schismatics who devoted too much time to their families, views which were to acerbate their relations. The story of the next fifteen years was to be one of attempted independence by the three intruding groups which masked a mutual interdependence.

The Kasai area had a great potential for trade. The land was fertile and large plantations of manioc and maize were possible. The population density was such that porters and workers could be expected to be readily available. Coveted rubber and some ivory, especially among the Bakuba where it may have been stored, were believed to be there for the taking. Most encouraging of all was the known extent of the desire to trade by Africans.

The first company to follow the State officials into the Kasai was the Sanford Exploring Expedition, (S.E.E.), formed in Brussels in 1886 by Messrs. Sanford, Brugmann, Balser and associates. At this time the only State post accessible by a water route in the Kasai area was Luebo and the S.E.E. established a factory there in 1886.² The company, however, could not afford to operate an isolated post in the interior and, in December 1888, it was taken over by the Société Anonyme Belge pour le commerce du Haut-Congo (S.A.B.), founded by Albert Thys.³ The S.A.B. also assumed responsibility for the State post at Luebo since there was no State official assigned there from 1888 until approximately 1904.⁴

Luebo had several important advantages as a trading centre. Its position on a navigable river allowed easy access from the outside world and provided it with good local communications, while its location among peoples eager to trade meant that it would probably be profitable. The precolonial trade patterns discussed earlier reveal an active trade between

the markets at Kabao in Kuba territory north of Luebo,⁵ and Kalamba's market southeast of Luebo, both connected to Angola. Furthermore, the Luebo area, as well as most of the Kasai region, was rich in rubber vines and trees which yielded the raw rubber which the trading companies desired. The S.A.B. first established a factory at Luebo, but the rich rubber vines along the Kasai River encouraged its agents to expand the area of exploitation.

In 1891 Ernest Stache, an agent for the S.A.B. established a secondary post at Wissmann Falls, mainly for the purpose of buying ivory, but Stache obtained only twenty-five tusks of varying sizes.⁶ Most of the company's trade, however, was in rubber and not in ivory.⁷ In the same year, Stache opened a factory at Bena Luidi, at the junction of the Lulua and Kasai Rivers. In 1893, two former State agents, Leroux and G. de Macar, became its managers.⁸ The S.A.B. expanded further by establishing Bena Bendi at the junction of the Sankuru and Kasai Rivers in 1892 and Manghai and Nanzadi, near the confluence of the Lubue and Kasai Rivers, with two European agents and thirty men each in 1893. On the Sankuru, the company's posts were located at Mukikamu and Inkongo, also established in 1893.⁹

Inkongo lay in the fertile area near Lusambo, where the agent, Janssens, developed large plantations of manioc, maize and rice. His workers came from a neighboring village whose inhabitants Janssens had persuaded to move to the vicinity of the factory. Besides supplying the workers at the factory with rations, the plantation's crops undoubtedly were also used to trade with.¹⁰

By 1893, the S.A.B.'s factories thus extended along the Kasai and Sankuru Rivers in areas where the inhabitants had indicated a desire to trade and had a receptive attitude towards the foreign intruders. More significantly with the exception of Inkongu, located near Lusambo, none of the factories had been established in the vicinity of State posts.

These factories sought rubber in exchange for cloth. The Lulua, Zappo Zap and the Bakuba all brought rubber to Luebo, while the Bakuba also brought some ivory to exchange for camwood. Lapsley describes rubber production in the Luebo area as follows:

The rubber is caught from an incision in the tree or vine, stewed until viscid, cut into strips, which are rolled into balls two inches in diameter. Then the balls are stuck together in blocks of one hundred.¹¹

These were then taken to a factory where

One Accragrabs the basket of the nearest Zappo Zap or Bashilange, as the case may be, empties its contents into a large one, ready for the purpose, and suspends it on the scale. Mr. E. adjusts, reads, and says one fathom, two fathoms strong cloth, the latter if the vender has brought a big basket full. He steps inside the store to the counter, seizes a piece of cloth, measures the length from one finger tip to the other of his outstretched arms. Bakan cuts it off, thrusts it into the hand of the buyer, and thrusts him out of the way.¹²

On the Sankuru the agents at Mukikamu, Uncles and Roux, were not as successful as the S.A.B. in encouraging the surrounding population to collect rubber. The dilemma was partially solved with imported labour. Uncles, an American from New York who had managed coffee and rubber

plantations in Costa Rica brought ten Costa Rican and Nicaraguan rubber-cutters with him.¹³ Some of them were placed in auxiliary posts, near the main factory, where they attempted to induce the local population to cut the rubber vines properly and to bring the latex to the camp of the imported worker to prepare it for shipment. The rubber being brought in was filled with impurities such as dirt, "bark from the trees and oil from the bodies of the Africans on whom it was plastered for convenience of carrying."¹⁴

By 1896, local Africans had been induced to bring latex to the factory, but it was still filled with many impurities. Uncles accordingly devised a method to purify it and improve its market value. There is no indication as to how much rubber this particular post was collecting, but Uncles estimated that with four hundred workers employed in the harvesting of the latex he would be able to produce a ton of purified rubber in two days.¹⁵ The subsequent increased volume of rubber brought to the post may possibly have been because of an increase in local prices, or since, with time, competition between companies forced a rise in the amount paid for the latex. The assistants whom Uncles imported were accustomed to managing a factory and probably had had experience in pressuring people to work. But even at that, the total rubber production in the Kasai for 1896 was only 160 tons for all private companies, which suggests that cooperation from the local population was minimal.¹⁶

On either side of Mukikamu were competing factories established by the Nieuwe Afrikaanse Handelsvennootschap (N.A.H.V.), based in Rotterdam. This company began operations in the Congo in 1885 and opened negotiations to enable it to enter the Kasai area in 1886 but as these were not completed quickly, it was not until 1888 that the N.A.H.V. moved into Luebo.¹⁷ By 1894 they had established two additional factories on the Sankuru at Butala and Zappo Zap.¹⁸

For six years these were the only trading companies in the Kasai. However, in 1892, the Compagnie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie decided to create a new company called the Compagnie du Caoutchouc du Kasai. Although negotiations were never completed, the plans for this company became the basis upon which the Compagnie du Kasai was established in 1907.

With the free trade decree of 1892 promising at least temporary stability in the Kasai trade various new companies were formed. An affiliated company of the S.A.B. the Société Anonyme de Produits Végétaux (S.A.P.V.), was formed in 1894 under the leadership of Ernest Maerten, who had formerly managed the plantation work at the State post at Luluabourg.¹⁹ The company's centre of operations was Galikoko, where it received a concession of 1,000 hectares and an option over a further 4,000 hectares on the right bank of the Lulua, extending to the Kasai, with exclusive rights to exploit rubber within a 30 kilometre radius of Galikoko.²⁰ The

S.A.P.V.'s intention was to establish coffee plantations and, during Verner's visit to it in 1896, he noted that:

Garden beds, made by driving short sticks close together into the ground, forming a bed fifteen by four feet, and then filling in with humus, were covered with grass six feet above the beds. In these the Liberian coffee was planted to be later put out in the fields. In 1896 the work had just begun - two years later they had about a hundred thousand plants put out. This work had been done wholly by Belgians under the superintendence chiefly of Messrs. Ponthier and Michels.²¹

The labourers were Baluba, many of them slaves of the Zappo Zap who hired them out and took their pay. At Gallkoko there were five hundred of these labourers and Verner noted that it cost \$300 per month to support them, which was the equivalent of four yards of calico and one hundred pounds of manioc dough for each person. In spite of this ambitious attempt to enter the coffee business, rubber trading seems to have provided a quicker profit, for a State agent noted that "the S.A.P.V. was supposed to plant coffee, but its coffee came up rubber...."²²

In 1895 the S.A.P.V. opened a new factory at Bena Makima on the Kasai River which brought it into competition with the S.A.B. at Bena Luidi. Further expansion occurred in 1900 when the S.A.P.V. received a concession of 100 hectares of land at Mushenge, the Bakuba capital.²³ The factory at Mushenge was established in the wake of the new Nyimi's refusal to acknowledge the State by paying his taxes, which had resulted in the assault on the Pyaang in 1899.²⁴

The opening of the railway between Matadi and Leopoldville in 1898 made cheaper transportation possible and caused a series of smaller companies to be formed for, or to begin, operations in the Kasai. The Plantations du Lubéfu, under the direction of F. Cassart, was established in 1897 together with another company, La Djuma. In 1898 La Kassaienne, under the direction of Rom, Le Loange, and Le Trafic Congolais were organized. In 1899 three more companies were formed, Les Plantations Lacourt, l'Est du Kwango, and La Centrale Africaine. In 1900 Les Comptoirs Congolais Velde was created. Two other companies, La Belgika and La Compagnie des Magasins généraux which had established factories at Stanley Pool in 1895 moved into the Kasai in 1900. These fourteen companies (thirteen Belgian and one Dutch) amalgamated on December 31, 1901 to form the Compagnie du Kasai (C.K.).

Besides these organized companies operating in the Kasai before 1902, there were also individuals who traded privately. At Luebo, Marius Baudour, a former S.A.B. agent did so, while the Portuguese traders, Saturnino and Carvalho, were still in the Kasai: Carvalho was back at Luebo but traded in slaves in the surrounding markets, while Saturnino had a factory at Kapuku-Kimbundu on the Muanzangoma.²⁵

The main objective of the companies was to trade in rubber, which led to keen competition between them, especially in areas where several companies had factories as at Leubo, where one of the most prosperous companies was

La Belgika, which purchased from five to six tons of rubber each month.²⁶

The method by which rubber was obtained was left to the discretion of the individual agent. The primary aim was to show a profit at the end of the month in whatever manner it could be arranged since, as Landbeck notes, the central office was not interested in theory but in results.²⁷ Consequently European agents of various companies at the same post would attempt to balance their books at the end of the day by using trickery and cunning to persuade a caravan of rubber carriers to leave their rubber with them rather than with a competitor.²⁸ To further compete with one another, companies sometimes located so near to each other that on occasion their boundaries would overlap. This became evident in 1902 when the State sent a surveyor to the Kasai to learn the exact areas designated to each of the participating companies of the C.K. In several localities, such as Inkongu and Butala, three or four companies operated without having their borders defined.²⁹ This meant that rich rubber areas were exploited by workers from several companies, which caused disputes. Since most factories were located away from State posts, since State control at best was weak and since State attention in any case focussed on events to the east of the Kasai area, company agents were left to cope with their own problems.

The result was a level of competition which none of the companies could support. The attempt to find workers, and the gathering and preparation

of rubber, were open to fraudulent methods. The purchasing price of rubber increased with a consequent increase in company expenses, particularly after the advent of the small companies in 1897. In the Kasai the cost price rose from 40 to 50 centimes per kilo of rubber to 1.50 to 2.00 francs per kilo in 1901.³⁰ The desire to take advantage of these prices led the local population to increase the weight of the rubber they sold to the trader by introducing sand, palm nuts, bark and other waste matter into it. Consequently the companies were paying more for a product that was yielding less.³¹ By the end of 1901, eight of the fourteen companies closed their accounts with a deficit or without showing a profit, so that the formation of the Compagnie du Kasai saved some of the companies from total destruction.

By the end of 1901 there was a chain of trading stations along the Kasai regions main river systems. The companies responsible for them operated independently of State control and State assistance. This meant that traders penetrated into areas where the African population wanted the trade articles which the companies brought with them, provided the local population was willing to collect rubber to purchase the articles.

However, the Kasai was as rich in souls as it was in rubber. Wissmann's expeditions led him to believe that the Lulua were a deeply religious people, who would provide a fertile field for missionary endeavours. Lulua belief in a creator (Nzambi) together with their questioning attitude on matters of life and death could, he felt, form a basis for

instruction in Christianity.³² These views were supported by Grenfell in 1886. However, the Baptist Missionary Society did not act immediately and, by the end of 1886, the Bishop Taylor Mission had moved in.

Taylor, an American Methodist Bishop, had experience of missionary work in India and South America. He established a self-supporting mission whereby volunteers joining his service did not receive financial aid directly from the mission but were obliged to find their own means of support for their work on the field. One of Taylor's volunteers was a medical doctor, William Summers, who arrived at Luanda, Angola, in May 1884 and immediately moved into the interior to Malange. During his time there, he encountered one of Pogge's former guides, Germano, who was preparing to take a caravan of provisions to Luluabourg to replenish Wissmann for his journey to the east coast,³³ and Summers accompanied Germano to the Kasai.

The Portuguese explorer, H.A. Dias de Carvalho, described Summer's entry into the Kasai:

Dr. Summers of Bishop Taylor's Mission at Malange, who had naturalized himself a Portuguese subject organized...a caravan to go on missionary labours to Lubuku, which was his most ardent desire.

He entered Lubuku, with the Portuguese flag hoisted at the head of the caravan.... Well, Mr. de Macar rated him vehemently for having hoisted that flag and denied his consent for the prosecution of his labours. Among many flattering compliments addressed by that honourable gentleman

to Dr. Summers,...I shall only mention that Mr. de Macar did not like to see him carrying the Portuguese flag because the Portuguese were all a set of beasts and thieves.³⁴

In spite of State opposition, Summers' brief visit gained him the respect and admiration of the Lulua since he arrived at Luluabourg at the time of a smallpox epidemic and devoted his strength to controlling it.³⁵ After a year of dedicated effort, he became ill early in 1888 and decided to make his way to the coast. However he died at the village of Chinyama and his body was returned to Luluabourg where the Lulua buried him in a ceremony reserved for kings.³⁶ Summers was the forerunner to a more permanent witness to the Gospel in the Kasai by both Catholic and Protestant missionaries.

Summers' stay at Luluabourg may have occasioned the first of many incidents in which religion and European and African politics conflicted. In 1886 Kalamba, the Lulua leader, sent word to de Macar at Luluabourg requesting Catholic baptism.³⁷ The signed document has engendered some controversy. Van Zandijcke considered it to be a political move on the part of de Macar to keep the Kasai open to Catholicism since Summers, at Luluabourg was flying a Portuguese flag.³⁸ However, Storme disagrees and considers the petition a simple request on Kalamba's part to partake more fully of the European civilization since he had heard much about God from the explorers.³⁹ The most likely explanation is that Kalamba recognized an opportunity to gain additional support in his efforts to unite the Lulua.

There was no one to replace Summers and the B.M.S. was too occupied with its work on the Congo River, so the field was left open for the American Presbyterian Congo Mission (A.P.C.M.) to found the first Protestant mission stations in the Kasai. William Henry Sheppard and Samuel Norvell Lapsley arrived at Luebo in April 1891 where they were immediately able to negotiate a land agreement with the Commissaire du District who happened to be on a tour of inspection at Luebo. The new mission was located just north of the Lulua River near a Bakete village. The location was appropriate since it was in the proximity of five groups of peoples: Bakete, Bakuba, Lulua, Luba, and Zappo Zap and it was also a trade centre. The missionaries were sure that being settled near the Bakete village of Kasenga would lead to immediate converts. This was not to be the case for, although the Bakete were friendly to the missionaries, they did not feel any need for the Gospel, while they did wish to trade.⁴⁰

For the new missionaries, the choice of Luebo as a missionary site was an appropriate one for numerous reasons. River transport was the only practical means of reaching the area in 1891 and Luebo was at the head of navigation on the Lulua River. The dense population in the surrounding regions made it feasible for the mission to attain its primary objective: to spread the Gospel message to as many people as possible. The presence of traders and the occasional visit from State officials made it possible to secure supplies and attend to necessary business. Lapsley very quickly

recognized that State support was not necessarily always in the best interests of the missionaries, since they were then identified with a secular and not necessarily popular institution. But the practicalities of the situation did not escape him, as he noted:

It is doubtful whether missionaries get more immediate good than harm from "State protection." But without the present secular occupation, the missionaries would have been obliged to conquer a foothold, inch by inch, as on the lower Congo. The State makes this interior field accessible.⁴¹

The early years were difficult and filled with tragedies and triumphs. In March 1892 Lapsley died while in the lower Congo where he was taking care of transport arrangements. In the meantime, in April 1892, Mr. & Mrs. George D. Adamson arrived and they were followed by others so that, by the end of the year, there were seven Protestant missionaries at Luebo. This early expansion continued, so that by 1901 the A.P.C.M. had fielded a total of nineteen missionaries of whom sixteen survived early struggles with loneliness, disease, an unfamiliar climate and adjustment to foreign cultures. In this period of time, their accomplishments were varied. Sheppard had gained an audience with the Bakuba Nyimi at Mushenge, but a mission station at the capital did not follow at this time.⁴² The Nyimi eagerly received Sheppard; because of his fluency in bushoong, the Bakuba language, he was thought to be a reincarnated royal predecessor.

During the four months Sheppard spent at the capital he was busy attempting to gain converts, but the Kuba resisted Christianity. The main reason for this was probably because of the self-sufficient nature of Kuba culture. Their own religion satisfied them completely, and, although they were willing to listen to Sheppard, they were not willing to change their ways.⁴³

Sheppard's journey to America in 1893 prevented the establishment of a mission at the capital, and, when he returned the following year a new Nyimi, Mishaape, had succeeded to the throne, reversing the former Nyimi's policies and excluding Europeans from his kingdom.⁴⁴ The nearest the missionaries came to the capital was to Ibanche in 1897. Another station was opened at Ndombi, located near Wissmann Falls, in the same year. Both stations were closed a few months later while waiting for the government to clear the land claims. Ibanche was re-opened in 1899, but Ndombi remained closed.

The most outspoken pioneer among these early Presbyterians was William McCutchan Morrison, who later skilfully led the campaign against the abuses committed by both the State and the Compagne du Kasai. He was also a careful scholar and, in his efforts to make the Gospel available to the Baluba and Lulua, having realized that for the present it would be impossible to reach the Bakete and the Bakuba, he reduced their language, Tshiluba, to writing. The gift of a printing press to the mission in 1900 allowed portions of the Gospel and hymns to be distributed in the Tshiluba language to those already literate.⁴⁵

The missionaries' labours were slow in producing results. Their efforts among the Bakete and the Bakuba were largely fruitless, so that even labour had to be recruited from outside the area. By March 1895, after four years of hard work, three adults and four children were baptized and these were the first converts at Luebo.⁴⁶ With the coming of the Baluba in 1895-1896, the number of converts increased because of their dependence on the mission for support so that, by 1901, church membership had increased to 550. These Baluba, who settled near Luebo, accepted the teachings of the missionaries and considered their new life as a welcome release from their former status as slaves: it was less arduous to submit to the missionaries and their teachings than it had been to obey their former masters.

It was not unusual for the missionaries to accept slaves and purchase their redemption:⁴⁷ indeed this was the means by which all Europeans in the Kasai procured labour and supporters. Lapsley followed this practice quite freely and on various occasions ransomed children who became the nucleus of the school system at Luebo.⁴⁸ Other converts included some of the Lulua who did not follow Kalamba and needed a form of identification with a force that represented strength and power as the missionaries did at Luebo. For them the church represented a recognition of a new status as opposed to their traditional roles.⁴⁹

For many of these people the missionary very quickly became a symbolic chief, a recognized authority. As such, the mission station became a

magnet attracting refugees and redeemed slaves, over whom the missionary exercised certain rights which included the obligation, on the part of the African, to work for the mission for a pre-determined time to cancel the costs of his redemption from slavery. Some of these individuals become strong disciples for the mission and acted as catechists, carrying the Gospel into the surrounding villages in search of new converts. Others were professed followers of the Christian faith for their own ends, to be a part of a culture they deemed to be superior to their own especially when they become literate. In times of testing, as in the Christian Church throughout the world, these motives were exposed.

Besides the Protestant missionaries the Roman Catholic Church also entered the Kasai. Early in 1886, Leopold II decided that the Congo Free State should be evangelized by Belgian missionaries and he invited the Scheut Fathers to participate in this work. In August 1888, the first four Scheut Fathers left Antwerp for Boma. Their first mission and headquarters was at Berghe-Ste-Marie located at the mouth of the Kasai River. It was not until November 1891 that the Scheutists moved into the Luluabourg area. When they did so, they were directed by Père Emeri Cambier who guided the Catholic mission through the early years just as Morrison did the Protestant mission. Both men were energetic, capable and fearless in defense of, or attacks on, State policies.

The Scheutists, like the Presbyterians, sought to evangelize and establish an indigenous church among the local Africans. The first Scheut mission station was established near the Luluabourg State post and a short distance from Kalamba's old village.⁵⁰ It was Père Cambier's intention to establish his mission near Kalamba, possibly because of Kalamba's request for baptism which Cambier had seen at Berghe-Ste-Marie,⁵¹ or because gaining Kalamba's support would open the door to his Lulua following. As a result of a personal encounter with Kalamba, a hilltop location near the Mikalayi River was granted to construct a mission. It was initially referred to as the Mikalayi mission but, three months after its foundation, the first baptism was held on March 19, 1892, St. Joseph's day, and the mission became known as the Luluabourg St. Joseph Mission at Mikalayi.

The Catholic mission grew rapidly. Père Cambier's companion, Père de Gryse, returned to the west coast because of illness and Cambier spent the next nine months alone. During this time, he worked at constructing buildings and planting crops. When the Supérieur Général de Scheut, T.R.P. Van Aertselaer, arrived at Lusambo in March 1893, Le Marinel and Gillain recommended the establishment of a mission station in the vicinity of Lusambo. The promise was given but other events intervened so that the mission, Nazareth St. Trudon, was not established until March 1895. In the interval another station, Mérode-Salvator, was constructed near the village of Chief Kalala Kafumba in April 1894.⁵² These mission stations

closely followed State penetration and provided a point of occupation by Europeans in areas where the State could send liberated slaves and where the State itself did not have sufficient personnel to permit permanent occupation.

There were, however, times when the State and the mission did not agree. One of the State agents with whom the mission came into conflict was Pelzer in 1894, when he stopped at M'érode-Salvator while en route for Kanda Kanda.⁵³ The incident is an example of the African leader Kalala Kafumba, playing one group of Europeans against the other, hoping in the end to be on the side of the stronger. Kalala was actually a rival of Chief Kasongo Fwamba, who was more powerful and had already requested the missionaries to construct a mission in his territory. Père de Gupe describes Fwamba, on the occasion of the latter's visit on March 1, 1892, as a powerful Lulua chief and very rich in ivory and slaves as a result of his trade with Mpania Mutombo.⁵⁴ Fwamba was probably paying tribute to Kalamba but, with Kalamba in flight Fwamba saw his opportunity to replace him. He had been trading with the Cokwe long enough to bring him sufficient guns to subdue the surrounding chiefs including Kalala Kafumba.⁵⁵ Now Fwamba needed the support that the missionaries had given Kalamba, consequently he requested that a mission be established in his area. Cambier agreed, but limited staff, the soldiers' mutiny at Luluabourg, and the rivalry between Fwamba and Kalala delayed action until 1897.

Having heard of Fwamba's request for a mission station Kalala saw his opportunity to outwit him by importuning the Fathers to establish a mission in his village as soon as possible. The request came at an opportune time, for Van Aertselaer, the Supérieur Général, had arrived and was undoubtedly impressed with the African's desire for missionaries. Kalala promised the new mission a gift of six cattle and fifty slaves. The offer was accepted and Cambier constructed a few temporary buildings in June 1893 and then left promising that missionaries would soon arrive. Reinforcements came in 1894, when five Sisters of Charity and two more priests arrived. Père Garmyn and Père Hoornaert were destined to go to Kalala Kafumba but, in the interval, the mission had been destroyed by Mpania Mutombo's raids through the area.⁵⁶

Kalala, having secured the mission, regretted the terms he had made and the gift he had given of fifty slaves and four cattle, rather than the six he had promised. He made a complaint to the State to the effect that the mission had not redeemed the slaves, that, in fact, the slaves were a part of the booty from the conflict with Mpania Mutombo. Père Garmyn attempted to rectify the situation by returning the four cattle and redeeming the slaves with cloth, but the effort was in vain. Pelzer was convinced that the mission had violated its privileges and placed itself above the law.⁵⁷ Kalala was pleased with the impression he had made on the State, and therefore claimed that the total number of slaves the mission had received was actually one hundred instead of

fifty. Pelzer's response was to notify the mission that he would take all of Père Garmy's people and should he resist he would be put in chains. Pelzer was able to capture sixty-eight persons, the remainder having fled, and it was impossible to operate the mission.⁵⁸ Mérode was therefore closed until March 1895.

At the beginning of 1895 Gillain came to Luluabourg on a tour of inspection in response to the complaints of the Catholic mission concerning Pelzer. Gillain's report indicated the necessity of another expedition to Kanda Kanda to settle Kaniok problems but, en route, Pelzer was directed to repair the damage he had done to the mission at Kalala Kafumba.⁵⁹

The situation with Kalala Kafumba shows the political involvement of the Catholic missionaries. To a great extent the State and the mission served each other. When an area became sufficiently calm as a result of State intervention, a mission could be established and frequently a State post was located in close proximity to it. The mission acted as a type of occupation force with State assistance when required. This was particularly true in the southern portion of the Kasai where lack of manpower inhibited outright State occupation, but encouraged a piecemeal and gradual occupation by whatever reliable means available.

In some cases the conflict between the State and the mission centred on personalities and when, as in the dealings with Kalala, the two people involved were Pelzer and Cambier, the stage was set for additional tension.

Pelzer was quick-tempered and impulsively brutal, even toward his fellow officers. Père Cambier was equally excitable and frequently lost his temper. The disagreement revolving around the slaves the mission had received from Kalala was in part the result of personality conflicts between Europeans, but it also raised other issues. Did the mission have the right to accept slaves and redeem them? The practice was not new for either the Protestant or the Catholic mission, so Pelzer's statement that the mission could not redeem the slaves confused Cambier.⁶⁰ Indeed the rapid growth of the Catholic mission must be largely attributed to co-operation between the mission and the State which was manifested by the slaves captured in caravans by the State being turned over to the care of the Catholics.

Cambier also had his misunderstandings with Le Marinel who had become Inspecteur de l'Etat for the Kasai in 1893.⁶¹ Under Le Marinel's direction, Mpania Mutombo had been placed in charge of governing an area to the east of Lusambo which he continually raided for slaves. Among these were the Bakwa Nkoto, who sent a message to Cambier requesting refuge either at the mission or in the vicinity. Cambier interceded on their behalf to Le Marinel, who promptly reprimanded Cambier for his involvement in State affairs. The Bakwa Nkoto were in Mpania Mutombo's jurisdiction and, therefore, only the State could decide their fate. The situation was further complicated when Le Marinel sent Pelzer to Mikalayi to secure all the Bakwa Nkoto refugees who had already arrived and return

them to Lusambo for State action. The fact that Cambier had given refuge to several deserters in exchange for a gift of slaves and ivory worked to his disadvantage. His independent action was considered an affront to the State and, for an undetermined time he was forbidden to redeem slaves, or receive slaves or any gift from chiefs.⁶²

There are two points which probably explain the friction between Le Marinel and Cambier in this instance. The flight of the Bakwa Nkoto from their designated area was interpreted by the State as desertion from a chefferie. Therefore, Cambier was considered an accomplice when he harboured them. Also Le Marinel accused Cambier of establishing his own state by giving these deserters an area in which to construct their village with no obligations whatsoever to the State.⁶³ In actuality the State did not oppose the mission's policy of becoming the guardian of orphans and former slaves, many of whom the State agents themselves turned over to the mission. These disputes between the mission and the State, therefore did not seriously hamper Catholic missionary activity.

The first baptism at Mikalayi, three months after it was established, brought eighty-eight infants into the church. On the station itself there was a total African population of 255: most were slaves, some redeemed by Cambier, while others were gifts from Kalamba or other African leaders. To redeem a slave from Kalamba cost four metres of white or indigo cotton.⁶⁴ By the end of the Mission's first active year 300 people had been baptized at Mikalayi and a Christian village had been

established which was to provide the nucleus to spread Gospel teachings into other villages later. Growth was spectacular for, in 1894, Mikalayi had a population of one thousand.

Père Cambier assisted in the establishment of Nazareth de St. Trudon near Lusambo, in March 1895. This was an area with fertile soil which offered the opportunity to establish large fields of manioc, bananas and citrus fruits. In a report to his superior, Cambier stated:

I have at the present time 60 children, 30 boys and 21 girls.... Almost everyday the Bakuba, who live on the other bank, come to sell me children and adults. The price of a man or a woman is 2 croisettes (copper crosses), that of a child is 1 croisette. In general the croisettes come to us from Mpania Mutombo for one roll of cloth each.⁶⁵

In this fashion the mission prospered. The calm after the Luluabourg revolt was conducive to the establishment of Hemptinne St. Benoît near Chief Fwamba's location. The station began, and was to remain, under the direction of Père Seghers for thirty years. Each time the Scheutists opened a new station the nucleus of the African Christian population came from the Mikalayi station. Seghers took a number of Christian families and about one hundred children with him to Hemptinne. The mission, located on the Lulua River south of Luluabourg, grew by virtue of its proximity to the Cokwe slave trading route, for slaves fled the caravans and took refuge at the mission.⁶⁶ To establish Tielen St. Jacques near Kanda Kanda a caravan of 300 people left Mikalayi in July 1898 to form

the nucleus of the new station. By the beginning of September there were already thirty-six completed houses in full occupation. The Cokwe razzias were a constant menace, but they were never forced to evacuate.⁶⁷

After ten years of operations, the Scheutist mission's statistics in 1901 were impressive. The total number of Christians was 3,100 and all except 8 were residents of the mission stations so that Christianity was linked to a geographical location. Another 5,628 were under religious instruction, of whom 1,092 were preparing for imminent baptism. There were 771 Christian families, of whom all except 2 lived at the mission stations, and 767 families attended catechism classes in pagan villages.⁶⁸

By 1901 a pattern had developed whereby refugees and labourers gathered around the European settlements and formed their own villages with their own headman, frequently displaying an attitude of superiority to other villagers. They represented an emerging elitist group who were to serve the Europeans well in the years to come. The European settlements around which they gathered might be a State post, a commercial factory or a mission station. The nature of the settlement depended largely on geography for, in areas like Luebo and Luluabourg where several European settlements existed larger groups of these new villagers settled, while along the river systems where the trading factories were located, the

the adherents were fewer in number. This pattern of settlement was restricted to the north, for effective State, commercial and mission penetration of the southern area was not to take place until after 1901.⁶⁹

FOOTNOTES

1. La Congrégation du Congo Immaculé de Marie was founded in 1862 at Scheut-les-Bruxelles. In the beginning its evangelical sphere of operations was to be Mongolia; however, in 1876, Leopold II, anxious to enlist Belgian missionaries for the Congo, arranged for the Scheutists to establish themselves in the Congo, particularly in the Kasai area. R.P. Léon Dieu, Dans la Brousse Congolaise (Les origines des Missions du Scheut au Congo) (Liege: A Maréchal, 1946), pp. 14-15. Please refer to Map on page 94 for locations mentioned in this chapter.
2. François Bontinck, Aux origines de l'Etat Indépendant de Congo: Documents tirés d'Archives Américaines (Louvain: Editions E. Nauwelaerts, 1966), pp. 345-353. General Henry S. Sanford was a former Minister to Belgium and a U.S. representative at the Conference of Berlin in 1884-1885. He was responsible for securing U.S. recognition of the International Congo Association. Charles Balser and Georges Brugmann were both Brussels bankers. Alexander Légat, a former State administrator in Northern Congo, was the company's first agent. In 1889 he returned to the service of the State when he became assistant Commissaire du District for Luluabourg. Most of the company's other business interests were located in the Lower Congo.
3. Mouvement Géographique, September 3, 1893, p. 80.
4. Storme, La mutinerie militaire, p. 30. See Map VII for place locations.
5. See Chapter II. The Kuba themselves travelled considerable distances in their pursuit of trade, for Wissmann met a group of them in the Mai Munene area in 1881. Wissmann, Unter deutscher Flagge, p. 77.
6. J.W. Lapsley, ed., Life and Letters of Samuel Norvell Lapsley, 1866-1892 (Richmond: Whittel and Shepperson Printers, 1893), pp. 165, 179.
7. Dr. Vansina states that ivory was scarce on the market at Luebo and probably not sold to S.A.B. because no guns were sold in return. Letter dated February 16, 1976.

8. Mouvement Géographique, September 3, 1893, p. 80. G. de Macar should not be confused with Adolphe de Macar, State agent at Luluabourg, 1886-1888. Paul Culot became manager of Bena Luidi in 1894.
9. Ibid. Warren C. Uncles and H. Roux were agents at Mukikamu.
10. Ibid.
11. Lapsley, Life and Letters, p. 186.
12. Ibid., p. 190.
13. Bontinck, Aux origines de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo, p. 437. The Scheutist missionary, Père De Deken, visited the area in 1893 and referred to these imported workers as Brazilians. They were probably the Costa Ricans and Nicaraguans Bontinck mentions. Mouvement Géographique, November 15, 1896, no. 46, p. 558.
14. Bontinck, Aux origines de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo, p. 437.
15. Mouvement Géographique, November 15, 1896, no. 46, p. 559.
16. Ibid.
17. Samuel P. Verner, Pioneering in Central Africa (Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication, 1903), p. 102. One of the earliest agents of the Dutch house was Van den Andel, formerly a soldier in the French Colonial Army.
18. Storme, La mutinerie militaire, p. 32.
19. Verner, Pioneering in Central Africa, p. 93.
20. Heinrich Waltz, Das Konzessionswesen im Belgischen Kongo, Vol. I (Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1917), pp. 58-59. The two posts, Bena Makima and Galikoko, were not taken over by the C.K. when it was formed in 1901. Waltz explains the granting of the S.A.P.V. rights as a form of "hush-money" given by the King in order to stop the protests against his monopolistic decree. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

21. Verner, Pioneering in Central Africa, p. 93.
22. Ibid., p. 94.
23. Fritz Van der Linden, Le Congo, les Noirs et Nous (Paris: Librairie Maritime et Coloniale, 1910), p. 234.
24. See Chapter III, pp. 90-91.
25. Storme, La mutinerie militaire, pp. 30-32.
26. Paul Landbeck, Malu Malu: Erlebnisse aus der Sturm und Drang periode des Kongo-staates (Berlin: August Scherb G.M.B.H., 1930), p. 36. Landbeck, the Belgika agent at Luebo from 1899-1901, states that the agent's share of the profits on that amount of rubber was between 500-750 francs per month.
27. Ibid., pp. 38-39.
28. Ibid.
29. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Boma, June 9, 1903, Deputy Governor-General Fuchs to the C.K. Director at Butala.
30. Waltz, Das Konzessionswesen, p. 240.
31. In the years 1898-1901 the purchase price, that is, the value of goods received from Africans, and selling price in Antwerp was 1.11 and 9.43 francs in 1898; 1.39 and 9.15 francs in 1899; 1.48 and 7.93 francs in 1900; and 1.86 and 6.09 francs in 1901 respectively. Ibid., p. 66. Verner, who was in the Kasai from 1896-1899, expresses it in terms of American dollars as follows: "The articles demanded by the natives in exchange for this crude rubber are principally cloth, salt, beads, hoes, knives and cowries. Cloth is the principal article desired,.... For example: one yard of the ordinary unbleached cloth made by our [American] mills will purchase two pounds of rubber, worth in European or American market, two dollars. After deducting all expenses of transportation, commission merchants' taxes, harbor dues, everything in fact, it is safe to say that under our present treaty rights with the Congo Free State, ten cents worth of cotton cloth ought to bring the dollar's worth of rubber to any American port." Verner, Pioneering in Central Africa, p. 471.

32. Wissmann, Im Innern Afrika, p. 157.
33. E.M. Braekman, Histoire du Protestantisme au Congo (Brussels: Librairie des Eclaireurs Unionistes, 1961), pp. 132-133.
34. Dias de Carvalho, Lubuku, pp. 56-57.
35. Ethel Taylor Wharton, Led in Triumph: Sixty Years of Southern Presbyterian Missions in the Belgian Congo (Nashville; Board of World Missions, Presbyterian Church, U.S., 1952), pp. 4-5.
36. Ruth M. Slade, English-Speaking Missions in the Congo Independent State (1878-1908) (Brussels: Academie Royale des Sciences Coloniales, 1959), p. 166.
37. Storme, Het Ontstaan van de Kasai-Missie, pp. 16-18.
38. Van Zandijcke, Pages d'histoire, pp. 85-86.
39. The petition probably had very little impact on the actions of the Roman Catholic Church since the plans to enter the country had already been made.
40. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 28.
41. Lapsley, Life and Letters, p. 197.
42. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, pp. 33-37.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p. 75.
45. E.T. Warton, Led in Triumph, pp. 54-55.
46. Ibid., p. 34.

47. The controversy this led to will be discussed below in Chapter IX.
48. Lapsley, Life and Letters, pp. 163, 189.
49. Mary Douglas, The Lele of the Kasai (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 267.
50. Marcel Storme, Het Onstaan van de Kasai-Missie (Brussels: Académie royale des Sciences d'Outre-Mer, Classe des Sociétés Morales et Politiques, N.S., Mémoire in 8^o, XXIV, 3, 1961), p. 192.
51. Ibid., p. 23.
52. Storme, Konflikt in de Kasai-Missie, p. 5.
53. Ibid., p. 209.
54. Scheitler, "Histoire de l'Eglise Catholique au Kasai," p. 11.
55. Vallaëys, Rapport sur les Baluba, p. 22. See Chapter III above.
56. Storme, Konflikt, p. 56. See Chapter III above.
57. Ibid., pp. 166-172. Pelzer's argument was that this was an imposition or tribute, which only the State had the right to collect.
58. Ibid., pp. 227-228.
59. Ibid., pp. 333-335.
60. Ibid., p. 229.
61. The Inspecteur de l'Etat or State Inspector, assisted the Commissaire du District, in a similar capacity as the State Inspector assisted the Deputy Governor-General. See Chapter I above.
62. Storme, Konflikt, pp. 117-120.

63. Ibid. See Chapter II above.
64. Van Zandijcke, Pages d'histoire, pp. 96-97. In villages farther away from Kalamba the price was 2 metres for 1 slave.
65. Storme, Konflikt, pp. 437-438. A roll of cloth consists of about 22 yards.
66. Scheitler, "Histoire de l'Eglise," pp. 64-65.
67. Ibid., p. 78.
68. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
69. See Map VII.

CHAPTER V

EUROPEAN PENETRATION AND THE AFRICAN REACTION 1902-1908

By the end of 1901 the European occupied area in the Kasai was limited mainly to locations along the main river systems and several posts in the interior. State posts consisted of Isaka (1899), Bena Dibele (1895) and Lusambo (1890) on the Sankuru River; Luluabourg (1886) on the Lulua River; and Kanda Kanda (1897) on the Lulu River. The factories of the trading companies were located at Butala, Mukikamu, Zappo Zap, Inkongu (Ikongu) and Ifuta on the Sankuru River; Mangai, Bena Bendi, Bena Luidi, Nzonzadi and Bena Makima on the Kasai River; Luebo on the Lulua River; and several interior posts such as Galikoko, north of Bena Makima, and Mushenge, the Kuba capital. In the ten year period from 1891-1901 the missionaries had also established stations at various locations. The A.P.C.M. had a station at Luebo and Ibanche, while the Scheutists had stations at Mikajayi, Hemptinne, Thielen St. Jacques, St. Trudon, and Mérode.

The stations were concentrated in the north because initial European penetration had come along the water routes, while posts were established wherever the local population did not offer open resistance. The main areas of control existed around the principal State posts of Lusambo, Luluabourg and Kanda Kanda as well as the trading station of Luebo;

while the area under some European influence extended into the Bakete territory to the north of Luebo and part of the Lubilash River and its tributaries. Whereas missionaries followed State penetration by establishing stations in close proximity to State posts, the trading companies established factories where the local population was willing to trade with them. The areas of effective control were thus limited, and scattered, in part because all European agencies lacked the manpower required to exert more general control.

This left vast areas of the Kasai completely uncontrolled with not so much as a State post or even a periodic inspection tour by a State official. One such area was the Kuba kingdom, where the population had been successful in resisting European entry until 1899-1900; several expeditions had then been directed at the area, but limited personnel did not allow for the establishment of a State post within the kingdom, so that the S.A.P.V. post at Mushenge was the only evidence of a European presence when the military columns withdrew.

Another uncontrolled area lay between the Kasai and Lulua Rivers, south to the Angolan border. The only attempt to establish a State post in this large area before 1901 had been made in 1894 at Wissmann Falls. It had been intended that this would be the frontier post from which the occupation of the south would take place. The revolt of the Luluabourg garrison in 1895, however, caused the post to be abandoned and it was never reopened. The revolt occasioned an expedition under Captain Michaux

to punish those African leaders who had participated in the mutiny but, although Michaux penetrated as far south as the Lunda capital at Musumba² no State post was established and the entire south remained unoccupied and uncontrolled by the State until later.

Several factors made it possible to extend European penetration further into uncontrolled areas after 1902. First, the Katanga had been secured as Congo Free State territory following a series of expeditions into the area which had the combined effect of driving out the Arabs and forestalling any plans the British might have had to permit the British South Africa Company to lay claims to the Katanga. This allowed some of the officers from the Katanga to be stationed in the Kasai area. Second, the formation of the Compagnie du Kasai (C.K.) on December 24, 1901 strengthened the C.F.S. even though there were many occasions when disputes arose between the State and the C.K. With the State holding half the shares in the company, it could depend on the C.K. to act as its agent in areas where there were insufficient State agents. Furthermore, State expeditions were, on occasion, accompanied by C.K. personnel whose interest in establishing trading factories was supported by the State, anticipating that this would assist in the pacification of the population and the occupation of the area concerned. This was particularly the case in the south, where both the State and the C.K. hoped to curtail the Angola trade.

The State's attention, by 1902, was directed to the opening of the southern Kasai by expeditions to establish State posts sited to cut off the flow of rubber to Angola. Attaining this objective was complicated by several important issues. The most significant of these was the shortage of personnel experienced by all three European agencies, the State, the Missions and the C.K., which prevented any concentrated European occupation in any particular area. For the State this meant that the area where the need was greatest received attention first, which caused the State's attention to be diverted from one area to another as one crisis was followed by another. In order to secure the southern and western borders, it was thus necessary to cut into Cokwe trade by establishing a post at Dilolo, by breaking Kalamba-Muana's trade connections with Angola, and by gaining an access to Sala Mpasu territory in order to provide a shortened route to the south. In addition, there was the Kuba kingdom which the Europeans had been able to surround by establishing posts on the river systems, but, due to staff shortages, had not been able to occupy. Although all of these problems were separate, yet they were interrelated, while they could not be dealt with simultaneously because of limited manpower. What was done in one area dictated what was done elsewhere; and, since relations with the Kuba affected all European groups, and, to a certain extent, determined what happened elsewhere in the Kasai, it is necessary to examine the Kuba problem before turning to the others.

The Kuba and related peoples lived in the area between the Lulua and Sankuru Rivers. The navigability of the river systems made it possible for the first trading companies to enter the Kasai area and establish factories along them. Easy accessibility to the area should have made it possible for the State to occupy it first; however, limited State personnel, and the cohesion of the Kuba, caused the State to leave the area to the operations of the companies which formed the C.K.

The State conquered the highly centralized Kuba kingdom towards the end of 1899 when the capital, Mushenge, fell; however, the State was not strong enough to maintain an occupying force throughout the area. At this time, the State had posts at Luluabourg, Isaka, Bena Dibele and Lusambo, but none directly on Kuba territory. After the conquest, the S.A.P.V. received a large land concession at the capital: thus, the foreigner and his entourage of capitas (buyers) had made an entrance into the heart of the kingdom. After 1901 the C.K. also entered Kuba territory and became in effect the State's representative governing body. The fourteen commercial societies trading in the Kasai before 1901 had factories established chiefly along the river systems³ and, wherever the C.K. had sufficient personnel, these were now occupied by C.K. agents. Since the C.K. was not in fact a military force, although the State allowed each factory a maximum of twenty-five guns, it was hoped that peripherally-based commerce would have a pacifying influence on the kingdom's population.

The rich rubber areas along the Sankuru, Kasai and Lulua Rivers caused the C.K. to concentrate its efforts into opening factories as quickly as possible. By 1903 factories were located at Bolombo, Bachi-Shombe, Bena Luidi, Ibanche, Misumba and Idanga in addition to the factories taken over from the fourteen companies in 1901. One of the chief consequences of the C.K. presence on Kuba territory was that it became responsible for collecting the State-designated imposts wherever no State posts were in existence. The C.K. traded imported products (such as cloth and beads) and croisettes (copper crosses) for rubber and ivory. Africans needed the croisettes, since their imposts to the State had to be met by the payment of croisettes. As a result, the population was forced to produce rubber in order to acquire the crosses to be returned to the C.K. on behalf of the State. Refusal to pay imposts resulted in a punitive expedition by the State, bringing with it pillaging and raiding.⁴ These expeditions were feared and caused women and children to flee into the forests, especially when no European accompanied the soldiers.

The ruthless methods employed by the C.K. caused the local population to retaliate by refusing to work, hiding when the company's capitas (buyers) came by, or, in extreme cases, attacking the capitas and destroying the factories. Such an incident occurred at Bena Luidi in 1902. Bena Luidi had been a factory operated by the S.A.B., but by 1900 it had been abandoned for a safer location at Bena Makima, where the S.A.B. operated together with the S.A.P.V.⁵ It was not until 1903 that the

C.K. reopened Bena Luidi and, in the same year, established a factory at Bachi-Shombe.⁶ Within a brief period of time, both factories were burned and the C.K. pirogues on the Kasai were attacked. Charles Liebrecht, Secretary General, immediately issued orders for the Commissaire du District to take action. Captain De Cock, Chef de Secteur at Luluabourg, led the expedition which resulted in the re-opening of both factories.⁷ By the end of 1903 the official political report listed the region along the Kasai as calm.⁸ At the same time, however, a State administrator, Wessels, was accompanying the Deputy Public Prosecutor on a mission of inquiry along the Kasai to investigate the attacks on the C.K. installations. They encountered hostility and attacks from both the Bashilele on the left bank of the Kasai and the Bakuba on the right bank. The return trip to Luebo was made via Ekumbi and Galikoko, both C.K. posts, where the local population was not openly hostile but cautious.⁹ A year later the factory at Bachi-Shombe was again attacked and destroyed.

The resentment of the Bakuba was not only directed against the C.K. agents but against all foreign intrusions into their territory. The vast majority of the C.K.'s African employees were Baluba and Lulua who, in the 1890s, gathered around European settlements. The Bakuba regarded them with contempt and they were frequently mistreated in Bakuba villages. Then, too, besides the C.K. and the occasional State presence in Bakuba territory, there were also the missionaries. The A.P.C.M. had settled at Luebo and Ibanche, hoping eventually to reach the Bakuba capital. All these

foreign groups were operating in an area that had its own political problems particularly as, since 1899, there were increasing indications that the Nyimi was losing political power: by 1904 some of his people were demonstrating their independence by refusing to acknowledge him through paying tribute to him. By the end of 1903 various events had occurred which eventually resulted in a revolt in November 1904 for which the State, the C.K. and the missionaries were all partially responsible, although all three European groups blamed each other for causing the revolt. The missionaries accused the State of not being able to maintain peace and mistreating Kot aPe, the Bakuba Nyimi. The State accused the C.K. of brutalities committed against the Bakuba, causing them to revolt. The C.K. charged the State with interference in the company's trading operations, while both the C.K. and the State were convinced that the missionaries were interfering in African political affairs which threatened the Bakuba throne. There is even some evidence to indicate that the Nyimi himself instigated the revolt in an attempt to rid his kingdom of foreigners and so unite his people. Before drawing any conclusions as to where to place the blame, however, it is necessary to examine some of the background to the events occurring before the revolt.

It was not difficult to see how the missionaries' involvement in the tribal politics of the Bakuba could have anything but serious consequences. When Sheppard of the A.P.C.M. made his first appearance in the Bakuba capital in 1892 and met the then Nyimi, Kot aMweeky, he was greeted as a

resurrected ancestor of the royal family. Even though this made Sheppard a privileged person for the remainder of that Nyimi's reign, it meant that he became a dangerous rival for each succeeding Nyimi, for Bakuba kingship was based on matrilineal succession and, in order to avoid succession difficulties at the death of a Nyimi, it was the practice to repudiate and persecute the children of the deceased king.¹⁰ This frequently resulted in death or banishment from the kingdom.

One of Kot aMbweeky's sons, Mishaamilyeeng, contested the succession of Mishaape and was forced to flee, finding refuge with the A.P.C.M. at Ibanche from 1896. His attempt to gain the throne and his identification with the missionaries increased the alienation the Nyimi already felt for the missionaries, especially Sheppard. When Kot aMbweeky's successors, Mishaape, Mbop aKyeen and Miko miKyeen died within a period of less than two years as a result of a smallpox epidemic, Mishaamilyeeng was suspected of having killed them through bad medicine and evil thoughts, even though he had remained at Ibanche throughout.¹¹ The A.P.C.M. was considered an accomplice because of its insistence on treating illnesses and, therefore, it is not surprising that the A.P.C.M., as well as Mishaamilyeeng, was regarded as an enemy of Kot aPe for his entire life.¹²

In an attempt to banish Mishaamilyeeng, Kot aPe enticed him to the capital and then to the State post at Isaka in 1902 on a charge of murder and tax evasion. Sheppard and Vass of the A.P.C.M. rushed to his defense. Kot aPe was seeking for a way to quench the smallpox epidemic that had

spread through the kingdom and charged that his predecessors had been killed by a black medicine buried on A.P.C.M. land, where Mishaamilyeeng had found refuge. This explanation did not satisfy the judge at Isaka and Mishaamilyeeng was released and returned to Ibanche.¹³ For Kot aPe, however, the problem of the epidemic was not resolved. Since he blamed Mishaamilyeeng's magic for the deaths, he needed a stronger magic to overcome Mishaamilyeeng's magic and eradicate the epidemic. He sent a messenger to the chief of the Zappo Zap requesting his best magician to come to his court to prepare this strong medicine. Vansina states: "It was a perfectly logical thing to do since the Zappo Zap had decisively conquered the Kuba; therefore their magic must have been stronger."¹⁴ Zappo Zap sent Yonge (Iyqong), who prepared a spell which stopped the epidemic.¹⁵ Kot aPe kept the Zappo Zap sorcerer with him up to the time of the revolt in November 1904,¹⁶ probably as a safeguard against any further curses from Mishaamilyeeng.

There was a brief interlude of better relations between Kot aPe and the missionaries from the end of 1903 into early 1904, during which the A.P.C.M. was invited to send evangelists to the capital. At the same time the C.K. also had buyers at Mushenge. Thus this might have been a time during which the Nyimi decided he had the most to gain by following a policy of friendship towards the European. Whatever his reason may have been, however, events after June 1904 soon revealed Kot aPe's intention to rid his country of all foreigners and return to the ways of his ancestors.

The Nyimi's insecurity within his own kingdom emphasized the problems he encountered with the State. As an invariable rule, the Nyimi received a tribute payment from his subjects in recognition of his kingship, and after 1899 these payments allowed him to meet the impost demands of the State. When, however, his subjects defaulted on their payments, as appears to have been the case in 1904, the Nyimi not only had difficulty in paying the State but also had political problems with at least some of his subjects. By April 1904 Kot aPe was so far behind in his payments that he received a summons to appear at Luebo, where he received a fine of 100,000 cowries (\$75.00) because he arrived late. When he was unable to pay, he was put in jail. The A.P.C.M., shocked by De Cock's action, advanced the money to procure his freedom. On his way back to Mushenge Kot aPe spent two weeks at Ibanche with the missionaries.¹⁷ A.P.C.M. accounts indicate that he was furious and bent on revenge, although his attitude to the missionaries was friendly at this time.¹⁸ Oeyen, the Chef de Secteur for the C.K., indicates that the Nyimi was friendly toward the C.K., and especially to Oeyen himself.¹⁹

As the C.K. Chef de Secteur, Oeyen must have been aware of the injustices committed by both the C.K. agents and their capitas. Several agents had been charged with mistreating local peoples as early as December 1902, when the C.K. agent at Ibaka, Koelman, was charged with causing the death of a worker as a result of excessive beatings. In July 1903 four agents: Piron, director of the S.A.P.V. at Galikoko; Chargois and Kestileyn,

C.K. agents at Luebo; and Charles Delcommune, C.K. agent at Bena Makima, were charged with having burned African villages in the vicinity of Bachi-Shombe in revenge for the destruction of the factory there. All four were released because of lack of evidence that they had taken a direct part in the crime. In addition, other agents were charged with various offenses. Louis Dor of Bienge was charged with being indirectly responsible for the death of an African as the result of a shooting by one of Dor's armed capitas. Dor was transferred to another secteur and the capita was given a six months' prison term. Van Roy of Ifuta was discharged from the C.K. after he was found guilty of detaining women in his quarters, requiring Africans to produce rubber without payment, and mistreating Africans, especially his own capitas. Constant Beugot of Idanga was also discharged by the C.K. for causing bodily harm by beating four African women.²⁰ The company's capitas also used force on many occasions. Furthermore, most of the capitas were Baluba or Lulua and, in some cases, Africans from West Africa. They worked for the company because, in some instances, they had been employed by the State but had been dismissed because of some infraction which they had committed. One such man was John Call from Sierra Leone, who had become a buyer for the C.K. at Ikongu. In January 1905, he was given a sentence of five years at hard labour for seizing villagers and tying them to posts for a day as punishment. Kafe from Lagos was a buyer for the same factory and had been brought to justice for killing one of his servants.²¹

These examples indicate sufficiently that the C.K.'s operations were not peaceful and explain why foreigners were resented by the Bakuba population. While the C.K., the State and the missionaries were arousing the indignation of the Bakuba, events in the region around Bena Dibebe and Misumba were creating conditions of unrest. A cult called Tonga-Tonga had been invented in April or May 1904 by a resident of Ofenga village near Bena Dibebe. This new bwanga (magic) was to make the participant immune to European attack by turning bullets to water. A further advantage to the bwanga was that whoever participated in it would no longer need to pay State dues.²² In June, and again in August 1904, the people of Ifuta and Misumba attacked a C.K. factory at Ifuta causing the agent, Hofman, to flee for his life.²³ From there the cult swept along the Sankuru River into the Bolombo and Butala regions and into Geyen's area of responsibility at Ekumbi. The State led several expeditions along the Sankuru to pacify the population. In June De Belvaux, a Second-Lieutenant with the Force Publique, went into the Bena Dibebe area to relieve the besieged C.K. factory at Bena Dibebe and to re-open the Bena Dibebe-Kole route, which the rebels had closed.²⁴ In July, Adriansen, an administrative agent, led an expedition into the area north of Misumba for the same purpose, claiming also to have restored calm to the region when he returned.²⁵

Early in September 1904, Geyen made a tour of the area north-east of Ekumbi and Mushenge. He received confirmation of the reports that the company's capitas at Bolombo had either fled or been murdered. He was

cautioned by a capita from Butala not to venture further north than Bienge because the entire area was in a state of revolt due to the widespread use and acceptance of the new bwanga. However, the people of Bienge informed him that the Bakuba chief had come into the area to prove to the people that the bwanga was false and would not stop bullets, which he had demonstrated by firing a shot at a Mukuba, killing him. When Oeyen met the Nyimi on September 16, Kot aPe confirmed this by stating that he had toured the area and punished the people, as well as fining a village he had passed through for not having rendered him homage. The fine consisted of 10,000 cowries.²⁶ During Oeyen's repeated visits to Mushenge up to September 22, Kot aPe reassured him of his good intentions towards the European.

The Nyimi changed his attitude after 22 September, in part because of State pressure and in part because of internal Kuba political conditions. State pressure developed because of Hubin's actions at Ibanche, where the C.K. had a factory and where the A.P.C.M. missionaries had become uneasy and requested State assistance. Lieutenant Hubin occupied Ibanche for several days at the end of September²⁷ and evidently Kot aPe sent him a payment of croisettes which Hubin refused to accept, demanding rather that the Bakuba chief come to Ibanche and bring with him fifty genuine Bakuba to be enlisted into the Force Publique.²⁸ Later, on October 14, when Oeyen sent one of his Mukuba messengers to the court, Kot aPe's reply was that Hubin's refusal of the impost at Ibanche was the last straw for the

Bakuba and they would no longer make payments to the State, nor would they allow their subjects to become soldiers in the service of the State.²⁹

Kot aPe's internal difficulties appear to have reached a critical point as Hubin was exerting pressure, for Kot aPe decided to accept the bwanga at the end of September or early October. The reason might have been that he realized he could no longer keep his subjects unified unless he openly accepted it and declared himself opposed to foreigners in the kingdom. In this way he could safeguard his authority and direct the blame for internal disunity toward the Europeans and their foreign capitas.

Whatever the reason, the chief called his village elders together to take this bwanga while making a payment of 5,000 cowries and 3 goats.³⁰ From this time, Oeyen was no longer allowed into the capital. Although on several occasions his messengers were able to approach Kot aPe, the Nyimi consistently stated that he was through with all Europeans and that all Europeans were to leave Bakuba territory. In the course of replying to messages from Oeyen and Drion, the S.A.P.V. agent at Mushenge, the Nyimi sent one to Oeyen informing him that his subjects had wrested authority from him (avaient arraché ses plumes de chef) because he was trading with the whiteman. He further stated, "If the bwanga really exists, I will not pay impost anymore."³¹

Undoubtedly the State's impost created a problem for Kot aPe, but whether it was because he feared his loss of authority among his own people is not clear. He knew that, by the beginning of October, his chief

minister, Kot mwaan, was arousing the people north of the capital to drive out the foreigners and to kill them if they resisted. No danger, it was thought, would befall the Bakuba if they had subscribed to the bwanga.³² Kot mwaan would enter the villages, on a tipoya (a portable chair) and with a fanfare, to incite the population to revolt. If Kot aPe wished to maintain his position of authority, it seems he was obliged to join the revolt. Fighting the European to maintain unity among his people made more sense than expecting the European to help him establish unity. Furthermore, he had help from some of the Zappo Zap magicians, including Kischi and Yongo. Evidently at one point during the revolt, there was a danger of the Zappo Zap revolting along with the Bakuba, and only the intervention of Père Cambier at Luluabourg, in the view of the C.R., prevented this.³³

The actual revolt, occurring between November 1-5, affected all Europeans. Simultaneous attacks were made on Ibanche, Bena Makima, Ekumbi, Galikoko and Bachi-Shombe. One of the bloodiest battles took place at Bena Makima, where several hundred Bakuba came within 100 metres of the Catholic mission, which was surrounded. Père Polet led a counter-attack, killing some Bakuba and thereby proving the bwanga false.³⁴ Both De Cock and Hubin moved into Kuba territory as quickly as possible.³⁵ As far as the C.K. was concerned, the greatest assistance came from the Scheutist mission of Mikalayi. Under Père Cambier's orders, Père Van der Molen and Frère Hubert led a group of twenty-five armed men to Bena Makima to assist both the company and the missionaries.³⁶

The Bakuba were decisively defeated. The costs of the revolt were heavy on both sides. The A.P.C.M. station at Ibanche was burned to the ground, forcing the personnel to take refuge at Luebo. For the C.K., the material losses were the heaviest. The factory at Ibanche was burned and 20,000 francs' worth of merchandise was stolen, together with 3,930 kilos of rubber. At Ekumbi, the factory was burned; merchandise to the value of 1,281 francs was stolen; the plantations were destroyed. At Bena Makima, merchandise to the value of 2,099 francs was stolen together with about 100 machetes and two guns, and the head capita, Mutshipula, was murdered. At Bachi-Shombe, 1,640 francs' worth of merchandise was lost, together with other equipment, while the rubber drying machine, containing 1,193 kilos of rubber, was burned.³⁷ The State probably experienced the least losses, apart from its half interest in the C.K.'s losses.

For the Bakuba population, the loss of life was heavy. Furthermore, the months of preparation for the revolt had taken them out of the fields and by December 1904 it was feared there would be widespread famine. Cassart states that the area surrounding Bena Makima and Bachi-Shombe could not provide enough food for even the C.K. personnel at these posts,³⁸ and manioc was being ordered from Lubue on the lower Kasai. Luebo experienced an inflow of 3,000 people as a result of the evacuation of Ibanche and food supplies were scarce.³⁹

When the evacuation to Luebo took place, the Bakuba followed with the intention of destroying the European posts there also. However the six

Bakete villages surrounding Luebo offered no assistance to the Bakuba and their attack was easily repulsed. The State followed the Bakuba to their capital, which the Bakuba abandoned. The king went into hiding in the marshes of the Lubudi River, but was captured and made his submission to De Cock on February 7, 1905.⁴⁰ He was not imprisoned on this occasion.⁴¹

After the heat of the revolt had cooled and the State had withdrawn from Mushenge, Kot aPe must have again feared that a threat to his throne from Mishaamilyeeng still existed for, in April 1905, according to Cassart,

Kot aPe sent 3 magicians to Ibanche to poison Shamilengu [Mishaamilyeeng], sheltered at the A.P.C.M..... Mr. Hubin, being there at the time the magicians arrived, was able to arrest two of them, and after an investigation, he left for Mushenge in order to arrest Lukengo [Kot aPe].

Since he had only 10 soldiers with him, I left the 27th [April] for Bena-Makima by pirogue and the 28th I was at Galli Koko, where the whites had no news of Mr. Hubin. On questioning the Bakuba they told us that Lukengo had sent 10 goats and 50 chickens to Mr. Hubin so that he would not go all the way to Mushenge, the latter then returned to Ibanche. Returning to Bena-Makima the 28th we noticed that the women and children were no longer in the Bakuba villages, the first of May the clerk, Swatson, wrote to his agent that Lukengo must have been arrested.⁴² ...finally the third I learned that Hubin had arrived with Lukengo at Galli Koko where I, accompanied by Père Pollet, immediately went to join him. Mr. Hubin had succeeded perfectly in his mission, and in using threats against the arrested chief he was able to arrive at Galli Koko without any open hostility on the part of the Bakuba.⁴³

At Hubin's request, Cassart accompanied him to Ibanche, followed by thousands of Bakuba. At Galikoko, Cassart sensed that one word from the chief would have led to an attack by his followers, but the chief remained silent, possibly because this is where Hubin removed his chains or possibly also because the chief knew that he could no longer hope to unite all his subjects. At Ibanche the attitude of the Bakuba was one of indifference, for they refused to even supply food for Kot aPe⁴⁴ who clearly had lost the support of the Bakete around Bachi-Shombe and the Bakete between Ibanche and Luebo, because both groups claimed he had lied to them with his bwanga when he said that the guns would not harm them (les fusils ne parleraient pas).⁴⁵ On May 22, 1905, Kot aPe was sent to Lusambo via Basongo. He was returned to Luebo on August 12 and escorted back to Mushenge via Ibanche by Captain De Cock.⁴⁶

From this time on the Bakuba were no longer able to follow their former isolationist policy. The king had seen various military installations during the time he was in custody and he was willing to promise to allow the C.K. to trade in his kingdom. Furthermore, it was to his advantage to have State support in order to reassert his position in his kingdom. To have the State and the C.K. support him as king constituted a form of reconciliation between the Nyimi and the European.

With the revolt over, it was now necessary to attach blame. As far as the State was concerned, the C.K. in particular was responsible for the revolt. The principal agent, Oeyen, whose secteur responsibilities

included the Bakuba capital, was accused of provoking the revolt by his brutality and poor management. In February 1905, Oeyen was interrogated by Captain De Cock, at which time Oeyen was requested to recount the events of the months preceding the November revolt. He replied to the charges in a lengthy report, in which he took exception to the fact that he was being interrogated whereas Drion, the S.A.P.V. director at Galikoko, and Van Noten, a C.K. agent at Galikoko, and all European personnel at Bena Makima were not questioned, and neither were the Bakuba.⁴⁷ De Cock's interest in questioning Oeyen may possibly have been generated by reasons other than just Oeyen's access to the Bakuba capital. All the Europeans knew Oeyen to be impulsive and hot-tempered towards the African population but, in spite of this, Cassart, the C.K. Chef de Secteur and Oeyen's superior, stated that the events preceding the revolt clearly indicated Oeyen was not to blame.⁴⁸ With Oeyen's well-known reputation, it may have suited De Cock to use him as a scapegoat. Furthermore, one of Oeyen's former employees testified to the fact that Oeyen frequently used the cbicotte (whip) and his capitas traded in slaves.⁴⁹

The C.K. did not approve of the manner in which De Cock conducted his investigation of the revolt. Their experiences with him in the past had not always been to their advantage, and they were sure he now intended to hold the trading companies responsible for provoking the revolt. In a communication to the Director General of the C.K. in Brussels, Dreyepont states: "Decock loudly announced, in the presence of Lesclapart

and Brissac [C.K. employees], that he intended to make the trading companies [S.A.P.V. and C.K.] responsible for the revolt. He has done everything possible to keep himself out of a law-suit."⁵⁰ What possibly irritated the C.K. even more was that De Cock had listened to one of his soldiers, Lubanda, who had been in the employ of the C.K., but had been discharged in June 1904, at the request of Kot aPe because of his slave dealings. Now Lubanda was testifying against the C.K.⁵¹ As far as the C.K. was concerned the reasons for the revolt were exclusively political. However this was not necessarily the case for, when the State Prosecutor, Bossolo, reported to the Commission of Enquiry in 1905, he stated:

It is easy to notice from this report that the Lualaba-Kasai which used to enjoy a reputation of peace and tranquillity, no longer merits it. It has become disturbed and has necessitated frequent expeditions especially after the constitution of the Compagnie du Kasai became effective in 1902. Formerly the competition of the trading companies required them to treat the native well in order to keep him in their employment.... With the formation of the syndicate this was no longer necessary and the good relations with the natives ended. Even though the company wants to find a political motive for all the revolts which have troubled the region in the past year and a half, it is certain that, except for a few cases where political motives have joined with others, the chief cause has been the poor trading system and the bad behaviour of the white and black company personnel towards the natives.⁵²

The C.K. maintained that the main causes of the revolt were the State imposts and the presence of unwelcome foreigners on Bakuba territory. All three European groups were affected by the latter charge, since they all employed Baluba and Lulua capitas or catechists to advance their own causes. Regarding the former charge, since the State imposed the obligation of collecting imposts on the C.K., the State must accept some responsibility for the manner in which the company met this obligation.

However, despite the dispute over the origins of the revolt, the State, the C.K. and the Nyimi had to reconcile their differences. Although the State had succeeded in restoring a semblance of calm to the Kuba area, it did not have sufficient manpower to effectively occupy it and maintain the peace, and consequently the State governed through the Nyimi. The State needed the C.K. to collect its imposts, while the company wanted to continue to exploit the Bakuba kingdom. Since the Nyimi needed State and C.K. support to maintain his own position, all three parties sank their differences. Reconciliation between the Nyimi and the A.P.C.M. was not so easily accomplished, whether because of Kot aPe's fear of Mishaamilyeeng or because of the Presbyterians' persistence in entering the kingdom is not clear, but Kot aPe remained cool towards the A.P.C.M. until his death in 1916.⁵³

After its reconciliation with Kot aPe, the State intervened only rarely in Bakuba affairs up to February 1908, although the area was far from calm. Incidents occurred which should have resulted in more sustained State action, which was not possible because De Grunne spent most of 1907 in the area between the Lulua and Kasai dealing with Mukoko and Kalamba-Muana in the south. Despite this, the State expected the C.K. to be able to draw State revenues from Bakuba territory while exploiting it commercially, and while the company's greed made its agents ruthless in their demands for more rubber and other products from the Africans. Thus, the C.K.'s agents again generated hostility very shortly after Kot aPe was allowed to return to his kingdom in August 1905.

In 1906 Père Polet, who worked the plantations at Bena Makima, for the C.K., was transferred to Mushenge. In April 1907 he was killed in a dispute concerning a quantity of rubber which the C.K. had demanded in the village of Baambooy. Polet had threatened the village chief with his revolver whereupon Miaan, possibly a village notable, killed him with an arrow. Polet's assistant, Père Augustin Janssens, took the body back to Bena Makima while the king, himself, together with his soldiers apprehended Miaan and, after a brief trial, sentenced him to a six months' prison term in the capital.⁵⁴ In June 1907, a C.K. worker was murdered at Iboush, between Koshi and Ibanche. Again the king intervened and brought the killer to the State post at Luebo.⁵⁵ In July of that same year, Cornelis, a C.K. agent from the Luebo factory, was killed at the village

of Kapudi (Zappo-Lulua). Kocher, the Chef de Poste of Luebo, hastened to the scene with twelve soldiers to conduct an investigation and to apprehend the culprits.⁵⁶ At about the same time, an incident occurred at Bakwa-Moiza in which a C.K. agent was fired on by some Pianga people. The C.K. Chef de Secteur, Dor, requested State aid but all he received in return was a letter from Saut, the Assistant to the Commissaire du District, urging the C.K. agents to take more precautions when moving about: Cornelis, for instance, was killed in a village noted for its hostility to the company, where even his assistants did not wish to accompany him. Saut stated: "If the State is to guarantee protection to the agents of the company...it is desirable that they (the agents) should respect this protection and act wisely towards the natives without provoking them."⁵⁷

De Grunne was aware of these events occurring in Bakuba territory but, by the end of 1907, he was still in Bakete having just completed his expedition against Mukoko. In a letter to his father, he deplored the murders and lack of sufficient State posts to effectively control the district.⁵⁸ After his return to Luluabourg, he went to the Luebo area in February 1908 to return some vagabond Lulua and Baluba slaves to their chefferies. He was severely criticized for this by the A.P.C.M. who accused him of slave raiding. Until this time the missionaries had considered De Grunne "just and fair even though he was a Roman Catholic."⁵⁹ The incident marked the beginning of tense relations between the A.P.C.M. and De Grunne.

Until 1910 when the first State post was established at the Bakuba capital, the territory was left for the C.K. to exploit. Occasional visits by the State's representatives to the area were not sufficient to establish any long-range policies. It was possible to crush rebellions, but the limited number of State personnel did not allow for permanent occupation. It is noteworthy that, when Père Polet was murdered in April 1907, the State did not intervene even though a European had been killed. Thus it was that Kot aPe came to be considered an enlightened sovereign whose sole desire was to see his people happy and prosperous.⁶⁰

The State's inability to permanently occupy Bakuba territory was due to staff shortages and the need to establish State posts in the areas south of Luebo and Luluabourg, where the Cokwe still actively resisted the European occupation. Cokwe resistance increased after Kalamba fled to the upper Kasai River in 1896 and united with factions from the Cokwe, Lulua and Bapende peoples, all groups which depended on trade into Angola to maintain their independence. Kalamba found further support in a remnant of the mutinous Batetela soldiers who had moved into the southern Kasai, trading slaves for guns with traders in Angola.

There were not sufficient State forces to stop this trade or even to reoccupy Wissmann Falls after it was evacuated in 1895, despite the fact that a dissident Kuba group under Chief Ndombe and the Pende village under Chief Belinge, both living around Bashi Bienge, had given their allegiance to the State. When Presbyterian missionaries visited Ndombe

in 1899, Africans were still joyally paying tribute to the State.⁶¹

Trading companies did not venture as far as Wissmann Falls because of fear of Cokwe attacks and chose rather to remain near the confluence of the Lulua and Kasai Rivers and along the Kasai up to a point adjacent to Luebo and no further.⁶²

After 1902, the State's main objectives in the southern zone were to establish its political borders in the extreme south and then attempt to control the area. To accomplish this it was necessary to defeat Kalamba and his allies, as well as to gain the submission of the population at large. Furthermore, if the area was to be effectively controlled, the State would have to establish posts. Dilolo was crucial, since it was believed to be the source of both the Kasai and Zambezi Rivers and was, therefore, a focal-point of international attention. In May 1901 the C.F.S. accordingly requested the Comité Spécial du Katanga (C.S.K.) to found a trading post there, in part also to isolate some Batetela soldiers from the Angolan trade caravans.⁶³ This task was inherited by the C.K., which eventually acted with the State.

The first attempts to occupy the south were made in 1902 when the State sent several expeditions into the south under De Clerck, Hendrickx and Gallaix, all having as their purpose the establishment of State posts.⁶⁴ The Hendrickx expedition, in which De Clerck participated, intended to defeat the Batetela soldiers and then continue on to the south to establish two State posts.⁶⁵ A battle took place on the west bank of the upper

Lubilash, which resulted in the death of one white man and the retreat of Hendrickx with his remaining forces.⁶⁶ The other expedition under the command of Gallaix, was sent to open one post between Kanda Kanda and another in the Lake Dilolo area.⁶⁷ However, Gallaix's orders were changed: he was first sent to the aid of Hendrickx and then, with De Clerck, continued to the south.

Besides these military expeditions, the State also sent out a commercial expedition under a British prospector, E.A. Daly, who, with a German named Dussing and eleven armed soldiers provided by the State, proceeded to Lake Dilolo via Kanda Kanda, Mutombu-Mukulu and Kayembe-Mukulu towards the end of 1902. Daly and Dussing were ordered to develop a route to the south which could eventually be used to provision an intermediate post. It was not anticipated that this would present serious problems, since the Kaniok and Lunda peoples, through whose territory the march would have to proceed, had already submitted to the State. However the presence of mutinous soldiers made travel and the procuring of porters difficult. Daly and Dussing, hoping to avoid the mutineers, went to Kayembe-Mukulu, where they arrived on December 4, 1902, but they were forced to return to Mutombo-Mukulu when they realized their inferior military position in relation to that of the Batetela soldiers. The plan to establish a post at Kayembe-Mukulu was therefore dropped.⁶⁸

Daly and Dussing arrived at Lake Dilolo in February 1903 and reported that the nearest European post was the Portuguese one at Mana Kandundu. Their attempt to cross the Lutumbue River was resisted by the local population and resulted in an exchange of gunfire in which the chief of the area, Chief Koujouga, and several of his men were killed. The chief's force numbered between 300-400 armed men but evidently they were too inefficient to repulse the prospectors' advance with their eleven soldiers.⁶⁹ Their arrival at Lake Dilolo also upset the Portuguese Government and brought accusations against Daly, who was charged with leading a military force into Portuguese territory and causing death to people considered wards of the Portuguese Government.⁷⁰ Daly justified his actions concerning the latter accusation by stating that one of his porters and his wife were killed before his men had opened fire. In regard to the land claims, Daly was able to produce maps which indicated that the incident occurred in C.F.S. territory. No serious consequences arose from these happenings, although they did invite some official correspondence between the two governments.⁷¹ By the time Daly returned to Kanda Kanda, De Clerck had arrived and established a State post at Dilolo while Gallix, who had accompanied De Clerck, returned to Lusambo.

The hazards revealed by Daly and Dussing's journey to the south caused the State to send an expedition under Edgard Verdick to find a shorter, and safer, supply route. Verdick's expedition was accompanied by

the C.K. geographer, Questiaux, and constituted the first of several missions in which C.K. representatives accompanied State expeditions for the purpose of learning about the trade potential of a region, the navigability of its waterways and the attitude of its population.

As a result of the report made by Questiaux on this march to Dilolo and back, the C.K. began to plan its own moves into the south. In 1903 the Commissaire du District assured the C.K. director that such a venture would be regarded as a means of assisting the State's efforts to pacify the south by establishing legitimate commerce.⁷² With the permanent State post offering the necessary protection, the C.K. initiated its own penetration of the south, which the State advised should be carried out carefully and systematically in order to prevent any uprisings which might result from hasty occupation of an area where the State was not sufficiently established.⁷³ Thus the C.K. sent several expeditions: some went all the way to Dilolo; others went to the middle Kasai River area south of Luebo. The intention was to establish factories throughout the southern area and especially along the Kasai River, in an effort to prevent rubber from crossing the river into Angola.

With the establishment of the State post at Dilolo the C.K. sent an expedition into the area in 1905 under the direction of Alfred Cudell, accompanied by a Portuguese trader, Americo Frausto. Frausto was familiar with the Dilolo area because of his earlier experience, in 1904, as an independent trader with his own factory, destroyed by the Luena chief,

Tshiniama. In 1905, Frausto joined the C.K. and immediately went with Cudell on his exploratory mission.⁷⁴ Frausto was familiar with the trading possibilities of the Dilolo area and also with the attitude of State agents towards the Cokwe people for, after his own 1904 expedition to the Cokwe, he had written a report in which he portrayed how the State often misinterpreted Cokwe behaviour.

He gave as an example the fact that

Frequently one of the Congolese Cokwe will decide to visit his former village (on Portuguese territory): this Cokwe will be followed by a suite of slaves; as is customary; however, if he encounters any State agents he will be arrested for slave dealing; that could have sad consequences, such as cause a revolt.... The exchange of slaves is done to obtain cloth from Portuguese territory.... If the Congolese were given the opportunity to buy merchandise at a good price I am sure they would stop trading on the left bank of the Cassai. To arrive at this result the Compagnie du Kasai is able to do more with its force.⁷⁵

Frausto also had some very definite views on how the Company and the State could cooperate to the advantage of both, stating that

...according to the plan which I have studied for the commercial occupation of the country...of which I know the customs of its various peoples, it will be easy to close the frontier (to the Bika traders); however, to do so it is necessary that the State assist the Compagnie du Kasai by establishing a new military post at a chosen point replacing the present one which is strategically poorly located (Dilolo).

It is also important that the Compagnie du Kasai and the State agree to prevent the latter from

exacting any impositions whatsoever from the natives; the day that the State demands tribute of any kind whether in rubber, croisettes or food supplies (goats, flour, etc.) they will cross the Kasai; this would be regrettable because it would be impossible to replace them with others who produce more rubber. On the other hand the State shouldn't need imposts since it has interests in the Company; it would gain more by assisting the Company than by making impositions.

The tendency for the Cokwe to abandon the country is already noticeable on the route between Dilolo and Katola; many of the villages are empty and some natives who are still there have told me they will also cross the Kasai; I suppose it's because of the soldiers who act as messengers between Dilolo and Katola. It would be better if the State did not use soldiers for this service.⁷⁶

Frausto's observations were substantiated by Questiaux when he travelled south in 1905. The undisciplined behaviour of State forces created hostility between them and the local population instead of inducing the latter to submit. Frequently, difficulty in obtaining sufficient food supplies arose because the first State officer in the area would kill the chickens and goats while marching through the villages, or he would allow his soldiers to go to the villages, while armed, in order to buy food: "the depredation caused by the soldiers is unprecedented and it is true that from Katola to Dilolo there is hardly a village left, most of the route is deserted."⁷⁷

Besides this, the State's policy of underpaying its porters and servants and the poor quality of its merchandise were also factors which caused Africans to refuse to trade with it. In addition, the State's prices were generally low, compared to Portuguese prices. Questiaux reports:

The prices paid by State agents are inconsistent; sometimes very high when they pay in gunpowder and cartridges; other times much too low; an egg costs seven cartridges, some flour, and a length of cloth; on the other hand, transport from Kapanga to Katola, about four good days, is worth a half length of cloth; actually at Dilolo the rations are paid in cloth; the soldiers dispose of many cartridges in trade, buying cloth from the porters coming from Kanda-Kanda: one length = 30 cartridges.

In the beginning, foodstuffs were bought with gunpowder which caused that commodity to depreciate; the native now demands about a half keg of gunpowder for 100 balls of rubber weighing 11 to 1300 grams raw.⁷⁸

Arbitrary trading practices by the State, as well as the shoddy merchandise offered by both the State and the C.K., contributed to the disgust the local population felt toward the "Bula Matari." As a consequence the C.K. did not establish a factory at Dilolo until 1907.⁷⁹ Even though the State had been optimistic in its 1903 report that the extreme south had been occupied and was calm as a result of the establishment of posts at Dilolo and Katola, there were constant skirmishes between the State and the local population⁸⁰ and, although this area came under the influence of the State, it was certainly not controlled by it until much later.

Co-operation between the State and the C.K. also existed in the middle Kasai River area where the C.K. depended on State support to move into the Djoko-Punda, Golongo, Kabeya and Mai-Munene areas. Although State agents did not accompany the C.K.'s expeditions, it was anticipated that State assistance would be available if necessary. The C.K.'s move into this area was designed to make the State's task simpler. However, the very fact that the C.K. did not trade in guns created a trade barrier; furthermore, the region from Djoko-Punda south to Mai-Munene was not as rich in rubber as regions further east.

Also the agents whom the C.K. sent into the region were frequently inefficient and aroused the hostility of the population, instead of encouraging peaceful commerce.⁸¹

Moving into this territory brought the C.K. into Kalamba-Muana's region. When Kalamba died, sometime before 1899,⁸² he was succeeded by his step-son, Kalamba-Muana, who continued the former's animosity to the State. Therefore establishing any factories in the area was bound, sooner or later, to result in a confrontation with Kalamba-Muana. In 1904, the C.K. established factories at Djoko-Punda, Golongo and Kabeya with the intention of moving into the Mai-Munene area and eventually establishing factories along the Kasai up to Dilolo. The first task was to make peace with Kalamba-Muana in the hope that, when this was accomplished, the Colons would be weakened. As it was, C.K. agents found difficulty in persuading Africans to accompany them into Kalamba-Muana's territory.

An example of this was the expedition led by Chef de Secteur, Bertrand, up the Kasai with intention of reaching Mai-Munene: by the time the expedition arrived on the fringe of Lulua territory, 40 Bapende porters had fled for fear of an attack from the Lulua because of a recent disagreement between the two peoples. Bertrand was then able to obtain twelve porters from Golongo and reach the Lulua village of Tchiluata from whence he wished to continue to Mai-Munene with a Lulua escort. After much discussion, the escort was provided despite the Lulua's alleged fear of Kajamba-Muana's reactions at having the foreigner escorted into his territory. Bertrand reached Kasimba, on the Kasai River, and noted that

Here the Bapende change their decor, the villages are large, the huts spacious and well built, many goats, sheep, pigs, etc. The men are tall, well-built, a sharp contrast to the Baluba who are generally short and thin.

The chief is an elderly man, with long braided hair which he wears down his back; he looked at us a long time (it was the first time he had seen a white man), examined our jacket, pants, shoes, etc.

After this examination, he condescended to meet our demands for water, a goat and food for our men. We asked for information about the countryside and we learned that we were just an eight-hour march away from Mai-Munene. We were delighted to be almost at our destination when the next day we asked the chief for a guide: he emphatically refused one (the evening before he had met with all the surrounding chiefs) and he would not permit us to continue our march towards the south.

When we asked the reason, he replied that he feared the famous Kalamba's anger if he let us pass.

I learned, however, that this was only an excuse and that in the meeting of the chiefs the previous evening it had been decided to stop us, even by force if necessary, from going any further south and the real reason was that they fear that we will prevent their trade in guns, gunpowder and especially slaves, which is practised on a large scale in this area (it is hardly necessary to say that these guns come from Portuguese traders located in the north of Angola).⁸³

Bertrand's attempts to continue towards the south were halted by threats from the local population and he concluded that the future of any trade by the C.K. in that area would be limited because of the trade with Angola.⁸⁴ He goes on to say:

Here everything is counted in guns, a slave woman is worth a certain number of guns, a goat is worth a certain number of cartridges, etc. Furthermore the chiefs do not allow their subjects to wear loin cloths made of European cloth, not a man or a woman wears it; they all wear their own woven cloths, the women and the children wear several strings of red and black beads of Portuguese origin.... It is not basically just rubber going to the Portuguese, according to what I hear, there is a large scale trade in slaves.⁸⁵

The C.K.'s efforts to advance into Kalamba-Muana's area remained frustrated, but the resistance to European occupation cannot be attributed solely to Kalamba-Muana. Early in 1904 the C.K. Director in Africa, Dryepont, conducted a tour throughout C.K. territory for the purpose of opening factories in new territories, including a factory at Mai-Muriene.⁸⁶

To do this would have required the consent of the surrounding African leaders, and when Labryn, a C.K. agent, arrived at Mai-Munene in October 1904 he was told that ever since the C.K. had arrived at Kabeya, Kalamba-Muana had moved to the left bank of the Kasai. Furthermore, if he wished to negotiate with Kalamba-Muana, he must first meet with the Cokwe chief, Moukkau Djambi, who would then give direction to Kalamba-Muana's village.⁸⁷

Frobenius, a German ethnologist who travelled to Mai-Munene in 1905, speaks of Kalamba-Muana as being feared by both white and black, the mere mention of his name striking terror in the hearts of his enemies.⁸⁸ This may well have been inspired propaganda for the sake of keeping Europeans out of his trade area without a pitched battle which Kalamba-Muana might lose. Then, too, Kalamba-Muana depended on the Cokwe for support. The C.K.'s observations were that the area was under the control of the great Cokwe chief, Moukkau Djambi, and although Kalamba-Muana had a large following of his own, he paid a tribute to Moukkau Djambi.⁸⁹

The joint control of the western part of the Kasai district by Kalamba-Muana, the Cokwe and their allies made penetration difficult for both the State and the C.K. The State did not have sufficient manpower and the C.K.'s trade articles held no attraction. Bertrand states, "In my opinion, as long as the Government does not authorize us to sell gunpowder all the produce will be drained to Portuguese territory."⁹⁰

There is no indication that the State entered this territory before 1906, although during the course of Labryn's travels around Mai-Munene he met several old men who stated that he was the fourth white man they had seen. Of the other three, two were Portuguese and the other was "Katanga," the African name for Lieutenant Cassart,⁹¹ whom they probably met during the course of Cassart's campaign against Kalamba in the Luluabourg area in 1895-1896.

There may possibly be another reason for the State not venturing to attack Kalamba-Muana at this time. When Dryepondt made his tour of C.K. factories in 1904, he also visited the R.C. mission of St. Joseph at Mikalayi. From his interview with Père Cambier, he learned that the latter had travelled to Mai-Munene, hoping to meet with Kalamba-Muana, but had been forced to retreat. Dryepondt had actually come to Luluabourg to settle a problem with the Zappo Zap rubber collectors who were continuously crossing the borders between secteurs in order to procure rubber. He learned from both the Zappo Zap and Cambier that the Zappo Zap rubber traders went as far as Kalamba-Muana's village "to whom, contrary to the opinion admitted by the State, Sappo is secretly allied."⁹² There is no other evidence to support this statement, which itself explains why the State hesitated to move against Kalamba-Muana: the State could not rely on Zappo Zap troops.

In December 1904, Dryepondt wrote to the Commissaire du District that Kalamba-Muana had promised to receive C.K. agents in his territory. "If we can pacify Kalamba we will have rendered a service to the State."⁹³ The C.K. would then hopefully be able to trade with Kalamba's people and the State would be able to establish a post on the Kasai which would give it a further foothold in its move to the south.

The C.K.'s persistence resulted in a factory being established at Mai-Munene in March 1906, but on May 7 of the same year it was attacked, pillaged and destroyed.⁹⁴ Reconstruction of a new post was begun immediately, but, by July, Kalamba-Muana was threatening to strike again. In establishing themselves at Mai-Munene the C.K. had the same experience as the State when searching for suitable African allies: whom could they trust? They needed an intermediary between themselves and the people or chief, in this case Kalamba-Muana, with whom they wished to trade. Their choice here was Chief Kabeya, with whom they had made an agreement to build a factory near his village in 1904. Kabeya was familiar with Kalamba-Muana's territory and knew him personally. The fact that the C.K. wished to trade with Kalamba-Muana disturbed Kabeya because it threatened his own trade in gunpowder with the south. He consented, however, to mediate between the two parties. Kabeya's mediation appeared to be successful, for Kabeya indicated that Kalamba-Muana would accept peaceful penetration, but when the factory at Mai-Munene was destroyed and when July brought renewed threats from Kalamba-Muana, the C.K. Inspector

Lescrauwaet, began to suspect Kabeya. He states:

We have pushed our limits to the point of receiving Kabeya as a friend. He was the one responsible for making our proposals of peace to Kalamba.

In what way will he have done so, and what is his personal attitude, the scoundrel? I keep hoping that a ball will go astray and deliver us from this good-for-nothing.

In the courts he would be acquitted, we have no tangible evidence of the multiple crimes he commits. He would certainly benefit from a Non-Lieu.⁹⁵

The rumoured second attack on the new installations came on July 31, 1906. The State had established a secondary post at Mai-Munene which acted as a rest centre for Lieutenant Bradfer, the military Chef de Secteur for the Lulua, when travelling through the area. Bradfer had been at Mai-Munene since May when the factory was destroyed and was present at the second attack, for the rumour had been taken seriously. Bradfer decided to allow Kalamba-Muana and his men to attack and discharge their gunpowder and then to pursue them across the plains. When the attack came it lasted from nine in the morning until the evening with a force of 500 attackers, some of whom were mutinous Batetela soldiers. Many were armed with guns. The Batetela had about twenty Martinis, two Mausers and some Albin guns. The State and the C.K. were successful in their defense, but the attack had depleted their own supply of cartridges. Kalamba-Muana had experienced a serious defeat and it would have been an opportune time for the State to lead an expedition against him; however, lack of cartridges and manpower prevented it.⁹⁶

It was not until September 1906, therefore, that Bradfer and the Commissaire du District, Gustin, were able to lead an attack against Kalamba-Muana. Since his village was located on the left bank of the Kasai, the intention was to attack from a point opposite the village. Kalamba-Muana responded by withdrawing further inland.⁹⁷ This, in itself, was considered a success, in that Kalamba-Muana was forced to retreat, thus breaking his strength on C.F.S. territory. During the course of the next year, until September 1907, the State gradually increased its operations throughout the area. The post at Mai-Munene was fortified, and garrisoned by 50 soldiers under the command of Lieutenant LaDot to maintain surveillance over Kalamba-Muana.⁹⁸ Bradfer's report to the Commissaire du District, Gustin, must have indicated his optimism about the area because, when Gustin responded on November 4, 1907, he advised Bradfer to begin organizing chefferies throughout the area along the Kasai.⁹⁹

During the course of 1907, Alfred Cudell, the C.K. prospector, returned to the Mai-Munene area with the new Chef de Secteur for the Lulua region, Count De Grunne. After Kalamba-Muana's retreat in 1906 it was considered opportune for the State to demand his submission. Cudell evidently had met Kalamba-Muana in 1905 and was considered to be on good terms with him, so that it was thought safe for him to move into Kalamba-Muana's territory. Furthermore, making peace with the old chief would also profit the C.K. by allowing its expansion without fear of disturbance.

Whatever the reason may have been for taking Cudell with him, De Grunne chose Cudell to arrange for a meeting between Kalamba-Muana and himself as the State's representative.¹⁰⁰

The meeting took place in the village of Gongo-Gongo, where De Grunne arrived with eight soldiers. Writing of the incident to his mother, De Grunne states: "We were surrounded by thousands of natives armed with guns, etc., if Kalamba had wanted to avenge himself for the beating Gustin and Bradfer gave him, he could never have had a better opportunity."¹⁰¹ Kalamba-Muana made an unconditional surrender to the State and promised to move to the Luluabourg area. The Mutetela soldier, Kondolo, who was with Kalamba, also surrendered.¹⁰²

The reasons for Kalamba's surrender are varied. Certainly one of the most important was the defeat he had experienced the previous year at the hands of the State. He must have begun to realize the State's increased strength and his own powerlessness. Then, too, there was the increased surveillance over the trade carried on with Angola, even though it was still to be many years before the slave trade and the trade in guns and gunpowder was stopped. Furthermore, Kalamba-Muana was an old man by this time and no longer the great chief of the Lulua, as a result of his long absence from the Luluabourg area. It is also possible, however, that Kalamba needed the State at this time. When the State made its first attack against him in 1906, he seems to have been assisted by both Kondolo and Kimpuki, the Batetela soldiers. Possibly because he realized that

Kalamba-Muana's power was broken, Kimpuki left, taking some of Kalamba's relatives as hostages¹⁰³ and demanding a ransom for their release. In November 1907, Gustin requested De Grunne to send some close friend of Kalamba-Muana's to De Clerck in order to have him help negotiate the release of the hostages.¹⁰⁴ Two years later, the matter still had not been resolved, for De Grunne wrote a letter to the Chef de Poste at Katola in November 1909, requesting him to intervene on behalf of Kalamba-Muana's oldest son, Mupungu, and his friends Mokenge I, Mokenge II and Mabale who had been taken as hostages and then sold to the Cokwe not too far from the Katola post. De Grunne wrote: "On Kalamba's behalf, having submitted to the State and living near Luluabourg, it would be desirable to have his son and friends returned to him."¹⁰⁵ However, this was a difficult matter and in July 1910 another directive was sent to secure their release,¹⁰⁶ but there is no evidence that this was ever accomplished.

For De Grunne, Kalamba-Muana's submission was a real victory, since he estimated that the chief's followers comprised about one-third of the population in the Lulua secteur.¹⁰⁷ But he realized, also, that the area was far from settled for, in the secteur for which he was responsible, some of the greatest resistance to European penetration came from the Sala Mpasu peoples, the northern neighbours of the Lunda.

Penetration into Sala Mpasu territory was slow, but the C.K. had seized upon the seeming friendliness of Bumba, a chief of a northern group of Sala Mpasu, to establish a factory on the fringe of his territory

at Bakete in 1903 and,¹⁰⁸ by 1905 there were C.K. factories near the villages of Bumba and Mukoko, two of the most powerful Sala Mpasu chiefs.¹⁰⁹ Bumba had previously formed an alliance with the Cokwe and enriched himself by trading Bakete slaves for guns. By allowing a C.K. factory near his village, he may have regarded the C.K. as another trading partner to increase his prestige. However, his slave trading continued until De Grunne campaigned against him in June 1907. A Cokwe caravan, having raided the Bakete, stopped on its way to the Portuguese border. De Grunne was able to surprise the caravan and, in the confrontation that followed, thirty-seven Cokwe were killed, and about 200 slaves were freed and allowed to return to their village. The Cokwe chief, Tchinkenke, escaped but was captured by Bumba and handed over to De Grunne. This ended Tchinkenke's annual dry season raids into Bakete territory,¹¹⁰ since Tchinkenke and ten of his foremost men became State prisoners at Lusambo.¹¹¹ Whether Bumba recognized in the State a force superior to that of the Cokwe is unknown but, from 1907 on, the State regarded him as a loyal supporter. The incident had also assured the State of Bakete support when the leaders came to thank De Grunne for the defeat of the Cokwe slave raider, Tchinkenke.¹¹²

Another Sala Mpasu leader, Chief Mukoko, located on the right bank of the Lulua, had also, at some time, traded with the Cokwe because of the guns in his possession.¹¹³ The C.K. factory located near his village was being constantly harassed by him until the C.K. decided to transfer it to

the village of Chief Tambwe in 1907. This meant a loss for Mukoko since he would no longer be able to raid the C.K. caravans, so, in anger, he retaliated by destroying the factory before the transfer was completed.¹¹⁴ De Grunne's visit to Mukoko in June 1907 was intended to investigate the C.K.'s complaints against him, and, if possible, force Mukoko's submission. Mukoko fled and De Grunne's attempt failed.

De Grunne was unable to follow Mukoko because he was called upon to deal with Kalamba-Muana. While enroute to the Kasai River, De Grunne passed through Babindji territory near the Lueta River where an incident had occurred which demanded State action. In May 1907 the C.K. agent, Baud'huin, had been wounded, taken captive, robbed and stripped of his clothes near the Lueta River.¹¹⁵ De Grunne's report on this must have been more revealing than his letter because when Saut, the assistant to the Commissaire du District, made his report he stated that Baud'huin had done what many C.K. agents did, namely: enter territory which had not been visited previously by Europeans. For Baud'huin, in particular, this was a presumptuous and stupid move, since he had just arrived from Europe and had no knowledge of the local population.¹¹⁶

This event created a disturbance in the entire area surrounding Kongolo, which obliged the State to send out Lieutenant Poire with twenty-five soldiers. Until the end of July 1907 there was an uneasy calm in the region, but unrest occurred again when the agent for the Compagnie du Chemin de fer du Katanga, Warnier, came through the area and

arrested the Babindji Chief, Tchinema, and put him in chains. The uprising which followed such an affront was too much for Poiré to control, and De Grunne had to go to his assistance. The reaction of the people was to attack the C.K. factory, causing it to be closed, and to attack Poiré's soldiers. Poiré confirmed that the initial cause was Warnier's dealing with the chief.¹¹⁷ These incidents did not foster the good relations between Africans and Europeans which were essential for commerce and peaceful penetration.

These various incidents also show the magnitude of De Grunne's task as Chef de Secteur of the Lulua. From Kongolo, he went to the Kasai River to be instrumental in Kafamba-Nuana's submission. That task completed he had at once to return to Sala Mpasu territory where new crises had arisen.

By October 1907 the transfer of the C.K. post from Mukoko to Tambwe had been completed. However, the C.K. agents, Albert Schoup and Georges Leclercq returned to Mukoko's area hoping to place C.K. buyers in the rubber-rich area. Schoup did not meet with Mukoko but with a lesser chief, Mabuta. During the negotiations, Schoup objected to the demands made by the chief and insulted him by raising his hand against him, probably meaning he slapped his face. This humiliation was too much and Mabuta's son shot Schoup. His head was cut off and sent to Mukoko,¹¹⁸ while the rest of his body was eaten.¹¹⁹

This event occasioned De Grunne's expedition into Sala Mpasu territory in October 1907 to investigate Schoup's death and arrest those responsible. De Grunne, certain that Mukoko was the instigator of the crime, was blind to the potential allies he might have had among the enemies of Mukoko and Mabuta, one of whom was Mukini a Kalo. De Grunne and his troops were met at the Lulua by the Ana Kalunda, a group of Sala Mpasu, under the leadership of Mukini a Kalo who seemed to have attempted to greet De Grunne in a friendly manner. De Grunne, probably accompanied by Bakete who had earlier been humiliated by the Ana Kalunda, met Mukini a Kalo with gunfire, killing him and causing his warriors to flee. De Grunne now had not only Mukoko and Mabuta and their following as enemies, but also the enemies of Mabuta.¹²⁰

From his own point of view, De Grunne was satisfied that his expedition had been successful in that, on October 26, 1907 Mukoko was taken prisoner to Lusambo and punished for the crime committed by Mabuta's son,¹²¹ for his past hostility to the State and the C.K. was sufficient evidence to label him the instigator of the crime.

De Grunne's last expedition into Sala Mpasu territory was made in 1908 to investigate attacks on an American prospecting expedition consisting of six whites, 800 porters and 25 soldiers.¹²² The group was attacked immediately on entering Sala Mpasu territory, first at Kamsele, where it lost ten men and thirty-five pieces of equipment, an event which discouraged its members sufficiently to cause them to turn back and head to

the north west, where the geologists of the expedition discovered the first diamond on November 4, 1907, near the village of the old Lulua chief Kalamba-Muana. De Grunne's own expedition met with such opposition that it was forced to retreat. After 1909 La Société Internationale forestière et minière du Congo (commonly known as Forminière) made some advances into Sala Mpasu territory because of the economic advantages of the mining industry to the local population, but effective occupation by the State did not occur until much later.¹²³


By 1908 the southern area, which the State had hoped to occupy without great difficulty, had at best experienced only the State's influence. The vastness of the area, the limited manpower and the opposition from African groups, especially the Cokwe and Sala Mpasu, made occupation impossible. De Grunne expressed a general frustration when he wrote:

It is a region in Congo where there are more crimes (the assassinations of Père Polet, Cornelis and Schoup in a 5 month period) and more attacks than anywhere else. The reason is simple.... Look at a map and you will see that to defend my secteur, which extends from the Sankuru to the 8th degree, I have only three posts: Luebo, Luluabourg and Kanda Kanda. Furthermore the entire region between the 7th and 8th degrees, the Lulua and the Kasai, has never been seriously explored. Several agents of the Compagnie du Kasai do some trading there, and it is marked by the paths of the trading Cokwe coming from Angola.¹²⁴

The Cokwe's greatest concern remained the safe-guarding of their trade with the south. As long as guns were not among the trade items offered by the State or the C.K., the Cokwe remained uncooperative. The Sala Mpasu were united and politically self-sufficient enough to resist effective occupation until the 1920s. The joint C.F.S. - C.K. move into the south had resulted in the establishment of some posts and factories, but resistance by the population frequently endangered the European personnel in them. By 1908 the southern region (south of Luebo, Luluabourg and Kanda Kanda) had State posts at Kanda Kanda, Dilolo and Katola with an additional rest centre for itinerating agents at Mai-Munene, while the C.K. had established several factories along the Kasai River and on the fringes of Sala Mpasu territory. Limited personnel prevented a more concentrated occupation, both in the south and in Kuba territory.

Whereas in 1901 the European presence existed chiefly along the main river systems, by 1908 some posts such as Mai-Munene, Katola and Dilolo were established in the interior. Although several important advantages had been gained in the years 1901-1908, including Kalamba-Muana's submission to the State and the suppression of the Kuba rebellion, some of the former obstacles to occupation still remained. Among these were the Cokwe, who were still carrying on a flourishing trade to Angola, and the many areas where local Africans were so hostile that peaceful occupation was impossible.

Besides this, the years 1901-1908 brought with them tensions between Europeans and Africans which affected the relations between the different European groups. All these actions took place against the complicated background of intra-European relations, and it is necessary to examine these relationships in isolation before turning to equally involved issues stimulated by the rise of the Reform Campaign, which impacted upon the Kasai region.



VIII. STATE POSTS, 1902-1908

X. MISSION STATIONS, 1902-1908

FOOTNOTES

1. See Maps VIII, IX and X for locations mentioned in this Chapter.
2. Musumba was located at approximately 8°20'S, near Kapanga where the State established a post in 1904. Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule, pp. 46-48.
3. These factories included: Butala, Mukikamu, Zappo Zapo, in the Sankuru River; Bena Makima and Luebo on the Lulua River; Bena Luidi on the Kasai River; and Inkongu near Lusambo. The C.K. also took over the factory at Mushenge.
4. Vansina, "Du royaume Kuba," pp. 23-24.
5. Verner, Pioneering in Central Africa, pp. 214-215.
6. C.K. Archives, Brussels, List of Factories and Posts of the C.K.
7. A.E. (A.A.) 527, January 27, 1905, Bossolo to the President of the Commission of Inquiry, Lualaba - Kasai District, *Expéditions militaires effectuées dans le District pendant les années 1902-1903-1904*; C.K. Archives, Brussels, October 29, 1903, Liebrecht, Secretary General of the Department of the Interior, to the C.K., Brussels.
8. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Rapport mensuel sur la situation générale du District, January 1904.
9. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Rapport sur un voyage fait en compagnie de Monsieur le Substitut du Procureur d'Etat à Bashishombe et dans la région de Bashibange.
10. Jan Vansina, "Recording the Oral History of the Bakuba: II. Results," Journal of African History (1960, No. 2) p. 269.
11. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, pp. 160-161.

12. Vansina, "Du royaume Kuba," p. 20. The Hungarian explorer, Emil Torday, visited the Kuba in 1907-1908 and became friendly with the Bakuba king. In recalling the events of the revolt, the Nyimi placed the blame for it on the missionaries, especially Sheppard, whom he accused of attempting to replace him by Mishaamilyeeng: Emil Torday, Causeries Congolaises (Brussels: Librairie Albert Dewit, 1925), p. 143.
13. Vansina, "Du royaume Kuba," p. 19; Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, pp. 161, 176.
14. Vansina, "Du royaume Kuba," p. 19.
15. Ibid.
16. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bena Makima, March 2, 1905, Oeyen to the Chef de Secteur at Luebo.
17. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 167; Vansina, "Du royaume Kuba," p. 21; Kellersberger, A Life for the Congo, p. 68.
18. Kellersberger, A Life for the Congo, p. 68; Wharton, Led in Triumph, p. 9.
19. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bena Makima, March 2, 1905, Oeyen to the Chef de Secteur X à Luebo, p. 2a.
20. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Lusambo, December 31, 1904. District du Lualaba-Kasai. Actes de mauvais traitements envers des noirs commis dans le district pendant les années: 1902-1903-1904, Bossolo to President of the Commission of Enquiry.
21. A.E. (A.A.) 513, Lusambo, May 4, 1905, Bossolo au Directeur de la Justice.
22. "Fétiche de guerre Tonga-Tonga," Congo, 1921, II, pp. 423-428.
23. Ibid.

24. A.E. (A.A.) 527, January 27, 1905, Bossolo to the President of the Commission of Enquiry, District du Lualaba-Kasai, Expéditions militaires effectuées dans le District pendant les années 1902-1903-1904.

25. Ibid.

26. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bena Makima, March 2, 1905, Oeyen to the Chef de Secteur X at Luebo.

27. Vansina, "Du royaume Kuba," p. 21.

28. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bena Makima, March 2, 1905, Oeyen to the Chef de Secteur X à Luebo, p. 2c.

29. Ibid., p. 5a.

30. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bena Makima, March 2, 1905, Oeyen to the Chef de Secteur X at Luebo.

31. Ibid., p. 3c.

32. Ibid., p. 3.

33. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Rapport au Conseil Général, February 25, 1905. Yongo was the magician Kot aPe had received at his court earlier to prepare the medicine to counteract the smallpox epidemic.

34. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Luebo, December 10, 1904, Cassart to Director at Dima.

35. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Expéditions militaires pendant les années 1902-1903-1904.

36. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bachi-Shombe, December 30, 1904, Dryepondt to the Director General.

37. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, March 2, 1905. Dryepondt to the Commissaire du District of the Lualaba-Kasai; Rapport au Conseil Général of February 25, 1905.

38. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Luebo, December 10, 1904, Cassart to C.K. Director at Dima.

39. Ibid.

40. Luebo Territorial Office Archives, Renseignements Politiques et Divers, 1904-1908; C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bena Makima, March 2, 1905. Oeyen to Chef de Secteur X à Luebo. De Cock told Oeyen that Kot aPe had submitted to the State with a gift of 3 goats and 10 chickens. Oeyen then asked if the chief was arrested and taken to Lusambo. De Cock replied: "Why would I have arrested him and why would I send him to Lusambo!!" Oeyen then reminded De Cock that on the occasion when the latter passed through Galikoko in November he stated his intention to take the Bakuba chief in chains along the route from Ekumbi-Galikoko-Luebo to parade him in front of the Bakuba and Bakete. According to De Cock this was no longer necessary since the chief had submitted at Ibanche.

By February 11, fifteen Bakuba arrived at Bachi-Shombe and, on the Nyimi's orders, were to assist with the work of the factory. They told Cassart that the Nyimi had submitted to De Cock with a gift of 3 goats and 10 chickens and had requested that Drion (S.A.P.V.) act as intermediary to make his peace with the State. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bachi-Shombe, February 11, 1905, Cassart to C.K. Director at Dima.

41. The accounts by Wharton, The Leopold Hunts Alone, p. 107, and Kellersberger, A Life for the Congo, p. 72, in which they state that the Nyimi was led in chains must refer to the events which occurred in April and May 1905. Vansina and Shaloff also refer to Lieutenant Hubin taking Kot aPe to Lusambo as a prisoner at this time; however according to the Luebo territorial report for 1904-1908 and a report by Cassart of the C.K., Hubin arrested Kot aPe at the end of April or May 1. Vansina, "Du royaume Kuba," p. 22; Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 165.

42. The capture of the king is described by Shaloff as follows: "Because the Kuba did not fear his small contingent, he caught them off guard when he suddenly pointed a revolver at Kot aPe. His subjects did not know what to do, for they struck at the snake (Hubin) then the calabash (Kot aPe) would be broken. As a result, Hubin's daring act succeeded." Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 165.

43. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Luebo, May 11, 1905, Cassart to the C.K. Director at Dima.

44. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Luebo, May 11, 1905, Cassart to C.K. Director at Dima.

45. Ibid.

46. Luebo Territorial Office Archives, Renseignements Politiques et Divers, 1904-1908; Frobenius, Im Schatten, pp. 228-229.

47. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bena Makima, March 2, 1905. Oeyen to Chef de Secteur X at Luebo.

48. C.K. Archives, Luebo, December 10, 1904, Cassart to the Director of the C.K. at Dima. In all the inquiries made by the State, C.K. and the A.P.C.M. in regards to cruelties committed by C.K. agents. Oeyen's name is never mentioned. The only complaints against him are those mentioned by Leo Frobenius, the German ethnographer, who met him at Bena Makima in July 1905. As a self-appointed ethnologist for the C.K. Oeyen naturally resented Frobenius and found ways to provoke him. The most noteworthy incident was when Oeyen was accused of attempting to prevent Frobenius' servants from fishing near the wharf at Bena Makima. The incident involved a great deal of correspondence between Frobenius and C.K. and finally led to an inquiry in February 1906 which cleared Oeyen.

49. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bena Makima, March 2, 1905, Oeyen to Chef de Secteur X at Luebo, pp. 7-11.

50. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, May 3, 1905, C.K. Director in Africa to Director General.

51. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bena Makima, March 2, 1905, Oeyen to Chef de Secteur X at Luebo, p. 6. Dryepondt considered De Cock to be arrogant and self-important. During De Cock's interrogation of Oeyen he was pacing back and forth swinging a sword-cane which he had taken from the Bakuba king. In a marginal note Dryepondt states that he had given this weapon to the chief as a gift in 1902.

52. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Basongo, January 27, 1905, Bossolo to the President of the Commission of Enquiry at Leopoldville.

53. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, pp. 171-172.

54. Vansina, "Du royaume Kuba," p. 27.
55. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Lusambo, September 12, 1907. District du Lualaba-Kasai. Rapport Mensuel sur la situation générale du District by Saut, Assistant to the Commissaire du District.
56. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Lusambo, August 2, 1907, Saut to the Governor-General.
57. Ibid.
58. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. VIII, Bakete, December 4, 1907, De Grunne to his father.
59. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 133.
60. Emil Torday, On the Trail of the Bushongo, p. 119.
61. Verner, Pioneering in Central Africa, pp. 200-202, 377.
62. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Map of Factories et Postes occupés ou ayant été occupés. Probably 1910.
63. Marie-Claire Lambert-Culot, "Les premières années en Afrique du Comité Spécial du Katanga," Etudes d'Histoire Africaine, III (1972), pp. 283-284. Hopefully the Cokwe would begin trading with the C.S.K. This did not materialize before the end of 1901, at which time the C.K. became the vehicle to eventually fulfill the State's expectations.
64. Edgard Verdick, Les Premiers jours au Katanga, 1890-1903 (Bruxelles, Editions du Comité Spécial du Katanga, 1952), p. 162.
65. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Boma, February 18, 1903, Deputy Governor-General F. Fuchs to Secretary of State.
66. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Undated letter from Dussing and Daly, Prospectors, to the Chef de Poste, Pierarche. Copy made at Lusambo, January 20, 1903 by the Commanding Captain for the Kasai, Edgard Verdick.

67. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Boma, February 18, 1903, Deputy Governor-General F. Fuchs to Secretary of State. Please see Map 8 for locations.

68. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Lusambo, January 23, 1903, Commanding Captain of the Kasai District, Verdick, to the Governor-General.

69. A.E. (A.A.) 294, Kanda Kanda, May 11, 1903, E.A. Daly to the Commissaire du District of the Lualaba District.

70. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Nana Kandundu, Portuguese West Africa, March 3, 1903, Daly to Secretary of the Interior.

71. A.E. (A.A.) 294, Brussels, June 12, 1903, Count d'Azeur de Silva, Portuguese Legation to Secretary of State, le Chevalier. Daly communicated his own views both in regards to his experiences at Lake Dilolo and in regards to the C.F.S. as follows:

My escort of soldiers and carriers with a few exceptions are down with inflammatory rheumatism and fever. There are many desertions (five in all) among the soldiers taking with them their rifles and ammunition, and some 22 among the Lusambo porters.

I wish Your Excellency would have the kindness to hurry up your military people certainly I have never come into contact with people so slow, so fearful of consequences, so absolutely worthless and unreliable as the military people of the district Kasai. They must move, otherwise I will not hold myself responsible for the members of this Expedition.

A protest from the Portuguese post at Nana Kandundu has been handed me against bringing an armed force into the State and also against the killing and wounding of natives at the crossing of the Lutumbwe River on Sunday February 22.

I have refused to admit their contention as to the district being Portuguese or the natives affected wards of the Portuguese Government. I contend that act was justified on the ground that some natives killed one of my porters and his wife the previous day. They also attacked in numbers 400-500 before we fired a shot. The first volley of shots was fired over their heads but they kept advancing....

The natives are not unfriendly as a rule but very suspicious of white men arriving from the north as they have been educated to believe that these men were their enemies and the natives accompanying them were cannibals.

I had some discussions on the road with some of the more powerful chiefs but as a rule the people have been left in a condition where they can be used by the next white man passing.

I need help promptly. If your people are too slow or too dead to move please let me know by Portuguese mail route and then I will as usual shift for myself. A.E. (A.A.) 294, Lake Dilolo, Congo Free State via Nana Kandundu; Portuguese West Africa, March 3, 1903, E.A. Daly to Governor of the Congo Free State. The results of Daly's expedition, together with all the official correspondence between himself and the Portuguese Government, were sent to the central Government in Brussels. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Boma, July 10, 1903, Deputy Governor-General, F. Fuchs to Secretary of State.

72. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Rapport Annuel sur une situation generale du District du Lualaba-Kasai, December 31, 1903 by the Commissaire du District, Chenot.

73. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, October 4, 1904. An unsigned communication.

74. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, May 22, 1905, Dryepondt, Director in Africa. Organisation - Expédition du Sud, Cudell et Frausto. Cudell came to Congo in 1900 as an agent for the S.A.B. In 1902 he entered the service of the C.K. as a Chef de Secteur. He had previously been to the southern Kasai to explore the navigability of the upper Lulua River. Now he and Frausto were to do the same for the upper Kasai up to the Wissmann Falls area at Djoko Punda.

75. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Frausto's undated (probably 1904) report to the C.K.

76. Ibid. In 1906 Frausto returned to the south of his own accord and was killed near Kalamba-Muana's location on the Kasai River.

77. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Katola, November 5, 1905, Rapport sur la region Katola-Dilolo. Chef de Secteur du Sud de la C.K., Questiaux.

78. Ibid.

79. C.K. Archives, Brussels, List of Factories and Posts. Undated. Probably 1910.

80. Further comment on this will be made in Chapter VI, below, when discussing the State's administrative policies.

81. Leo Frobenius, Im Schatten des Kongostaates (Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1907), pp. 278-295. See Chapter VII for more on C.K. personnel problems and methods.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 257.

83. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Kamoina Village, September 3, 1903, Rapport d'un voyage dans le Sud du Secteur du Kasai Supérieur (Secteur VIII), by Chef de Secteur, Bertrand.

84. *Ibid.*, also A.E. (A.A.) 65, Golongo, December 17, 1903, Bertrand to C.K. Director at Butala. Bertrand reported that, according to Cokwe statements, slaves given in exchange for guns went to Loanda-M'Putu (St. Paul de Loanda). On October 17, 1903, a group of Cokwe passed by Kabeya to go to the Luebo River to purchase slaves for guns. They had 67 guns (20 were flint-lock) and 35 kegs of gunpowder. On November 1 Cokwe passed carrying 142 guns (55 were flint-lock) and 106 boxes of gunpowder and cartridges and, on November 22, 65 guns (22 were flint-lock) and 57 kegs of gunpowder. On November 28 a convoy of 45 slaves passed Kabeya enroute to the Portuguese coast. The flint-lock guns were labelled "Tower Manchester WDICR modèle 1862."

85. C.K. Archives, Brussels, September 3, 1903, Rapport by Bertrand.

86. The C.K. hoped that with a factory at Mai-Munene, Kabeya, Kanda Kanda and Tshitadi it would be possible to go into the southern part of the district.

87. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Kabeya, October, 1904, Rapport de mon voyage du 5 au 28 octobre, Labryn.

88. Frobenius, Im Schatten, p. 260.

89. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Kabeya, October, 1904, Rapport de mon voyage du 5 au 28 octobre by Labryn.

90. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Golongo, May 1, 1904, Rapport d'un voyage dans le secteur VIII, Bertrand, Chef de Secteur du Kasai-Supérieur.

91. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Kabeya, October, 1904, Rapport de mon voyage du 5 au 28 octobre, Labryn.

92. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, February 9, 1904, Rapport sur notre voyage à Luebo-Luluabourg-Jako-Punda. African Director of C.K., Dryepondt to Director-General of the C.K.

93. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, December 31, 1904, Dryepondt to the Commissaire du District of Lualaba-Kasai. He also stated that one of the main problems was the Baluba porters who were so terrified of the Cokwe that the further south they moved the more deserters there were. He requested 30 or 40 Batetela from the Lubefu area who could help in opening the south Kasai. The C.K. would pay them 4 lengths of cloth each plus a ration.

94. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Mai-Munene, July 27, 1907, C.K. Inspector, Lescrauwaet to Bradfer, Chef de Secteur de la Lulua à Mai-Munene.

95. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Mai-Munene, July 29, 1906, C.K. Inspector Lescrauwaet to the C.K. African Director. A non-lieu means insufficient grounds to prosecute.

96. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Mai-Munene, August 2, 1906, C.K. Inspector Lescrauwaet to the C.K. African Director. He stated that for an effective expedition against Kalamba it would require at least 200 well-armed soldiers.

97. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Mai-Munene, September 24, 1906, Lescrauwaet to Dryepondt. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Notes Relatives à Kalamba, Lusambo, January 5, 1907, Commissaire du District, Gustin.

98. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Undated report on the situation in the Kasai district. Probably 1906.

99. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Mai-Munene, September 8, 1907, Journal de Voyage by Cudell. The exact location of Kalamba-Muana's village is difficult to ascertain. Kalamba's flight to the left bank of the river must have led him to believe that he was escaping to Portuguese territory. His Portuguese trader, Cesó, also claimed he was in Portuguese territory and had even raised a Portuguese flag in his village. Ibid. De Grunne was later able to supply evidence to prove Cesó wrong. A.F. -1-1.1st series Vol. VIII, Luluabourg, October 2, 1907, De Grunne to his mother.

100. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol VIII, Luluabourg, October 2, 1907, De Grunne to his mother.

101. Ibid.

102. Ibid.; C.K. Archives, Brussels, Mai-Munene, September 8, 1907, Cudell, Journal de Voyage.

103. Luebo, Commissaire du District Archives, Lubefu, November 4, 1907, Commissaire du District, Gustin to the Chef de Secteur de la Lulua.

104. Ibid.

105. Luebo, Commissaire du District Archives, Luluabourg, November 27, 1909, De Grunne to the Chef de Poste (probably Katola).

106. Luebo, Commissaire du District Archives, Lusambo, July 25, 1910, L'Adjoint-Supérieur to the Commissaire du District, Saut, to the Chef de Zone à Dilolo.

107. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. VIII, Luluabourg, October 2, 1907, De Grunne to his mother.

108. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Factories and Posts of the C.K.

109. Ibid.

110. Emil Torday, On the Trail of the Bushongo (London: Seeley, Service and Company Limited, 1925), pp. 152-153; A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. VIII, Luluabourg, July 9, 1907, De Grunne to his mother.

111. Luebo, Commissaire du District Archives, Lusambo, August 2, 1907, Saut to the Governor-General.

112. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Luluabourg, July 10, 1907, Rapport spécial by De Grunne.

113. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Luluabourg, July 10, 1907, Rapport sur la Reconnaissance effectuée du 12 juin au 5 juillet, 1907, by De Grunne.

114. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Lusambo, September 10, 1907, Avis et Considérations du Commissaire du District à l'appui du rapport sur la reconnaissance effectuée du 12 juin au 5 juillet, 1907, par M. le Sous-lieutenant De Grunne et de la prise d'une caravane d'esclaves conduites par des trafiquants Klokos. Pour le Commissaire du District, L'Adjoint Supérieur, Saut.

115. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. VIII, Bakete, December 4, 1907, De Grunne to his father.

116. Luebo, Commissaire du District Archives, Lusambo, August 2, 1907, Saut to the Governor-General.

117. Ibid.

118. Pruitt, "An Independent People," p. 383.

119. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. VIII, Bakete, December 4, 1907, De Grunne to his father.

120. Pruitt, "An Independent People," pp. 391-394.

121. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. VIII, De Grunne to his father. Mukoko died while in prison at Lusambo.

122. Ibid. He states that the expedition was in search of gold but so far had found only whiskey.

123. Forminière was created with American and Belgian capital on November 6, 1906. It was granted a concession for prospecting over a large area of the C.F.S. for a period of six years, after which the company was to decide on a specific area for exploitation. The discovery of diamonds in the Kasai resulted in the company receiving a concession of 3,716,000 hectares for mining and another 1,100,000 hectares of wasteland. The Kasai became one of the world's richest diamond fields. Pierre Joye et Rosine Lewin, Les Trusts au Congo (Bruxelles: Société Populaire d'Editions, 1961), pp. 226-228.

124. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. VIII, Bakete, December 4, 1907, De Grunne to his father.

CHAPTER VI

STATE ADMINISTRATION 1902-1908

Although Leopold ruled the Congo through the three interconnecting agencies of the State administration, the Church and the large trading companies, his main agency was the State administration, and the purpose of this chapter is to describe the organizational structure of the State and its effectiveness in the Kasai area, by concentrating on the specifics of the State's attempt to strengthen and expand its control. The State's problems of control, however, fall into two parts: the general question of impositions and the issue of State control over the South. These problems will be turned to after the pattern of administration has been established.

At the beginning of 1902, the Kasai area had a Commissaire du District at Lusambo, and Chefs de Poste at Luluabourg, Bena Dibebe, Isaka, Kanda Kanda and Dilolo; on the establishment of Katola and the reopening of the Luebo post in 1903, a Chef de Poste was appointed to each location.¹ Although administrative provision was made for the Kasai district to be divided into secteurs, with a Chef de secteur responsible for each, it was not until 1903 that the first Chef du secteur was appointed in the Kasai. The area of responsibility for the Chef de secteur was large and, until 1908, seems to have included the entire district.²

This administrative structure was bolstered by the Force Publique, which was usually commanded by a military captain who was responsible for maintaining order by providing troops for the various posts and assisting the Chef de secteur when necessary.³ The troops were divided into companies ranging in strength from 50 to 100 men. The 1903 annual report indicates that there were 250 men at Lusambo, 200 at Dilolo, 100 at Katola and fifty at both Luluabourg and Kanda Kanda, while Bena Dibele and Luebo were each garrisoned by twenty-five men.⁴ In addition to these soldiers, there were reservists who worked the plantations around the posts to fulfill their labour obligations to the State. Lusambo had 241 reservists, while Luluabourg had twenty-five and Kanda Kanda six.⁵

With this limited manpower, the State's control over the Kasai was weak. Controlled areas existed only around State posts, mission stations and C.K. factories: even there, control was not complete and occasional military operations were necessary.⁶ Although European influence, especially through the State and C.K. operations, extended into parts of the southern area and along the Kasai and into the Bakuba region, there were still vast stretches that remained uncontrolled and uninfluenced. After 1902 the State's objective was to move into these areas to establish administrative control.

This objective was to be attained under the direction of the Commissaire du District, whose main function was to supervise and control his district in order to maintain peace and cause Africans to accept the

authority of the State. The framework was the chefferie system, introduced by a decree in 1891 which divided the Congo into areas, each of which was to be administered by an African ruler who was, wherever possible, a traditional ruler. The chefferie system was reinforced by another decree in 1906 by which every African was assigned to a chefferie, which might consist of one or several villages. Where there were no traditional rulers, as among the Lulua and Baluba, the State invested a lineage leader or elder who had submitted to the State.⁷

An invested chief was authorized to exercise his authority over the local population residing in his chefferie, whether this consisted of just a few villages or a whole series of clan groupings, so that way the State official did not need to intervene in the affairs of the people in general. An even greater advantage for the State was that this made it possible for the local population to be forced to assist in defraying administrative expenses by supplying food, labour and porters when required, or, in some cases, soldiers for the Force Publique. These impositions were justified by the State on the grounds that they would encourage the habit of working, which was considered to be one of the best ways of civilizing an allegedly inferior population.

An invested chief's obligations under these arrangements were to cultivate certain pieces of land for the production of State designated crops, using labourers from his chefferie. The chief's authority over his subjects was supposedly based upon customary law provided that

customary law did not conflict with the State's laws, and intervention was limited to violations of the chief's delegated authority. The advantage of the system for an invested chief was that he could count on the strength of the State to force his subjects to submit to his authority while, for the State, it meant an extension of its authority, even with limited European personnel, and an assurance not only that resources would be available to it, but also that Africans would work for its benefit.⁸

The possibilities for abuse inherent in this system are easily apparent. The individual invested by the State might be unacceptable to the population. An example of this was the selection of Moamba Gufulu as chief of the Bajila Kasanga by virtue of his long relationship with the European: his subjects refused to recognize his authority.⁹ Another is provided by the Ambaquistas from Angola who had accompanied Wissmann, for many of them became invested chiefs in the Luluabourg area where they remained loyal State supporters.¹⁰ Others, like Pania-Mutombo and Zappo Zap, were invested as chiefs over their followers as a reward for services to the State. The weakness of this was that, since it had the effect of making the chief locally powerful, he could become a threat to the State if he became hostile to it because the State did not possess adequate military forces.

Most of the chefferies initially established were located near sites occupied by Europeans, so that food and labour supplies could be obtained easily. Some of the initial chefferies were very small: Pedro, a Baluba village near Luebo, had fifteen huts and a total population of sixty-two persons, of whom only fifteen were men.¹¹ While the State's general intention was that a chefferie should be administered by an hereditary chief, Europeans in the Kasai found that the social system had been disrupted by the introduction of firearms. Thus petty chiefs, in some instances, had become powerful by trading in slaves and guns with the Coloue: Kalamba, recognized by Wissmann as the legitimate chief, is but one example. In some cases, the hereditary chiefs or leaders had had their power usurped, or had even been killed by younger members of the clan who had been able to gather a following around themselves and, through the use of guns, had been able to assume chiefship. If the legitimate hereditary chief remained alive, he might withdraw with his supporters to form a separate agglomeration. State officials, in these circumstances, then recognized both men as chiefs, thus creating two chefferies. In 1921 Vallaeys, the Territorial Administrator, reported that this was frequently the case in Dibaya Territory, where he noted that:

In effect, the powers of certain actual chiefs date back to the early period of our occupation, and we have consequently those chiefs we call chefs à Bakelenge (Whites). What the guns have done for the chefs à Batshok

(Cokwa), here the "mukanda" (certificate) of the European, given to a notable as a result of his promise to submit and pay imposts, fulfills the same function.

It must be noted that the chef à Bakelenge is not necessarily a usurper..., but as in the case of the chef à Batshok, he is often the head of a clan, sometimes the eldest member as in the case of Tshinjama of the Bakwa Mwaza who benefitted from it. The consequences of the Batshok revolution are also true for the European revolution: the regrouping of clans and the removable from office of certain hereditary chiefs to the benefit of the chefs à Bakelenge.¹²

There were also cases in which the hereditary chief, being suspicious of the European, would disappear and a slave would be advanced to be recognized as chief. In some cases this created problems, particularly when the slave became a powerful chief and exercised authority which might contradict that of the hereditary chief.¹³

Before 1903, the prestations of labour and food supplies were generally light and flexible, the amounts being determined by each Chef de Poste. These amounts were based on the density of the population, the type of supplies procurable from the area and the attitude of the people. In the event that the chief did not meet the State's demands, the usual punishment was a fine and imprisonment until his subjects had fulfilled the requirements. When several chiefs united to resist the payment of imposts it was indicative of an impending revolt and was sufficient reason for the State to send out an expedition.¹⁴

The decree of 1903 stipulating the amount of labour required did not invalidate the system of prestations: in fact it legalized the system, in that the forty hours of labour per month required of each adult male fulfilled the demands of the prestation. In reality each village of a chefferie whose chief had submitted to the State not only supplied the prestations but also extra labour in portage service or road work. This meant that a village like Kalambaie, with a male population of 290, was to provide 520 kg. of manioc, 105 kg. of corn, and 2 chickens monthly and, in addition, 750 hours of labour plus 2,150 hours of portage service. In 1910 the village provided 110 porters.¹⁵

The decree provided for remuneration to the African for both labour and provisions, at rates determined by the Commissaire du District. However, the amount the State paid for provisions was frequently lower than local market value. For example, in 1904-1905 the market value for a goat around Luebo was 5 francs; but the village of Dumbi, a Bakuba village in that area, with a male population of 450, had to pay the State 5 goats in December 1904 which the State valued at 1.75 francs each.¹⁶ The village thus lost 3.25 francs for each goat. However, not all villages were obliged to pay these imposts. After the Bakuba revolt of 1904 certain villages, such as the Baluba village of Zaka, were almost completely emptied due to fear and were, therefore, exempted. In other cases the impost consisted of supplying materials for the reconstruction of the A.P.C.M.

station at Ibanche. Some villages, such as the Bakete village of Kasenge, were to supply a specified amount of manioc to the markets at Luebo. Those villages which gathered rubber for the C.K. were also exempted from specific imposts.¹⁷

State policy on imposts at first sight suggests that the State used them to support missions and companies, and this is undoubtedly the case for certain areas when labour and food imposts are examined in isolation. However, the injustices done to the African were exposed by the Commission of Enquiry which conducted its investigations from October 1904 to February 1905.¹⁸ The commission observed that there had been no change in the amount of work and the value of prestations since 1892 and for financial reasons there had also been no adjustment in commutations into cash. This meant that, while superficially the law was being applied, in reality the African was working harder than he was legally required to, without remuneration for the extra hours.¹⁹ The minimum pay for one hour of work in the district was 0.025 francs.²⁰ In some cases the work demanded of the African consisted of gathering rubber for which the State price was 30 centimes per kg. of dry rubber. This price recognized that twelve hours or 1 1/2 days was required to produce 1 kg. of rubber, but it did not allow for the travelling time required to go to and return from the rubber-producing areas, which might result in the African using up 6 days to produce 1 kg. of rubber. The same inequalities existed regarding payments for produce. One chicken,

for example, was valued at .25 francs or 10 hours of work, when its actual market value was .75 francs or 30 hours. A goat corresponded to 10 days' work or 2 francs, whereas its market value was 5 francs or 25 days' work.²¹

Despite these injustices, the African was also obliged to assist in the construction and maintenance of roads and State posts for which he was not paid, contrary to the requirements of the law. State officials' attempts to justify this to the Commission of Enquiry were made on the grounds that the African was rewarded through becoming more civilized. The actual advantages to the Africans were so small as to give rise to doubts of any advantages whatsoever: probably the greatest benefit to them was the facility with which they were now able to travel along the new roads.²²

The State also demanded that part of its impositions should be met by the payment of croisettes. The State held that one kilo of rubber was worth 30 centimes in the Kasai, where it valued a croisette at 1.20 francs when received by it from an African, but at 3.50 francs when the State supplied croisettes to the C.K. The C.K. disposed of croisettes for at least 5 kilos of dry rubber to Africans, who returned the croisette to the State at 1.20 francs. Thus the African received a maximum of 24 centimes per kilo of rubber at the C.K. factory while the State's price was 30 centimes.²³ While the C.K. exploited the African

through the sale of croisettes, the State was also taxing the C.K. heavily by causing the company to purchase croisettes and dispose of them to Africans.

Statistics on croisettes from both the State and the C.K. differ from those arrived at by the Commission of Enquiry. The State report for December 1903 indicates that, in the course of the year, 30,000 croisettes were sold to the C.K. for 3.50 francs each yielding a profit to the State of 2.10 francs.²⁴ This represented a profit to the State at the expense of the C.K.'s field operations, over and above the State's right to half the C.K.'s profits by right of half ownership. There seemingly were several prices for rubber in the Kasai. It was the prerogative of the Commissaire du District to fix the price against croisettes and in April 1905 it was fixed at four kilos of dry rubber per croisette.²⁵ This confirmed the Commission's findings of 30 centimes per kilo. However, this pricing was not adhered to by the C.K. Morrison, of the A.P.C.M., gives a price of 25 centimes as the maximum paid,²⁶ whereas F. Van Der Linden, a former C.K. agent, gives a price of 1.25 francs to 1.50 francs per kilo.²⁷ For the years up to 1905 Morrison's price seems to be accurate and confirmed by the Commission's investigations insofar as the C.K.'s valuation of rubber handed over by an African to obtain a croisette is concerned.

By 1908 the average price of rubber had arisen to 1.25 francs with an anticipated increase to 2.00 francs.²⁸ Several reasons account for this: the supply of rubber was already on the decline as a result of poor collecting methods and, by 1906, the croisette was officially discontinued as currency for taxes even though in practice it was still used. In order to maintain the incentive to bring in rubber, the C.K. would have been obliged to raise the price paid for latex.

In addition to underpaying Africans for the rubber they produced, the C.K. practiced an additional abuse in that the factories released croisettes only after all other merchandise was sold. Since State imposts were paid in croisettes, this had the effect of obliging the African to bring rubber to the factory until all merchandise was sold and he could purchase his croisette. The Commission considered this alone to be a sufficient reason for removing the croisette as an impost.²⁹

These abuses were revealed clearly in the report on the Kasai, drawn up by Bossolo, Deputy Public Prosecutor from the Lusambo office, in connection with the 1904 Commission of Enquiry. The specific injustices which had emerged in the Kasai were published in Bossolo's report. The abuses were further reiterated by Professor F. Cattier.³⁰ This caused the C.K. to state that "natives take and have always taken the merchandise from our factories which has suited them, and we have never had either the means or the plan to oblige them to take one piece of merchandise

rather than another,"³¹ which can hardly be regarded as an open response to the charge made against the C.K.

The State lacked the will, before 1904, to correct the abuses which it had itself fostered and, when international pressure forced a self-examination, the extent of the State's problems became apparent. Bossolo identified one issue clearly when he wrote that

As for the State personnel, it is insufficient in number and inferior in character. Reasons of delicacy prevent me from emphasizing this too much, but I think it could prove a serious subject for the Commission. Even in examining the past and the occupations of those who, employed by the State, are called, to a great extent, to fill isolated posts with the aim of introducing civilization, justice and progress, one can easily question how they are able to perform this duty....

In summary, as far as the District is concerned, the State's obligation is to conduct itself in a more just manner towards the natives. It is not in the matter of abuses, of which there are few,...but in the manner of behaviour and attitude towards the natives in both public and private exploitation where improvements are needed.³²

The Commission of Enquiry was directly responsible for producing the reforms of 1906 in the guise of decrees which, among other things, were intended to alleviate some of the pressures on Africans in the areas of excessive taxation, reorganization of chefferies and the duties of chiefs in relation to State administrators. The reforms legally brought to an end the practice of allowing commercial companies, such as the C.K.,

to collect the rubber tax. This concerned the C.K. deeply, and it feared that it would be placed at a financial disadvantage. However, assurances had been given to the Brussels headquarters of the C.K. that there was no need to be disturbed.³³ This reduced the reforms to a paper project especially since they did not restore the Kasai to the status of a free trade area. International opinion correctly held that the reforms were inadequate, and the Congo Reform Association pressed for Belgium to take over responsibility for the colony. In September 1908 the annexation took place and the Congo Free State became the Belgian Congo.

The international hostility generated by the abuses discussed above focussed attention on the north. However, from 1902, it was becoming increasingly clear to the State that, if it wished to enjoy security in the Kasai, it would have to stop Cokwe trade with Angola. This required the effective occupation of the Kasai. Limited State personnel made it possible to establish only two posts in the south, at Dilolo and Katola. Thus the large area between the Lulua and Kasai Rivers had to be left to the mercy of the C.K., subject only to an occasional visit from 1907 by De Grunne, after his appointment as Chef de Secteur.

In 1903 there was only one State post in the south and this had been established at Dilolo to stop the contraband trade in ivory, rubber and firearms carried on by the Cokwe. This post alone was ineffective,

for Cokwe trade routes extended into the interior as far as Kanda Kanda. The Cokwe were assisted by a group of Batetela deserters from the Force Publique, participants in the 1895 Luluabourg mutiny, who raided for slaves, whom they traded to the Cokwe in return for firearms, so that the post at Dilolo was surrounded from time to time by hostile groups. It became a serious matter to keep Dilolo supplied from Lusambo.³⁴ Consequently, an intermediate post, established on the 9th parallel approximately mid-way between Kanda Kanda and Dilolo, was deemed necessary.

This was the main task given to De Clerck and Gallaix when they met in the Lunda territory of Mwata Yamvo in 1903. Mwata Yamvo's large village, located near the 8th parallel, was surrounded by a desolate area with very limited population and food supplies. The Lunda leader wished the post to be established near his village; however, this request was refused, and a compromise location was selected. The Mwata Yamvo agreed to move his village to a site a few miles south-west of the Lulua River at Kapanga, which had a more dense population. It was a compromise site to both sides, for De Clerck reported that the ideal location would have been Muene Kasa but, in order to be assured of porters and a safe route through the area, it was necessary to humour the Mwata Yamvo.³⁵ An officer named Paquet, along with seventy-five soldiers, was left to man the new post, while De Clerck continued southwards to occupy Dilolo.

By the time Daly, the prospector, left Dilolo to return to Kanda Kanda, De Clerck had arrived at Dilolo, while Gallaix returned to Lusambo. Verdick was not satisfied with the location of the intermediate post at Kapanga and, in April 1903, he decided to lead an expedition into the south to seek a more appropriate site. His route was to be via Kanda Kanda and then to Mwata Yamvo near Kapanga; on his return he intended to explore the region between the Lulua and Kasai Rivers hoping to find an alternate route to supply the southern posts before returning to Luluabourg.³⁶

Verdick's expedition left Lusambo on April 16, 1903 and consisted of Verdick, a military medical doctor and Lieutenant Liard, plus 115 soldiers and 300 porters. At Kanda Kanda they were joined by the Chef de Poste, Pierarche, and a Compagnie du Kasai geographer, P. Questiaux.³⁷ Upon reaching Mwata Yamvo's capital on May 21, Verdick learned that De Clerck had already succeeded in occupying the post at Dilolo, which allowed Verdick to remain at Mwata Yamvo to settle the matter of the intermediate post. In surveying the surrounding area he was certain that the post could not remain at Kapanga³⁸ for several reasons; it was too far north to act effectively as a supply post for Dilolo, but, even more important, Verdick echoed De Clerck's surprise at the devastated condition of the formerly rich and heavily-populated Lunda Empire. The Cokwe slave traders had decimated the villages and ravaged the countryside. This made it difficult to obtain foodstuffs and porters; furthermore, an isolated State

post could have very little impact. Consequently, Verdick continued southward through Cokwe territory³⁹ and along the Lulua up to the 9th parallel where the Lunda chief, Kibamba, proved friendly and invited the State to establish a post in his vicinity. Verdick accepted the chief's offer because

Kibamba is located within the confines of the Balunda and in the proximity of several Cokwe centres. From Kadinga up to the Lulungu the area is populated with Cokwe where it will be impossible for a Mulunda to travel without an armed escort...likewise no Cokwe will risk his life in Lunda territory.

On the other hand, I had the assurance that nothing would impede communication towards Kanda-Kanda; it was, therefore necessary to place ourselves in such a location as to have the two races within range and since we were in the midst of a population eager to assist us and possessing immense fields, we decided to stop here.⁴⁰

Verdick assisted in constructing the new post, Katola, before leaving on June 15, 1903. Paquet assumed duty at the new post with seventy-five soldiers, having received an assurance from the local population that the route between Katola and Dilolo would remain open.⁴¹

Verdick returned through the region of the Kawanda people, a branch of the Sala Mpasu, who had not yet experienced the passage of a State patrol through their territory. Verdick had been warned by Kapanga that the Kawanda were fierce and would attack relentlessly using knives and poison arrows, but Verdick insisted on following the Lulua northward.

On June 25, the expedition met the first Kawanda of whom Verdick reports: "The contrast with the Balunda is enormous. The Kawanda are, in general, short and stocky, without knowledge of guns, and besides their bows, they are armed with a fearful knife which they wear from a belt of braided string."⁴² Attempts to negotiate with them were futile. "They told us that no one had ever come to them and no one would ever be admitted either."⁴³ An attempt to get guides to lead his expedition through the area was frustrated. Even though the villages bordered on one another yet they were constantly at war with each other, so that a guide might agree to assist them for a few kilometres but would then return in haste to the shelter of his own village.

From June 26 until July 10, when they left Sala Mpasu territory, the expedition was continually harassed by men armed with knives, bows and arrows, while poisoned sharpened spikes and slivers were planted in the paths. The Kawanda were tenacious fighters, courageously reckless, and they refused to retreat until their ranks were decimated.⁴⁴

The only Sala Mpasu who had firearms were the northern people, under the leadership of Chief Bumba. Upon arriving in his territory, Verdick was met by men carrying guns who informed him that they did not trade with the Kawanda: however, they did trade with the Cokwe. At this time, these northern Sala Mpasu were friendly to the State expedition.⁴⁵

Verdick was impressed by the difference in the Lunda and Sala Mpasu countryside. Whereas the former showed desolation, the latter revealed richness in the vegetation and very little evidence of any exploitation of rubber. However, he concluded that it was absolutely essential to bring the Sala Mpasu into submission to the State as soon as possible to prevent Bihe and other traders from draining out the riches of the area before the State could do so.⁴⁶

The last twenty-five miles of Verdick's journey to Luluabourg led him through unfriendly Lulua territory. The very first night an attack resulted in the death of one of his soldiers. The villagers involved had been followers of Chief Gongo whom Michaux killed in 1896 because of his support for the mutinous Batetela soldiers. The villagers had now regrouped and were united in their resistance to the State. Here, too, Verdick suggested a forced submission to the State was essential in order to prevent the Lulua from becoming too strong.

To bring all the Bena-Lulua who are located between the Lulua and Kasai into submission we would need a force of 300 men at our disposal. These troops would be divided into 3 columns, in order to operate at the same time in 3 different places, between the Lulua and the Kasai.

The only possible tactic would be to attack the enemy and allow him to attack in order to have them burn up as much of their gunpowder as possible, then attack them vigorously and then pursue them after a few days.

For the Bakete and the Kwanda [referring to the entire Sala Mpasu peoples], it would be an easy matter, but it would be necessary to operate on both banks of the

Lulua at the same time and to establish a post to the north of the Kawanda, I believe at that time they would be helpless and would be our prisoners. I consider it an urgent matter that we settle down in this country, especially among the Ba-Lulua, in order to effectively stop the traders who, at this time, are introducing improved firearms. Otherwise the two posts in the south will be powerless in stopping the caravans which furtively pass to the left bank of the Kasai. To wait a few more years would be allowing the strength of these insubordinate tribes to grow.⁴⁷

Verdick's observations and recommendations, though probably accurate, were difficult to act upon. The district was large and manpower limited. Furthermore, each new post increased the demand for troops, while each expedition required an armed escort. Although recruitment was generally proceeding without difficulty there were still insufficient troops, especially since the 1895 revolt at Luluabourg had made the State move more cautiously in its selection of soldiers. The soldiers who had served in the Arab campaigns were no longer recruited after the Luluabourg uprising, while the western portion of the Kasai district was still largely insubordinate: the burden of supplying recruits therefore rested upon a few pacified African leaders and their followers.⁴⁸

At the end of 1903 the Commissaire du District, Chenot, drew up his annual report, in which he stated that the most important event of the year had been the alleged pacification of the southern part of the district which had culminated in the establishment of the two posts at Dilolo and Katola.⁴⁹ However, Chenot was optimistic about the southern portion of the

district, since incidents early in 1904 showed how precarious the position of the State actually was. The Chef de Poste for Katola in 1904, Lieutenant Scaramboni, conducted a reconnaissance to the Kasai River to discover whether there was a Portuguese steamer conducting trade between Portuguese factories located on the left bank of the river. He found that the rubber passing into Portuguese territory was not going via a steamer but on several large pirogues to factories across the river from Dilolo while others were located a two-days' walk into Angola. Scaramboni noted that all the men of the villages along the right bank of the Kasai, had percussion guns (fusils à piston) and large quantities of gunpowder, which they had obtained through trading with the Portuguese. A very active slave trade still existed, and the authority of the C.F.S. meant nothing: in fact, the area from Katola to Dilolo was hostile to such an extent that Scaramboni and his forty soldiers could not prevent the capture of one of his own porters.⁵⁰ Just six kilometres west of the Katola-Dilolo route, Scaramboni was attacked by hostile Cokwe who assured him that they did not want the presence of the whiteman. These Cokwe were active slave traders, well-armed and conscious of their superior strength in arms over the State. Scaramboni's report was forwarded to the Central Government, at Boma with an added comment by the Commissaire du District, Chenot, as follows:

In spite of our desire to penetrate peacefully, incidents such as Mr. Scaramboni has described are to be avoided since the result will probably be a migration of the native population to the left bank of the Kasai. The necessity for occupying the south-west border of the State and expelling all smugglers which infest it are becoming more and more evident.⁵¹

In September 1904 Scaramboni next led an expedition into the territory of the Lunda. To understand the reasons for this expedition a brief review of events in the Lunda leadership struggle is necessary. In 1896 when Captain Michaux was travelling through the Kasai punishing those chiefs who had supported the Luluabourg mutiny, he met the Mwata Yamvo, Mushidi, and his brother Kawele at his court. Mushidi and Kawele were attempting to reassert their authority against the Cokwe. There were, at the same time, two other Lunda chiefs, Mwene Kapanga and Mwene Mpanda, who had also fortified themselves against the Cokwe. From the time of Michaux's visit in 1896 to Verdick's expedition in 1903 the Lunda were left to themselves to work out their succession problems and their relationship to the Cokwe. In this period of time, the Lunda were able to check the advance of the Cokwe. However, all four Lunda chiefs had resisted the Cokwe, so that Mushidi did not emerge as the sole leader. Such was the position when the State troops returned in 1903, during a period when hostilities between the Lunda and the Cokwe were temporarily at an end. The arrival of the De Clerck expedition in April 1903 brought the leadership question to a head. Kawele gave several porters

to De Clerck to enable him to take some supplies to Dilolo. En route they fled, leaving their loads in the villages. As a result, Kawele and Mushidi were arrested but, when they were released the following day, they fled to the forests⁵² and, by 1904, Kawele had made an alliance with the Cokwe and was in open rebellion against the State. In the interim, Chief Kapanga won the Europeans' favour and he brought up Muteba, the son of the late Mwata Yamvo, whom the State recognized as the new Lunda leader in 1907.⁵³

Scaramboni's military expedition in 1904 was against Kawele, who had invaded that portion of Lunda territory ruled by Chief Muteba in an effort to bring them into submission to himself instead of to the State.⁵⁴ The expedition was not successful, and Kawele and Mushidi continued to resist the State until 1907, when they were killed by Muteba.⁵⁵ With their competition eliminated, Muteba's position was secure.

A further result of the State's occupation of this southern area was De Clerck's campaign against the surviving remnant of the soldiers who had mutinied at Luluabourg in 1895. For twelve years these soldiers had roamed through the south in league with the Cokwe. As the State cut into Cokwe areas, the strength of the mutineers was broken and a state of relative calm settled upon the region. Although the Cokwe still traded in firearms, it was more difficult for them to do so because, in 1908, the State closed the border with Angola, hoping to force the Cokwe within the Congo to trade with the C.K.⁵⁶

By the end of 1908 the State was still in a precarious position as far as its relations with the Cokwe was concerned, and it was to be another decade, at the very least, before a more permanent peace could be established. In the meantime, the Cokwe took every available opportunity to raid for slaves and trade in guns. The southern area had, however, come under the influence of the State, although it was only partially controlled by 1908, and only in areas around the State posts. Vast areas between the Kasai and the Lulua Rivers remained totally uncontrolled, and some areas were not even influenced by the State. The State had moved into the areas along the Kasai, and into Sala Mpasu territory where the C.K. operated, but insufficient personnel prevented a long-term occupation. For the Bakuba area, a similar situation existed. The State could summon sufficient troops to crush the Bakuba revolt, but there were not enough men to place in posts throughout the area. The entire Kuba area was left to the control of the C.K., which acted on behalf of the State.

The State's accomplishments in the years 1902-1908 consisted mainly of extending its influence in the south where the agreements with the Lunda allowed for the establishment of posts at Katola and Kapanga and for the security of the Lunda area under Muteba's leadership. In addition, the surrender of the Batetela soldiers undermined Cokwe strength and helped to make an eventual conquest possible. However, the State's strongest ally was the C.K. which shared common interests with the State:

namely, making a profit from the rich rubber groves and preventing rubber from leaving C.F.S. territory illegally. As a result, while the State created bases in new regions, the C.K. was relied upon to extend its influence on behalf of the State. The company's methods of operation and organizational structure thus will have to be considered in the next chapter.

FOOTNOTES

1. The position at Luebo is unclear. A post existed between 1885 and 1888, but no European military officer was appointed to it until 1903, and State forces there appear to have come under the supervision of the S.A.B. until a Chef de Poste was appointed in 1903. Verner, Pioneering in Central Africa, p. 101.
2. When De Grunne assumed duty in 1907, as Chef de Secteur, he indicated in a letter that his secteur responsibilities extended from the Sankuru to the 8th parallel. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. VIII, Bakete, December 4, 1907; De Grunne to his father.
3. It appears that the Captain acted as Chef de Secteur in the Kasai until this position was specifically filled by De Grunne. The Captain's duties actually consisted of training and disciplining the soldiers, providing for their uniforms and food rations, and maintenance of the weapons. Gilliaert, La Force Publique, pp. 66-67.
4. Ibid., The Kasai District extended beyond the area under study and included Lubefu, Lodja and Kole each with a company of 50 men; and Basongo (also called Bena Bendi) with 25 men.
5. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Lusambo, February 20, 1904, Rapport Mensuel sur la Situation Générale du District, for the month of January 1904 by the Commissaire du District, Chenot.
6. Chapter V dealt with such events as the Bakuba revolt, the burning of C.K. factories and the destruction of the A.P.C.M. station at Ibanche.
7. The actual investing was usually done by the Commissaire du District or Chef de Poste in a ceremony designed to strike the emotions of the population. The chief's sign of office was a nickel medallion on a chain. F. Cattier, Droit et Administration de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo (Bruxelles, F. Larquier, 1898), p. 226. The function of the invested chief in the Congo was similar to that of the 'warrant chief' under the British system in Nigeria. The term 'warrant chief', was applied to Africans who had no local recognition but to whom the British Colonial authorities

had given extensive powers to rule over groups of peoples. J.C. Anene, Southern Nigeria in Transition 1885-1906 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 260, 264, 265, 270, 308.

8. Cattier, Droit et Administration, pp. 226-227.

9. See above pp. 89 above.

10. Luluabourg Archives, Luluabourg, January 1, 1921, Report on Chefferies des Angolais by the Principal Administrator. Most of their subjects were other Ambaquistas.

11. A.E. (A.A.) 65, List of Chefferies; Luebo Territorial Archives, Renseignements Politiques. Contains a list of the Chefferies for Luebo Territory from 1904-06.

12. Vallaeys, "Rapport sur les Baluba," p. 30.

13. Ibid.; Hilton-Simpson, Lands and Peoples of the Kasai, p. 91.

14. In 1904 De Cock and Kocher carried out a series of operations in the Bakuba territory before the November revolt occurred. One of these was to the village of Songi-Munene which, together with several surrounding villages, had not paid imposts since January, 1904. Luebo Territorial Archives, Renseignements Politiques.

15. A.E. (A.A.) 65, List of Chefferies.

16. Luebo Territorial Archives, Renseignements Politiques.

17. Ibid.

18. See below pp. 213-214 for additional information on the Commission.

19. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Basongo, January 27, 1905, Bossolo to the President of the Commission of Enquiry.

20. Ibid. The daily rate was determined by taking the value of a month's wages which consisted of 2 fathoms of cloth plus rations, or 1 franc when calculated on the basis of 40 hours of work a month with 8 hours of work per day.

21. Ibid. The State authorized price per kg of rubber had dropped to 30 centimes in 1904 from 34 centimes in 1902-1903. When collecting rubber, the African had to allow for a 10%-20% loss through drying.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Lusambo, January 20, 1904, Rapport Annuel sur une Situation Générale du District du Lualaba-Kasai au 31 Decembre 1903, by Commissaire du District, Chenot.

25. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, May 4, 1905, Dryepondt to the C.K. General Director. This was in effect when Bossolo made his investigations, but it was not followed.

26. Vansina, "Du royaume Kuba," p. 25.

27. Fritz Van Der Linden, Le Congo, Les Noirs et Nous, Paris Librairie Maritime et Coloniale, 1910, p. 205.

28. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Financial Report for 1908.

29. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Basongo, January 27, 1905, Bossolo to the President of the Commission of Enquiry.

30. Professor F. Cattier wrote a book entitled Etude sur la Situation de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo, published in 1906, in which he denounced the State and C.K. for the abuses they were committing in the Congo.

31. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, February 19, 1906, C.K. General Director to the Editor of the Le Soir.

32. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Basongo, January 27, 1905, Bossolo to the President of the Commission of Enquiry.

33. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, August 9, 1906, Dryepondt to C.K. General Director in Brussels. Dryepondt's letter in the C.K. Archives had a marginal note saying, "We have been told not to worry."

34. Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule, pp. 48-50.

35. A.E. (A.A.) 294, Muene Kapanga, March 22, 1903, Rapport sur le poste de Muata-Yamvo by Second-Lieutenant, De Clerck.

36. A.E. (A.A.) 294, Kanda Kanda, May 10, 1903, Commanding Captain of the Kasai District, Verdick to Governor General.

37. Ibid.

38. A.E. (A.A.) 294, Kanda Kanda, May 9, 1903, Chef de Secteur du Sud, Compagnie du Kasai, to Commissaire du District du Lualaba-Kasai.

Kapanga later became the new capital of the Lunda in 1912 and the Belgian administrative headquarters for Kapanga territory.

39. Luebo, Commissaire du District Archives, Rapport sur la Fondation des Postes du Sud, E. Verdick, 1903 (?), p. 2. The Cokwe, armed with guns, were friendly even requesting trade with the whites since for some time now there had been no trade caravans arriving from the south into this area. These Cokwe had been trading rubber for guns, Ibid. They remained hostile towards the Lunda.

40. Rapport sur la Fondation des Postes du Sud, E. Verdick, p. 3.

41. This was a ten-day march. At Dilolo, De Clerck was in command assisted by Mr. Nickel and one hundred soldiers. Rapport, Verdick, p. 3.

42. Rapport, Verdick, p. 6. With this knife the Sala Mpasu warriors could decapitate an enemy in one blow. Pruitt, "An Independent People," p. 352.

43. Rapport, Verdick, p. 6.

44. On June 30 an incident occurred which resulted in the death of Lieutenant Liard. Verdick had just crossed a river and was waiting for the others to follow when he heard gunfire and, soon after a messenger informed him that Lieutenant Liard had died. A quick investigation and the statements of Dr. Polledro, who was on the scene, indicated that it was an accident.

A native quietly approached and in spite of the effort of Lieutenant Liard he refused to move and seemed about to unsheath his knife. At this moment the soldiers seeing the danger, began firing wildly and Lieutenant Liard dashed for his gun, and in turning toward them was struck in the heart. Ibid., p. 8.

45. This changed four years later when De Grunne led an expedition into their territory and found them internally united to resist European occupation.

46. Ibid., p. 14.

47. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

48. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Rapport Annuel sur une Situation Générale du District du Lualaba-Kasai, December 31, 1903, by the Commissaire du District, Chenot.

49. Vellut states that a Belgian Administrator, Carpentier, wrote that the Lunda seemed to have gone into a long and acute period of decline which began about 1865 and which would have caused the disappearance of the Lunda if the C.F.S. had not intervened. Does one then conclude, Carpentier continues, "that for the African peoples there is a relatively short period which separates their success from their decline or is it to be considered as a result of the tyranny of Mwata Yamvo and the succession difficulties within the Empire?" Vellut states that the observations made by British Administrators in Zambia corroborate those of Carpentier in which they state that the Lunda have been the victims of the Cokwe and the Lwena in the slave trade. Only the principal Lunda chiefs were able to resist them and remain in their villages, others lived as animals in the forests subsisting on wild fruits and honey. Even in 1914 there were difficulties in procuring labourers from among the Lunda in the Belgian Congo. It was rumoured that the 300 Lunda recruited to patrol the frontier between Angola and Congo had been sold to the Belgians as slaves. Vellut, "Notes sur le Lunda," pp. 160-161.

50. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Katola, July 24, 1904, Chef de Poste, Lieutenant Scaramboni to Commissaire du District, Chenot.

51. Ibid.

52. Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule, p. 48. There are several accounts explaining the break in relations between the State and Mushidi and Kawele. In his recent studies on these events, N'Dua Solol Kanampumb (himself a Lunda), explains that one of the main reasons was that Mushidi wished to reoccupy his old capital to the south of Katola but needed State help to do so. The State refused to assist him and consequently began the rupture which was aggravated by State impositions of food and porters. N'Dua Solol Kanampumb, "Mwant Yav Mushid," Etudes d'Histoire africaine, V (1973), pp. 44-48

53. He was not invested until 1916.

54. A.E. (A.A.) 527, District du Luababa-Kasai, January 27, 1905, Expéditions militaires effectuées dans le District pendant les années 1903-1903-1904. Deputy Public Prosecutor, Bassolo to the President of the Committee of Enquiry.

55. Kanampumb, "Mwant Yav Mushid," p. 49.

56. Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule, p. 50.

CHAPTER VII

THE COMPAGNIE DU KASAI 1902-1908

The Compagnie du Kasai (C.K.), which was composed of the fourteen companies which operated in the Kasai from 1886 to 1901, was established by a royal decree dated December 24, 1901.¹ The decree virtually ended free trade in the Kasai basin by giving the company exclusive trading privileges. In its efforts to extend its trading interests throughout the Kasai area, the C.K. faced some of the same problems as the State, especially those stemming from limited personnel and Cokwe trade dominance over the south. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the administrative structure of the C.K., and then to discuss its consolidation in the north, its expansion into the south and its problems within the Kasai as a whole.

The C.K.'s charter gave it a field of operation which covered the area bounded by the Kasai and Sankuru Rivers to the north, by the Lubefu River to the north-east up to the 5th parallel; by the western limits of the Comité Spécial du Katanga (C.S.K.) in the east; by the Congo State border to the south, and by the Inzia River, which, together with the Kwilu-Djuma River, formed its western limits.² With the exception of the region granted to the C.S.K., this was the largest area of exploitation granted to any trading company, and it covered 360,000 square kilometres.³

The working capital of the company was fixed at 1,005,000 francs to bearer, of which one-half went to the C.F.S. and the remainder to the fourteen companies which formed the C.K. In addition, 4020 profit-bearing shares of no specific value were issued, of which one-half went to the State and the other half to the fourteen companies. The number of shares received by each company was determined by its rubber output for 1901, which totalled 1270 tons.⁴ In return for the shares received, the fourteen companies surrendered all import and export rights, especially over ivory and rubber, to the C.K., together with the factories and commercial posts which had been established. At the same time the State gave up its trading rights to the new company.⁵ The total assets gained by the C.K. from the fourteen companies involved merchandise worth 2,712,850.65 francs; European household supplies worth 114,525.06 francs; and other equipment worth 72,363.19 francs⁶, while a less obvious asset was the unwritten trading monopoly in the Kasai gained through State involvement in the amalgamated commercial enterprise.⁷

The main objective of the C.K. was the collection of, and trade in, vegetable produce and ivory, and all operations connected with commercial, industrial and agricultural exploitation, exporting and importing. To accomplish this, the C.K. used the transport vessels it had acquired from the contracting companies. These included the steamers "Saint Antoine" and "Le Président Wégimont"⁸ and several barges. Additional vessels were immediately purchased, while the C.K. also signed a contract

for one year with the Congo Transport Company (Citas) to handle its merchandise at Stanley Pool.⁹

The central administrative office of the C.K. was located in Brussels and was essentially managed by the State. The administrative structure consisted of an Administrative Council (Conseil d'Administration), a Permanent Committee (Comité Permanent) and supervisory personnel; the three groups combined to form the General Assembly. The powers of the C.K. were exercised by the Permanent Committee which consisted of four members, two elected by the General Assembly, but approved by the State, and two appointed by the State from the General Assembly or at large. The president of the Permanent Committee was also the president of the Administrative Council and he was appointed by the State. In addition to the president, the Administrative Council consisted of fourteen members, of whom at least one-half were appointed by the State, while the remainder were elected from the General Assembly.¹⁰ In addition, the State had the power to appoint one or two additional delegates to attend all the meetings of both the Permanent Committee and the Administrative Council in an advisory capacity. The supervisory personnel consisted of three inspectors or commissioners, two elected by the General Assembly and one appointed by the State. These inspectors worked closely with the General Director, also appointed by the State, whose main function was to manage the daily affairs of the company and to carry out the decisions of the General Assembly as they applied to the Congo.

The Brussels organization controlled C.K. servants resident in the Congo. The Administrative Council in Brussels appointed the director in Africa, whose function it was to run the affairs of the company in the Congo in liaison with the General Director in Brussels, as well as with two inspectors or commissioners who toured the C.K. field of operation.¹¹ The C.K. trading region was divided into zones or secteurs, each under the management of a Chef de Secteur who was directly responsible to the director in Africa. By 1904 there were fifteen secteurs, the boundaries of which were adjusted periodically according to the availability of rubber and the extent of the company's penetration into new territories. The Chef de Secteur supervised the extraction of rubber and ivory in his secteur by touring through his area, supervising the construction of new factories, taking inventories of the factories' warehouses and settling any disputes that might have arisen. His staff consisted of agents or managers of factories located throughout the secteur in areas where the population was friendly and sufficiently large to assure an abundant supply of rubber in exchange for croisettes and European merchandise. The factory managers were responsible for the stock in trade and the bookkeeping, and were required to submit a monthly report to the director in Africa who forwarded the reports to Brussels. In this way, C.K. officials in Brussels could monitor the company's proceedings in the field with considerable accuracy.¹²

Each factory was surrounded by small auxiliary posts located about a thirteen hours' walk from the factory and manned by African capitas, acheteurs (buyers) or assistants, who were responsible for visiting the surrounding villages and purchasing rubber. Each factory also employed a varying number of workers depending on the size of the factory:¹³ wages for African personnel varied with the area.

Initially the C.K.'s African centre of operation was Butala, a former N.A.H.V. post on the Sankuru River, until shipping agreements with the State could be finalized. When it was learned that the State limited the transport of C.K. merchandise and steamer traffic to Stanley Pool to five steamer vessels, it was agreed that a centre closer to the mouth of the Kasai should be selected. A new centre Dima,¹⁴ located at Swinburne near the present site of Bandundu, was established to serve as both a transport and administrative centre. There were many advantages to this location: it was on the western border of C.K. territory and on the Kasai River, near the entrances to the Kwango and Kwilu-Djuma Rivers, which meant that all personnel and merchandise entering C.K. territory would have to pass through Dima. The site was also surrounded by stands of timber suitable for ship-building and, since the width of the river allowed for the easy construction of a slip, Dima could act as a centre for the repair and maintenance of steamers while, lastly, the new centre was just a day's journey from Kwamouth, a telegraph centre.¹⁵

The C.K. was immediately successful as a commercial enterprise. This was partly because competition had been almost totally eliminated, and partly because the State's interest in the company caused it to provide necessary assistance in the form of protection for expansion, insofar as the State could provide this in light of its own limited personnel. The union with the State also gave the C.K. a trade advantage, in that the company collected State imposts, a factor which forced the African to trade with it.¹⁶ The company had a further advantage in that it was formed at a time when the demand for rubber on the world market was rising, while the company's labour costs dropped due to lack of competition from other trading companies.

However, while it was commercially viable, the C.K. was not without its problems. Basically the commercial operations of the C.K. depended on the work done by its field personnel, and it was not easy for it to acquire staff. At this time, Belgians were not particularly interested in working in the Congo, and various reports on the extreme climate and about the uncivilized population were sufficient to discourage any ambitious young man from seeking his fortune there. Frobenius, the German ethnologist who had occasion to meet many C.K. agents in 1904 and 1905, states that most families discouraged their sons from going to the Congo.¹⁷ In consequence the C.K.'s directors frequently had to be satisfied with employees who had been refused employment elsewhere or whom the State

had refused to re-engage.¹⁸ According to Frobenius, there were two categories of people who went to the Congo for work: those with marital problems at home, and those whose financial endeavors in Europe had failed. He also stated that,

One finds people here, employed as traders, with the most unusual backgrounds. Only a small minority have had any experience in trading.¹⁹

A C.K. agent's main objective was to harvest as much rubber in as short a time as possible. In order to encourage efficiency in attaining this objective, the most capable and cooperative agents were assigned to the richest rubber areas while the others were sent to poorer areas. This system was effective, since the wages paid to agents were very low and were supplemented by each agent receiving a percentage of the rubber he succeeded in collecting.²⁰ This placed considerable pressure on the agents because, in order to realize a personal profit, their various expenses had to be covered. Every agent had a boy (servant) and a cook plus a boy for the cook; frequently the agent also had a mistress. Since all of these people had to be paid in salt and cloth, the agents used various methods to regulate the bookkeeping so as to cover these extra expenses. If the agent was capable, some of these irregularities were seemingly overlooked.²¹ Some of the methods the agents used were to pay less for the rubber or to cheat the African out of a full measure of beads

or salt by putting something into the bottom of the measuring spoon. Frequently these tactics were successful for only a limited time until either the agent was called to account for his faulty bookkeeping or Africans refused to be short-changed and discontinued their trade with the C.K. factories, the latter alternative being followed especially where Africans could trade with the Cokwe as an alternative to dealing with the C.K.²²

The chief trading articles at all factories were beads, cotton cloth or calico of poor quality used in West African commerce, American cloth, salt and croisettes.²³ It was C.K. policy to fix the amount of rubber required in return for the merchandise the agents distributed from the factory. In order to facilitate the bookkeeping process, the selection of wares was very limited. Furthermore, most of the products, especially the cloth, were of inferior quality to that sold in the Dutch factories of the N.A.H.V. on the lower Congo.²⁴ The explanation for this was simply that an inferior product would be consumed more quickly and, when it was, the African would be obliged to bring in more rubber to replace worn-out articles.²⁵ Besides legitimate trade articles such as cloth and salt, some of the agents also traded in alcoholic beverages - a common practice among Portuguese traders - even though trade in alcohol had been prohibited in the Congo by decree as early as 1890.²⁶ Not only was alcohol used as a trade article, but it was soon discovered that the African was more amenable when trading if he had had an opportunity to

imbibe beforehand.²⁷ Very early in the history of the C.K. in the Kasai, the company's administrators were requested by Droogman, the Secretary-General of the Department of Finances in Brussels, to take action against the captains and mechanics of its steamers along the Kasai River, who were trading with the riparian peoples in both alcohol and absinthe. The practice involved the ship's crew obtaining alcohol from European traders up-stream from Stanley Pool and then selling it to traders along the Kasai. The traders in their turn either kept it for themselves, since drunkenness was a common problem among C.K. agents, or else they used it as a trade article,²⁸ since one bottle of absinthe could be sold for 20 francs in currency or 25 francs' worth of merchandise.²⁹

The limited European personnel available for the Congo required C.K. agents to depend on their African associates or capitas to accomplish much of the work involved in their trading operations. In many cases this created tensions: since the C.K. had to have reliable workers, it meant relying on groups of people such as the Baluba, Lulua and Zappo Zap, who were considered to be foreigners by some of the Kasai peoples and were frequently mistreated in the villages on this account. This gave rise to problems of security, for which the C.K. depended on the State which, likewise, depended on African auxiliary groups for its strength. The relative military weakness of the State eventually resulted in the establishment of a C.K. police corps in 1906.³⁰

The capitas sometimes aggravated the financial difficulties of the agents, who had to depend on African subordinates because European numbers were so limited. The capitas thus carried considerable responsibility. They meted out punishments (whippings) where necessary, although there was no legal authority to sanction a capita doing so, assisted with work at the factories, and acted as the chief buyer of rubber in the villages. This latter responsibility involved the capita in the avance or trust system of trade which was practiced throughout the Kasai. The capita took a quantity of merchandise into the villages and then departed to return about the beginning of the month to collect rubber in return for the merchandise. In each case, the agent would indicate how much rubber he expected for the merchandise he had handed out. Many times the acheteur did not act responsibly and, being proud of his position of authority, he would squander his wares in lavish living so that, when the time came to return to the factory, he would have an insufficient amount of rubber. In some cases the capita gained wives instead of rubber while, in others, he would disappear altogether. Since the agent had to account for the merchandise he had distributed, the treatment given to slovenly capitas was frequently extremely harsh.³¹

Some examples are provided by Frobenius on the occasion of his tour to the region of Kabeya and Golongo early in 1905. Through mismanagement and unreliable capitas, the agent at Kabeya, Labryn, had arrived at a

deficit of 7,000 francs. The capitas were punished with imprisonment while Labryn took their wives either to keep them or to sell them into slavery. Two of the wives were sold to his African employees for ten lengths of cloth each.³² The capitas themselves were frequently punished by being whipped which, on occasion, resulted in the death of the victim. Bossolo's report for the Commission of Enquiry in 1905 revealed an extensive list of C.K. agents charged with injury to, or the deaths of, African workers through whippings.³³ To avoid a great deal of adverse publicity, the C.K. dismissed agents periodically; in other cases, agents were simply transferred to another secteur to hopefully mend their ways.³⁴

The harsh treatment meted out to the capitas was passed on by them to the villagers from whom they wished to collect rubber. Capitas were supposed by law to go unarmed, but frequently they were given guns to force the production of rubber. In other cases they would threaten to summon the troops of the Bulamatari (State) to punish villagers. This was quite an effective threat for, though many villagers had never seen State troops, they had heard of their punitive expeditions. The African name for the State soldiers was Pumbulu, meaning hyena, a much detested African animal.³⁵ It should be added that frequently these were empty threats since, in many instances, company factories were located long distances away from State posts.

When the C.K. was formed at the end of 1901 most of the factories it occupied extended along the Sankuru and Kasai Rivers, and these factories became the springboard for penetration into the regions occupied by the Bakuba and the Bakete to the north of Luebo. The C.K.'s advance into the Bakuba kingdom was achieved by sending agents into the territory and, following the establishment of factories, sending capitas into the villages. However, in spite of these attempts, the C.K.'s penetration into Kuba territory was slow. Although its influence extended throughout the kingdom by the time of the Bakuba revolt in 1904, the company's control remained limited to the area along the Sankuru River and the factories at Ibanche, Bachi Shombe, and Ekumbi north of Luebo. Even though the C.K. had taken over the S.A.P.V. factory at Mushenge, the capital, there were only periodic visits to the capital by C.K. agents, for trading operations were otherwise left to the capitas.³⁶

One of the reasons for the company's inability to extend its area of control more quickly was due to the capita buyers whom it employed. The Bakuba were not willing to serve as capitas or porters and were, therefore, considered lazy and unreliable. The C.K.'s method was to force the production of rubber, treating the population as if they were slaves even though they received some remuneration. For the Kuba this paid slave labour implied political subjection and they consequently resisted as much as possible. Thus the C.K. brought in the foreign capitas whom the Kuba regarded with disdain and mistreated.³⁷

As a result of the State's presence at Luluabourg, the C.K. was able to open a factory to the north of the State post at Kapulumba in 1902. From this location, the C.K. extended northwards into Bakete territory in 1902 and then moved into the areas to the east and west in 1903. By the end of 1903 C.K. influence extended from the Luluabourg area along the Lulua River to the Kasai and, by the end of 1908, most of the Kuba kingdom had come under the C.K.'s influence.

The C.K. factory at Kapulumba, on the left bank of the Lulua River, was established in 1902 by Paul Landbeck, a former agent for the Plantations Lacourt and now a C.K. agent, as a result of a tour made through the Luluabourg area with a view to exploiting it for the C.K. The territory of Kapulumba was under the control of longo, a Lulua headman, whom the State had conquered but to whom all petty clan leaders in the area were paying tribute.³⁸ Landbeck chose to locate his new factory on the Luebo-Luluabourg caravan route to facilitate transport. Kapulumba, who had been chafing under the tribute he was paying to longo, considered this an opportunity to establish his own power by supporting the C.K. and by himself serving as a middle man between the surrounding villages and the European.³⁹

While Landbeck was building the factory at Kapulumba, other C.K. agents were occupying some of the stations left by the companies which had formed the C.K. One of the oldest of these locations was at Bena

Makima, which remained under the ownership of the S.A.P.V. but which was leased to the C.K. and consequently came under its jurisdiction. The chief activity at both Bena Makima and Galikoko which also belonged to the S.A.P.V., was the production of plantation crops such as coffee and rubber. As a result of an agreement between the C.K. and Père Cambier of the Scheutist Mission, and following the orders of the Mission's central organization, it was decided that the care of the plantations at Bena Makima would be assigned to the missionary priests of the Mission.⁴⁰ This arrangement, completed early in 1904, was carefully made so as not to violate the decree of December 28, 1888, which stated that no religious or scientific body was to occupy more than 50 hectares in one location. The C.K. was also reminded of article 6 of its own agreement with the State, whereby the company did not have the power to join with another association or to grant land rights to another association without State authorization.⁴¹ Consequently the fields, though cultivated by the priests and their workers, remained under the jurisdiction of the C.K. Buildings, likewise, though occupied by the priests, were to remain under C.K. jurisdiction.⁴² It should be noted, though, that the mission at Bena Makima was called Saint Victorien, after the patron saint of the company's director, although the name was never indicated on official company maps.⁴³

As far as the C.K. was concerned the presence of the priests at Bena Makima did not constitute a mission. It was considered a convenient

way of procuring personnel for station duties. Père Cambier had agreed to assist the company in supplying both priests and labourers for the venture. The priests were remunerated on the same scale as other C.K. agents.⁴⁴ The first priests designated were Père Van Kerckoven as agent and Père Polet as assistant. They brought forty male workers with them, of whom thirty had families.⁴⁵ The manner in which the priests carried on their functions differed little from that of the C.K. agents in general. After the Bakuba revolt of 1904, certain chiefs had been given the responsibility by the State of supplying workers to the plantation and to assist in the building projects. When the workers were slow in arriving, Père Polet went into the villages, gun in hand, and brought the chiefs to the mission where he placed them in chains until their people came to work. Frobenius noted that these were tactics used by both Catholic and Protestant missionaries.⁴⁶

✓ The C.K. also benefitted from its association with the Scheutists and the State in the Kanda Kanda region. The establishment of a State post at Kanda Kanda in 1897 and the Catholic Mission of Thielen St. Jacques in 1898 provided an opportunity for the C.K. to be a part of a growing European settlement by constructing a factory near Kanda Kanda's village in 1903.⁴⁷ By January 1905, at the time of Frobenius' visit, the C.K. had both a factory and a plantation.⁴⁸ Kanda Kanda became the centre from which C.K. agents accompanied State expeditions into the south, and

from which they eventually went west into Sala Mpasu territory.

The C.K.'s move into the south did, however, present serious problems which, in part, were due to the limited State penetration into the area south of Luebo and Luluabourg. The area of Djoko Punda (Wissmann Falls) had been briefly occupied by both the State and a trading company, the Compagnie de Bergeyck in 1894 to 1895. However, when the Luluabourg garrison mutinied, the post was closed and the C.K. did not establish a factory at Djoko Punda until 1903. The C.K.'s move into the south was impeded by its dependence on State protection but the State itself was weak because of its own limited personnel.

Both the State and the C.K. shared a mutual need to penetrate the southern region, in part because of their interest in economic gains, and in part because of the need to control the southern region as part of C.F.S. territory. The abundance of rubber and ivory throughout the south had also attracted the Cokwe some years earlier. When the Cokwe first began their advance into the Kasai in the 1860s, one of the important trade commodities was ivory. However, by the 1880s the elephant in the Kasai had either become extinct or had moved northward and the only ivory remaining was stored ivory which, for the Kuba, formed part of the tribute paid to royalty. Although the C.K. traded in ivory when and where it could, the Kasai area in general produced very little,⁴⁹ and the C.K.'s main exploitive methods were directed towards the collection of rubber,

which caused the company to enter into competition with the Colore and traders from Angola. Therefore, in order for the C.K. to establish factories and exploit the area without interference it was necessary to cut off the trade in rubber and guns between Angola and the C.F.S.: keeping the rubber trade within C.F.S. borders was possible only through the elimination of Angolan trade in the Congo. The State and the company were, however, both weak and thus, by 1908, while the C.K.'s trade influences extended beyond the area under State control, the area influenced by the C.K. extended only over those areas in which the State could give some assistance to the C.K., however irregularly. Since the State was weak in the south, the C.K. exerted little influence even by 1908.

In addition to the problems of limited State support and the competition from Angolan traders, there was the additional problem of transporting rubber out of the southern region. The land route required porters: the Lunda were reluctant to work as porters, while the Sala Mpasu resisted European intrusion. The water route presented more favourable possibilities, since both the Kasai and the Lulua Rivers flow to the north. However, the Lulua was navigable for pirogues for only short distances between areas of rapids while, in some areas, the banks of the rivers were inhabited by peoples, such as the Sala Mpasu, who remained hostile to European penetration until after 1908. Although the Kasai River was wider, and

navigable for longer distances, it also contained rapids. A more important fact was, however, that the Kasai formed the border between the Congo and Angola and, consequently, formed the main transportation route used by the Cokwe to export rubber from the C.F.S. into Angola. For this reason, the C.K. and the State determined to gain Kalamba-Muana's submission, for it believed that the destruction of Kalamba-Muana's power would also disrupt trade across the border. However, although Kalamba-Muana submitted to the State in 1907,⁵⁰ the trade into Angola was to continue well beyond 1908.

The C.K.'s actual penetration into the south occurred along the two main river systems, the Lulua and the Kasai. Penetration along the Lulua began when Questiaux accompanied Verdict, whose expedition to Lunda territory was intended to establish a State presence on the border with Angola.⁵¹ The expedition followed the Lulua River and, due west of Kanda Kanda, Questiaux established a C.K. factory at Bakete in 1903 on the right bank of the Lulua. However, the C.K.'s attempts to establish factories at other sites in the south were frustrated by various circumstances. State expeditions into the area in 1903 and 1904 led to the establishment of State posts at Katola and Dilolo, but the ravages committed by the State's soldiers caused entire villages to relocate away from the Katola-Dilolo route. In order for C.K. trade to be profitable, these villages would have to be restored along the trade routes, especially in order to supply porters and foodstuffs to allow rubber to be drawn from the south.

Furthermore, in the Dilolo area, the Lwena chief, Tshiniama, had been successful in preventing European traders from establishing a factory at Dilolo in 1904.⁵² The active trade between the Lwena and the Cokwe with Angola had to be broken before the C.K. could trade safely in the area. Repeated State expeditions into the surrounding areas and the strengthening of the State post at Dilolo resulted in Tshiniama's flight in 1907 so that the C.K. established a factory at Dilolo in the same year.

While the C.K. was waiting to establish itself at Dilofo, the company agents moved along the Lulua to establish a chain of posts which led it into Sala Mpasu territory. Bumba's friendliness permitted the establishment of a factory at Bakete in 1903;⁵³ however, the C.K. agents never trusted him, since it was not uncommon for capitas to return to the factory injured or in flight while, on occasion, they were even killed.⁵⁴ The presence of Cokwe in Bumba's territory implied that he was allied to them, which did not encourage Europeans to trust the Sala Mpasu leader. This alliance existed until 1907, when De Grunne attacked a caravan of Cokwe slave raiders near Bumba's village and Bumba finally submitted to the State.⁵⁵

On the right bank of the Lulua River, the Sala Mpasu population under the powerful leadership of Mukoko had also made an alliance with the Cokwe to raid the nearby Kete peoples. As a result of this alliance, Mukoko had a large supply of flintlock muskets. In 1905, Mukoko allowed

the C.K. to establish a factory at Mukoko, probably because it gave him the opportunity to raid the company's caravans,⁵⁶ by which means he was accustomed to control the trade-flow to the south through raids.⁵⁷

Mukoko's harassment of C.K. caravans resulted in an order from Dima to find a more secure site for the factory. The resulting move to Tambwe in 1907 infuriated Mukoko, both because of his own economic loss and the economic gain of his rival, Chief Tambwe, and he responded by pillaging and destroying what remained of the C.K. establishment at Mukoko.⁵⁸ As a result of C.K. requests, De Grunne then led an expedition into Mukoko's area to investigate the charges against Mukoko. However, Mukoko fled, probably aware of C.F.S. military strength and the impossibility of his own position in relation to it. De Grunne's opinion of Mukoko was formed on the basis of his information from C.K. agents and the Kete, whom Mukoko raided. Consequently, he ignored Mukoko's gifts, intended as peace offerings, and chose to regard Mukoko as an enemy with whom he would not negotiate.⁵⁹

A few months later the C.K. agent, Albert Schoup, was back in Mukoko's territory, probably with the latter's consent. Schoup's insolence when refusing to meet the demands which Mukoko made for provisions resulted in the C.K. agent's death and the return of De Grunne to take Mukoko to Lusambo as a prisoner.⁶⁰

These incidents were probably influential in facilitating the C.K. penetration of the Sala Mpasu peoples in the Luiza area south of Mukoko for, in 1908 the C.K. was able to establish a factory at La Luiza and M'Pagi. By 1908 the C.K. advance along the Lulua River had resulted in factories at Bakete (1903); Tshibaka, Tshikongo, Kabuluku, Kaniama and Tshitadi in Bakete territory (1904); Mukoko (1907); and La Luiza and M'Pagi (1908),⁶¹ while further south in Lunda territory C.K. factories existed at Katola (1905) and Dilolo (1907). The C.K.'s intention to locate factories as near to the C.F.S. borders as possible resulted in the establishment of factories at Tshilemo (or Cilemo), Kimpuki and Kafutchi in 1909.⁶²

Rubber from the various factories was transported to Tshitadi which was considered a secure factory because of its proximity to both the Scheutist Mission, Hemptinne St. Benoit, just 2 1/2 hours away, and the State post at Luluabourg, 14 hours away.⁶³ The Catholic mission was a potential source for porters if the C.K. agents were unsuccessful in recruiting them, while the mission also provided foodstuffs, such as coffee and fruits. C.K. success in the area was undoubtedly due to cooperation which it received from the Catholic mission, the large areas of unexploited rubber in the regions occupied by the Bakete and Sala Mpasu, and the Africans' desire to trade.⁶⁴

While the C.K. was moving into Kuba territory and south to Kanda Kanda and Dilolo, it was also penetrating the region along the Kasai River above Wissmann Falls. The intention was to establish factories along the Kasai River and eventually reach Dilolo in order to stop the trade flow to Angola. The C.K. was aware that the obstacles to this plan were the Cokwe, who controlled much of the trade, and Kalamba-Muana, their ally.

Djoko Punda (Wissmann Falls) was the terminus for steamer traffic along the Kasai above Kwamouth. The C.K. established a factory there in 1903 and it became the supply depot for factories further upstream. The existence of this factory made it possible for agents to procure trade articles without returning to Luebo.⁶⁵ From here Bertrand, Chef de Secteur and C.K. geographer, moved upriver with his assistant, Labryn, to establish a factory at Golongo, early in 1903, and at Kabeya in October 1903. Golongo was located on the right bank of the Kasai River and, by the time Frobenius visited it in September 1905, it had become a thriving settlement. The ethnographer described it as the "most attractive station the company had."⁶⁶ However, it was constructed near a swamp and, during the rainy season, some of the main buildings had water constantly on their floors. Kabeya was just a three hours' walk away and not directly on the river bank but among a population which had trade relations with Kalamba-Muana. Labryn observed that the villages in the surrounding area were clean and many gave the impression of wealth. In the village of Kakamba the chief

had a herd of fifteen magnificent cattle which he would not hear of selling. Everywhere balls of rubber and foodstuffs abounded.⁶⁷

Production of rubber for these two factories was, however, seasonal, and in September 1904, production fell at both factories. Bertrand explained it as follows:

...the Bapende are out hunting and not producing rubber. However, there is a considerable amount of rubber in their villages. Unfortunately they will not come to sell their rubber for anything except gunpowder. Of the latter, we have none, even though we ordered it two months ago already... Our population was told a month ago that a considerable amount of gunpowder would arrive so they keep the rubber in the villages.⁶⁸

The factory location at Kabeya, together with Kanda Kanda and Tshitadi, were intended as the points from which the entire southern area of the Kasai would eventually be occupied by the company.⁶⁹

Bertrand's first expedition into the south in an attempt to reach Mai-Munene⁷⁰ had taught him, that in order to establish free access to these areas, the Bapende and the Cokwe would have to settle their differences since the routes to the south were closed because the Cokwe would not permit the Bapende to pass, nor would the Bapende allow free passage to the Cokwe. Bertrand was able to persuade the Cokwe Chief Moile and the principal Bapende headman to agree to a reconciliation between their respective peoples. He did not directly state what method he used to

achieve this, except to say

the Cokwe and Bapende begged me to arrange for guns and especially gunpowder to be brought to them since they told me they have had enough of trading with those...Portuguese thieves!!!⁷¹

Undoubtedly Bertrand offered guns in return for peace.

Although some African leaders came to terms with the European, this did not mean that the way to the south along the Kasai was now open. Kabeya himself, who had allowed a C.K. factory to be located in his vicinity to take advantage of both the trade to the north and the trade to the south, was not anxious for Bertrand to proceed further south for fear of disrupting his own trade in guns. In April 1904, when Bertrand arrived at Kabeya with the intention of proceeding deeper into Cokwe territory, the chief bribed the porters with goats and palm wine to divert the expedition, reinforcing his gifts with an announcement that they would surely be massacred en route. All of Bertrand's porters fled during the night and had to be replaced with porters from Golongo.

After eventually succeeding in crossing the Kasai River, Bertrand's expedition was halted near the Tshikapa River by the Cokwe Chief, Moamba, who refused to allow it to continue without the agreement of a council of chiefs. Bertrand writes:

...the different chiefs arrive preceded by drummers: Tchinema (who is completely blind) Chamakata, Tchifama, Lengelemata, Tchisenge, Moinatounge, Chamalambo, and Bondo.

Each chief is dressed in a CASSOCK (with a small cape and hood with a green lining) of a Portuguese priest. They all wear a stole and a large copper crucifix on their chest. Each one wears a red hat as head-gear. One would seem to be attending a meeting of black nobles.

All of these chiefs speak Portuguese and are surprised that we do not understand them, they tell us that they will not allow us to go further into the interior under the pretext that the Cokwe of the south are very evil and could possibly harm us.⁷²

After some further discussion, Bertrand and Labryn were allowed to continue, aware that the chiefs' real motive for not wishing them to pass was the presence of a Portuguese factory within a two days' walk and that their commerce in guns and gunpowder would be in jeopardy. The C.K. agents arrived at Mai-Munene on April 2, 1904, and commented on the richness of the area both in rubber and food supplies. At this time no attempt was made to establish a C.K. post at Mai-Munene. Although there were friendly villages in the vicinity, it was then evident that there were no trade articles which the C.K. could offer which could match those of the Portuguese. Bertrand noted also that the Cokwe possessed a considerable amount of ivory which they sold to the Portuguese. The density of the population, the richness of the territory and the desire of the population to trade made this a most desirable area for the C.K. to

occupy and, therefore, Bertrand's orders to Labryn were to direct "all his efforts" towards establishing a commercial relationship with these Cokwe.⁷³

The difficulty in obeying this order stemmed not only from political conditions around Mai-Munene itself but also from the attitude of chief Kabeya, whose influence extended over a large area south of the Kabeya factory. Kabeya, wanting the best of two possible trade worlds, thwarted Labryn's attempt to penetrate into the south for his alliances included one with the great Cokwe chief, Moukkau Djambu. Kabeya's trade with the Cokwe was mainly in guns and, when the C.K. agents moved into his trading area, he sent messengers ahead advising village leaders that the real intent of the white intruder was to destroy the gun trade.⁷⁴ Although a factory was established at Mai-Munene in 1906, its future was very uncertain as long as opposition came from Kabeya and Kalamba-Muana and his Cokwe allies. The Kasai River from Wissmann Falls to the Pogge Falls was found to be navigable to boat traffic in 1906, and it was considered more profitable to locate near the Pogge Falls at Mai-Munene: the factory at Kabeya was therefore closed, while the factory at Golongo was transferred to Bantua Sanki, located just above the Wissmann Falls in 1907,⁷⁵ since the water route reduced transport charges in both directions. The opening of the Kasai River to company transport was considered the key to opening the southern part of the Kasai, C.K. factories were, therefore,

to be established along the river routes as much as possible and, with the submission of Kalamba-Muna⁷⁶ resulting in a measure of peace in the area, the company set out to explore the possibilities of navigation on the upper Kasai from a factory established in 1908 at Kalamba-M'Buji, just above the Pogge Falls.⁷⁷

Although there were rich rubber supplies in the area, production at Golongo and Kabeya was never very high. A persistent problem for Secteur VIII was the shortage of European trade articles. The area between the Lulua and Kasai Rivers had been left to the C.K. to both exploit and govern. The State military Chef de Secteur appeared only when the C.K. agents were involved in skirmishes with the local population, as in 1906 at Mai-Munene, and he then returned to Luluabourg.

The local population reacted negatively toward the C.K. for several reasons. The prime reason was the threat of interference with their gun trade with Angola. However, a second reason was the C.K.'s policy here, as in other areas, of bringing Baluba capitas with them. Frequently these capitas were armed and captured women and children as hostages unless the local population collected rubber. These methods account for some of the low yields in rubber and also for the murder of a capita in the vicinity of Mai-Munene.⁷⁸ The Baluba workers at the factory were certain that this was Kalamba-Muana's work and, fearing it was but the prelude to an all-out attack from Kalamba-Muana, they all fled. This indicates

a constant difficulty which all the C.K. factories experienced. Bertrand, on several occasions, requested workers from Lusambo, about "thirty Bakuba workers from Lusambo or preferably Batetela" since the post had only fourteen workers in 1904.⁷⁹ Dryepondt attempted to comply, but the only response he received from the State was confirmation of the then policy of not recruiting in the Lusambo area and from among the Batetela.⁸⁰ The prohibition against Batetela was generated by memories of the Luluabourg mutiny of 1895, which was still too vivid in the minds of the State agents, while some Batetela rebels were known to be allied with Kalamba-Muana, and to bring more members of the same groups into the area might, it was feared, generate another revolt.

C.K. penetration was aimed at rubber production and, wherever factories were established, agents pressured the local population to collect rubber. At Djoko Punda rubber production averaged about 1000 kilos per month but dropped when the State imposed a tax on Chief Ndombi and his people,⁸¹ since the imposts on Ndombi's village consisted of five goats and twenty-five croisettes.⁸²

In 1906 the total rubber production for the southern area covering Secteurs VII and VIII was 144 tons,⁸³ of which amount 30 tons came from the Mai-Munene area.⁸⁴ Although the C.K. was realizing a profit from its establishments in Secteurs VII and VIII, it was still not prospering to the extent the Portuguese were for, in 1905, Frausto had estimated that

they were collecting about 200 tons a year from the Kasai while, in 1910, Lacourt reported the amount to be about 300 tons.⁸⁵ In some cases, as in the area south of Mai-Munene, Portuguese merchants were located on C.K. territory under Kalamba-Muana's protection.⁸⁶ After Kalamba-Muana's submission to the State in 1907, secteur boundaries were altered to include the entire right bank of the Kasai as illustrated in Map XII. However, the C.K. was never able to extend its operation south along the Kasai River as it intended because of the competition of traders from Angola and, until the end of 1908 in any case the State was never sufficiently strong to provide the necessary security to penetrate further south.

The problems which the C.K. experienced with its African workers in the southern Kasai were not without political significance: however, they were relatively minor when set against the major problems facing the C.K. throughout the Kasai. Its major problems involved the practice of rubber poaching, both in C.K. areas and in adjoining areas; the acceptance of pounded rubber; the issue of croisettes and State imposts; the C.K.'s risks in areas beyond State influence; the reactions of Africans to C.K. agents; the decline in the value of rubber; and the eventual creation of the C.K. police.

In order to facilitate the operations of the company, the C.K. divided its trade area into secteurs with agents and capitas generally

restricted to trading in their assigned secteurs. Within the area of this study there were six secteur divisions which must be identified briefly. Secteur XI extended along the Sankuru River as far as Inkongu. To the east of it and across the Sankuru River was secteur III-IV, which shared an eastern border with the Domaine Privé. Secteur X-XII covered the area surrounding Luebo and included the heart of the Kuba kingdom, as well as Djoko Punda and Luluabourg area west of the Lulua River. Directly across the Lulua River to the east was secteur IX which touched the eastern Luluabourg area. Secteur VII consisted of the region from approximately Tshitadi, south to the Angolan border with the Lulua River as its western border and with the C.S.K. on its eastern border. The remaining secteur was secteur VIII, to the west of the Lulua River and extending along the Kasai River.

These arbitrary secteur divisions were, in part, responsible for some of the problems experienced by the C.K. and their African subordinates. The company's desire for economic gain placed pressures on European agents and, especially, on African capitas who frequently disregarded secteur divisions in their anxiety to procure rubber. In spite of the risks involved, capitas were anxious to work for the C.K., since the position offered a certain prestige by virtue of being commissioned and, to some extent, protected by the European trader,⁸⁷ and it was one way in which an African might become relatively rich. These benefits

were sufficient for the capitas to accept some of the accompanying pressures, such as producing a certain amount of rubber, by violating secteur boundaries. For instance, by 1908 there were at least 285 capitas in Secteur X-XII.⁸⁸ This resulted in friction among the capitas, who were assigned to collect a certain amount of rubber in a designated area over a given time. Sometimes this friction carried over into the relationship between C.K. agents. In Secteur VIII the agents were certain that their low yields were due to the capitas of Secteurs X-XII, directly north of them, exploiting their fields, whereas Secteurs X-XII found violators from Secteur IX, to the east of them, on their territory. This accounts for some of the beatings capitas received which, in some cases, even caused their deaths.

In some cases the capitas' trading violations were a result of the C.K. agent's questionable methods, as Dryepondt was to discover. The C.K.'s immediate success at Kaputumba can undoubtedly be attributed to Landbeck's great energy and ability.⁸⁹ At the time of Dryepondt's tour in 1904 the two Europeans, Landbeck and his assistant, Verlecke, had a total of 100 capita buyers in all the surrounding villages. Their efforts yielded an average of three tons of rubber a month, or about thirty kilos for each capita and, of this yield, about 600 kilos came from the Bamba region in Secteur IX which Landbeck's capitas unscrupulously raided.⁹⁰ These same capitas did not hesitate to annoy and molest the

Zappo Zap buyers who had been given the right to gather rubber wherever they chose which, in fact, led them to trade with Kalamba-Muana.⁹¹

The number of capitas did not allow the agents sufficient time to control their activities in the villages since there were always capitas bringing rubber into the factory. The sum total of Dryepondt's observations for Secteur X were:

At present it is impossible: to know where a factory buys its rubber; to know the exact price paid for it; to know where the buyers for each factory go; to know exactly how many employees each factory has; and to know the reason for the low production in some regions and what remedy to apply.⁹²

Dryepondt's comments are of interest since the C.K. claimed to know its entire operation through the monthly reports the agents were supposed to make. These reports were frequently incomplete and, in many cases, they were never written. The C.K. directorship was interested in profit and concerned with local reaction only where it impeded the company's activities. Dryepondt also visited the C.K. factory at Bena Makima, which was directed by E. Delcommune. When Dryepondt arrived there at the end of January 1904, De Cock and Vessels had passed through to investigate an incident in which some Bena M'Vula, who were not employed by the C.K., were collecting rubber from among the Bakuba and transporting it to the factories where they were paid in cloth and salt. This type of activity was regarded by the C.K. as one way in which to exploit regions where

the population refused to work. The State, however, considered it illegal and a form of migration which could lead to conflicts among the population.⁹³ However, this was not an unusual procedure. Dryepondt stated all agents sent capita buyers into areas far from the factories. "Bena Makima buys rubber at Luluabourg and the 50 kilos that Bena Luidi bought in December, were bought at Fariala (midway between Luebp and Luluabourg)."⁹⁴ The company's purpose was exploitation and, as long as friction between areas could be avoided, the methods employed were of no great consequence.

The matter of rubber poaching between secteurs was an internal problem with which the C.K. had to deal; however a much more serious and involved situation arose when C.K. agents moved into regions outside of the C.K. charter area and when State agents exploited C.K. territory. Several examples illustrate the problem. The combined territory of secteurs XI, III-IV and IX shared a border with the Comité Spécial du Katanga in the east and the Domaine Privé⁹⁵ to the north. Before the C.K. was formed some of the fourteen companies had factories in operation along the Sankuru as far as Idanga. These were the first locations the C.K. occupied, where it almost immediately ran into difficulties with the State when zealous C.K. agents sent their rubber collectors into Domaine Privé territory. In this region, State agents exploited the area for Leopold and evidently had been accustomed to drawing rubber from the

banks of the Sankuru River also. Officially, the matter was dealt with early in 1903 when Droogman, the Secretary General of Finance for the C.F.S., informed the C.K. Director in Brussels that the amount taken by the State from the C.K. area would be credited to the C.K. account once it was known. Furthermore, the Commissaires du District would advise agents of both regions that no products were to be accepted into their factories except those from their own area of exploitation.⁹⁶

It was not as simple to deal with irregularities in the Congo as it was in the offices in Brussels as the following account demonstrates. By the end of 1902 word had reached the Commissaire du District and the C.K. that a C.K. agent was actually located on Domaine Privé territory. The Commissaire du District notified Bossolet, the Chef de Poste at Bena-Dibele and requested an investigation. In making a tour to Lodja, Bossolet encountered a C.K. agent, Heynessens, located at Besobe about two days to the north-east from Bena-Dibele, buying rubber in Domaine Privé territory. His main capita was located at Bena, further inland. Bossolet urged both to leave immediately and relocate within the C.K. concession; however, six days later when he returned from Lodja there were no signs of Heynessens even considering a move because porters were not available for him to do so. At this, Bossolet recruited porters and forced Heynessens to return to Idanga, claiming that the agent at Idanga, Heyberg, had ordered Heynessens to open the factory at Besobe

because trade merchandise from Idanga was of better quality than that available in the Domaine Privé.⁹⁷ Although the C.K. was officially requested to pay for the misappropriated rubber, the event was further complicated when De Clercq informed the Commissaire du District that Bossolet was in error and that the C.K. could prove that it was not Heynessens who was trading in the Domaine Privé but the Chef de Poste himself.⁹⁸ The proof consisted of reports coming from C.K. agents along the Sankuru which stated that State troops were forcing residents of the left bank to relocate on the right bank, presumably to be recruited as rubber collectors. At this point, Verdick, the military commander for the district, became involved and investigated the charges: he discovered that the relocations were made for political reasons only, and the recruitments were necessary for State purposes, and were not to be considered as competition with the C.K.⁹⁹

In spite of Verdick's explanations, the State did concede by the end of 1903 that certain State agents were collecting rubber not only in the Domaine Privé but also on C.K. territory.¹⁰⁰ At the same time the State did not accept the company's official word that Heynessens was innocent and, after much correspondence, some of which consisted of bitter attacks, the C.K. reimbursed the State in November 1904 with a stipulated sum of money which was considered to be the equivalent in value of the rubber taken from the Domaine Privé: whereupon C.K. agents were advised that the next time a similar problem arose they were to

solve it in Africa and not transmit it to Europe.¹⁰¹

The incident served as an opportunity for the State to remind the C.K. that the company had never, on any occasion, received an exclusive monopoly over any particular area. Therefore, it could not object to the State's recruitment of the local population for its own purposes. On the other hand, State officials were reminded that they had no trading rights on the C.K. concession.¹⁰²

Further conflicts existed in the area between the Lubefu and the Lulua Rivers. The C.K. designated this area as Secteurs III-IV and IX. The northern parts of Secteurs III-IV were not exploited by the C.K. until after 1909, when factories were established at Mukunji on the Lubefu River and around Lusambo and Pania Mutombo. These two secteurs contained African groups whose allegiance the State had gained earlier, namely, Zappo Zap and Pania Mutombo and their followers. Both were anxious for commerce and, because their area was not rich in rubber, their buyers travelled great distances to trade. "Unfortunately this doesn't happen without a bit of slave-dealing and without some abuses."¹⁰³ The aggressiveness of these buyers is evident by their results for, in 1906, Secteur III-IV produced 189 tons and Secteur IX produced 173 tons of rubber.¹⁰⁴

Since the area of Secteur III-IV shared a common border with the Comité Spécial du Katanga, problems similar to those along the Sankuru

developed in this area. By the end of 1902, it was noticed that the C.K. was unable to recruit in the Pania Mutombo area because Africans there were assigned to portage duty for the C.S.K. This meant they were leaving C.K. territory, frequently with produce which the C.K. was entitled to purchase, to work for the C.S.K. Furthermore, the C.S.K. was planning to construct a road from Tshofa to Pania, for which labour would be required within C.K. area for that part of the road around Pania and also for the post the C.S.K. would erect there.¹⁰⁵ This was literally paving the way for the products from C.K. territory to be transported into C.S.K. territory. A partial solution was finally reached in 1904 when the boundaries between the two companies were clearly established.¹⁰⁶

The desire for quick profit brought with it other questionable trade methods besides rubber poaching. One was the extraction of latex by pounding, which was practiced in order to produce as much rubber as possible, as quickly as possible, at the expense of killing the vines. A royal decree of January 5, 1899, prohibited the practice and required that an incision should be made in the bark to allow the latex to drip from the vines as this method preserved the vine for further use. After the formation of the C.K., the State sent out frequent reminders about the importance of using legitimate methods of rubber production and in 1902 despatched two Forestry Inspectors, Gentil and Laurent, to enquire about the company's actions in order to advise government officials on how to cope with company infractions. The State, on their advice, suggested

that company agents refuse pounded rubber. When the matter was re-opened in 1904 and the State again threatened to take action against the company, Dryepontt protested to the General Director, stating:

This matter is of the most serious concern to our company. These Draconian methods will have the effect of cutting our production in half, because the frightened native will refuse to produce any rubber at all, neither incised, nor pounded, nor rubber pulp for fear of being at fault and punished, because the complete incompetence of the majority of the Government's agents who would be called to intervene, together with their zealously, would make the production of any rubber dangerous for the native.¹⁰⁷

The company had the experience of 1902 to support it in this position. It was well-known that in 1900-1901 the village of Pania Mutombo alone supplied nearly 20 tons of rubber per month and all of it was known to be pounded rubber. After the C.K. entered the region and was obliged to refuse this type of rubber, the production dropped to 2 1/2 to 3 tons per month in spite of the high price of 1.25 francs per kilo. paid by the company.¹⁰⁸

Dryepontt pointed out further that when Gentil and Wildeman returned to study the problem once more in early 1904, their conclusions differed from those arrived at in 1902. They wrote:

Since it is not easy to collect rubber by the method of incision in the Lulaba-Kasai District because of the consistency of the latex, the natives frequently resort to pounding the bark

in order not to lose the latex coagulating in the bark of the vines. In regions, far from European control, this manner of production has become a part of native custom as a result of their need to procure certain European articles which they can't do without and which can only be obtained through the use of rubber as money. Knowing that pounded rubber is refused they have been able to perfect their method of producing it so that it is impossible to tell whether it is indeed pounded rubber or not.¹⁰⁹

Dryepondt's point in repeatedly citing the above in his correspondence with the Governor-General, the C.K. Director in Brussels, and the Commissaire du District was based on the observation that, if forestry experts like Gentil and Wildeman could not tell the difference between latex produced by pounding and that produced legally, how could an untrained agent or his assistant or his black capita buyers be expected to know the difference?¹¹⁰ While the spate of correspondence continued between Dima and Boma, the C.K. inspector, Lescrauwaet, visited Chenot, the Commissaire du District at Lusambo, with whom he discussed the issue. In a confidential letter to Dryepondt, Lescrauwaet stated that Chenot was aware of the difficulties in prohibiting the purchase of pounded rubber at factories and added that he had written to the government to inform it that

...all the measures the state could take to stop the gathering of rubber by beating the vines would be a pure waste of time, considering that the native is accustomed to this procedure and that he will not change too readily, ...and

to attempt to eliminate this deep-rooted custom would be useless.¹¹¹

Needless to say, company officials were in full agreement with Chenot and found comfort in the realization that he, for one, would not block their path to continued profits. But it did not solve the problem, and the triangular exchange of letters between the C.K. in Africa, its directors in Europe and the State continued, as did the practice of accepting pounded rubber. Although the method was illegal, the company encouraged it since it provided greater production in less time, and the company did so despite the State's threats to arrest C.K. agents, as it did from time to time.¹¹²

An additional problem for the C.K., especially in its eastern secteurs, developed over croisettes. In 1902 Pania Mutombo paid his State imposts in croisettes, but none of these were obtained from the C.K. factory. When he was interrogated on the matter, he stated that the croisettes came from near Lusambo, where he had traded chickens and goats to procure them. "We soon discovered that these chickens and goats were slaves. This wretch dreams only of his palm wine and women and will depopulate his village rather than oblige his people to work."¹¹³ Pania saw a much greater economic advantage in operating his own trading system than working for the C.K. and, since the State was satisfied as long as he paid his imposts, the company's grievances against him continued.

By the middle of 1903 the C.K. area was flooded with croisettes. The local population was able to get them anywhere without going to the C.K. factories for them. Pania was trading slaves for cattle and then trading the cattle to the C.S.K. An ox was worth thirty slaves and, when Pania needed croisettes, he used slaves also. The C.K. was informed by the C.S.K. that the State post at Lusambo had 2,850 croisettes for redemption by the C.K. The latter refused them on the basis of their abundance and consequent lack of value.¹¹⁴ The company's proposed solution was to be permitted to place a stamp of identification on each croisette which the African paid as impost and to have the State, in turn, accept only marked croisettes for impost payments. The State rejected this request and by March 1905 the croisette was officially abolished as an exchange article: however, it was to be a number of years before its use was abolished in practice.¹¹⁵

The C.K. predicted that, with the suppression of the croisette, trade would decline especially among the Bakuba, Bakete and Bashilele who stubbornly refused to produce rubber. With the impost in croisettes they had at least worked sufficiently to pay taxes to the State. The State's intention was to replace the croisette with imposts in labour and the production of crops, and to gradually introduce money as a form of exchange. The report of the Comité Permanent for March 1907 stated that all agents had been informed of the abolition of the croisette and that recent news from the Kasai indicated that the agents agreed to obey this request.¹¹⁶

However, that same year, the C.K. director in Africa was investigating the question of the croisette and realized that its use was still widespread and that it would continue to be so for some time.

From June 1906 to February 1907, C.K. agents at Lusambo received 4,789 croisettes from the State. When Dewevre was at Lusambo, on March 20, 1907, 2,000 croisettes arrived from Kanda Kanda. He wrote:

We tried to learn the reason for this; but you know how touchy and suspicious the State authorities are. Briefly, our investigation revealed that they came from the Kanda Kanda region and were transported by Commander Bradfer and were destined for the Saint Trudon Mission in small packages, since the State furnishes a subsidy in that form to the Mission.¹¹⁷

Dewevre's disgust over this revelation arose not from the realization that the State might or might not still be using the croisette as impost but rather because of the frequent recriminations the State made against the C.K. over its continued use of croisettes. As long as the State accepted them, and passed them on to the Mission, it was virtually impossible for the company to avoid using them. The C.K. was, however, using alternatives: round copper bars and copper rods in the form of arcs. These were proving successful in the Idanga and Ifuta area, since each bag weighed the same as a croisette.¹¹⁸ Because the croisette was still a preferred form of currency in the western secteurs of the Kasai region, and since the State was using it, Dewevre decided to inform

the Chefs de Secteur that the C.K. would also use it while at the same time introducing copper bars, for "In that way we are fulfilling our responsibility and our company is beyond suspicion."¹¹⁹

The State and the C.K. clashed over areas of exploitation and the use of the croisette, without becoming embroiled with the African population over these issues, even though both questions were the outcome of a lack of definition of the role of the State and the company. A third, and related, issue which did involve both parties with Africans, arose from the same causes and it was a complicated one. The State needed revenue from all areas, and thus needed to control as much territory as possible. The State held half the shares in, and controlled, the C.K. which needed to expand its profits. The State therefore encouraged the C.K. to exploit Africans as much as possible, even in areas where the State could not fulfill its obligation to protect C.K. agents, while the C.K. placed economic pressure on its agents, through the trust system, to exploit areas not controlled by the State. The State's demands on the C.K. thus encouraged C.K. agents to move into uncontrolled regions as the advance-guard of 'civilization' and, when the C.K. agents behaved in ways which provoked African resistance, the State was drawn in to re-establish an order which it had not previously felt strong enough to impose. This was particularly the case when the actions of the company's agents provoked Africans to kill them, as in the case of Schoup and Père Polet which have already been examined.¹²⁰ The uneasiness of the Europeans

generally at these incidents had the important effect of drawing together such vastly different interest groups as the missionaries and the traders, for both had vivid recollections of the events of 1904 and no importance was attached to the fact that the death of Cornelis did not occur in Bakuba territory but among the Lulua, and even though Cornelis's death was thought to be the result of the population being "brutalized by hemp and the least reason may often cause scuffles in which there are always injuries. Each Lulua has a gun and uses it."¹²¹ When Dryepondt travelled from Luebo to Luluabourg in January to February 1904 he remarked on the heavy use of hemp among the Lulua.¹²²

The C.K. clearly had a formidable task in attempting to assist the State in its administrative duties, and it was bound to be led into conflicts with Africans. This was especially true in regard to the collection of imposts assigned by the State and, in many cases, collected by the company. After the Bakuba revolt, De Cock had travelled through the area involved, handing out imposts both as a punishment and a means of rebuilding destroyed stations. Frequently the chief refused to pay the required impost, as in the vicinity of Galikoko where Chief Kasongo no longer made his monthly appearance at the state post by July 1905. By 1906 his village, together with two others, had been amalgamated to form one 'chefferie' under Chief Zaka. Zaka was a safe choice, since he was an ex-employee of the S.A.P.V., living less than a kilometer away

from Galikoko, and most of his villagers had also been employed by the company. Kasongo became extremely hostile, and by 1908, it was recommended that he be prosecuted for refusing to allow men from his village to serve the company as porters and for inciting the villages to disobey Zaka.¹²³

The Bakuba and Bakete villages to the north of Luebo received heavy impositions for participating in the Bakuba revolt and, after 1905, many of these villages also became delinquent in their payments. Some specific examples illustrate this more clearly. Just to the south of Ibanche, the villages of Chief Kabao and Chief Sangila had both participated in the revolt and, specifically, in the destruction of the European installations at Ibanche. After both were brought into submission to the State by De Cock, they were assigned to furnish materials to reconstruct Ibanche. Neither chief honoured the assignment and, in May 1905, they were taken to Lusambo and returned to their villages in August only on condition that they would each furnish 50 litres of palm oil a month for Lusambo. By 1907, both villages were producing palm oil, however, Kabao refused to present himself to Lardot, the Chef de Poste, until an hour of negotiation had passed. The report states:

The people have a very bad attitude, ...these people are bakete and belong to Lukengo's. [Kot aPe] chefferie...at my arrival no one wanted to get up and call the chief; I found much hemp which my soldiers seized, this made

the people grumble; the village is falling to ruins as most others I saw on the way.¹²⁴

A year later the Lardot again came to the village and reported that there had been some improvement but very little. In spite of "having seized all the hemp on my previous tour, I found new hemp among them now."¹²⁵ Sangila's village, also composed of Bakete and dependent on Kot aPe, the Bakuba Nyimi, did not exhibit the same hostility and was collecting small amounts of rubber by 1907. However, "these people are not very agreeable and it is only with difficulty that one can get anything from them."¹²⁶

A similar account is given of the village Bakwa Tombe which also participated in the pillage of Ibanche. This large village of 320 huts lost many inhabitants at the time De Cock moved through the area, and the chief obstinately refused to provide the imposts he had been given. In fact, in May 1907, when the Chef de Poste came to the village, the chief denied any knowledge of an impost or of the Chef de Poste's demand that he appear at Luebo. The messages to the chief had been relayed by a C.K. capita buyer who was able to produce witnesses to verify his truthfulness. In spite of renewed promises by the chief, by November 1908 no imposts had been brought in and the chief had ignored two further demands to appear at the Luebo post.¹²⁷ Neither the State nor the C.K. could exert any pressure on the disobedient population. The State did

not have sufficient personnel and the C.K. did not possess a military force, consequently there was no uniform method by which the C.K. could force the Kuba to work. The C.K.'s main employees, therefore, were the Baluba, Lulua and Zappo Zap who were in the area or who were invited to enter it.

There were some Bakuba and Bakete villages which did fulfill their impost obligations. Mombo-Munene furnished material to build a new post at Luebo in 1905, while Chief Lipaki fulfilled his impost requirements by supplying the Luebo market.¹²⁸ Very few of the Bakuba or Bakete assisted the A.P.C.M. in reconstructing their Ibanche mission in 1905, even though many Africans had been assigned to the task. By the end of 1905 the C.K. at Mushenge, the Bakuba capital, was still unsuccessful in providing assistance to the Presbyterians. Bossolet, the Chef de Poste at Bena Dibele, informed Van Cautern, the C.K. agent at Ibanche, on December 20 that he had sent some of the Nyimi's emissaries to urge the recalcitrant chiefs to supply labour and materials for Ibanche, and several chiefs were apprehended and brought to Mushenge as an example to the others.¹²⁹ This served some purpose, since three days later Bossolet sent a caravan of men and provisions to Ibanche,¹³⁰ but it took much labour to produce small results, largely because force was lacking.

The original agreement between the Compagnie du Kasai and the State promised protection to the company by State troops. However, by 1904

and 1905, it had become increasingly evident that, with the C.K. moving into areas far from State posts, some additional protection was needed, even though each factory was permitted to hold twenty-five guns. This bare provision made it possible to protect the factory in the event of an attack, but it did not give the necessary security to the company's agents as they roamed through a secteur in search of trade. It had been anticipated that State occupation would proceed at about the same rate as company expansion, but commercial operations extended over a wider area much more quickly. The Bakuba revolt of 1904, the difficulties around Dilolo, the hostility of the Africans around Kabeya, Golongo and in the Kwilu, especially at Atène, were all given as evidence that the protection given by the State was inadequate. Since these were all cited as local incidents, it was considered that a company police force, together with a few more magistrates, would help prevent further revolt. This was especially held to be the true solution in Bakuba territory, where the population was not completely submissive and adopted an insolent attitude towards company personnel.¹³¹

The C.K. had found State protection to be unreliable, for the State troops were obliged to hasten from one region to another as needed. Also because of the limited number of State troops, many emergencies did not attract any State attention. An appropriate example of this came late in 1907, when Père Polet was killed in Bakuba territory. There was no

possibility of immediate State assistance, since De Grunne was in the southern part of the district. The company deplored the fact that:

In several of our posts the natives steal, seize or kill our capita buyers, our workers are deserting, and at Atène they charge us a tithe for the water and bamboo we need in our constructions.¹³²

The arguments were convincing, especially when examples like Ibanche were given, for it was conjectured that, had a police force existed at the time of the revolt, the post would not have been destroyed. Accordingly, in September 1906 an agreement was reached whereby the State would create a police force commanded by State appointed officers, who would decide what action should be taken to maintain order, protect commerce and induce respect for State laws. Additionally, it was hoped that, with this force, the company would be able to move into the south and along the Kasai River.¹³³ The details took some time to finalize, and it was not until May 1907 that the first troops reached Dima.¹³⁴ Each police post was to be located away from the factories to show its independence of the C.K. and was to have its own exchange stores for its provisions. The police force was not to be mixed into the company's trading operations, and was to be under the command of the Governor-General, who would, in turn, designate it as part of the Force Publique for the Kasai District under the Commissaire du District's orders. For its services, the C.K. would pay an annual amount of 120,500 francs to the State.¹³⁵ No posts were located

in the Kasai area¹³⁶ under study here until April 1908, when one was erected on the upper Kasai near Mai-Munene to regulate commercial operations on the sensitive Angolan border.¹³⁷ The State required the police force to be on a navigable river route, and this limited its usefulness to C.K. factories located inland,¹³⁸ while the company had the same problem with the police corps as the State did with its troops: there were too few police for such a large area of operation.

The formation of the C.K. in December 1901 was intended to make exploitation of the Kasai area more profitable for Leopold. Although its primary role was commercial, the State's half ownership of the company, together with the State's majority management control of the company, made the C.K. a tool of the State to the extent that it became an administrative arm of the State. This identification with the State was both advantageous and disadvantageous in that the C.K. could count on State support, protection and assistance when it ventured into new areas. However, identification with the State meant that Africans confused the C.K. with the State, especially as retired State officials frequently joined the C.K. It was from this that the disadvantages stemmed, since the C.K. attracted African hostility as a result of the State's military operations. It also provided the occasion for frequent disagreements between the closely related groups; however, they were probably more the result of personality clashes than differences in policy.

The Kasai's richest resource was in its rubber reserves. The world demand for rubber made it a profitable trading commodity.¹³⁹

The high yields which were obtained were not without a price which, for the most part, was paid by the African population under the company's exploitive regime. The company's greedy appetite for profit resulted in forced labour, mistreatment and any ruthless tactics which would serve the company's interests.

Both the company's and State's methods were exposed by Leopold's Commission of Enquiry in 1904-1905, but it was only when the American Presbyterian Congo Mission took an active role in the Congo Reform Association that changes were made. The campaign will be discussed in a later chapter, for what is now necessary is to examine how the missions behaved.

TABLE 1

Monthly Wages of the Black Personnel at Tshitadi in 1906

Description of Personnel	No.	Monthly Wage In Cloth	Total	Duties
<u>Capitas</u>	2	8 lengths	16 lengths	Supervise the work and caravans
Carpenter	1	8 "	8 "	Woodwork
Head Carpenter	1	16 "	16 "	Woodwork
Wood cutters	2	2 "	8 "	Saw planks
Basket-makers	4	4 "	16 "	Making baskets
Sentries	2	4 "	8 "	Night watchman
Workers	14	4 "	56 "	Diverse tasks - clearing land, plantations, building,
Workers	87	3 "	261 "	Messengers
Cook	1	8 "	8 "	(Domestic
Cook's aid	1	4 "	4 "	(services
Boys	2	4 "	8 "	(
Buyers (Acheteur)	19	4 "	76 "	(Rubber
Buyers' assistants	5	3 "	15 "	(buyers
500 lengths or 650 francs				

Source: C.K. Archives, Brussels, Tshitadi, February 22, 1906,
Report by the Chef de Secteur, Quqstiaux.

TABLE 2

Rubber Production for the Congo and the Kasai and a Comparison of the Average Cost of Production and the Average Selling Price, 1901-1908

Year	Congo ^a (metric tons)	Compagnie du Kasai Concession (metric tons) ^c	Kasai Area (metric tons) ^c	Cost of Production per kg. ^b	Sales price per kg. ^b	C.K. profit per kg.
1901	6,000	1,270				
1902	5,350	500		5.46 F	8.06 F	2.60 F
1903	5,918	954	721	5.10	9.45	4.35
1904	4,831	1,156	716	4.40	9.68	5.28
1905	4,861	1,415	674	4.06	9.90	5.84
1906	4,849	1,473	824	4.31	10.30	5.99
1907	4,657	1,427		4.69	6.35	1.66
1908	4,560	1,410		4.62	8.15	3.53

^aWaltz, Das Konzessionswesen, p. 8.

^bC.K. Archives, Brussels, Comparisons in Cost and Sale Prices, 1902-1908. The 1901 sum is the total produced by the fourteen companies in the Kasai District.

^cC.K. Archives, Brussels, undated note on the C.K. rubber production, probably 1907. The amounts for 1901, 1902, 1907 and 1908 are not available; however, the Rapport du Comité au Conseil Général, March 6, 1909 states that production for 1907 and 1908 was similar to production in 1906. The table generally confirms that statement. The low yields in 1902 were the result of a six-month operational period. The profit margin dropped sharply in 1907 as a result of the slump in the American automobile industry and the arrival of Asian rubber on the world market. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Rapport du Comité Permanent au Conseil Général, March 28, 1908.

XII. C.K. SECTEUR DIVISIONS, 1907-1912

FOOTNOTES.

1. See Chapter IV, above.
2. See Map III. The territory east of the Kasai River falls into this area of study. Refer to Maps XI and XII for all geographic references in this chapter.
3. Waltz, Das Konzessionswesen, Vol. 1, pp. 92-93. Waltz gives a revised figure for the C.K. land grant as being 47 million hectares according to the 1912 estimates on the size of the colony.
4. Please refer to the Appendix on p. 449 for a breakdown of the companies' receipts.
5. In this regard the C.K. Rapport du Comité Permanent au Conseil d'Administration of July 16, 1903 notes that at the end of 1902 the State gave the C.K. 100 tons of rubber which it had collected at the State posts in the Kasai.
6. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Butala, September 29, 1902, Inspector Meunier to the Governor-General.
7. Although the Société Anonyme des Produits Végétaux du Haut Kasai (S.A.P.V.) was one of the fourteen companies which formed the C.K., it was granted the right to maintain its plantation operations at Bena Makima and Galikoko. Waltz, Das Konzessionswesen, Vol. 1, p. 59.
8. "Le Président Wégimont" was never used and sank at anchor in October 1902.
9. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Rapport du Comité Permanent au Conseil d'Administration, July 16, 1903.
10. Waltz, Das Konzessionswesen, Vol. 1, pp. 242-243. Most of the members of the first Administrative Council were former company directors and other appointees who were engaged in some aspect of the Congo

enterprise whether financially, militarily or through exploration. See the Appendix for the list of members of the first Administrative Council.

11. The C.K.'s first director in Africa was Dr. Gustave Dyepondt, a medical doctor and author of several works on tropical medicine. In 1890 he had participated in State expeditions to the Bele. Biographie Coloniale Belge (Brussels, 1948-1958), Tome III, pp. 265-267. Please refer to Maps XI and XII for the geographic organization of the C.K. in the Congo.

12. Leo Frobenius, Kolonialwirtschaftliches aus dem Kongo-Kasai-Gebiet, Sonderabzug aus den Mitteilungen der Geographischen Gesellschaft in Hamburg (Hamburg, L. Friedrichsen and Co., 1907), Band XXI, p. 11; The Congo Question. The Kasai Company to its Shareholders. A Reply to Detractors (Brussels, November, 1906), pp. 39-40. Just how faithfully these monthly reports were submitted is questionable. The C.K. Archives in Brussels contained reports by the Chefs de Secteurs particularly when a new factory was established or the local population's reaction to the C.K. caused a factory to be closed. The company's main interest was in realizing a profit and these statistics were issued in a monthly report by the Comité Permanent, but the reports did not always include all the secteurs.

13. The C.K. literature also refers to the buyers as sentinelles (sentries, borrowed from the English and also used in the Congo Basin area); linguists (the Portuguese term, as is capita); and acheteurs (buyers): the terms most commonly used are acheteur and capita. Letter from Jan Vansina, January 4, 1977. In some cases a distinction was made between the capita, whose task consisted of supervising the work at the factory, and the capita who bought the rubber. At the Tshitadi factory the former received a higher wage. Table 2 on page 285 gives an example of the personnel at the Tshitadi factory. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Tshitadi, February 27, 1906, Procès Verbal d'Inspection du Poste de Tshitadi by Questiaux.

14. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Report on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Compagnie du Kasai, February 1952. The name, Dima, was probably given by the Baluba workers who were taken there to assist in its construction.

15. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Rapport du Comité Permanent au Conseil Général, July 16, 1903.

16. This involvement between the C.K. and the State was described in Chapters V and VI.

17. Frobenius, Kolonialwirtschaftliches aus dem Kongo-Kassai-Gebiet, p. 13.

18. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Basongo, January 27, 1905, Bossolo to the President of the Commission of Enquiry at Leopoldville. These were often men of "questionable character" wishing to leave Belgium for a time.

19. Frobenius, Kolonialwirtschaftliches aus dem Kongo-Kassai-Gebiet, p. 14.

20. Frobenius, Im Schatten, p. 283.

21. In 1905-1906 the C.K. factory at Luebo was under the management of Klinkert who, very early in his trading career, developed a reputation for mismanagement of company accounts. Even though the company director was aware of Klinkert's cheating, no action was taken against him. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, February 19, 1904. Dryepont's report to the General Director.

22. Frobenius, Im Schatten, pp. 286-288.

23. Africans bought croisettes in order to pay State imposts. See Chapter VI above.

24. Frobenius, Kolonialwirtschaftliches aus dem Kongo-Kassai-Gebiet, p. 19.

25. Ibid.

26. A.-J. Wauters, L'Etat Indépendant du Congo (Brussels: Librairie Falk fils, 1899), pp. 410-411.

27. Landbeck, Malu Malu, p. 66.

28. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, December 24, 1903, Droogman to the C.K. in Brussels.

29. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, July 28, 1905, Droogman to the C.K. in Brussels.

30. See pp. 279-282 below.

31. Frobenius, Im Schatten, pp. 286-287. By 1908 the trust system was still widely used although the State opposed it because of the abuses it brought with it. In 1908 the C.K. director in Africa, Chaltin, sent out Circular no. 99, dated January 4, 1908, in which he reminded agents that the system was illegal. The reaction of the agents was that if the system stopped production would be lowered, especially in the Bakuba area where the trust system provided an incentive to produce rubber. Chaltin's reply was that in cases where C.K. trade was placed in jeopardy if the Circular was applied, the trust system should be maintained. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, May 20, 1909, Chaltin to Olivier. In his closing comments, Chaltin added "La lettre tue, l'esprit vivifie." This lack of sincerity indicates the window-dressing nature of some of the directives sent out by the C.K. and, also, explains why the trust system was still widely used as late as 1913 and in many cases up to 1919. It should, however, be noted that the trust system equally victimized the European agent and his capitas, since the C.K. treated its agent financially just as the agent treated his capita.

32. Ibid., pp. 288-9.

33. A.E. (A.A.) 527, January 27, 1905, District du Luaiaba-Kasai. Actes de mauvais traitements envers des noirs commis dans le district pendant les années: 1902-1903-1904.

34. Frobenius, Im Schatten, pp. 455-6.

35. Frobenius, Kolonialwirtschaftliches aus dem Kongo-Kassai-Gebiet, pp. 25-6. This is in the Kikongo language.

36. A C.K. map showing the distribution of factories and posts shows that the area around Mushenge was not controlled until 1907. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Carte des Territoires exploités par La Compagnie du Kasai.

37. Vansina, "Du royaume Kuba," p. 32; Frobenius, Im Schatten, pp. 196-197.

38. Landbeck, Malu Malu, pp. 59-64. Ingo's strength undoubtedly came from his trade with the Portuguese. Landbeck noticed numerous Portuguese words in their spoken language.

39. Ibid.

40. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, March 28, 1904, Droogman to the C.K. in Brussels.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Frobenius, Im Schatten, p. 199. The Scheutist Mission does, however, list it as a station as shall be noted later.

44. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, March 29, 1904, Director General of the C.K. to the Secretary of State.

45. Frobenius, Im Schatten, p. 119; C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, February 19, 1904, Dryepondt's report to the General Director states that Père Van Kerckoven, Père Delanghe and Père Lambrechts were all at Bena Makima early in 1904. Père Pollet was awaited to replace Père Lambrechts.

46. Frobenius, Im Schatten, pp. 201-202.

47. There is some uncertainty as to just what year the C.K. established themselves at Kanda Kanda. In Verdick's report he indicates stopping at Kanda Kanda in April 1903 where Questiaux joined his expedition. Presumably the C.K. was already in operation there at that time. The C.K. report on the dates at which factories were established places the establishment of Kanda Kanda in 1904. When Frobenius visited it in January 1905 he commented on the well-developed C.K. factory including its large plantations. Since this would take some time to construct the 1903 date seems most acceptable.

48. Frobenius, Im Schatten, p. 408. The first agent at Kanda Kanda was Bombeeck. Kanda Kanda became the capital for Secteur VII with Questiaux as Chef de Secteur.

49. Even the Bakuba secteur reports for April 1905 indicate that no ivory was collected at either Luebo or Kapulumba and only 156 kilos at Bena Makima. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Luebo, May 11, 1905. Report by Cassart, Chef de Secteur X-XII; Likewise the factory at Tshitadi rarely reported receiving ivory. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Tshitadi, February 27, 1906, Procès-Verbal d'Inspection.

50. See Chapter V above, especially pp. 178-180.

51. See pp. 166-167 above.

52. Tshiniama destroyed Frausta's factory in 1904 (see pp. 167-168 above).

53. See pp. 180-181 above.

54. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bakete, November 1, 1907, Procès-Verbal d'Inspection.

55. See p. 181 above.

56. Pruitt, "An Independent People," p. 375.

57. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Tambwe, May 20, 1908. Report by M. Grosemann, Chef de Secteur VII. Tambwe was established in 1907 with Bishof as the agent.

58. Pruitt, "An Independent People," p. 376.

59. Ibid., pp. 379-381.

60. Ibid., pp. 384-386. Details of the incident are provided on pages 183-184 above.

61. C.K. Archives, Brussels, List of factories and dates of establishment. Probably 1910.

62. It was anticipated that the trade route for the C.K. would follow the Lulua River passing La Luiza, Muene Kapanga, Katola, then down to Dilolo across to Tshilemo and then north to Kimpuki Kafutshi and

Kanda Kanda. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Occupation de la Lunda. An undated report, probably drawn up in 1906. The report goes on to mention that once the Benguela Railway was completed, the exploitation of the northern part of Angola, and possibly the southern part of Congo, would be facilitated by the existence of a means of rapid transportation to the coast. Ledrou was assisted at Katola by Simul. The factory at Muene Kapanga, with Hanssens as the agent, was an extension of the Mukoko factory. The C.K.'s prosperity in the rubber trade was shortlived. By 1910 Asian plantation rubber had appeared on the world market and the prices for native rubber dropped. Another product available in the Dilolo vicinity was wax. Ledrou estimated that it would be possible to buy at least one hundred kilograms of wax in good seasons, but commented "I don't know if it's worth the bother." C.K. Archives, Brussels, Katola, November 5, 1905, Rapport sur la region Katola - Dilolo by Questiaux; J. Miller writes that wax and ivory were among the most important export products from Cokwe territory between 1830-50, in his article "Cokwe Trade and Conquest," pp. 178-179. When world rubber prices dropped, wax again became an important export commodity after 1918. The decline in rubber prices caused the C.K. to close more than half its factories below the 8th parallel. Furthermore this area became a part of the Katanga in 1912. E. Bustin, Lunda Under Belgian Rule, pp. 53, 105-106.

63. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Tshitadi, February 27, 1906, ~~Proces~~-Verbal d'Inspection du poste de Tshitadi.

64. There is also a question concerning the C.K.'s trade in guns. Although this was strictly prohibited, Questiaux's list of trade items at Tshitadi in 1906 includes 11 guns and 161 kilograms of gunpowder. Ibid.

65. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, February 19, 1904, Director in Africa, Dryepondt to the General Director in Brussels. The first agent at Djoko Punda was Vandeweghe, who was transferred to Bachi-Shombe in 1904, when he was succeeded by Gillis. The reason for the transfer is not clear, except that Bachi-Shombe needed an experienced agent who would relate well to the local population, whereas Djoko Punda did not require these same qualities in a supply agent.

66. Frobenius, Im Schatten, p. 266. The agent at Golongo was Adrianson.

67. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Kabeya, October 3, 1904, Rapport de mon voyage du 5 au 28 octobre by Labryn.

68. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Djoko Punda, July 7, 1904, Report for June 1904 by Bertrand. Chef de Secteur. A marginal note signed by Dryepondt states that the gunpowder was at Bena Makima and was delayed because the steamer could not go up the Kasai until November, he adds that Bertrand could have sent for it by land route. "More initiative, please."

69. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, February 19, 1904, Dryepondt to the General Director. The agent at Kabeya was Labryn, assisted by Fransman and Bouhun. By 1910 both Golongo and Kabeya were closed and a new factory established at Fukumba, directly north of Kabeya.

70. See Chapter V above.

71. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Golongo, February 22, 1904, Bertrand to the Director at Dima.

72. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Golongo, May 1, 1904, Rapport d'un voyage dans le Secteur VIII (région de Kabeya). Reconnaissance du Chef du Secteur VIII, accompagné de Mr. Labryn, Gérant de Kabeya. Bertrand describes the costume as being typical of other chiefs in the vicinity. These were probably trade articles received from Portuguese Angola.

73. Ibid.

74. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Kabeya, October 3, 1904, Rapport de mon voyage du 5 au 28 octobre by Labryn. The area around Mai-Munene was overrun by Cokwe during the Cokwe emigration movement between 1878-1883, while the Lunda chieftianship over Mai-Munene was destroyed between 1885-1887. Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna, p. 224. It was through Moukkau Djambi that the C.K. hoped to meet Kalamba-Muana.

75. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Mai-Muene, July 27, 1906, C.K. Inspector, Lescrauwaet, to the Chef de Secteur.

76. See Chapter V above.

77. With Kalamba's submission to the State, Kabeya also submitted.
78. C.K. Archives, Brussels, May 1904. Report by Bertrand, Chef de Secteur VIII. Incidentally, this was the first capita to be murdered since the factory at Kabeya was established in October 1903.
79. Ibid.
80. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, January 17, 1905. Dryepondt to the General Director in Brussels.
81. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Golongo, October 10, 1904, Report for September 1904 by Bertrand, Chef de Secteur VIII. The resentment against paying the tax caused the population to refrain from collecting rubber.
82. Luebo Territorial Archives, Renseignements Politiques. A goat was worth 1.75 francs and a croisette was worth 1.25 francs to the State.
83. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Undated report on the collection of rubber by the C.K. Probably 1907.
84. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Rapport du Comité Permanent au Conseil Général du 20 Juillet, 1907.
85. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, May 28, 1910 Lacourt to the Minister of Colonies.
86. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Golongo, March 24, 1905, Bertrand to the C.K. Director at Dima.
87. At one point the company direction contended that the capita buyers were protected by law more completely than the agents themselves. Legally an agent was practically helpless when his capita buyers stole trade goods or deserted with them. If he did lodge a complaint, the deputy public prosecutor frequently found an error with the capita's identification papers which was due to the carelessness of the company agents and the case was dropped. In other cases, the hearing would be scheduled at such a distant date that the capita was no longer to be found and the case was dismissed. On the other hand, any misdemeanour on the part

of the capita could result in his dismissal. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Undated report on Question des Acheteurs.

88. Fritz Van der Linden, Le Congo, les Noirs et Nous (Paris: Librairie Maritime et Coloniale, 1910), p. 225, See Map XI.

89. In 1908 when investigations into the activities of the C.K. led to numerous prosecutions, Landbeck was accused of arbitrary beating and arresting individuals and outrages on decency. He returned to Europe on March 7, 1908. A.E. (A.A.) 212, List of C.K. agents under prosecution. Landbeck was an annoyance to both the company and the Scheutist mission at the time of Frobenius' visit to the Kasai. The missionaries, in particular, were certain that Landbeck had provided some of the material for Frobenius' charges against Père Cambier.

90. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, February 19, 1904, Dreyepont's report to the General Director.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. Refer to Map XI.

96. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, February 2, 1903, Droogman to C.K. Director in Brussels.

97. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bena Dibebe, March 21, 1903, Bossolet to the Commissaire du District. The amount of rubber Heynessens collected from September 1902 was about 3450 kilos which Bossolet thought was too low an estimate.

98. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Butala, August 19, 1903, De Clercq to the Commissaire de District.

99. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Lusambo, September 28, 1903, Verdick to the Governor-General at Boma.

100. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, November 4, 1903, Broogman to C.K. Director in Brussels.

101. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, November 16, 1904, General Director to Director at Dima. This did not end the raid on the Domaine Privé by the C.K. In 1905 a similar incident occurred around the Ifuta region.

102. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, November 1903, Note from the C.K. General Director in Brussels to Director at Dima.

103. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Undated report on the C.K. Rubber Collection. Probably 1907.

104. Ibid.

105. C.K. Archives, Brussels, November 4, 1902 Extrait d'un rapport sur l'inspection des Secteurs du Lubi, du Sankuru Supérieur et du Lubéfu by Dryepondt.

106. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, November 2, 1904, Liebrecht to C.K. General Director in Brussels.

107. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, August 3, 1904, Dryepondt to the General Director in Brussels.

108. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, August 22, 1904, Dryepondt to the Governor-General.

109. Ibid.

110. Ibid.

111. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ikoka, October 14, 1904, Lescrauwaet to C.K. Director at Dima.

112. C.K. Archives, Brussels, A bord du S/S "Antoinette," June 23, 1909. The State's arrest record lists the names of 47 C.K. agents arrested, but only one was charged with illegal trading practices. A.E. (A.A.) 212, C.K. Agents under Arrest.

113. C.K. Archives, Brussels; November 4, 1902, Extrait d'un rapport sur l'inspection des Secteurs du Lubi, Sankuru Supérieur et du Lubéfu by Dryepondt.

114. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Butala, July 20, 1903, De Clerq to the Commissaire du District of Lualaba-Kasai.

115. Ibid. Dr. Vansina has indicated that this request was rejected by the State because it would have interfered with the State's right to strike currency.

116. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Rapport du Comité Permanent au Conseil Général, March 23, 1907.

117. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ikoka, March 20, 1907, Dewevre to the General Director in Brussels.

118. Ibid.

119. Ibid.

120. See above page 161. The case of Père Polet in 1907, and the later murder of Cornelis, merits further brief comment. In the case of Polet the fear was expressed that the incident might occasion another revolt among the Bakuba. European traders wondered whether it would

...be a re-edition of the famous Toong aToong of 1904.

Apparently on the day of the murder the natives were busy making a bwanga. However, I doubt it; in that case the Bakete would have massacred all our men down to the last one; whereas the villages through which they passed gave no indication of hostility, in spite of knowing of the events from [Kot aPe] Lukengo's porters who fled at the beginning.

C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bolombo, April 19, 1907, Kesteleyen to the Director at Dima. Polet's murder was followed a few months later, in July 1907, by that of Cornelis. The C.K. agent was killed at Kapuki (Kapudi) about 4 1/2 hours from Zappo Lulua. These incidents caused

alarm among the Presbyterian missionaries at Luebo. Morrison wrote to Olivier, Chef de Secteur X, expressing his view that:

...such crimes ought to be punished most severely.
From what I have heard the natives have never been sufficiently impressed with the enormity of the crime in the killing of Reverend Polet. The trial and the execution ought to take place at the place of the crime. Otherwise the natives will not be much impressed.

I sincerely hope that you will be able to bring the body of Mr. Cornelis to Luebo.

C.K. Archives, Brussels, Luebo, July 11, 1907, Morrison to Olivier.

121. Luebo Territorial Archives, Renseignements Politiques. In 1908 the C.K. agent at Zappo Lulua was Lamis. The A.P.C.M. missionaries brought charges against him for detaining the son of a chief. These events will be considered later in discussing the controversy between the various concerns in the Kasai.

122. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, February 19, 1904, Dryepondt's report to the General Director.

123. Luebo Territorial Archives, Renseignements Politiques, 1904-1908.

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid.

128. Ibid.

129. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Mushenge, December 20, 1905, Bassolet to Van Cauteren.

130. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Mushenge, December 23, 1905, Bassolet to Van Cauteren.

131. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Undated report requesting a police corps. Probably 1905.

132. Ibid.

133. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, September 12, 1906, General Director of the C.K. to the Secretary of State.

134. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, April 16, 1907, Liebrecht to the C.K. General Director in Brussels. The C.K. was requested to construct the necessary buildings at all sites at which the police were to be located, as well as to start plantations nearby to ensure a food supply for the new post.

135. The Bulletin Officiel, no. 6, June 1906, pp. 260-261, states that police operations were prohibited except in emergencies. In such a case the Force Publique was to be employed exclusively in preventive measures with guns to be used for self-defense. The main function of police operations was to maintain the peace by arresting offenders. The C.K.'s request to locate police personnel at various sites was contrary to the decree. State approval of the request illustrates the difference between the theory and the practice of administration.

136. The first three posts to be constructed were M'Pana on the Kwilu River, Mabanda, on the upper Lutshima River, and Tshitombe on the upper Loange River. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Rapport du Comité Permanent au Conseil Général, July 20, 1907.

137. Until 1909 a total of five police posts were established with four located in the Kwango District. In May 1909 the Belgian Government decided to increase the police force, especially in the Kwango, at its own expense. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, May 7, 1909, C.K. Director in Africa to the General Director in Brussels.

138. There is not too much information available on the effectiveness of the police. An example of its operation in the Kwilu area will give an indication of some of the difficulties associated with it. In the territory around Kandale, on the Kwilu-Djuma River, the population had become hostile towards C.K. agents by 1909. Two of these agents, Dor and Ledrou, had been attacked when attempting to negotiate with the people and had been forced to retreat. The C.K. director's observations were: "It should have been easy to end this situation which was injurious to both our trade and our prestige. However, the police post at Tshitombe, consisting of two Europeans and fifty soldiers, is of no value in the area in which it is located. The post should be relocated further to the west to calm the troubled area of which I told you [Kandale]." C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, July 2, 1909, Chaltin to the Governor-General.

139. Table 2 on page 284 provides a comparison between the amount of rubber produced in the Congo as a whole and the amount produced in the C.K. concessionary area including the area west of the Loange River; or what the company designated as Secteurs I, II, XII, XIV and IV from 1901 to 1907. The cost price included the amount paid to Africans for each kg. of rubber and the total expenses such as transport and handling charges.

CHAPTER VIII

CHRISTIAN MISSIONS 1902-1908

Missionaries, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, who were the third force for civilization alongside the State and the C.K., had entered the Kasai area in 1891 and by 1902 had established a series of mission stations. The Protestant societies consisted of the American Presbyterian Congo Mission, which had stations at Luebo (1891) and Ibanche (1897), and the Westcott Inland Mission with a mission station at Inkongu (1897) near Lusambo. The Roman Catholic Scheutist Fathers had established mission stations at Mikalayi near Luluabourg (1891), Thielen near Kanda Kanda (1898), Mérode near Chief Kalala Kafumba (1894), Hemptinne near Chief Fwamba (1897) and St. Trudon near Lusambo (1895). The purpose of this chapter is to consider the work of the individual mission societies by examining their objectives and to identify the obstacles encountered by each in achieving them.

In essence the objectives of all the missions were the same: to establish an indigenous community of Christians. For the Protestants this meant an indigenous African church, while for the Catholics it meant membership in the universal Church. The methods of achieving these ends varied, and were influenced by the availability of mission workers, the

receptivity of the African population and the ability of a mission to acquire land for expansion. These issues were destined to lead to conflicts between the Protestants, particularly the A.P.C.M., and the Scheutists but, before considering this rivalry, it is necessary to discuss the work of each society separately.

Even though the African church membership of the American Presbyterian Congo Mission in the Luebo area was 550 by 1901,² the mission was faced with many discouraging factors in the years 1901 to 1908. One of the major problems was the shortage of missionaries for; between 1901 and 1912, eighteen new missionaries came to the field while eleven were lost, three by death and eight by retirement. The hardships of missionary life in the Kasai made it difficult for the Executive Committee of the A.P.C.M. to find recruits willing to go into a field where the chances of survival were slim, and those who did volunteer for service were chiefly black Americans who had been impressed by Sheppard, himself black, when he had been home on furlough.³

One of the most interesting of the new missionaries was Miss Maria Fearing. Born a slave in Alabama in 1838, she did not have an opportunity to gain a formal education until she was thirty-three years old. When Sheppard returned from Africa in 1893-4, he spoke at Talladega College in Alabama where Maria Fearing was an assistant matron. When she offered to serve as a missionary in Africa, the Mission Board refused to subsidize

her since she was "a tiny little Negro woman, fifty-six years old, weighing scarcely one hundred pounds."⁴ The Board's refusal did not weaken her resolve. She sold her property and provided her own support for the first two years of work, after which the Board recognized her effectiveness by assuming her further support. Her main work consisted of establishing and supervising a home for girls at Luebo, most of whom were former slaves. Wharton wrote: "Many a Christian woman in the Congo counts 'Mamu Felung' her mother in Christ."⁵

The lot of the missionaries was made somewhat lighter by the mission steamer, the S.S. Lapsley, named in honour of one of the first A.P.C.M. missionaries in the Kasai. Five railroad cars of boat parts had to be sent to Leopoldville where Lachlan Vass, a missionary, began assembling them to make it functional. The task was completed and in April 1901 the steamer made its maiden voyage up the Kasai and Lulua Rivers to dock at Luebo. For eighteen months the Lapsley served a dual purpose: to transport necessary supplies and to provide a medium to carry the gospel to the riparian population. However, the vessel was not constructed for Congo waters and sank near the mouth of the Kasai in November 1903 with the loss of twenty-three Africans and the Reverend H.C. Slaymaker. A new steamer was built and arrived at Luebo on December 24, 1906, and the S.S. Lapsley II gave the mission more than twenty-five years of service.⁶

The work of the A.P.C.M. centred on two main locations, Luebo and Ibanche. Luebo served as the mission's headquarters and grew rapidly, with metal-roofed brick buildings replacing the early mud and thatch sheds. In 1906 the first missionary doctor arrived, although a small dispensary had been in operation before this time under the supervision of De Witt Snyder, a pharmacist from Brooklyn. The new doctor, Llewellyn Coppedge from North Carolina, was faced with the task of practising medicine in a thatch-roofed dispensary with very little equipment and no trained nurse to assist him for the first seven years he was at Luebo.⁷ Through medical work, the mission's outreach was extended into another dimension which added to the population of Luebo.

The mission's desire to evangelize the Bakuba led to the establishment of Ibanche in 1897, thirty-five miles from the capital, hoping that from this location they would eventually be invited to settle among the Bakuba. However, the invitation never came and the Presbyterians were obliged to content themselves with a location at Ibanche from where they were able to contact Bakuba people living on the fringes of the kingdom. Despite long years of effort and concern the missionaries met with only minimal results. The Bakuba were satisfied with their own political, social and religious structure and felt no need for conversion. Besides this, the missionary who established the station had brought with him many Baluba and Lulua peoples whom the Bakuba considered inferior. At Ibanche the

missionaries were obliged to conduct the school and church services in two different sessions, one in the language of the Baluba and the Lulua and the other for the Bakuba, since the latter refused to attend services in which the former participated.⁸ Ibanche quickly became a mission station with a large church, a market place, schools and missionary dwellings. When the black American missionary, Althea Brown, arrived in the Kasai in 1902, she was stationed at Ibanche where she began the Maria Carey Home for Girls. By the end of 1904, at the time of the Bakuba revolt which has already been discussed, Ibanche was a busy centre for various missionary endeavors.

Believing the temporary friendliness of Kot aPe to be an indication that the Bakuba capital could eventually be attained, the A.P.C.M. quickly set about rebuilding Ibanche after the Kuba rebellion. When Frobenius visited the station in August 1905 he expressed his astonishment at the comfortable living conditions of the American missionaries and their rapid reconstruction of the mission. The staff at this time consisted of Alonzo and Althea Brown Edmiston, Joseph E. Phipps and J. McClung Sieg.⁹ In spite of all the good intentions and efforts of the evangelists, they did not succeed in approaching the Bakuba capital from Ibanche.¹⁰

In spite of the many trying conditions under which these early missionaries laboured, they never lost sight of their primary objective of establishing an autonomous African church. With the limited missionary

staff available at any one time, the mission depended heavily on African evangelists to carry the Gospel message into the surrounding villages. These evangelists, called catechists, were new converts who had received oral religious instruction and memorized certain portions of the Bible and Bible stories which, together with songs they had learned, were passed on to the villages they visited. Each of the two mission stations, Luebo and Ibanche, assumed responsibility for evangelizing a specified area. The catechist was frequently able to go into regions which were inaccessible to the missionaries, which had the advantages of opening new areas for the itinerant missionaries and also drawing interested Africans to the mission stations.

The catechists were carefully chosen for their qualities, such as sound judgment, intelligence and a conviction that their calling was to assist the mission evangelists. Since they were required to renounce their customary beliefs, the evangelists frequently suffered ridicule and scorn from fellow Africans. The missionaries were careful to screen potential catechists by observing them at work in villages near the mission station. With more experience they were allowed to conduct catechumen classes and then small classes in the village day school for which they were given a weekly allotment of three francs (then 60 cents) after 1907.¹¹ Once they had proved their effectiveness and faithfulness they were assigned to village work for a period of one or two years, after which those who were most promising were selected for additional training at Luebo.

The A.P.C.M. placed a strong emphasis on education as necessary for conversion since the latter depended on a knowledge of the Scripture. By 1896 Snyder had completed a dictionary and grammar in Tshiluba and also a sixteen page First Reader which the Baptist Mission at Lukolela printed for the Presbyterians. By 1906, Morrison had perfected Snyder's work and produced an excellent Tshiluba grammar and dictionary.¹² This, together with translations of Scripture portions and hymns, was published by the mission's J. Leighton Wilson Press at Luebo¹³ which went into operation in 1903. In spite of reports from the early missionaries that they were teaching reading and writing, most of the educational programme before 1900 was in the form of oral religious instruction with large catechism classes. It was not until 1901 that the mission reported that older boys and girls could read in their native language even though most of the evangelists were still illiterate.¹⁴ In 1906 an A.P.C.M. missionary described the school curriculum as follows:

After the alphabet is thoroughly learned, the first reader is taken up.... Several other small books of ascending grades are used, leading up to a paraphrase translation of Romans and First Corinthians. This is the highest reader. Meanwhile, instruction in writing is given. And some of the pupils learn to write very rapidly indeed.... To the more advanced simple instruction in arithmetic and geography are given.¹⁵

When Frobenius visited Ibanche and Luebo in 1904 he observed the operation of the Presbyterians' school system, and described it as a means by which

"hundreds of students were learning to read and write in their native language."¹⁶ The Lulua students had indeed become sufficiently competent to write letters to each other.

The primary goal in all education was to win converts who would become useful workers in a self-governing, self-supporting and self-propagating church. By 1902, the A.P.C.M. had two schools for girls, the Maria Carey Home at Ibanche and the Pantops Home at Luebo. The training of girls was considered essential so that African church leaders could contract Christian marriages. Most of the girls were the daughters of evangelists or girls who had been ransomed from slavery.¹⁷ They were given instruction in domestic skills such as sanitation training, sewing and proper conduct as prospective Christian wives. Even then, Mrs. Sheppard admitted that the real aim was not so much to teach sewing as to gather them together for prayer and song.¹⁸

The A.P.C.M. also gave industrial training to the boys. The Ibanche Industrial School, begun in 1906, had several functions. It served to teach boys some skills in improving village living conditions by constructing homes with windows, doors and comfortable furniture. Along with building skills, the students were taught how to grow crops more systematically in order to realize a greater harvest. All of this teaching had as its main goal the provision of religious instruction, along with vocational training, so that some among them would become evangelists and become self-supporting

through the use of their skill. The industrial school was operated by Alonzo Edmiston who believed "true Christianity transformed the whole man, within and without"¹⁹ and, because he believed this, he "taught the gospel of the hoe."

By 1908 the A.P.C.M. was still operating from just two stations: Luebo and Ibanche. Its outreach, however, extended to the surrounding villages where a team of evangelistic teachers, who could read and write, imparted the Gospel message to villagers. Itinerating missionaries continued the teaching process especially in preparation for baptism. On one such tour in 1906, Motte Martin baptized over 800 people, 175 at one service. Baptism led to church membership and, by 1911, the A.P.C.M. had over 7,000 baptized members.²⁰

The only other Protestant mission in the Kasai before 1911 was the Westcott Inland Mission (W.I.M.), which had its principal location on the Sankuru River at Inkongo, downstream from Lusambo. In 1896 two brothers, Lemuel Upton and William Henry Westcott attended a meeting in Bradford, England, where Charles A. Swan gave an account of his adventures in the Luluabourg and Lusambo areas. Swan had accompanied Frederick Arnot to the Katanga and went into the Kasai, with an escort of Paul Le Marinel's soldiers, to visit the Bashilange people about whom he had heard so much.²¹ Swan's account inspired the Westcott brothers, who were looking for a mission field, and in 1897 they set out for the Congo.

Although the Westcott brothers were Plymouth Brethren, they came to the Congo without the backing of any organized society. A small group of friends assisted in providing their passage money and some equipment. What they lacked in supplies they made up for in enthusiasm, energy and courage. Once they had settled at Inkongo, they began wrestling with the Bena Inkongo language.²² Upton Westcott concerned himself mainly with medical work since he had spent some years studying homeopathic medicine. Since the mission was located near Lusambo, which was both a State and a company post, U. Westcott was frequently called to the bedside of sick Europeans, while William's chief responsibility was evangelistic work in the villages. In 1900 they both returned to England, got married and came back to Inkongo with their wives, and William's wife became active in teaching reading and singing.²³

In 1910 Upton Westcott moved to Bakwa Mbule, a location to the north-east of Inkongo, to begin a new station. Until 1925 the work of the W.I.M. concentrated on the area surrounding these two stations.²⁴ The station at Inkongo remained its centre and the location of its medical work. The missionary staff was never very large, since each volunteer outfitted himself and was obliged to find his own support for the duration of his time in the Congo. When new missionaries arrived on the field, "they were free to join in the work already established, or to go elsewhere if they wished."²⁵

This mission's educational policy began at the turn of the century with a curriculum based on elementary-level Bible and moral stories, a hymnal and a catechism.²⁶ As with all other Protestant missionary societies in the Congo, the aim of the W.I.M. was to obtain conversions and with them build a strong indigenous church. There was no great effort on their part to engage in vocational education, since the interpretation which the missionaries placed on the New Testament caused them to emphasize itinerant evangelization at the expense of work at one specific location.²⁷ Thus, the Westcotts' policy was to provide instruction without having the African children board on the mission station; those who came for education remained only for school hours and then returned to their village.²⁸ Their educational efforts concentrated only on primary instruction until 1960.

The work of the two Protestant missions was complemented by that of the Scheutist Fathers, who had established five mission stations by 1901.²⁹ The missions' objective, between 1902 and 1908, was to consolidate their position around their existing stations rather than to open up new areas. Therefore, Scheutist missionaries spent more time visiting villages, instructing catechism classes and setting up fermes-chapelles, consisting of activities centred on programmes of agriculture and religion and, in some cases, reading and writing. The system of fermes-chapelles came into practice particularly after 1903, and its adoption marked the beginning of a new era of missionary work designed to establish out-post

schools which would be run by catechists and supervised by an itinerating priest from the central mission.

There were two reasons, in particular, which account for this change in method. The neighboring mission to the Scheutist mission was the American Presbytèrian Congo Mission which depended heavily on catechists to provide religious instruction in the villages surrounding Luebo and Ibanche. Their obvious success, and the eagerness of the Africans to learn to read and write, placed pressure on the Catholic mission to follow the Presbyterian example. In April 1902, Père Cambier, the Supérieur de la Mission du Haut Kasai, sent a directive to all mission stations endorsing the work of village evangelism. Each station was given a map indicating the villages for which the missionaries of that station were responsible.³⁰ Another reason for the change, however, was the work of Père Jules Garmyn, the superior at Mérode. Père Garmyn had been one of the founders of this station and, after the construction of the buildings was completed, he was happy to "carry out the orders of his Master: to go teach all nations, teach them to observe all I have told you."³¹ His method was to go to a village, sit down and wait for people to gather around: only then would he begin teaching. While he taught, the boys who had accompanied him would teach the children the Lord's Prayer and how to cross themselves. It would be days and sometimes weeks before he would return to Mérode.

The purpose of his itineration was explained in 1903 in a letter to his superior in which he stated:

One or two years ago I wrote to you explaining the work I had begun in the villages surrounding M'erde. I wanted to inspect the villages in our vicinity and particularly note the best places to spread the divine Word. This preliminary investigation is now finished. I have prepared a map on which I have marked in red the villages which have consented to allow our catechists in their midst, whereas the obstinate pagan villages are in blue.

In the main villages marked in red, catechists will be permitted to live (there are 20 of these). From time to time I will inspect their work, which will consist of teaching the Catechumens, and baptizing the dying.

Until now only children have been attending catechism classes, 15 here, 25 there, etc.... The adults are not coming, but that does not mean they don't know the main tenets of the Faith, since they listen to the lessons from behind the huts and bushes.

In this way the Word of God will be spread about, it is one step, a very big step.³²

Garmyn's methods were completely revolutionary. Until this time the Scheut missionaries had not been sending out catechists and Cambier did not approve of beginning even now. His view was that fermes-chapelles should be established by locating a group of African Christians, when these were available, under a missionary in a new area in order to undertake evangelization of the surrounding region. However, Cambier was realistic enough to recognize that, in view of Garmyn's immediate success and the threat of competition from the A.P.C.M., valuable time would be wasted and

territory lost if there was too much hesitation over the methods to be employed. Within the next few years both methods, the catechists and the fermes-chapelles, were put into use by the Scheutists, and at the end of 1902 Père Garmyn was relieved of his duties as the superior at Hérode in order to allow him to occupy himself fully in village evangelism.³³

As long as the missionaries and their catechists evangelized in Baluba villages surrounding their mission stations they could be assured of a following. The station at Hemptinne was actually on Lulua territory but, by 1901, there were no Lulua villages within a radius of four walking hours from the mission. The Baluba came in to occupy the vacant lands and by 1904 had established a total of seventy villages. The old Chief Kasongo Fwamba who, ten years earlier, had invited the mission to establish a station in his vicinity, now regarded the Europeans and the Baluba as a threat and let Père Seghers know that all strangers were to leave his territory.³⁴ Fwamba was no longer as powerful as he had been since his supply of guns had been cut off and sleeping sickness had depleted many of his villages. When Père Seghers visited him in 1903 requesting permission to send catechists into his Lulua villages, Fwamba therefore consented after much discussion.

By 1904 the outreach of the Hemptinne mission extended into Bakete territory to the south, where Père Joseph Vervaecke became the itinerant missionary.³⁵ The success of missionary outreach at Hemptinne can be

attributed to the energy and courage of Père Seghers, whom Africans called Tsimbalanga, meaning "Marred face," a name originally given to the military commander, Michaux, because of his facial scars which added to his appearance of authority. Seghers also had facial scars and an authoritarian manner.

The situation was somewhat different at Mikalayi. This station had begun as a refuge for slaves whom the mission redeemed. By 1901 there were 2,029 people in villages clustered around the mission, the vast majority of whom were former slaves and totally dependent on the mission. The advantages of this population for the mission were obvious: they provided the necessary labour for the construction of buildings and the working of plantations of coffee, corn and millet, the products which were traded with the Compagnie du Kasai and the State in exchange for transport of mission supplies on company steamers. As a result of this large population around Mikalayi, Père Cambier decided on the establishment of fermes-chapelles by which he would move a segment of the population to another location to begin more agricultural projects, like manioc plantations and poultry yards, and also build churches. For Mikalayi, this system became an economic necessity since the mission could not continue to feed its growing population.³⁶

The Catholic mission's operations in the Kasai were facilitated by the close association which existed between it, the Compagnie du Kasai and the State. The mission could be assured of State support and, much to the

chagrin of the Presbyterians, they could also be assured of land in those areas which the Presbyterians desired most. When the Scheutists accepted the C.K.'s offer to take over the plantations of the S.A.P.V. at Bena Makima early in 1904, the Protestants saw this as affirmation by the Catholics of the company's policies and methods. The first Scheutist Fathers assigned to Bena Makima were Van Kerkhoven, Delanghe and Lambrechts; the ~~latter~~ was replaced by Polet by the middle of 1904. The priests brought forty Baluba workers with them for the purpose of clearing land, constructing buildings and working the rubber plantation crop.³⁷ The close association between the C.K. and the mission was obvious to Frobenius when he visited Bena Makima in July 1904, when he noted that Père Van Kerkhoven acted in the capacity of a C.K. agent with Père Polet an assistant agent. The Catholics named their station St. Victorien, after the patron saint of the director of the company.³⁸

The Protestants were particularly annoyed when the Catholics gained access to the Bakuba capital and were able to establish a mission there in 1906. According to Cambler, the station was to be "for the glory of God and the salvation of souls; but it is special in that it is primarily erected to combat the influence of the Protestants at Luebo."³⁹ Père Augustin Janssens, Père Numa Polet and Frère Isidore Braecke were assigned to direct the new work. They brought with them twelve Christian families from the Namptinne station to provide a nucleus for the church. These foreigners were never very welcome and, just as the Kuba were not interested

in the Protestants, so they did not show an interest in the teachings of the Catholics. After a troubled two years at Mushenge, during the course of which Père Polet was killed, probably in part because his role was not clearly defined as either a missionary or a C.K. agent, the Catholics withdrew in 1908.⁴⁰

The mission station, St. Antoine, began at Lusambo as a ferme-chapelle in 1905, and became a station in 1907. The purpose of the new station was to extend the mission's evangelical outreach into the Batetela area to the east and, by 1910, there were 500 catechumens in the surrounding villages.⁴¹

For the Scheutist Mission the period covered by the years 1901-1908 was a time of expansion and consolidation, marked by an evolution of mission policy. In 1901 the mission was recognized as an autonomous branch of the Scheutist Congo Mission, and Père Cambier then became the Supérieur de la Mission du Kasai. In 1904 the mission was raised to the status of Préfecture Apostolique du Haut Kasai, with Cambier as prefect until 1913.⁴² It was Cambier's policy to strive for uniformity throughout the Kasai. In 1904 he sent a communication to all the mission stations outlining in detail the procedures to be adopted in conducting church services, baptisms, marriages, funerals, and all practices on the mission station. These were to be observed precisely so that Africans moving from one station to another would not have an adjustment problem as far as their religious

observances were concerned.⁴³ These years' also marked the beginnings of an educational policy which will be discussed next.

Such a policy came about partly as the result of the mission's new aim of evangelizing the masses, which required catechists who needed to be instructed, and also partly as the result of the competition offered by the education-conscious Presbyterian Mission at Luebo. The emphasis of the Catholic missions in the Congo was not as strongly aimed at literacy as it was for many of the Protestant missions since this, it was held, did not necessarily lead to a Christian population. In comparing Catholic and Protestant missionary goals, a Catholic missionary wrote:

One can also question whether school and education outside of religious instruction are the main means of civilizing the Congo. What is most important above all in a country where laziness engenders so many physical and moral miseries is to inspire them with the spirit and love of work.... On the missionary falls in great part, the duty to inspire the taste and spirit of work, a taste and a spirit which persist.... I think that the young Congolese, generally speaking, will be more useful to themselves and to society in liking manual work than in knowing only how to read and write.⁴⁴

Like the A.P.C.M. at Luebo and, indeed, the State and the C.K., the Scheutists in the Kasai accepted the gospel of manual work as their objective. They did not have a need to offer education as a means of luring Africans to the mission stations, since their close identification as a State-favoured mission caused them to be assigned large numbers of neglected children and redeemed slaves, which resulted in the creation of villages

next to all their stations. Since the orphans and redeemed slaves had to be fed by the mission, it was inevitable that the creation of large plantations of edible crops would have to be the mission's first responsibility. Working the plantations was a way in which the redeemed slaves could work off their debt to the mission in a way which allowed it to recover their redemption price.⁴⁵ However, despite the emphasis on manual labour, the Scheutists still had to engage in some educational activity.

Until 1908, the basis for most educational effort by the Scheutists was oral instruction. Catechists, who had been taught on the mission station, were sent into the villages to gather adults and children together in order to teach them some hymns, the catechism and prayers. According to Barbara Yates, the first mention of reading and writing at Luluabourg came in 1897 for:

educational effort to that point (1891-1897) having been 'purely religious, except for the terms of usual politeness which the boys learn in French and the girls in Flemish.' Other Upper Kasai Scheutists' central stations do not report secular education until 1901 at Lusambo (founded 1895), when they 'began to teach children the letters of the alphabet', and 1905 at Hemptinne St. Benoît (founded 1897), when similar instruction was began.⁴⁶

Many of the Catholic missions in the Congo, particularly the Jesuits in the lower Congo, had found the ferme-chapelle system to be useful both for educational and economic needs. In the Kasai, the first fermes-chapelles

were established in 1903 and consisted of about ten Christian families being transferred from the central station of Mikalayi to a new site to begin a Christian village. These families would be accompanied by several catechists and usually a missionary. This was an expensive project for the mission, since it involved the construction of huts, a school, a chapel and a residence for the missionary. Some of the expense was borne by the families involved, who consisted chiefly of former slaves who redeemed themselves through manual labour. Consequently the women worked in the fields to supply food and the men assisted in construction. The children formed the nucleus of the school system. It was hoped that through the outreach of the catechists from these locations the surrounding villages could be converted.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the farming methods and good work habits of the people comprising the ferme-chapelle would be an added example to encourage the pagans to accept Christianity. Between 1903 and 1910 all of the Scheutists' mission stations had either fermes-chapelles or postes-secondaires, which were stopping places for itinerating missionaries.⁴⁸

This network of mission stations, fermes-chapelles and postes-secondaires provided the framework for steady evangelization, which was also regulated by Cambier. In 1905 he fixed the period of time for being a catechumen at three years for adults who lived at the mission station and four years for those living in the villages. The instructions from De Clercq, the superior of the mission, were to proceed slowly and not be tempted by the desire to

have a register full of names. In 1907 the missionaries agreed on a two year preparation before baptism, with the sacrament of baptism being administered only if the last six months of the candidate's life had been "without any serious public sin."⁴⁹

This lengthy preparation period before baptism was in keeping with the attitude which the early Scheutists had toward the African. The missionaries' aim was not to develop a responsible and indigenous church group immediately, but rather to change the carefree pagan into a devout and obedient Christian. The priest would remain the responsible leader with an obedient following. This system, which applied at Mikalayi and the satellite villages dependent on it, was an example of the mission's policy. Father Auguste Janssens, a priest at Mikalayi, stated:

The great advantage of the system in operation is that Christians and catechumens are always under the eye of the missionary. The negro, even converted, remains a negro, that is to say a big child whom it is always necessary to keep in traces; whom one can never leave to himself, not even for a day, nor an hour, under pain of seeing him return to all the errors of his nature, perverted by so many centuries of barbarism.⁵⁰

These views coincide very closely with those of Père Cambier, the Supérieur de la Mission du Haut Kasai. He considered himself the leader and guardian of the Congolese in the Kasai and, as such, he was regarded as an indisputable authority. Because of the assumed inferiority of the Congolese, it was considered the missionary's duty to love him and seek to help him even though it was doubtful whether he could ever be fully raised up.⁵¹

The Scheutists in the Kasai by 1908, were using five instructional books: "two catechisms, two primers and a history of the Saints."⁵² These materials were printed at Nouvelle-Anvers, their station on the Congo River, since they did not have a printing press in the Kasai until 1907.⁵³ With time and religious instruction, combined with manual labour, it was anticipated that the African would gradually be able to free himself from his inherited state of degradation.

These same attitudes were present among the A.P.C.M. in their evangelizing efforts around Luebo and Ibanche. The missionaries generally assumed an authoritarian role over Africans, acting as protectors of the people and frequently attempting to censor the lives of others as well as their own adherents in the area. This did not exclude the State and company agents who, on occasion, violated the Ten Commandments. The bitterest conflict in the Kasai until 1908, however, occurred between the Catholic and Protestant missions, since the Protestants considered the Catholics idolators while the Catholics referred to the Protestants as heretics and schismatics. The differences between the Catholics and Protestants resulted in competition and harassment. Shortly after the first Scheutists arrived in 1889,⁵⁴ one of the priests stated that "in leaning solely upon God we have the invincible hope to save these people from barbarianism and to take them away from Protestantism."⁵⁵

In the Kasai area, the rivalry between the two missions focused at the outset on the business of acquiring station sites. To the Presbyterians, the Scheutists were identified with the State, since it was upon the king's urgings that they had agreed to enter the Congo. What angered the American evangelists in particular was that the State gave the Scheutists sites which the A.P.C.M. particularly desired. To the latter, this was contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between the U.S.A. and the Congo Free State of February 1892, which had granted the "right to erect religious edifices and to organize and maintain missions."⁵⁶ It was not until after Belgium had annexed the Congo in 1908, however, that the A.P.C.M. was free to expand to new sites. In the meantime, the Presbyterians were seemingly helpless in preventing the Scheutists from encircling them at Luebo. As long as Africans did not take a great interest in education, the Scheutists were able to keep a large population at their stations without providing schools. However, when Africans began to attend school willingly and even requested village schools, then the Protestants gained an advantage and the Catholic missionaries realized that they, too, had to provide schools. Consequently, the Scheutists began improving their educational system after 1903 in order to compete with the A.P.C.M. In 1907 they moved into Luebo and established a school across the river from the Presbyterian mission. One purpose of the school was to counter the influence of the Protestant mission at Luebo so that, to some extent, African interest in education accentuated competition between the missions.⁵⁷

Even though the rivalry between the Catholics and Protestants acted as a stimulant to educational effort in the Kasai, it also deepened the feelings of hostility and bitterness between the two representatives of Christianity. To the Protestants, Catholicism was as bad as Congolese heathenism and, to the Catholics, Protestant fanaticism was a constant enemy. Worst of all the rivalry drew the African into the fray. Protestant catechists told their villagers that Catholics ate children and corpses; while Catholic catechists went about telling Protestant school children not to read the books the missionaries gave them because all Protestants were devils. Frequently catechists of one faith were followed through villages by catechists of the opposite faith seeking to discredit them.

When De Grunne, Chef de Secteur de la Lulua, commented on the friction between the missions in 1907, he referred to it as a personality clash between Morrison and Cambier. In a letter to his father, De Grunne wrote:

The Reverend Morrison of the A.P.C.M. and Père Cambier at Luluabourg are the principal antagonists. It is necessary to recognize that Père Cambier finds it very disagreeable to see an intruder (the Rev. Morrison), slowly infiltrate the good work that he has established.⁵⁸

De Grunne's pro-Catholic bias is evident in this statement since the Presbyterians arrived in the Kasai before the Scheutists and therefore considered the Luebo area to be their territory. Although De Grunne was possibly right in stating that the personalities of Morrison and Cambier

automatically led to friction, he failed to take into account the conservative nature of both religious groups which made cooperation between them impossible, regardless of their leadership. Furthermore, the Protestants had experienced the frustration of applying for land without obtaining grants while watching the Catholics expand.⁵⁹

Aside from this underlying conflict, the efforts of both the Catholics and the Protestants to educate the African and the results achieved need to be evaluated. Although both faiths had a paternalistic attitude toward the African, they did differ in their expectations of the results which might be expected to flow from religious instruction. The Presbyterians were concerned with developing a self-reliant church and, in this context, considered the African capable of assuming a responsible role in the church, but only after many years of instruction and a subordinate position under the missionary. Protestant missionaries, meeting at Kinshasa in 1909, agreed that African church members should be given responsibility in forming rules for the conduct of believers. While waiting for the African to mature into a responsible individual, the missionary was to be tolerant and patient.⁶⁰ Morrison's attitude towards the African was that

We should remember first and last that the natives should be treated as kindly and courteously as white people. We should always keep in mind that we are their servants and not their masters. Under their black skins they have feelings and sensibilities similar to ours, which ought to be respected. If we laugh at their customs, appearance, or fetishes, we destroy their confidence in us and repel them. ...

On the other hand, you will need to maintain your dignity and repress undue familiarity or insolence. Be kind and firm but never harsh.⁶¹

In spite of this generous attitude displayed by the majority of the A.P.C.M. missionaries, there were various African practices which they did not feel they could respect or even condone. Chief among these was the practice of polygamy, which some bitterly denounced as a heathen practice which degraded women. Through a longer association with the culture, the missionaries conceded that women did not seem to mind their position, although "plural wives were denied baptism, after 1905, if they could not show that they had been forced into marriage or that they had not known that polygamy was sinful."⁶² Polygamists were allowed to become members of the church on condition that they would not marry again. B.A. Yates suggests that the reason most Protestant mission societies in the Congo displayed a lenient attitude toward polygamy at this time was that their teaching was concerned with a change of heart in the individual as opposed to the control of the entire family. She says:

While they did not condone plural marriage, they realized it formed the basic social structure of native life and was therefore difficult to change immediately or simply by fiat.⁶³

This tolerant attitude towards polygamy was severely criticized by the mission's supporters in America. The pressure from home and the realization that the spread of Christianity did not necessarily result in monogamy caused the A.P.C.M. to deny church membership to polygamists after 1918.⁶⁴

Neither the A.P.C.M. nor the Scheutists set about deliberately training an elite group among their African converts. The A.P.C.M. conducted a mass education programme for as many applicants as possible. Since they could not accept everyone, the mission could be selective and chose those who could eventually become church leaders, but these individuals were never set apart as an intellectual class. They remained a part of their native environment. The view of the Baptist Mission Society in the Lower Congo epitomised the Protestant attitude:

How far, we may ask, should the African be Americanized or Europeanized? Not at all. He is an African and should be encouraged to believe that the African race has its own special part to perform in the onward march of the human race, and that he will not best do his share by denationalizing himself, but by patriotically seeking to advance in harmony with his own temperament and surroundings. ...To civilize in order to Christianize, never works well.⁶⁵

The closest to an elitist group established by either the Presbyterians or the Scheutists were the catechists chosen to go into the villages to teach. Some of these men later became church leaders, others became leaders or a type of chief of a Christian community which located itself near the European mission station. An example of this was the village of Goye near Luebo. It consisted exclusively of catechists, evangelists, and former concubines of the Europeans. The head man was Goye, whom the State considered well-intentioned, while regarding his subjects with suspicion. A political report of 1908 states:

The village has a considerable number of idlers, A.P.C.M. evangelists and others. The principal work of these villagers is to sing at the mission. The village is a nuisance to the Luebo area.⁶⁶

In his book, La Politique Indigene, Louis Franck, who became Belgium's first Liberal Colonial Minister, shared the above opinion: he described these villages as consisting of individuals who had spent some time in the service of a white man and considered themselves to be different from other villagers. Franck wrote:

This is certainly the case for the soldier and even more so for the corporal and sergeant. It is also the case for company capitas, messengers, and assistant agents. In fact it also applies to the State messengers and mission catechists. All of these natives have experienced our influence. One of the most obvious effects of this has been that they consider themselves as being superior to the rest of the natives. This attitude is very evident among catechists who consider themselves equal to their native chief. If this is not carefully controlled they will rise up against them; they try to gather a certain number of natives around themselves and form a village in opposition to the existing legitimate village.

The same applies to both Catholic and Protestant missions. Since the catechists of both faiths are on the same level the end result will be a series of secessions splitting the native communities. One would then find, on the one hand a pagan village consisting of old men, women and children; and on the other hand, two groupings of young people; one led by Catholic catechists and the other by Protestant catechists, hostile to each other and the pagan village.⁶⁷

In summary, it should be reiterated that the elitist role these Africans assumed was not thrust upon them by the missionaries. Although missionaries did support the separation of African Christians from their non-Christian associates in order to remove them from pagan influence and temptation, they did not regard these Christian villagers as superior individuals. They were rather to become stronger Christians and, in the process, thereby become civilized and be an example of the power of the Gospel to their pagan friends.

There were distinct advantages for the African if he became a Christian. At the turn of the century it meant redemption from slavery for many, and hopefully, a more lenient master in the missionary. When the African began to realize the advantages of education, then a conversion experience became necessary to be admitted into the school system, since the missionaries could afford to be selective. This has caused the Catholic sociologist, Aylward Shorter, to note that:

Conversion may be a rite of passage into a new and more desirable social identity. ...School conversions are sometimes sparked off by the desire for a new name and status. ...Adolescent conversion is clearly linked with the cultural setting of the school and with the desire for social advancement.⁶⁸

However, the Christian church of Africa today bears witness to the fact that not all conversions were made from purely selfish motives for school advancement. The Presbyterians gathered an impressive number of

converts who remained faithful to their commitment. By 1907 the A.P.C.M. had ordained five elders and six deacons who acted as the nucleus for the organization of an indigenous church. In 1916 three elders were ordained as pastors.⁶⁹ The Scheutists were slower in providing church leadership as their first Lower Seminaries were not established until 1915, and their first Congolese priest was not ordained until 1934.⁷⁰

Both major missions in the Kasai experienced successes, and both missions accomplished this in spite of racist attitudes towards Africans and their hostility towards one another. Their mutual exclusive hostility reflected more than differences of religious interpretation, however, for the Scheutists were Belgians, supported by the sovereign state and the monopolistic Belgian company. The Presbyterians' inability to understand the close relationship which existed between the three organizations led them into a conflict with all three; and this led the Presbyterians to play a major role in the Congo Reform Movement as it affected the Kasai, as the following chapter demonstrates.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Chapter IV for an account of the missionaries' early years. Please refer to Map X for locations mentioned in this chapter.

2. This was not as impressive as the 3,100 converts the Scheutist Mission had acquired after ten years of operation.

3. In the early years of the A.P.C.M. black men and women formed a very important part of the mission's work force. Those in the Kasai up to 1923 include the following:

William H. Sheppard, 1889-1910
 Lucy Grantt Sheppard, 1894-1910
 Henry P. Hawkins, 1894-1910
 Maria Fearing, 1894-1915
 Joseph E. Phipps, 1895-1908
 Althea Brown, 1902-1937
 L.A. De Yampert, 1902-1918
 Lillian Thomas, 1894-1918
 A.L. Edmiston, 1903-1941
 A.A. Rochester, 1906-1939
 Annie Kate Taylor, 1906-1914
 Edna May Taylor, 1923-1939

Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, pp. 51-2.

4. Wharton, Led in Triumph, p. 75; Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 40.

5. Wharton, Led in Triumph, p. 75. Miss Fearing arrived at Luebo in 1894 and remained there for 21 years until 1915 during which time she took only one year of furlough time back in the United States.

6. Ibid., pp. 63-7. The new S.S. Lapsley was constructed in Scotland on the Clyde. The finished vessel had then to be taken apart, crated, shipped by steamer to Matadi, then by rail to Leopoldville and rebuilt for use. "A ship was necessary since each evangelist needed approximately 37 loads of barter goods a year. A load was equivalent to 85 pounds." Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 72.

7. Ibid., p. 76-7. In 1911 Dr. Coppedge received a citation from King Albert of the Belgians ("for devoted and distinguished service to His Majesty's subjects, both European and African," who made him a Chevalier de l'Ordre de Lion Royal and presented him with the medal of the Order.
8. Charles L. Crane, In the Heart of Africa, Facts about Africa and our Congo Mission (Nashville, Tennessee, Presbyterian Church in the United States, 1917), p. 30.
9. Frobenius, Im Schatten, p. 229; Althea Brown was married to Alonzo Edmiston in 1905. "Edmiston came to the Kasai with S.P. Verner, who was gathering curios and the like for the Louisiana Purchase Exposition of 1904 in St. Louis. When Edmiston learned that Verner had no real intention of founding a mission as he had promised, he joined the A.P.C.M. at the invitation of his friend L.A. De Yampert." Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 72.
10. Indeed, the Protestants were not to reach the heart of Bakuba territory until 1915 when a station was established at Bulape.
11. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, pp. 54-6.
12. E.T. Wharton, Led in Triumph, pp. 53-4.
13. The press was named in honour of Dr. Wilson who had worked for twenty-five years for the establishment of a Presbyterian mission in Africa. Most of the money for it came from a Sunday school in Baltimore. E.T. Wharton, Led in Triumph, pp. 62-3; Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 72.
14. Barbara A. Yates, "The Missions and Educational Development in Belgian Africa, 1876-1908" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1967), p. 83.
15. Ibid.
16. Frobenius, Im Schatten, p. 231.
17. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, pp. 60-1.
18. B.A. Yates, "The Missions and Educational Development," p. 155.

19. J.L. Kellersberger, A Life for the Congo, p. 78; B.A. Yates, "The Missions and Educational Development," pp. 193-4.
20. Wharton, Led in Triumph, pp. 80-82.
21. Braekman, Histoire du Protestantisme, pp. 147-8.
22. Slade, English-Speaking Missions, p. 202.
23. Braekman, Histoire du Protestantisme, pp. 149-151. Upton's wife died in 1903, after three years in the Congo. Upton remained in the Congo until 1917 without a furlough. In 1919 he married Miss Visick who arrived in the Congo from England. By this time he was almost completely blind. On October 23, 1929, he died at Lusambo. William returned to England in poor health in 1917, where he continued his work of translating the Bible into the Bena-Inkongo language. In 1922 his translation was completed. He died in England in 1936.
24. In 1925 they opened a station at Mitombe, to the east of Lusambo. Three years later the A.P.C.M. gave up their station at Lusambo to the W.I.M. In 1947 the W.I.M. began work at Bena Tshadi. These five stations directed by twenty missionaries constituted their diligent evangelistic efforts. Braekman, Histoire du Protestantisme, pp. 181-2.
25. Slade, English-Speaking Missions, p. 108.
26. B.A. Yates, "The Missions and Educational Development," p. 85.
27. Ibid., p. 121. Information on W.I.M. is lacking. They did not publish journals and were the only Protestant missionary society that did not attend the General Conference meetings. There was no central headquarters in England to which they sent reports or statistics of their work.
28. A.E. (A.A.) 527, Inkongo, Sankuru, Kasai, November 29, 1904, Wm. Westcott to the President of the Commission of Enquiry. Westcott stated that the only children resident at the mission at this time were three children of white men whom they were boarding and educating in their own home according to written agreements.
29. The only stations to be added between 1902-1908 were Bena Makima in 1904, Mushenge in 1906 and Lusambo in 1907.

30. M. Scheitler, Histoire de l'Eglise, II, p. 7. Mikalayi was assigned the area to the west of the Lulua to the Kasai River; Hemptinne had the area between the Lulua and Lubi Rivers; the area east of the Lubi to the Lomami was divided into three secteurs: the north was the responsibility of St. Trudon; the centre of Mérode; and the south of Tielen. The significant part of this division was that Cambier hoped to contain the influence of the A.P.C.M. to a relatively small area. The rivalry between the two missions will be discussed later.

31. Ibid., p. 6. A picture of that time shows him walking with the support of a long stick, his young servant leading the way and several school boys accompanying him.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 7. Père Garmyn left the Scheut order and the Congo in 1904 in order to become a Trappist Monk.

34. Ibid., p. 3. The presence of the numerous Baluba around Hemptinne was a factor in making it possible for the Compagnie du Kasai to establish a factory at Tshitadi in 1903.

35. Ibid., p. 8.

36. Ibid., pp. 9-10. A list of the mission's fermes-chapelles appears under footnote 46.

37. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, February 19, 1904, Dryepondt's report to the General Director.

38. Frobenius, Im Schatten, p. 199-200; The mission was transferred to Mushenge in 1913 and re-established at Bena Makima in 1927: Scheitler, Histoire de l'Eglise Catholique, p. 3.

39. Scheitler, Histoire de l'Eglise Catholique, p. 17.

40. Ibid., p. 17. The station was reopened in 1913 with the transfer of the Bena Makima mission to Mushenge.

41. Ibid., p. 21.

42. Ibid., p. 2.

43. Ibid., p. 12. Scheitler states that when he arrived in the Kasai in 1924 these procedures were still precisely followed.

44. A. Simpelaere, Mouvement des Missions Catholiques au Congo, Mars 1903, pp. 69-71, quoted in Yates, "The Missions and Educational Development," p. 137.

45. See Chapter IX for more on domestic slavery and slave redemption.

46. Yates, "The Missions and Educational Development," p. 68-69. Dr. Vansina has indicated that the boys were taught French by the Scheut Fathers who were French, while the girls were taught Flemish by the Sisters of Charity, a Flemish Order. The discord between the Walloons and Flemish was thus transported to Congo.

47. Scheitler, Histoire de l'Eglise Catholique, p. 29.

48. Ibid., pp. 18-19. In 1906 an agreement between the Vatican and the C.F.S. was made in which minimal standards for the educational system were outlined. The fermes-chapelles, established between 1906-10, met these standards. Because of the expense in establishing them, donations were requested. Donors of a certain sum were allowed to name the new ferme-chapelle. The postes-secondaires were outposts from the ferme-chapelle and usually consisted of a catechist, who was assigned to teach the catechism to the village children. The resident priest from the ferme-chapelle routinely visited the postes-secondaires in his area. The following is a list of fermes-chapelles and postes-secondaires from 1906 to 1910.

St. Joseph at Mikalayi

Fermes-chapelles: Lourdes Notre Dame, Ypres St. Joseph, and St. Antoine, established before 1906.

Grammont sur la Montagne (Kabue), Lemaire S. Coeur, St. Paul, established in 1906.

Flobecq Notre Dame de la paix, Notre Dame du Congo, established in 1907.

By 1910 the outreach of St. Joseph extended to fourteen fermes-chapelles.

Hemptinne

Fermes-chapelles: Kajangayi S. Remy, Courtrai S. Amand (Kabundi), established in 1906.

Postes-secondaires: Liège S. Urbain (Tshibalabala), Harelbeck S. Jean a Kabubiku (Bakete), established in 1909.

By 1910 there were six secondary posts.

Mérode

Fermes-chapelles: Hély St. Aignan (Kakufu), Westerloo St. Henri (Camp de dormeurs), established in 1907.

St. Trudon

Postes-secondaires: Ntumba, Makombo, established in 1910.

Tielen

Fermes-chapelles: St. Jean l'Evangéliste, established in 1907 at the State post of Kanda Kanda.

Tshumbe: Asseghem St. Jean, established in 1910 as a catechists post.

Lusambo St. Antoine: poste-secondaire established in 1907. The same year Lusambo became a mission station and St. Antoine became a poste-secondaire.

Pangu: established as a poste-secondaire to Dima in 1910.

Bena Makima: established three postes-secondaires in 1910.

49. Ibid., p. 24.

50. B.A. Yates, "The Missions and Educational Development," p. 215.

51. Ibid., p. 280.

52. Ibid., pp. 74-5.

53. R.P. Léon-Dieu, Dans la Brousse congolaise (Liège, Maréchal, 1946), p. 143.

54. The Scheutist Mission also opened missionary work in the Mayumbe area and the Kwango.

55. B.A. Yates, "The Missions and Educational Development," p. 165.

56. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 156.

57. B.A. Yates, "The Missions and Educational Development," pp. 170-1.

58. A.F. -1-1, 1st. series, Vol. VIII, Bakete, December 4, 1907, De Grunne to his father.

59. A further dimension of this rivalry will be examined in Chapter IX.
60. B.A. Yates, "The Missions and Educational Development," p. 221.
61. Ibid., p. 220.
62. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 66.
63. B.A. Yates, "The Missions and Educational Development," p. 229.
64. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 66.
65. B.A. Yates, "The Missions and Educational Development," p. 236. This statement was made by Bentley in 1888.
66. Luebo Territorial Archives, Renseignements Politiques, 1904-10.
67. Louis Franck, La Politique Indigène (Bruxelles: La Renaissance du Livre, 1923), pp. 19-20.
68. Aylward Shorter WF, African Culture and the Christian Church (New York, Orbis Books, 1974), p. 81. The Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole said the same thing when he stated: "I did not accept Christ as a personal Redeemer, or because of a deep conviction of Christ's way, but because I thought that since other boys and girls had accepted Him, it would be a nice thing for me to do the same thing. Not to be baptized was a kind of social stigma that goaded many boys and girls into professed repentance. Christ to me meant no more and no less than a social badge." Ndabaningi Sithole, African Nationalism (New York, Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 85.
69. E.T. Wharton, Led in Triumph, pp. 80, 109.
70. B.A. Yates, "The Missions and Educational Development," p. 234. The educational level of the A.P.C.M. pastors ordained in 1916 was probably similar to the level required by the Scheutists of those seeking to enter their Lower Seminaries.

CHAPTER IX

RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPEAN GROUPS IN THE KASAI
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE MOVEMENT FOR REFORM

Relations between Europeans in the Kasai were dictated by convenience, which led to initial acceptance of European imposed systems and African traditional institutions by all the parties involved. The Scheutists looked to the State for security, land and potential converts, while the State turned to the missions and to commercial interests, and especially to the C.K. from its formation, for administrative and political support. Equally, the missions shared common goals with commercial interests, since both groups believed, with the State, that making Africans work would contribute to their self-imposed task of civilizing them. Convenience in particular governed the relationship of the A.P.C.M. to the State: the missionaries were aware that the State's presence was essential, especially in the early years, to facilitate their own penetration of the Kasai and they, therefore, generally condoned the State's actions.¹ They benefited from the State's taxation and prestations' policies, since their African followers were exempted because of their association with the mission: the A.P.C.M. thus did not protest when these policies were introduced.

There were, however, limits to the extent to which the A.P.C.M. could associate with the State, in part because it was a Protestant body, in part because it was American-based whereas the State, the Scheutists and the C.K. all had roots in Belgium, and in part because some members of the A.P.C.M. were stubborn men who were prepared to fight for their principles. For better or for worse, when the A.P.C.M. took a stand on an issue of principle, the principle was interpreted against an American, rather than a Belgian,

cultural background and this aggravated the conflicts which began to emerge between the A.P.C.M. and the State over domestic slavery and the chefferie system. On these issues, principles and self-interest were inextricably mixed together, for public protests coincided with the missionaries' private knowledge that it was impossible for their mission to obtain title to the additional land which was required to allow it to expand into new fields.

These disputes upset the balance of convenience which existed in the Kasai as the State was beginning to become disenchanted with the C.K. However, the balance was not destroyed until the C.K. supported a Scheutist invasion of the Protestants' mission fields, which caused the A.P.C.M. not only to attack the C.K., but also to attack the State for, in Protestant eyes, the C.K. was but a projection of the State. In order to cut a path through the tangled maze formed by the relationship which existed among the various European agencies in the Kasai, and to comprehend the impact of local conditions within the Kasai upon the international movement for reform in the Congo, it is necessary to examine the disputes over domestic slavery and the chefferie system before turning to issues more directly related to the development of ties between the A.P.C.M. and the reform movement.

Although the State made repeated attempts to abolish the slave trade in the Kasai district, it did not make a similar attempt to eliminate domestic slavery. This was in part because the slave trade led to raiding and the destruction of villages. Villagers in these circumstances were carried off in large numbers to be sold into slavery, generally outside the Kasai district, whereas domestic slavery was a more subtle practice and grappling with it necessitated an involvement in the traditional internal institutions of local African society. The State was not prepared to face the consequences of such local interference, especially in light of its own military weakness in the district.

Because of the large number of runaway slaves and the extent of the slave trade in the Kasai, the State's Public Prosecutor ordered an investigation of the entire system of slavery in the Kasai early in 1902. The resulting report by S. Gréban de Saint Germain, Deputy Public Prosecutor at Lusambo, on these issues also revealed the extent of the deeply rooted system of domestic slavery in the Kasai whereby one or more persons were ceded as property to another person for the purpose of augmenting his village, labouring for him or founding an additional village.² These slaves were acquired through conquest or trade which did not prevent them, in some societies, as among the Kuba,³ from aspiring to a high position. The colonial system introduced a new dimension to the system, in that former State soldiers or laid-off workers who had some savings from their years of work, and who wished to establish independent villages for which they required subjects, would buy slaves. The person acquired in such a transaction became the property of the buyer and could be sold again if it was to the owner's economic advantage. In Gréban's opinion, this type of servitude was vastly different from slave trading and was, therefore, not to be confused with it. He stated:

This type of trade, called domestic slavery, is not abnoxious in character: the people acquired in this way are generally treated very well. Their master is interested in providing for them because they represent a monetary value to him, they enjoy certain liberties and the only difference between them and freemen is their subjection to their owner, a tie which could be compared to that of a servant to a master in Europe,

with the only difference being that here the tie lasts a lifetime unless the slave is able to redeem himself.⁴

Although the State realized that the system of domestic slavery existed, it did not recognize it as legal but chose rather to pretend it did not exist for, as Gréban remarked,

To suppress this institution would be dangerous from all points of view, [for] it is deeply-rooted among all the peoples. The authorities should protect it and attempt to root out immoral practices: frequently either the administrative or judicial authorities became involved in disputes arising from these sales. This custom, moreover, has nothing to hide, its practices are public and above-board, everyone sees it and knows of it.⁵

In part the State's willingness to accept the custom of domestic slavery can be understood when it is realized that all Europeans in the Kasai welcomed runaway slaves to their posts. For the missions, both Catholic and Protestant, it was a means of gaining converts and, for the State and the C.K., it provided employees. In consequence, Luebo, Luluabourg and Lusambo attracted many escaped bondsmen who, in effect, wished to transfer their allegiance from an indigenous master to a European one.

It was frequently difficult to distinguish between those who were runaway slaves, those who had been taken by slave traders and those sold to owners who, at the right economic moment, had disposed of them to new owners; and those who were domestic slaves according to Gréban's definition.⁶ When slave traders were involved, the missions and State benefitted when

the State seized caravans and the slaves were distributed to the missions. In other instances, slaves were redeemed through payment to a slave dealer ~~or to the State~~. The cost of redeeming a slave varied: in the vicinity of the Mikalayi mission in 1894, it took four pieces of cloth to redeem a slave while, in more distant villages, they could be redeemed for one or two pieces of cloth each.⁷ A policy of liberating slaves was applied throughout the Kasai by State officials, missionaries and Africans. It was actually illegal because of the implication that this encouraged slave trading and in 1894 Captain Pelzer, newly appointed Chef de Poste of Luluabourg, forbade the missionaries the right to redeem slaves without a licence. His decision, which was supported by Gillain, the Commissaire du District, particularly irked the Scheutist missionaries at Mikalayi. Père Cambier claimed that a circular had been sent to Luluabourg in 1892 stating that the State was to "close its eyes to redemptions [of slaves] made by Belgian missionaries."⁸ Catholic and Protestant missionaries alike were affected by Pelzer's order, which both missions found peculiar since the State denied the existence of domestic slavery and refused to recognize a price for redemption of slaves.⁹ However, despite Pelzer's actions, the practice of slave redemption quietly continued until September 1904 when Motte Martin, an A.P.C.M. missionary at Luebo, requested Chenot, the Commissaire du District, to agree to a fixed redemption price for domestic slaves.

At the end of September, 1904, Chenot, the Commissaire du District, made a tour through the Luebo area together with Hubin, the Chef de Poste at Luebo. At a meeting there with the A.P.C.M. missionary, Motte Martin, who had arrived in the previous year, Chenot agreed to fix the redemption price for slaves at 8 pièces of cloth each. The slave's liberty was then to be verified by a certificate of freedom which would be provided by the Chef de Poste after the transaction was completed. Furthermore, a register was to be maintained at the State post listing the names of all slaves liberated in this manner. Along with these detailed instructions passed on to Hubin, Chenot advised him to notify the missionaries that these were temporary measures since, by State laws, no system of slavery was recognized.¹⁰

In actuality, Chenot was not too certain of his legal position in making these arrangements with the missionaries. In a postscript to his letter to Hubin he wrote:

From the preceding considerations, you are able to conclude that slavery does not legally exist, the very fact of issuing certificates of freedom would constitute a legal recognition of the state of slavery, for which the individual must pay 8 pieces [of cloth] to his master to have it cease [existing]. It would, therefore, be preferable to issue as few certificates as possible or even none at all and to replace those already given by simply registering the freed person's name in a register kept at the post exclusively for that purpose.¹¹

Motte Martin was delighted with this turn of events and considered this administrative change invaluable in resolving the many palavers involving

those who wished to obtain their freedom. He further notified Chenot that the State could be assured of the missionaries' willingness to assist by whatever means to eliminate all forms of slavery.¹²

When Bossolo, the Deputy State Prosecutor at Lusambo, was notified of the agreement between Chenot and Martin, he wrote to the State Prosecutor at Boma stating:

Mr. Martin's intentions are naturally praiseworthy; domestic slavery, which is practiced everywhere, will take a long time to uproot, but, nevertheless, it is the duty of the State to assist those who would be willing to further the process of civilization. Naturally this measure of fixing prices in accordance with the economy of the region should be extended throughout the district. The Commissaire du District has written to the Governor-General about it; I considered it my duty to bring it to your attention in order that you would be able to give it the support it merits.¹³

The State Prosecutor did not share Bossolo's enthusiasm since, in his own communication to the Governor-General, he expressed concern that Martin's proposal would acknowledge that domestic slavery existed when by law this was not feasible.¹⁴

It appears that Chenot did not officially report his actions to the Governor-General until February 7, 1905. He was then careful to introduce his account with the statement that his first response to the Protestant missionaries' questions on the legal status of domestic slaves was that "domestic slavery is not recognized by the State and that legally there are

no slaves."¹⁵ Since, therefore, it was impossible to issue a decree to free slaves, it was reasonable, according to Chenot, to place the ransom fee at eight pieces of cloth (about 100 francs) until such a time as the State could consider the matter and possibly reduce the price gradually year after year, and eventually eliminate compensation to former masters.¹⁶

In July 1905 Chenot's term as Commissaire du District expired and he was succeeded by Gustin, who was instructed in November by the Governor-General not to interfere in the redemption of slaves. The only possible intervention was to give assistance and protection to slaves, and to anyone else who requested it, but not by assisting masters who wished to reclaim slaves as their property. The Governor-General's main concern was to keep State involvement to a minimum. If the missionaries wished to reimburse the chiefs for those of their subjects, who had settled at a mission station, that should be their choice - but it should not involve State intervention on any level.¹⁷

In the meantime, Hubin, the Chef de Poste at Luebo, was responsible for implementing Chenot's agreement and, almost immediately, complications developed over the fixed redemption price and the certificates of freedom. The misunderstanding concerning the price centred around the measurement of the eight pieces of cloth. At Luebo each piece of cloth used for trading by both the C.K. and the A.P.C.M. measured three feet instead of

six feet, the length used by the State. By March, 1905, Hubin had certified the redemption of about twenty-five slaves at the A.P.C.M. price. When he realized his error and informed Martin of the actual price set by Chenot, Martin considered the price to be too high and for a time, refused to redeem slaves at the State post.¹⁸ Most of the individuals redeemed by the A.P.C.M. were young women who had been freed in order to provide wives for workers on the mission station. Although Hubin recognized the humanitarian motives in this endeavor, he was convinced that it must stop because of the dissatisfaction it created among African leaders, who were losing subjects to the mission. In consequence some of these leaders were seeking to be relocated in the Luluabourg area, and any exodus of Baluba from Luebo would be regrettable, for the State and the mission, for both depended heavily on them for labour.¹⁹

When Hubin investigated the missionaries' involvement in the redemptions further, he discovered that a considerable number of the mission's evangelists had purchased slaves. When Martin recommended that Hubin ought to arrest all those who traded in slaves, Hubin answered,

You are going to oblige me to arrest all your evangelists, because I know the names of all the slaves they possess.²⁰

Freeing the slaves was a humanitarian move from the missionaries' point of view, as long as they benefitted through an increase in the number of

Africans in Christian villages surrounding the mission. Once there, freed individuals, who had worked off their debt to the mission, would buy slaves who would be indebted to them, consequently perpetuating the system, yet remaining with the mission and accepting it as their adopted society.²¹

The original agreement between Chenot and Martin further stated that certificates of liberation were to be given by the Chef de Poste after the slave had been freed in his presence. In January, 1905, Martin requested several certificates for people who had been freed at Ibanche by Sheppard in the previous year. As far as Hubin was concerned, this did not meet the requirements of the original terms of the agreement and he refused the certificates²² and, after March 1905, he no longer distributed any.²³

The area surrounding Lusambo also contained a population which had moved close to European establishments. Many were there as a result of the dispersions caused by the Arab slave trade; others were former employees of the State or the companies, who had chosen to settle near a big centre like Lusambo. In order to augment their small villages, it was a common custom for members of the latter group to purchase subjects as domestic slaves from among the surrounding peoples. When the Royal Commission of Enquiry passed through Lusambo in August and September 1905, Commissioner Malfeyt wrote a report stating that both the C.K. and the State were condoning and thus encouraging the slave trade, and the State's sensitivity

to world opinion at this time occasioned an investigation of the Lusambo situation by Lantonnois, the Congo's Deputy Governor-General, in March 1906.²⁴

Although the Deputy Governor-General's report did succeed in reassuring the central Government that the slave trade was indeed ended, Lantonnois discovered several cases in which State officials had purchased the liberty of domestic slaves. The most embarrassing case was that of Itanda - Itala, a seventeen-year old servant girl, who had been redeemed for twelve copper crosses by Bossolo, the State Prosecutor, on July 20, 1905. The certificate of liberation included the signatures of Bossolo, two State officials who witnessed it, Dr. Polledro and Léon Demoulin, and the signature of the Commissaire du District, Gustin, who approved it.²⁵ The reaction of the Baron Wahis, the Governor-General, was to acknowledge it as a regrettable, but excusable incident, since it occurred before his official instructions of November 2, 1905, prohibiting the issuance of certificates of liberation.²⁶

In mid 1906, the Westcott Mission at Inkongu suggested that the practice of domestic slavery be abolished very gradually by prohibiting the buying and selling of newly enslaved individuals after a certain date, and by making it possible for slaves to redeem themselves for a reasonable sum which, they thought, would be fair to both slave and master.²⁷ Gustin's reply was to reiterate the State's official position, which denied the

existence of domestic slavery and could, therefore, not permit the issuance of certificates of liberation, since such action would acknowledge the existence of slavery. But, Gustin added:

missionaries are free to make any arrangements they wish with the chiefs whose subjects might want to settle near their establishments.²⁸

Again, in 1909, the missionaries were reminded that Chenot's proposal to liberate slaves in 1905, by delivering certificates of liberation, was not to be followed, nor were the names of freed individuals to be recorded in a register.²⁹

The actions of State agents did not conform to the State's official position. In January 1909, A. Olivier, the C.K. Chef de Secteur X, reported:

The State is not ignorant of the slavery situation. At Luluabourg and Luebo State agents deliver certificates of liberation to any slave who can pay his master the sum of 16 pieces of cloth or 20 copper crosses.

Slaves who escape are constantly obliged by the State to return to their masters, this is especially true in the case of women. The Zappo-Zap, who know everything that is happening, are the biggest slave traders of all even though their villages are just several minutes from the State post at Luluabourg. There is no census taking which would put a stop to at least some of the slave trading.³⁰

As far as the Protestant missionaries at Luebo were concerned there was another question which was as important as the question of the redemption of slaves: namely, did a slave or a free individual have the liberty to leave his village to settle in another village? Thus, domestic slavery became confused with the chefferie system. In 1905, Chenot explained to Martin that, although every African was free to go wherever he wished, it would create a great many administrative problems if there were constant migrations of peoples. The division of the Congo into chefferies in 1891 had been carried out in order to facilitate the control of unsettled areas by keeping people within certain limits and, related to this, was the decree of 1903 which fixed impositions on villages and chefferies. Too much movement of population would make the application of this decree difficult also. All in all, the missionaries were to understand that basically the African was free except for these restrictions.³¹

Although there is no evidence that Martin resisted the chefferie system in 1905, or that missionaries and State officers were hostile to each other, the atmosphere became tense towards the end of 1907 and early in 1908. By this time, the A.P.C.M. was fully dedicated to exposing the cruelty of C.K. operations in the Kasai and equally ready, if necessary, to expose the State also. The necessary opportunity came in 1908.

In February 1908, De Grunne went to Luebo to search for some Lulua and Baluba who were former State and company workers and who had refused to return to their chefferies. These people, in the eyes of the Protestant missionaries, were exercising a basic freedom which the chefferie system denied them, while the State felt it needed to be assured of a labour supply whenever it was required and that the chefferie system ensured that labour would be available. Several chiefs in the vicinity of Luluabourg, such as Zappo-Zap, Kammonamba, Kankande-Tambwe and Mokenge-Klutu, had complained to De Grunne that, when their subjects' work with the companies had finished, they had refused to return and chose rather to remain at Luebo. In a letter to his father, De Grunne wrote:

I promised these chiefs to do my best to return these people to their villages, under the condition, of course, that it would be in conformity to the law guaranteeing their individual liberty.

These chiefs accompanied me to Luebo, but from the beginning of my inquiry, I ran into opposition from the missionaries of the A.P.C.M. who had given protection to these former employees and claimed that they had paid sixteen pieces of cloth to their former chief and now would not allow them to return to their villages.³²

Morrison challenged De Grunne on the legality of his actions by stating that the removal of these persons would not be respecting their individual liberty. And since these people wished to remain at Luebo, why did the State not establish several small chefferies around the Protestant Mission and invest some of the former workers as chiefs? To the first argument, De Grunne responded that the function of the chefferie

system was to maintain law and order, whereas at the present time these individuals were beyond all authority since they were not working nor had they returned to their villages. The notion of establishing chefferies around Luebo also posed problems. Although the idea may have been good, De Grunne did not believe there were any persons

among those vagabonds who had the prestige and character to command the respect of village subjects.³³

When De Grunne asked to see the people involved, only a small group appeared, each of whom was able to justify his presence at Luebo as either an employee at the mission or the company, or to prove that he was attached to a chefferie. These people were given an identification certificate and allowed to remain at Luebo. In the meantime, several Bakete chiefs complained of Baluba strangers who entered their villages to steal crops, palm oil and even their women. De Grunne granted them the authority to bring such people to Luebo for questioning.

What happened next was to demonstrate the difficulty which the law on chefferies could create, not only for State officials but also for the State, the C.K. and the missionaries. The incident began to develop two days later when

...Chief Kouet returned to the State post with twenty four people roped together. I immediately untied them and examined their case. Kouet insisted

that they had stolen in his village; but I did not find his complaints well-founded enough to prosecute the prisoners. Fourteen of them, all Baluba, were however, charged with being vagabonds and, by my orders, were returned to their rightful chiefs at Luluabourg. Since the others were questionable cases I allowed them to choose a place of residence and asked the chef de poste to watch them. A Compagnie du Kasai agent, Mr. Hobe, arrived just at this time and asked me if I knew of any natives who wished to be employed by the company at Dima. I pointed out these with whom I had just been concerned as those who needed work. He talked to them and they accepted his offer of work; but, when the steamer came to get them they refused to board. As a consequence they remained at Luebo.³⁴

As far as De Grunne was concerned, this ended the incident to the satisfaction of both Europeans and Africans. Quite unbeknown to him, the A.P.C.M. missionary, Lachlan Vass, had taken a photograph of the thirty prisoners with ropes about their necks.³⁵ This picture, together with a letter written by Rev. Charles Bond, was sent to Morel. Bond was a missionary with the Congo Balolo Mission and stationed at Lulunga, from where he sent reports on State activities to Morel from 1904 to 1908.³⁶ It appears he spent three weeks convalescing at Luebo³⁷, during which time he chose to continue supplying Morel with accounts of atrocities committed by the State. Morel passed the letter on to the British press and from there the well-known Belgian papers, Le Patriote and Le National, published an article entitled "Slave Raiding in the Upper Kasai" (Razzia d'esclaves dans le Haut-Kasai) on May 7, 1908. The newspapers accused a young Belgian officer of recruiting workers for the Compagnie du Kasai and, when peaceful

means were not adequate, claimed that force was used as the pictures indicated. Although De Grunne's name was not mentioned in the press articles, he was named in the British Parliament and in the Belgian Chambre by the Socialist leader, Emile Vandervelde, on May 2, 1908.³⁸

What infuriated De Grunne most was the missionaries' attack on his good name by such false reports. He denied ever taking part in any recruitment of workers, whether for the C.K. or the State, and insisted that he was only doing his duty by enforcing the regulations applying to the chefferie system. The C.K. report also vindicated De Grunne by stating:

An officer tries to free the country of numerous loafers, he uses legal means, but because a native chief, on his own authority, ties up several people in his village, the Reverend Protestant missionaries, in remarkably good faith, use it against him. The Compagnie du Kasai has never had recourse to the State authorities for the recruitment of its personnel, the supply has always exceeded the demand.³⁹

As for Bond's letter, the same report calls it

A letter by a young man with a superficial knowledge of the facts, but, in this case, a useful instrument in clever hands.⁴⁰

De Grunne's first action was to demand a retraction of the false charges from Morrison, which the latter refused to provide. Realizing that some action must be taken to clear his name, the young officer

turned to his father, Count François De Grunne, for help, hoping that his "many connections in England will permit you to come to my aid and give me a fair hearing."⁴¹ Furthermore, De Grunne informed his father that he was beginning proceedings against Morrison, Bond and any other missionaries involved, for defamation of character. This action was taken after the visit of the State Prosecutor, Mahieu, who was in the Luebo area for two months to investigate the incident before proceeding to Brussels in August, 1908.⁴²

There were also others who came to De Grunne's defence. Jules Renkin, the Colonial Secretary, accepted De Grunne's explanation concerning the vagabonds, and vouched for the officer's good character.⁴³ The Scheutists, who were not involved in the incident in any way, also defended De Grunne in a letter to his father. Père Seghers, who had just returned to Belgium, had spent some time with De Grunne at Luluabourg before his departure and was convinced that the officer's character had been maligned. The letter outlined the various heroic exploits accomplished by De Grunne and gave testimony to his good reputation among both Africans and Scheut missionaries.⁴⁴

In October, 1908, a Deputy State Prosecutor, Munch Larsen Naur, went to Luebo to further investigate the incident. However, when Naur questioned Morrison, the missionary stated that he now had no complaint to make and indeed, never did: it was the newspapers, and other people whom he did not know, who had misrepresented the entire incident. De Grunne

wrote:

He [Morrison] will have to prove this. In any case, I received a letter from one of the missionaries, who now had a case against him, who admits to writing to Mr. Morel last March, where he spoke of me, but favourably, he says. The Prosecutor, a Norwegian called Munch Larsen Naur, is indignant; he told them they were blackmealor [sic].⁴⁵

At the same time as the State Prosecutors, Mahieu and Naur, were conducting their investigations in 1908, the British Vice-Consul, Wilfred Thesiger, was also in the area. As far as De Grunne could determine, this entire chefferie affair might work against the missionaries and, consequently, against Thesiger, since he relied on the Protestants for his information. He further hoped that if this should occur, then Morel, who was always fighting the State, would be silenced.⁴⁶

In spite of the libel suit which De Grunne had begun against him, Morrison did not hesitate to continue reminding the State of the dangers of encouraging a form of slavery by enforcing the chefferie system. At the end of September, 1908, he wrote to De Grunne about a man named Sinanduku who had been living at Luebo for about two years but was now to be returned to the chefferie of Chief Gabiaie near Luluabourg. Since Sinanduku's wife and house were at Luebo, Morrison argued that he should be allowed to remain there, even though he had been assigned to a particular chefferie. The fact that Luebo had not been organized into

chefferies at this time meant that any strangers in the area could be runaways from the chefferies to which they had been assigned. To

Morrison, this was slavery, and he stated his opinions to De Grunne as follows:

I have been afraid that this chefferie system would be easily converted into a very convenient form of slavery. If this system is worked well it will mean that every man who has ever slept a night in Melanche or Lusambo can be claimed as being attached to the chefferie there. That is the reason why when you were here seven or eight months ago, I asked that the chefferie system be established here as well as at Melanche and Lusambo, so that men could legally stop here as well as at these two places. Thus far, I have heard nothing of this request. It was approved by Mr. Gustin when he was here. Some other cases have come to my attention in which the people clearly assert that they are not slaves of the people at Melanche, and have never considered themselves as permanently attached to any one there, and yet you now apply to them the chefferie system and are returning them to Melanche, so they say. I certainly think it would be an injustice to return this man Sinanduku to Melanche under the circumstances.⁴⁷

De Grunne, who was at Luebo at this time, replied immediately and expressed his astonishment that the missionary was still not able to understand the entire legal aspect of the chefferie system. In an effort to clarify the system, De Grunne compared it to the European organization where everyone must have a residence or address; and also, as in Europe, if the individual desired to change the place of residence, this must be declared at the appropriate State offices. De Grunne added:

This is what the natives who leave Luluabourg for Luebo do not wish to understand. They never ask for permission to leave and the reason is simple: they generally leave Luluabourg for Luebo as a result of a palaver in which they are at fault and wish to escape the authorities.⁴⁸

De Grunne further advised the missionaries that chefferies were in the process of being organized in the Luebo and Galikoko areas. He concluded his letter by repeating what he had told Morrison before, but which the latter did not believe; namely, that

These are not slaves whom we are returning to Luluabourg, but perfectly free subjects who have refused to submit to the laws.⁴⁹

Morrison was genuinely dumbfounded by this definition of liberty and never accepted the State's concept of assignment to chefferies. He did however concede, by December, 1908, that at the time De Grunne visited Luebo in February, there had not been a razzia nor a labour recruitment and that, in fact, no one had made a slanderous attack on De Grunne.⁵⁰ This retraction was part of a deposition made by Morrison when the State Prosecutor, Mahieu, investigated the chefferie incident.⁵¹

It was not until June 17, 1910, that Morrison and De Grunne finally settled their dispute. The exchange of letters between them consisted of each giving his own description of what had actually taken place in February 1908 when De Grunne visited Luebo. De Grunne stated that he had responded to the Belasse chief's request by removing illegal squatters from

their territory, but this did not constitute a razzia. Morrison grudgingly admitted this to be so and wrote that

Apart from my opinion as to what the consequence of your visit might have been or as to what your intentions were your statement of what actually occurred is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, practically correct.⁵²

This settlement did not end domestic slavery nor the chefferie system, but it did clear the air for better relations between the State and the Presbyterians on those two issues. It can be speculated that, had the A.P.C.M. operated in an area where organized chefferies would have provided it with sufficient mission personnel, the dispute might not have arisen. The question of assignment to chefferies became significant when the mission's interests were affected. On the other hand, other events in the Kasai had made the missionaries sensitive to State action, and the quarrel over domestic slavery and the chefferie system became part of a much larger and more extensive protest. Some of the A.P.C.M. grievances included their inability to receive more land concessions to expand when the Scheutists seemed to have all their requests granted, a situation which caused the Protestants to recognize the extent of the State's support of the Catholic mission. Then, too, after 1901 the State controlled and financed Compagnie du Kasai entered the area and began exploiting the population through methods which the Protestants could not accept, but which, in their view, were condoned by the State. This, together with previous

State atrocities which the missionaries had witnessed, drew them into a campaign to ameliorate conditions for Africans in the Kasai. The A.P.C.M. found the support they needed in the Congo Reform Association, founded in 1904. However, before proceeding to the particulars of the campaign as it affected the Kasai area and to the details of the A.P.C.M. involvement, it is necessary to briefly examine the general background of the campaign and the nature of the accusations directed against the State.

Before 1899, the majority of the reports on cruelties practised upon Africans in the Congo Free State came from the Upper Congo area, where the Anglo-Belgian Rubber Company's monopoly on the trade in rubber resulted in atrocities. Most of the protests that were made came from missionaries who directed their appeals to Brussels, hoping that King Leopold would be stirred to fulfill his philanthropic promises by correcting the abuses committed by his State agents, notably by restoring the area to free trade as stated in the Berlin Act of 1885. In the 1890s, the missionaries' protests were made public by H.R. Fox-Bourne, secretary of the Aborigines Protection Society, and Sir Charles Dilke, a British Member of Parliament. The issue of the maladministration in the Congo was debated in the British House of Commons in 1897, but there were no provisions for international intervention under the Berlin Act and, consequently, reformers could only express their frustration.

Attacks by Fox-Bourne and Dilke against the Congo administration continued to be made in the British Press until 1903. Although these attacks may have been annoying to the Congo authorities, they were never threatening enough to result in changes. It was during the years 1899-1900 that W.M. Morrison and W.H. Sheppard of the A.P.C.M. began their own attack when they witnessed the results of the bloody Zappo Zap assault on the Pyaang of the Bakuba kingdom. Although the missionaries had previously seen members of the Force Publique ravage villages and fields, they had not seen anything to compare with what the Zappo Zap had done. The carnage, cannibalism, incinerated village and, above all, the mutilation of Africans by cutting off their hands were horrors which shocked the evangelists and stirred them to action. The investigation which followed exonerated Du Four, the State agent, but disillusioned Morrison and Sheppard with the system of justice as it functioned in the Congo.⁵³ The missionaries persisted in protesting against the State's methods and won the support of Fox-Bourne, who included Sheppard's account of the Zappo Zap raid in his book, Civilisation in Congoland, published in 1903.⁵⁴

It was not until his first furlough in 1903 that Morrison's concerns over Congo administration were made public. En route to the U.S.A., he visited both Brussels and London. While in Brussels, he conferred with the Secretary of State for the Congo on the possibility of receiving future land concessions to allow for the expansion of the mission's programme. This request having been denied, Morrison left Brussels in a hostile mood

for London, where he publicly denounced the Congo administration. The fact that he made no denunciations while in Brussels was later used against him repeatedly by both the defenders of the State and the Compagnie du Kasai, who concluded that Morrison's outbursts resulted from his inability to wrest more land concessions from the Congo administration. Morrison justified his silence on the basis that the State had not responded to his previous complaints, although he expressed a willingness to return to Brussels and confront King Leopold if his expenses were met.⁵⁵ To some extent Morrison's opponents both now and in later years, were accurate in maintaining that his protests were motivated by the inability to secure more land grants for the mission from the State. But this does not mean that the Presbyterians were not genuinely shocked by what was happening in the Kasai.

The attention of the public was directed toward the Congo and, in particular, to the Kasai, through Morrison's campaigning in England and America in 1903, and his protests were soon bolstered from another source. In May, 1903, Congolese affairs were debated in the British House of Commons as a result of the pleas of Edmund Dene Morel, editor of the West African Mail which he had established in February, 1903, to provide a medium through which to attack Leopold.⁵⁶ Following the debate in the House of Commons, Roger Casement, the British Consular agent at Boma, was instructed to travel to the interior to authenticate the many stories of alleged atrocities. Upon Casement's return to London, and after subsequent meetings with Morel,

the latter founded the Congo Reform Association. Through the various branches of the Association, including one established in America in November, 1904, the reformers sought to bring down the Leopoldian system.

Morrison channelled his complaints through the Association while he was home on furlough from 1903 to 1906. With the strong support of the Presbyterian Church, other missionary societies and the press, considerable pressure was exerted on the United States to urge Belgium to annex the Congo. After Leopold's Commission of Enquiry returned from the Congo with a report which condemned the administrative system, most Belgians realized that changes were necessary and after much debate the Congo Free State was annexed by the Belgian Government in 1908.⁵⁷

Although much of the direct conflict between the A.P.C.M. and the Congo State officials terminated with the annexation, the oppression in the Kasai continued. As far as the missionaries were concerned the brutalities committed by the Compagnie du Kasai were as much the State's responsibility as the company's, since the State owned one-half of its shares. Yet the Presbyterians' attack against the company did not begin until 1906, a fact which the company was never able to comprehend except in terms of the missionaries' frustration at being refused certain land concessions while the Catholics received whatever they requested.⁵⁸ The years from 1906 to 1909 were filled with charges and counter-charges. The A.P.C.M. gathered

strength for its side by propaganda through the mission's official paper, the Kasai Herald, published periodically at Luebo. Furthermore, in 1908 the British Vice-Consul, Wilfred Thesiger, travelled through the Kasai under the careful direction of the A.P.C.M. On its side, the company also had its defenders, one of the strongest of whom was the Belgian Colonial Minister, Jules Renkin. However, the company also conducted some serious inquiries into its own operations with results which were never publicized. Some of these results will be examined in this chapter.

The C.K.'s sensitivity to criticism can be understood. Since its formation in 1901, the company had experienced difficulties with its employees. Each secteur seemed to give rise to its own problems, which had led to several investigations by the company itself.⁵⁹ But it was not until the report of the Commission of Enquiry was published in 1905 that some of the company's methods were exposed. Even then, most of the blame fell on the State administration, but the C.K. was on the defensive and considered this the commencement of the attacks on the company from the publication of the report.⁶⁰

In general, the A.P.C.M. and the C.K. managed to coexist peacefully in the Kasai for the first five or six years of the company's presence in the area. Although the relationship was formal and never cordial, it did include amenities such as gifts for the missionaries' children on festive occasions and the exchange of dinner invitations from time to time.⁶¹ It also included sharing equipment, such as hammocks and tents,⁶² and, to

a certain extent, sharing a common goal, namely, civilizing these people "who lie plenty. We always tell the natives that we wish them to work and collect rubber, but they are disobedient and lazy."⁶³ It was common knowledge among the C.K. agents that Sheppard traded in ivory from time to time. In 1904 he sold 88.5 kilos of ivory to Cassart, the C.K. Chef de Secteur.⁶⁴ There were also occasions when the missionaries supplied porters for the company and vice versa.⁶⁵ It is possible to suggest that, had the C.K. treated the Bakuba better and had the A.P.C.M. received additional land concessions, the two foreign groups with their very different views of life could have continued to live in harmony. The chief differences between them revolved around the religious practices of the mission, which constantly interfered with the commercial interests of the company, although the missionaries never questioned the right of the C.K. to exist.

What baffled the C.K. most was why the missionaries waited so long to make their attacks. The Commission of Enquiry submitted its report and expressed dissatisfaction with the company's activities, but there was no open condemnation until January, 1908, when Sheppard wrote an article in the Kasai Herald. In it, Sheppard recalled that just three years earlier the Bakuba had been prosperous with large fields and stated that any traveller in the area would have found the people living in large houses with well-kept yards. He then stated:

But within these last three years how changed they are! Their farms are growing up in weeds and jungle; their King is practically a slave; their houses now are mostly only half-built single rooms, and are much neglected. The streets of their towns are not clean and well swept as they once were. Even their children cry for bread.

Why this change? You have it in a few words. There are armed sentries of chartered trading companies who force the men and women to spend most of their days and nights in the forests making rubber, and the price they receive is so meagre that they cannot live upon it. In the majority of the villages these people have not time to listen to the Gospel story, or give an answer concerning their soul's salvation.

Around the mission, however it is still quite prosperous.

The parents are sending their children to the school.⁶⁶

It was this article which put the C.K. on the offensive, even though Sheppard did not specifically name any company. The result was an exchange of letters, in which the C.K. director at Dima, Dr. Dryepondt,⁶⁷ expressed surprise and shock that the A.P.C.M., with whom the C.K. had always enjoyed good relations, should now resort to publishing an article which contained a series of false statements. Therefore, the sooner Sheppard retracted these statements and published an apology in the next issue of the Kasai Herald, the sooner any bad impression which readers might have received would be corrected.⁶⁸ Dryepondt stated that the C.K. never used armed sentries and their entire operation was based on

only one single trading principle, 'l'offre et la demande' (supply and demand), and natives are not forced to make rubber for us, nor any other work.⁶⁹

Morrison had no intention of urging Sheppard to apologize unless an impartial tribunal proved him wrong. This was not likely to be the case since other members of the mission could corroborate Sheppard's statements. In fact, Morrison added more charges of wrongdoing by stating:

I may say that complaints are constantly coming to us from the natives to the effect that the agents of your Company threaten them with punishment from the State if they do not bring in the amount of rubber imposed. We are prepared to prove that natives are held by force on your stations by the agents when the rubber is short.⁷⁰

In spite of these accusations, Morrison expressed a desire to continue the cordial relations which the missionaries had always enjoyed with the company, but the latter should not expect that their eyes would be blinded to the company's wrong-doings.

Morrison's final complaint concerned the Nyimi of the Bakuba who, he reported, was terrifying his people into making rubber by touring the area with "several scores of soldiers dressed like State soldiers and armed with cap-guns."⁷¹ Although Morrison had informed State officials of the situation, nothing had been done. In practice, Morrison did not believe this to be a matter for State intervention: it was simply a case in which the C.K. should act by calling a stop to the Nyimi's manoeuvres, since he operated under the authority of the company as a result of his submission after the Bakuba revolt in 1904.

The reply to Morrison's allegations was made by Louis Napoleon Chaltin, who succeeded Dreypondt in March 1908. He supported Dreypondt's earlier remarks by stating that the company's principle of supply and demand meant that natives were not forced to make rubber; they were, indeed, free to work or not to work. He then added that, as many Africans renewed their contracts for years of service at a time, this should be proof that the remuneration which they received was adequate. As far as the Bakuba chief was concerned, Chaltin stated that complaints should be directed to the State, since the Nyimi was directly responsible to the State and not to the company. Chaltin further suggested that if Morrison wished to appear before an impartial tribunal the request could probably be granted, if the missionaries would "define those [their] accusations, and give names, dates and facts."⁷²

Morrison did not reply to this letter until August 18, when he made his harshest criticisms to date. In the intervening period of time, the missionaries remained active in their campaign. Copies of all the letters between the C.K. and the missionaries were sent to Morel in London, who passed them on to the British Government and the press. In consequence, the company's General-Director in Brussels, Victorien Lacourt, issued a strong rebuttal of the allegations of the missionaries and threatened legal action if there was no retraction.

Meanwhile, in the Kasai, the missionaries gained support for their position from the British vice-consul, Wilfred Thesiger, who visited the Kasai from the end of May until early September, 1908. The very fact that Thesiger depended on the A.P.C.M. for transportation, lodging and interpreters may have influenced him in their favour. But it should also be noted that his visit was ordered by the British Government, which had become sensitive to the many reports of outrages committed in the Congo. His report was completed in September 1908 and presented to Parliament in January 1909. The report confirmed everything Morrison had stated in his letters, so that critics of the mission discounted Thesiger's report because of his close association with the missionaries during travels in the Kasai.

Thesiger's report concentrated on five chief injustices practised by the C.K. in their dealings with the village population. In summary form they are as follows:

1. By State law it was forbidden to collect rubber by means of cutting the vines and then beating the pieces until all the rubber was extracted, since this "pounded" rubber caused untold waste as well as the destruction of the rubber vines. It did, however, bring greater immediate yields than the legal method of collecting rubber by incision. Consequently a company which had financial profits as its only and immediate goal could not be expected to have long range intentions concerning the preservation

and restoration of rubber vines.⁷³ Thesiger made a point of stating that, as recently as two years prior to his visit, rubber was collected by the method of making incisions since at that time, in 1906, the Deputy Governor-General, Lantonnois, had toured the Kasai and could verify that this was the practice.

In his desire to emphasize the corruption of the company, Thesiger erred on this point. The acceptance of "pounded" rubber by the C.K. dated back to the formation of the company and, according to the C.K. director, such rubber had been accepted by its forerunners. The C.K.'s repeated answer to this charge was that they could not correct a practice which had become a way of life for the African. The visit of Lantonnois did nothing to change the company's policies. His report to the C.K. praised their efforts: his only criticism was that, occasionally, some company agents had a tendency to exercise political authority in their regions, a practice which could be excused on the basis of the great distances between State posts.⁷⁴

2. As far as Thesiger could observe, the Africans were taxed by the company even though Dryepondt and Chaltin denied the company's power to do so. The very fact that villagers were required to bring in certain quantities of rubber or, having failed to do so, were punished, constituted a tax or an impost in Thesiger's view. He found that each capita was charged with collecting a certain quota of rubber balls from each village in his area of responsibility; that some of the larger villages were

taxed at 15,000 balls; and that this meant that villagers found very little time to cultivate their own fields, or to hunt and fish.⁷⁵

3. Thesiger's most severe criticism concerned the use of armed sentries, specifically prohibited by State law. The decree of April 30, 1901, stated that no permits were to be issued thereafter which allowed for capitas to be armed with guns. Thesiger found that, in spite of this law, the capitas in Bakuba territory were all armed, a point which Dryepondt disputed in a letter written as late as March 8, 1908.⁷⁶

4. Thesiger gave examples of cases where company agents punished Africans by imprisonment for one producing sufficient rubber. He cited other cases where agents imprisoned women in order to induce the men to make up their shortages in rubber, and found that this abuse was particularly common at Ibanche.⁷⁷

5. Thesiger then referred to the company's use of the Nyimi and his troops to force Africans to make rubber and to punish them if they did not. He held that after the Bakuba revolt of 1904-5 the Nyimi had spent some time in prison, before he became a faithful ally of the European, and it was Thesiger's opinion that since the State had a half interest in the C.K., it was not likely that the Nyimi's support of company policy would be curtailed.⁷⁸ This opinion caused him to believe that, if there was to be any relief for the Bakuba, it could only come about by the Belgian Government taking over responsibility for the administration of the Congo.⁷⁹

It was just after Thesiger left Luebo that Morrison wrote Chaltin the condemnatory letter of August 18, 1908, in which he made the same charges that Thesiger was to include in his report. The only difference was that Morrison, in reply to Chaltin's letter, refused to disclose the names of any Africans or to identify any villages involved for fear of reprisal. He further stated:

Again I ask for an impartial investigation, conducted by a person or persons not interested in the rubber business directly or indirectly. This is certainly a fair proposition, and if you are honest in your expressed desire to know the truth about the matter I am sure you will gladly accept this challenge. Moreover, when the charges are established, we shall endeavor to have you punished, and your agents and all others who are the abettors of these wrongs done to the natives. In this list will doubtless be included some State official, for you know that all this wrong could not go on if it were not winked at and permitted by the State. You know also that the State and the "Compagnie du Kasai" are one.⁸⁰

Morrison added that he was quite certain that when the day of reckoning came the rubber, which had been illegally collected, would be restored to the people. Although he expressed his confidence at being able to win the case against the company, yet he expressed doubts that Chaltin or anyone else would be punished. "Even if one or two insignificant agents should be detained for a while as a show before the world, I know it will not change the settled policy of the 'Compagnie du Kasai'."⁸¹ He further suggested that, at the time of Chaltin's visit to the Kasai in the immediate future, he would

have ample opportunity "for the display of your professed interest in the natives."⁸²

The C.K. and the State conducted independent investigations into Thesiger's and the missionaries' complaints about trade practices in the Kasai and each of these investigations will be examined separately.

Chaltin, the C.K. director in Africa, visited the Kasai with his secretary, Emile Delgeur, during September and October 1908. By the end of November a summary of his findings, in addition to declarations by both company agents and Africans, were forwarded to headquarters in Brussels. The purpose of Chaltin's tour was to investigate the truth of Sheppard's article in the Kasai Herald and Morrison's letter of May 11, 1908, in which he indicated the corrupt practices of company agents at Mushenge, Ibanche and Zappo-kulua. While awaiting Chaltin's arrival, Albert Olivier, the Chef du Secteur X, made his own inquiry into the complaints against the company's agents.

Of all the accusations made by the missionaries and Thesiger, the one stating that the company armed its capitas touched the most sensitive nerves. Chaltin emphatically denied that any of the C.K. buyers were given weapons to facilitate the collection of rubber; this, indeed, was impossible since the company did not possess weapons. However, while he stated that the decree of June 3, 1906, prohibited any African engaged in trade from carrying a weapon, it should be noted that, when the decree was first published, the

then C.K. director had not only deplored this restriction because C.K. African buyers went from village to village exchanging merchandise for rubber but also added that

They all carry guns which they consider a weapon of DEFENCE. Many natives have guns as a result of the Afro-Portuguese trade. If article 3 of the decree is rigorously applied, it would have the consequence of forbidding our buyers to carry a weapon when it is not forbidden to any other native.⁸³

In spite of this Chaltin was able to identify witnesses in the course of his investigation who testified to the fact that the company buyers did not carry guns. Among these witnesses was Albert Olivier, the Chef de Secteur X, who could recollect only one case in which a buyer entered the village of Songi Munene armed with a gun. He was reprimanded and never repeated the offense.⁸⁴ Likewise, Henri Courtin, the agent at Luebo,⁸⁵ Boyle, the assistant at Zappo-Lulua,⁸⁶ Krause, the agent at Ibanche,⁸⁷ Fransman, the agent at Mushenge,⁸⁸ and eighty-three chiefs⁸⁹ who were questioned all denied any truth in the allegation that the buyers carried guns. Fransman admitted that certain buyers had had guns at one time but claimed that, when they were severely reprimanded, they no longer carried them in the course of their trading transactions.

This emphatic denial of both Sheppard and Thesiger's statements was tempered by Chaltin when he added:

It is evident that among the buyers we take into our service there will be those who possess them, as they have the legitimate right to own the flint-lock type of gun. But when they are hired, they are forbidden to travel with guns through the villages where we place them as buyers.... In the area where Mr. Morrison and Mr. Sheppard live, the vast majority of the natives have guns and they constantly carry them when they leave their village. Of all the caravans I met while travelling through the territory of the Lulua, the Bakete and the Bakuba there was none that was without a group of men armed with guns.⁹⁰

In order to set the record straight Chaltin mentioned that all Africans in the employ of the A.P.C.M. owned guns, which they carried with them at all times while travelling. The mission's evangelists were no exception. It was a mystery to Chaltin that such a fuss should be made about a practice which had become well-established and which was quite acceptable to the African. Since many Africans carried muskets, how could the carrying of a weapon be considered a means of intimidating any African or exerting some kind of pressure on him?⁹¹

This ample supply of guns was shown by the C.K. to be the result of an active trade with the Portuguese traders of Angola who exchanged them for slaves. In response to questions, Mouton, the agent at the C.K. factory at Mai-Munene, stated:

The Portuguese sell guns, cartridges, gunpowder, alcohol, cloth, haberdashery, salt, musical instruments, umbrellas, parasols, hats, knives, machettes, religious objects such as the crucifix, badges, etc. But their main trade articles are guns of all kinds, cartridges, gunpowder and cloth.

These items are traded for slaves, ivory and rubber. ... The guns sold by Portuguese enter our territory and are particularly directed towards the Bakuba through the traders at Luebo and Chief Kalamba.

Kalamba's people, laden with guns, gunpowder, cartridges, cloth and other Portuguese articles, go to Kabeya, Luebo and the Bakuba, where they exchange their merchandise for slaves and ivory, but when there is not sufficient ivory to load the caravan of slaves, they also accept rubber.

... This trade is especially lucrative for the people of Luebo, since a gun has a trade value of 3 to 4 pieces of cloth from the Lukengo, the Bakuba chief.⁹²

Further confirmation of this trade came from Crick, the Chef de Secteur VIII, who added that the abundance of guns among the people of Luebo and Luluabourg and among the Bakuba was primarily the work of the traders at Luebo. These African traders, among whom were A.P.C.M. followers, would go to Mai-Munene to work for the C.K. until they had acquired a gun from the Cokwe. In 1907, Kalamba supplied the Nyimi with guns in exchange for ivory and slaves. The Cokwe leader, Mahila, located at Djoko Punda, was also an active trader. Crick states:

These transactions are made in Bashilele territory where the chief [Mahila] goes to collect rubber. Lukengo's people cross the Kasai at Bena Luidi. For one gun, 40 cartridges and 1 keg of gunpowder, Lukengo [the Nyimi] gives a man.⁹³

This evidence indicated that it was virtually impossible to control the trade in guns and the widespread use of them by Africans, regardless of

how vehemently the C.K. officials and their witnesses denied the use of weapons. Even Sheppard pleaded ignorance when De Grunne questioned him shortly after he had published his article, to learn precisely where he had seen armed sentries: the missionary's reply was that he had never seen any.⁹⁴ Furthermore, in an interview with Krause and Olivier in March 1908, Sheppard was said to have admitted that the article which appeared in the mission's publication was not the one which he had prepared. In actuality, the article had been altered by Morrison as a result of questions the latter had asked Sheppard concerning the Bakuba. Sheppard expressed shock at reading the published version and now desired the C.K. to know that he intended the company no harm and wished to make amends in some way. His suggested solution was to publish an explanatory article in the next Kasai Herald: this was rejected by Olivier since the Herald appeared only once a year. It was, therefore, agreed that the missionary would write to the C.K. director, making a full explanation of all that had transpired in hope of repairing any damage done to the company.⁹⁵

Even though Sheppard unburdened himself to the C.K. agents and promised to do the same to the director, there is no evidence that any letter was ever written. There is, however, a possibility that Sheppard was sincere in his desire to remain on good terms with the company, possibly for his own advantage.⁹⁶ He also wished to gain more access to the Bakuba people which became possible in part when the Nyimi sent five girls to the school at Ibanche.⁹⁷ It would appear that Sheppard would have preferred

Morrison to conduct the reform campaign on his own, and that he was drawn into the fray against his wishes, for Sheppard also appeared anxious to retract his statements in which he compared the prosperity of the Kuba of earlier days to their poverty in 1908.⁹⁸

In order to refute Sheppard's allegations, the C.K. questioned Kweta, the Nyimi, two capitas, a worker and several chiefs at Mushenge who had been there before the date of the C.K.'s penetration. During the interview with Kweta, witnessed by all the Europeans at Mushenge at the time, Kweta replied that there was no difference between the plantations of ten years ago and those at the time of the interview. Formerly only the Nyimi had large houses and the manioc plantations had surrounded the compound, as they then did. The only variation was in 1904, at the time of the Bakuba revolt, when none of the Bakuba planted crops. However, Kweta continued, when De Cock restored peace, he commanded that the fields be cultivated and this the Bakuba were doing.⁹⁹ When other Africans were questioned, none complained about a lack of time to work the fields because of the demands of the company. As far as Chaltin was concerned, the accusations in this regard made by Thesiger were based on a hurried visit through many villages during the dry season. In many cases the Vice-consul did not even greet the villagers, while Sheppard, who accompanied him, allowed the false impressions to be formed.¹⁰⁰

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• At the same time that Chaltin spoke of the lack of complaint from Africans concerning company work, he also expressed surprise that the missionaries should be accusing the company of making the Bakuba work when Sheppard, in particular, was well aware of their unwillingness to do so. He further stated that the missionaries knew that the C.K. did not force Africans to collect rubber, nor threaten to call the State troops if rubber was not brought in. Although Chaltin did admit that, from time to time, it was necessary to enlighten Africans about the advantages which they received from working: "it is even necessary to periodically arouse their desire for things, but to force them to work would be unfathomable."¹⁰¹

The manner in which rubber was collected was described by Fransman, the agent at Mushenge. Although the collection of rubber was not forced on the Bakuba, it was necessary to stimulate them through exhortation, gifts and advice. If this still proved insufficient, then they were reported to the State so that they might pay an impost in foodstuffs or porters.¹⁰² This type of persuasion was justified on the basis of the great benefits accruing to the African in his development as a civilized human being. Olivier supported this statement by citing the example of Kamanga village, where the amount of rubber produced was so low that the buyer was withdrawn from the village and only returned after the village chief made repeated pleas.¹⁰³

In all probability, one of the reasons for the many charges made by the missionaries against the company lay in the competition between them, for the one sought its harvest in souls and the other in rubber. A clash was bound to occur, particularly when it concerned working hours which frequently conflicted with worship hours. When Morrison accused the company of constraining villagers either in chains or in prison or molesting them in some way, the company vehemently objected. An observation made by many of the agents was that, in villages where the A.P.C.M. had placed its evangelists, the production of rubber was usually low and, on some occasions, it ceased altogether. However, they refused to believe that, in villages where both catechists and buyers were placed, the buyers tended to interfere with the work of evangelism. Olivier stated that both functions operated very well in most cases, but invariably production dropped when catechists entered a village. It was his observation that, since Thesiger's tour through the area, the A.P.C.M. had engaged in an ambitious outreach programme. He told Chaltin that:

Mr. Edmiston has visited the Bakuba region, Mr. Sheppard has been among the Piangas and Mr. Vass among the Bena Lulua. As I told you earlier in locations where they place their catechists production drops. That is the way it was in the village of Tchifufa where they just placed a catechist. Our capita has been able to buy only 3000 balls of rubber (about 30 kilos) whereas formerly in the same period of time he brought 6000 balls.¹⁰⁴

Even though Olivier wished to give an impression of smooth relations subsisting between the company and the mission, they do not appear to have been smooth in fact. One of the constant points of friction was the relationship between the capita buyers and the mission catechists. The buyers had deadlines to meet to bring in an amount of rubber equal to the advance payment they had received. If the agent at the factory was particularly demanding, and the village the buyer was trading in was very involved in church activities, then meeting the agent's quota posed problems which required the use of violence. The catechist, too, was under pressure. He had been taught that working on Sunday was a sin and so deemed it his right to punish those who disobeyed. The A.P.C.M. catechist, Kongolo, in the village, Bena Bilulu, struck an African named Tchimasango because he was collecting rubber instead of attending church. He then took the rubber Tchimasango had at hand and tossed it into the bush.¹⁰⁵ The same catechist forbade a woman to grind corn and threw the mortar into the bush on the basis that Nzambi (God) disapproved of this work on Sunday.¹⁰⁶

As far as the agent Lamis was concerned, the mission affected the company both directly and indirectly. Directly because the missionaries attempted to show Africans that collecting rubber was debasing and contrary to God's laws, "which has led the catechists to nickname us 'Satana',"¹⁰⁷ while the indirect influence was evident in the schedule

imposed on all villagers where catechists had been placed. Those villagers who refused to obey were threatened or beaten, with the punishment being especially severe if they were caught working for the company. To illustrate his point, Lamis cited the case of Kongolo and his activities at Bena Bilulu, where the C.K. formerly had collected a large amount of rubber. He stated:

This village brought a monthly total of 150 to 200 Kilos of rubber. By June 15, one month after the arrival of the A.P.C.M. representative, the production dropped to 50 kilos. Furthermore, when my capita, Kalombo, returned he informed me that the Chief of Bena Bilulu would refuse to accept any more market products since he now desired to devote his time exclusively to practising the protestant religion.

I requested my capita to tell me the catechist's schedule. It is as follows: Daily: 7 o'clock - church services; 8:00-11:30 - school; 2:00-5:30 - school; 7:00 in the evening - church services. Sunday schedule: Church services at 9:00, 3:00 and 7:00. It is compulsory for all the village inhabitants to follow this schedule.¹⁰⁸

It should be noted that all Europeans in the Kasai, whether the state, C.K. or missionary, placed pressure on the African to meet their individual obligations. This inevitably led to clashes between them. Chaltin's investigation is replete with illustrations depicting the competition that existed between the Protestants and the C.K. Yet there are also instances in which the missionaries co-operated and encouraged Africans to work for the company, supplied porters and did not hesitate to

accept gifts from the company's agents.¹⁰⁹ The missionary who was especially co-operative in this regard was Sheppard, although Sieg and Edmiston are also mentioned.

One of Morrison's charges against the C.K. concerned arbitrary arrest and detention by the agents. Although Morrison did not mention specific agents by name, it was evident that he meant those near the A.P.C.M. mission stations. An instance was reported by Dr. Coppedge in 1908 when, accompanied by Courtin, the C.K. agent, he went to Zappo-Lulua to give medical aid to the agent, Lamis. While there, Coppedge listened to a complaint concerning the hostages held at the factory until sufficient rubber was gathered. One hostage was the son of Chief Tchifembe, detained on two occasions: the first time he was short 1600 balls of rubber and was released only after bringing 1000 balls and a male goat; the second time he was short 3500 balls but just remained in detention for a few hours. According to Lamis this was a debt which was still owing. Lamis freely admitted to using the trust system which meant that, whenever the rubber entering the factory was inferior in value to the merchandise which had gone out, hostages would be kept until the deficiency was cleared. Lamis denied ever mistreating the hostages or tying them to a post.¹¹⁰

The Chief Zappo-Lulua testified that Lamis struck him because, when Thesiger visited his village, his hunters had just returned with an animal, of which a portion was offered to the Vice-consul, who informed the chief that he was selling his rubber at too low a price.¹¹¹ When the C.K. capita

arrived, the chief informed him of his intention to get a better deal for his rubber as Thesiger had explained. Upon hearing this, Lamis went to the chief and, after some discussion, struck him in the face.¹¹² Lamis denied having struck the chief but admitted to reprimanding him severely and

I seized him by the ear and shook his head violently while I reproached him for having lied to the British Consul about the amount of time allowed to him for paying for the merchandise advanced to him. He told the British Consul that he brought his production to the factory on a monthly basis when in actual fact for the past three months I had not received even a ball of rubber. I behaved the way I did in order to prove to the natives that I was not under the authority of the British Consul as he attempted to make them believe. In spite of what I did the chief visits me regularly.¹¹³

Such was one of the incidents that provoked a rebuke from Morrison. Another occurred in connection with Krause, the C.K. agent at Ibanche. There were various complaints concerning Krause: one made by Chief Bonsa Conjet of Sengaboya, alleged that Krause had struck the chief in the face, knocking out two teeth but, when he reported the incident to Sheppard, the missionary took an indifferent attitude towards it.¹¹⁴

The most serious incident, however, occurred when Thesiger was in the area. One of the company's workers had fled to the mission when Krause was touring the villages. When Krause returned to Ibanche, he sent a messenger to the mission ordering the man to return. Krause's messenger

returned and informed him that the mission clerk, Hammond, a West African in Sheppard's employ, told him that no fugitive was at the mission and he should return with a message to his white man that he (Krause) was a tchanana (nothing) and if he sent another messenger, he would be beaten. Indignant at this display of arrogance, Krause went to the mission with an escort of five armed men¹¹⁵ and went to the residence of Edmiston, where Hammond was on duty. Krause informed Chaltin that:

At first I stayed outside the house at the foot of the stairs. I asked the clerk to return my man. At first he said he wasn't there, then he said he was in the house. I insisted, saying that I must send this man to the State and if he wasn't handed over I would be obliged to say that he was being hidden at the mission. At this Hammond became angry and made fun of the State by saying we were dirty Belgians, and that the British Consul was there and that the British would come and kick us out of the country. ...

He insulted me and I threatened to slap him if he did so again. He repeated the insult. I dashed up the steps and slapped him twice.

Hammond told me if I slapped him again he would defend himself, he had guns; and he went to get them and placed them on the verandah.

I retreated, booed by the mission people who had gathered.

When the British Consul came to the factory and after having talked about many things he told me that he had received a complaint from Hammond, a British subject, in his capacity as British Consul. He told me he came to the factory expressly to settle the incident in a friendly manner by suggesting that I make amends by paying an indemnity to the clerk.

Mr. Sheppard, who was present, fixed the cost at five pieces of cloth and accepted the payment from me stating that the palaver was terminated.¹¹⁶

In the opinion of Chaltin, the C.K. director, these incidents should not have been repeated in Thesiger's report. Furthermore, Chaltin held that agents should not be completely responsible for what the capitas did in the villages. Most detentions and beatings were the work of capitas, who were under pressure to produce sufficient rubber to pay for the merchandise they had received on trust at the factory and then advanced on trust to producers. However, the C.K. director seemed to forget that it was the company's agents who pressured the capitas to produce.

In some respects, Thesiger's tour through the area seemed, to the C.K., to be for the express purpose of finding fault with the company. The company held that, if it had been an impartial investigation, Thesiger would surely have noticed that many of the abuses committed by the company agents and its capitas were also committed by the missionaries and their catechists. A few examples have been given earlier;¹¹⁷ these, together with some incidents collected by Chaltin, constitute a list of evidence against the A.P.C.M., which can be extended. For example, the housekeeper of the C.K. river Captain, Brausart, was retained for eight days at the mission at Luebo in a room without windows while the captain was away. This was done, allegedly, in an effort to persuade the woman to marry one of the mission clerks, although Brausart later learned that the missionary Hockings wished her to be his wife. When the woman

refused, she was detained to induce her to change her mind.¹¹⁸ Detaining Africans for various reasons was a common mission practice: for example, a man named Kalochi was arrested on board the S.S. Lapsley and chained with the approval of Morrison.¹¹⁹ In addition, several Africans testified to having received beatings from some of the missionaries. One was a man named Momba who transported some products to Luebo. When he demanded payment, Rochester beat him with a leather belt and chased him from the station.¹²⁰ On another occasion, Rochester punished a man with twenty lashes for having engaged in an impropriety with a woman from the mission station, who was also beaten, while Sheppard beat a man for the same reason.¹²¹

In view of the fact that the missionaries committed atrocities, the company agents could not understand why they would attack the company for some of the very acts of which they, too, were guilty. Furthermore, the C.K. had been in the area since 1901, yet Morrison waited until 1906 to make his first accusations and the article in the Kasai Herald did not appear until January 1908. During his tour of investigation, Chaltin questioned the various agents concerning changes in the attitudes of the Presbyterian missionaries and the reasons for them. All those questioned suggested the same reason: the construction of a Catholic school at Luebo near the A.P.C.M. station and another at Demba, which was completely financed by the C.K.

All agents reported that their relationship with the missionaries had been friendly, with frequent social contact. Olivier, the Chef de Secteur X, reported that until the middle of 1907 he had sent monthly gifts to the missionaries' children, when Morrison suddenly requested that this practice be stopped.¹²² Henri Courtin, the agent at Luebo, accompanied the State Prosecutor, Mahieu, during the course of his tour through the area in 1906 and, during an encounter with Morrison, the latter bitterly complained about the fact that all the land concessions were going to the Catholics while the requests made by the Protestants were continuously refused.¹²³

Chaltin had arrived at the same conclusion before he made his tour to the Bakuba area. Through his contacts with Olivier in the Bakuba territory, he learnt about Morrison's complaints concerning specific company agents and their trade practices. Since the practices were long-standing, Chaltin concluded that the company had made two enormous errors and, in a letter to the C.K. director in Brussels, he wrote:

The first is irreparable, it is the choice of Luebo for the installation of a school of a definite religious character. Everyone knows that Luebo is, in a sense, a Protestant fief just as Luluabourg is a Catholic fief.

In all cases the State has respected the acquired areas, avoiding any clashes on the matter.

Now, what have we as traders, done; when for us neutrality in religious matters should be the rule?

We have decided to install a school directed by Catholic priests in the very heart of Protestantism.

Father Cambier acted in his role as Catholic priest when he seized the opportunity offered to him and, as soon as he arrived at Luebo, spared no effort in making proselytes in order to obtain converts. But he acted under the name of the Compagnie du Kasai which never had any reason or right to oppose the religious efforts of the American missionaries. It would, therefore, be against our name that hostilities would be expressed.

The second mistake is just as irreparable as the first, and that was to abandon Luebo and move to Demba, the other area of Protestant activity.¹²⁴

Chaltin therefore held that the article in the Kasai Herald was a method by which the Protestants could avenge the company's full support for the Catholic missionary effort. Chaltin did not believe that the A.P.C.M. was opposed to the company per se: rather, the mission was attacking the company for covertly supporting Catholicism and overtly undermining Protestantism, for the Protestants had been the first to begin missionary work at Luebo: therefore, they jealously guarded what they considered to be their exclusive right to the area. The C.K.'s action involved financing a project for beginning Catholic work at both Luebo and Demba, and Morrison was bound to react, especially since his own requests for more land concessions had been refused. And the situation was not helped when Cambier not only constructed a chapel at Luebo, but also positioned it "where it could easily be confused with the buildings of our factories."¹²⁵ Under these conditions, Chaltin was certain the C.K. could never expect the goodwill of the American missionaries again: in fact, he stated that "they will not cease to annoy us."¹²⁶

Although there is a strong element of truth in Chaltin's observations, they rest on an over-simplification. His explanation tends to play down Morrison's general concern over the treatment of the population. This concern is reflected in his actions, not only against the C.K., but also against the State, especially over African freedom of movement. It can be surmised that the ever-existing conflict between the Catholics and the Protestants, and the support which the former obviously received from both the C.K. and the State, served to heighten Morrison's criticism of both. But another point must be taken into consideration. It was not the Protestant missionaries alone who objected to the C.K.'s manner of operation: the State had frequently advised the company to correct its methods.

During most of the time from 1907 to the end of 1908 De Grunne, the Chef de Secteur de la Lulua, was in the southern part of the Kasai district settling difficulties which frequently stemmed from atrocities committed by C.K. agents. Although he had praised the company for its good work and organization in 1907, he also advised moderation in their demands. His investigation into the complaints in Bakuba territory, which are examined below, convinced him that widespread abuses were practiced by the company and that there was a need for general reform. His investigation can be considered as being impartial, since he had nothing to gain by supporting the missionaries, especially in view of the manner in which Thesiger had conducted his observations, while De Grunne and the missionaries were having their differences over domestic slavery.

It was Morrison's contention that the State's half-share interest in the company would prevent the State from conducting any impartial inquiry into the company's affairs, which caused him to believe that, at best, several agents might be dismissed, for the sake of appearances, but no thorough house-cleaning would occur and that these same agents might be re-hired and promoted. Undoubtedly Morrison had seen examples of this. In one known instance an agent, Louis Dor, stationed at Bienge, was charged with causing the death of an African by sending an armed worker into a village for the purpose of collecting palm wine. Dor was acquitted, but the worker was fired.¹²⁷ This incident occurred at the end of 1903 and, by 1908, Dor had been promoted to the position of C.K. Inspector in Secteur XIII.¹²⁸ Also, although Thesiger and the Presbyterian missionaries concentrated on exposing the C.K.'s abuses among the Bakuba population, other areas were also subject to the C.K.'s ruthless methods.¹²⁹ Morrison was probably aware of abuses in other areas. Hostage-taking, beatings and the burning of villages were common practices employed by company agents. Africans responded in various ways. Among the Sala Mpasu in the area from Tshitadi to Luiza, there was a strong resistance to the company's capitas, where the capitas frequently were killed or forced to flee: if the State arrived to make arrests, the population fled into the forests. It was in this area that the C.K. agent, Albert Schoup, was killed in 1907.¹³⁰ Therefore, frequent reaction by Africans everywhere was to refuse to collect rubber. In many areas, the company's response was to

bring in more Baluba and Lulua workers, who settled around European posts and worked for them. This, in turn, antagonized the local population even more because, frequently, these capitas were armed and ruthless. Undoubtedly, the Bakuba revolt of 1904-1905 was in part a response to these outsiders being on Bakuba territory.

De Grunne was probably better informed than Morrison, and the Chef de Secteur for one was certain that much of the criticism against the company would cease if local capitas were employed and if the trust system were abolished. By 1908, however, there was little indication that the company was effectively improving its method of operation.

In spite of the truth of Morrison's charges, the C.K. decided to take legal action against Sheppard and himself in an attempt to vindicate the company and discredit the Protestants. The case was heard at Leopoldville, between September 24, 1909 and October 4, 1909. The judge was Charles Louis Gianpetri. The missionaries' lawyer was Emile Vandervelde, the Belgian Socialist leader, who had favoured Belgian annexation of the Congo since studying the report of King Leopold's Commission of Enquiry in 1906. As an agnostic, his motivation for conducting the defence was not founded on religious support for the Protestant cause but, rather, on the possibility of being able to discredit the opposition Catholic party then ruling Belgium.¹³¹

The final issue in the case was whether armed sentries of a chartered company forced people to work or whether this accusation was false and libelous. The trial resulted in the acquittal of the missionaries and the C.K., as the plaintiff, was ordered to pay forty-two francs for court costs. Since Sheppard's article did not name the Compagnie du Kasai as the chartered company, the judge's decision turned on the inability of the company's lawyer to prove that Sheppard's article had in any way harmed the C.K.¹³² Thus Sheppard was exonerated and the company's role minimized.

The reform campaign and the trial had drawn the attention of the European world to the C.K.'s policies. A measure of satisfaction was gained from the fact that about one-third (66) of the C.K.'s agents were arrested or under investigation for having committed excesses of one kind or another. Of this total, ten were judged guilty of crimes like murder, beating, hostage-taking and arbitrary arrest: the remainder were acquitted, including Lamis and Krause.¹³³

The State's response to the missionaries' accusations was not as defensive as that of the C.K. Nevertheless, De Grunne was aware of the impact that Thesiger's tour of the Kasai would have. The State's permanent presence in the Kasai had not been too prominent until 1908 and, since it was chiefly located at Luebo, Luluabourg, Bena Dibele, Lusambo and several posts in the south, State officials were aware that injustices existed as a result of C.K. activities, as the Commission of Enquiry had

had reported in 1905. When Thesiger toured the Kasai in 1908, the Commissaire du District, Saut, requested De Grunne to investigate all charges made by the British official, because

You must know that everything the British Consul declares or will declare during the course of his ~~tour~~ will be the subject of his correspondence to his Government, which will then be published in the form of a "white paper."

Therefore I am asking you to conduct an investigation, to rectify proven abuses, and to inform me of all measures taken, so that I am able to supply the Congo State Government with the necessary explanations to enable it to protest the statements of the British "white paper."¹³⁴

Even before Thesiger arrived in the Kasai area, State officials were aware of what to expect. From the time the British Vice-Consul set foot on African soil in March 1908, he was monitored by State agents at each of his stopping places. En route to the Kasai, Thesiger toured the Jesuit territory around Kisantu and the American Baptist area at Sona-Bata. State officials noted the particular attention he gave to examining the work of the Jesuits by questioning village chiefs on the manner in which the mission procured its orphans. The Vice-Consul's interpreter for the duration of his visit was a catechist from the Baptist Mission station at Sona-Bata. Heer, the State agent at Banza-Boma, observed that Thesiger obtained his information from chiefs in Protestant villages where catechists had been placed. In the Jesuit region, he interviewed an African named Tunkâri whom Heer referred to as "a pedlar who actually is a political agent for the

Protestant missionaries."¹³⁵ Also, by the time Thesiger arrived in the Kasai, the State officials both in Belgium and Lusambo considered that he was a biased visitor intent on criticizing anything supported by Belgium, including Catholic missions. After receiving Heer's report, the Deputy Governor-General, Fuchs, wrote to the Secretary of State that

It seems to me that Thesiger's attitude is susceptible to the same criticisms you made at the time of Casement's investigations.¹³⁶

Thesiger, accompanied by a secretary, arrived at Luebo on June 19, 1908, on board the A.P.C.M. steamer, Lapsley II. His first stop was the Presbyterian Mission, where he lodged and, for his entire time in the Luebo-Luluabourg area, he was constantly accompanied by members of the Protestant Mission who acted as interpreters. Morrison guided him in the vicinity of Luebo, Sheppard in Bakuba territory and Vass and Rochester in the Luluabourg region. In some respects, Thesiger's visit was untimely as far as the State and the C.K. were concerned. In general, the State had enjoyed good relations with the Protestant missionaries until February 1908, when De Grunne came to Luebo to return some Lulua and Luba squatters to their rightful chefferie.¹³⁷ The tension this incident created between the A.P.C.M. and the State was undoubtedly a factor in influencing Thesiger against the State because of his close association with the Presbyterians.

Thesiger's first visit to a State officer in the Luebo area was to Kocher, the Chef de Poste, with whom he spent an hour in which he discussed domestic slavery and sleeping sickness problems.¹³⁸ Kocher revealed his suspicions concerning the British Vice-Consul's bias to the Secretary of State when he reported:

He [Thesiger] stayed at Luebo until June 25 and then went to Ibanche where he stayed six days. July 1, accompanied by Sheppard, he traversed the country of the Bakuba and went to Mushenge.

In his conversation with the Lukengo [Nyimi], Sheppard acted as interpreter obviously to, so to speak, legalize the article that appeared in the Kasai Herald. According to the Lukengo [Nyimi], Sheppard pointed to the consul and said, 'You see this white man, when he returns to Europe he will tell the State officials whatever you tell him, because he is very powerful'. In the Bakuba villages he questioned the natives on the payment they received from the C.K.; told them that they did not need to collect rubber if they did not wish to do so; and asked any questions Sheppard suggested.¹³⁹

The points that seemed to have irritated the State particularly about Thesiger's tour were his constant reliance on the Protestants and his authoritative manner, suggesting precedence over State officials. It was these tendencies that irritated Heer when Thesiger was in the Kwango especially when some villagers referred to him as the "English Judge."¹⁴⁰ After Thesiger had toured the Luluabourg area, a chief from Kanda-Kanda stated that the A.P.C.M. missionaries had told him that the foreign official represented a Bula Matari which would soon defeat the one presently in control.¹⁴¹

During the time Thesiger was in the Luebo-Luluabourg area, he never bothered visiting the Catholic mission stations although, when he left Luebo, he followed a route not normally taken by European travellers. Kocher concluded that going via-Demba would give him an opportunity to view the school the C.K. was funding on behalf of the Scheutist missionaries.¹⁴² Furthermore, the British Vice-Consul spent very little time with the State agents at either Luebo or Luluabourg. De Grunne particularly was piqued by this, since Thesiger made many accusations but refused any invitations to discuss them with officials. In a letter to his father, De Grunne wrote:

The British Consul, Mr. Thesiger, has just passed through here accompanied by two Protestant missionaries. He has questioned the natives in great secrecy, but it is impossible to know what he thinks. When I learned he was at Luluabourg, I hurriedly returned, but he left shortly afterwards. He did not accept my invitation to dine and I doubt if I spent more than two hours with him.

It is strange how these people have conducted an investigation with so little impartiality. The Consul did not make any inquiries of the Catholic missionaries who have been in the region for twenty years; he did not visit any of their stations; he did not question any State or company agents; he satisfied himself by visiting only those places which the Protestant Americans wished to show him.¹⁴³

To a great extent, De Grunne's criticisms seem justified. When Thesiger arrived at Lusambo in mid-August his attitude towards both the

State and the Catholic mission appeared to have changed. He agreed to accept the hospitality extended by the Commissaire du District, and not only lodged in State quarters but also spent some considerable time discussing administrative policies with both Saut and Hoornaert, the Deputy Public Prosecutor.¹⁴⁴ In a lengthy interview with the latter, he repeated his complaints against the operations of the C.K. and some of its agents.¹⁴⁵ As far as missionary activity was concerned, the Lusambo area never was the contentious area that Luebo was, so that Thesiger was at liberty to visit both the Protestant apolitical Westcott Mission and the Catholic Scheutist Mission of Saint Trudon. He expressed his admiration for the latter in their efforts to combat sleeping sickness and, in general, their interest in civilizing the population.¹⁴⁶

In spite of Thesiger's ~~apparent~~ impartiality in the course of his visit to Lusambo, this did not lead to any mitigation of his criticisms of State and C.K. policy. The content of the white paper was no secret either to State officials in the Congo, or to the Belgian Government, long before it was published. During the course of his tour, Thesiger had clearly indicated his points of criticism to Saut, De Grunne, and Hoornaert. These in turn were sent on to Boma and from there to Brussels. Lantonnois not only received the reports from Saut and De Grunne but, by mid-September, Thesiger himself was back in Boma condemning the State for its involvement in the exploitation of the Kasai. The Deputy Governor-General was convinced that an impartial report could not be expected because of the involvement of the Protestant missionaries in Thesiger's tour.¹⁴⁷

The State had not been completely impervious to the proceedings in the Kasai. In earlier years, numerous State and C.K. agents had been arrested for mistreatment of Africans, even though in many cases they were released with a mere reprimand or a light sentence. In a discussion with Lantonnois, Thésiger expressed the view that the judicial system in the Kasai was inadequately staffed to provide adequate protection for Africans. To this, Lantonnois was able to answer that a goodly number of agents, especially from the C.K., had been arrested during 1908, and thus he held that Thésiger's report could not be taken to prove that the Congo State's administrative system was inferior to that of other colonial systems.¹⁴⁸

Lantonnois was, however, much more concerned than he implied to Thésiger. In his correspondence with the Secretary of State and the Lusambo officials, the Deputy Governor-General expressed his concern about the numerous C.K. agents under investigation and stated that "this appears to denote a system in which abuse is general."¹⁴⁹ Thésiger had named Lamis and Krause specifically as C.K. agents who should be brought to justice; consequently, Lantonnois requested the attorney-general to conduct detailed investigations into the activities of these two agents in particular and into the company's activities in general. Other questions to be investigated included determining whether or not the State had assumed a passive or complaisant attitude towards the C.K.'s activities, and whether or not the A.P.C.M. had ever requested the State

to intervene in the company's trade policies.¹⁵⁰ In actual fact, the number of C.K. agents under investigation amounted to one-third of those in the field.¹⁵¹ As a result of these directives, a series of investigations began, the most extensive of which was carried out by De Grunne, accompanied by the magistrate, Munch L. Naur. Seemingly, the purpose of the investigation was not so much to determine how conditions could be improved, but rather to determine whether Thesiger's accusations were valid. The urgency in the matter rested on the fact that the findings had to be available before the publication of Thesiger's report.

De Grunne was instructed to ascertain why the A.P.C.M. had not complained earlier about the State's lack of concern over the C.K.'s unsatisfactory system of trading. He caused Morrison to list several reasons, including the missionaries' hope of an eventual reform of the company from within; however, when the company took no action even after the A.P.C.M. had corresponded with the C.K., Morrison said that he had requested action from the British Consul. Morrison justified this decision on the grounds it could be expected that the British agent would conduct an impartial investigation, which the State's representatives could not, since the State owned half the shares of the C.K. This, according to Morrison, was why the State Inspector, Mahieu; Commander Gustin; Chef de Secteur, De Grunne; and the Chef de Poste, Kocher, all chose to ignore the C.K.'s methods. In Morrison's view, any inquiry conducted by a

State representative would be influenced by the State's financial involvement in the company; therefore, an independent tribunal had to be turned to.¹⁵²

A few days after making a declaration to De Grunne, Morrison sent a letter to Naur repeating his responses to De Grunne and adding:

If the agents of the State in this region do not know of these facts, surely they ought to be punished for criminal neglect of duty in allowing to go on for many months a situation which is most shameful and disgraceful in view of the widely professed denials of the existence of such a state of affairs.¹⁵³

Although Morrison did not trust the State to make an impartial investigation, he did express the willingness of the A.P.C.M. missionaries to assist in any way possible, while insisting that an investigation without Sheppard or some other missionary being present would be worthless.¹⁵⁴ De Grunne then wrote to Sheppard requesting the latter to accompany him into Bakuba territory to investigate Thesiger's accusation.¹⁵⁵ Since Morrison was the official representative of the A.P.C.M., De Grunne's letter was forwarded to him and Morrison's immediate response to it was to forbid Sheppard from accompanying the government party. His reasons were carefully outlined as follows:

1) You [De Grunne] are purely an administrative officer of the State and have no authority, that I know of, to act in the capacity of a juridical officer. ...Dr. Sheppard is a very busy man, and he has no time for

making useless trips through the country with you.

2) Monsieur le Substitut Munch Larsen Naur has just been at Melanche. He had a splendid opportunity for investigating the whole situation, but you know that he came away and has gone off without making this investigation. You were with him at Ibanche, the director of the C.K. was there, the judge was there, Mr. Kraus was there, and many witnesses could have been gotten in a few hours. ...The fact that this splendid opportunity was not embraced seems quite clearly to point to the conclusion that there was an agreement among you not to make any investigation just now.

3) This offer [Morrison's offer to assist in the investigation] was refused. ...He [the judge] told me...before going to Ibanche, that he was going to the village of Lukengu to make investigation there. He also told me after his return from the Bakuba country, he would give me a chance...of bearing witness against the C.K. You know that he returned here, I think on Tuesday of this week, and left on a State steamer the following day. I did not see him at all.

4) Judging from conversations had with you and Mr. Munch Larsen Naur, and from the tone of your letter to Dr. Sheppard, I am inclined to believe that the 'investigation' you propose making is not intended as an investigation of the C.K., but an investigation of Dr. Sheppard and the English Consul and myself. I believe you are also trying to clear yourself for permitting such a state of affairs for so long to go on in this region of which you are the chief.¹⁵⁶

Morrison's annoyance with Naur and De Grunne caused him to suggest that word would have been sent to the villages to clear away guns so that, when Sheppard and De Grunne passed through, there would be no evidence to prove wrong-doing and the missionaries' case would be lost.¹⁵⁷ Morrison may also have been somewhat uncertain of Sheppard's ability to remain

firm on the missionaries' charges against the company, especially in view of some of his commercial relations with the C.K.

Both Naur and De Grunne conducted investigations in spite of Morrison's suspicions. In Naur's report to the State prosecutor, he indicated that, during his brief tour through the area, he had to admit that, even though Morrison's allegations were highly exaggerated, there was a great deal of truth to them. The villages surrounding Ibanche admitted quite freely to collecting all their rubber by pounding. It was also Naur's conclusion that a thorough investigation into the activities of Krause was necessary.¹⁵⁸

De Grunne's investigations provided him with sufficient information to allow him to respond to Thesiger's report after it was received by the Belgian Government in January 1909. De Grunne admitted that much of the rubber collected was pounded rubber but noted that, despite many warnings from foresters and State agents, the practice continued. The C.K. agents simply told Africans not to work when a State agent toured the area: consequently, De Grunne claimed, he never actually witnessed the collection of rubber by pounding but saw the pounded vines and, since he could not catch anyone in the act of wrong-doing, he could not make any arrests but was able merely to issue reprimands.¹⁵⁹ It was De Grunne's observation that the Bakuba did not pound the vines but rather made two incisions, one at the top, the other at the bottom, then they peeled off

the bark and collected the juice. Obviously the vine died in the process, but he stated: "they are not familiar with a better method since the company's agents do not show them any."¹⁶⁰ The Lulua, on the other hand, pounded the vines even though the State agents had warned against the practice. C.K. personnel did nothing to stop them, since the vine died in either case.¹⁶¹

As far as De Grunne was concerned, a much more serious problem existed in the low price which the company paid for the rubber. Before the C.K. entered the area, the African was able to trade 500 balls of rubber (5 kilos) for three pieces of eight yards of good quality Indigo Drill: after the C.K. was formed, the same quantity of rubber traded for one piece of eight yards of poor quality Guinea cotton.¹⁶²

Although De Grunne was willing to agree that some of the abuses Thesiger mentioned in his report actually existed, he was annoyed that the British agent had not discussed them while he was in the Kasai and, especially, that he had drawn all his information from Protestant missionaries who, in March 1908, had been questioned by De Grunne and had then made no complaints against any of the C.K. agents yet, three months later, they had accompanied Thesiger through the area finding the exact locations where abuses were committed.¹⁶³ De Grunne did not condone the C.K.'s methods, but he was baffled by the missionaries' inconsistent behaviour. He criticized various practices of the company, but repeatedly deplored the insufficient number of State agents, which rendered it

impossible to supervise the entire area. He recommended that each State post should have two agents, allowing one to be itinerating at all times.

De Grunne admitted that formerly the buyers had been armed with guns, and possibly were still armed, although he had not seen any. In interrogating various chiefs, there were numerous reports which confirmed not only the carrying of a weapon by the buyer but frequent threats of use, and actual use in some instances.¹⁶⁴ As far as De Grunne was concerned, the problem could be solved by having Bakuba buyers in Bakuba territory, since most of the complaints against buyers came from Bakuba villagers who were being urged to produce rubber by Lulua and Baluba buyers. In many instances these buyers, especially at Luebo, Ibanche and Galikoko, were formerly employed by the companies that amalgamated with the C.K. and now worked for the C.K., settling in Bakuba villages with their entire families and demanding houses and food.¹⁶⁵ It was impossible, in De Grunne's opinion, for C.K. agents to be unaware of the situation, but the shortage of State agents made a closer control difficult, although some of these buyers had been arrested and taken to Lusambo. Certainly one reason for the C.K. agents' non-intervention was because of their own involvement in securing high profits, which led to agents either tolerating abuses by their buyers or actually committing their own. As soon as a State officer was aware of a company agent's mistreatment of Africans, the agent was either arrested and discharged or placed under investigation.

De Grunne could point to the impressive list of C.K. agents under investigation in 1908.¹⁶⁶ When questioning the chiefs, all expressed satisfaction with the C.K. and its manner of trading, except for the practices used by Krause and Lamis.

De Grunne also investigated Thesiger's observations on the Nyimi, the Bakuba king. Thesiger alleged the Nyimi in 1908 was being supplied with guns by the C.K. in order to force Africans to produce rubber and he further stated that, since the Nyimi had been a State prisoner at Lusambo for some time after the Bakuba revolt of 1904, it could be inferred that his freedom was not unconditional but subject to the demands of the State, which must have condoned any expeditions the chief made in the name of the C.K. An example of such a raid took place in 1907 at Mweka, where villagers refused to produce rubber because of the mistreatment accorded to them by a company buyer.¹⁶⁷

Other evidence indicates that there was considerable justification for Thesiger's complaints against the Nyimi and his armed escort. As early as May 1907, the Chef de Poste, Kocher, was aware that the Nyimi had 112 private soldiers dressed in a blue uniform, wearing a brown fez and armed with percussion guns. Whenever the chief toured the villages, he was accompanied by at least fifty of these soldiers, who created fear and tension among the villagers because they were considered to be State troops, even though their uniforms did not resemble those of State soldiers.

Kocher informed the Nyimi that he must reduce the number of soldiers he took with him and change their uniforms. The Nyimi objected to the first order on the basis that a great and important chief must also have a large escort.¹⁶⁸ De Grunne later claimed that, while the Nyimi had not broken any law, the chief agreed to change the uniform his men wore. As far as the guns were concerned, the Nyimi had permits for them, so here, also, he was not in violation of the law. The guns were not supplied by the C.K., as Thesiger stated, but came from the south through Baluba traders, who probably received slaves in exchange.¹⁶⁹

According to De Grunne's investigations after Thesiger's departure, there was no evidence that the Nyimi had ever used his soldiers to kill villagers: they were merely an armed escort to display his power as he toured the villages. The Mweka incident had been used by Thesiger to prove the Nyimi's military involvement in the C.K.'s operations, and De Grunne spent some time sifting out the details in order to prove Thesiger wrong. He found that the event actually took place in September-October 1907, when the Nyimi was notified that the Mweka villagers refused to collect rubber.¹⁷⁰ The villagers' refusal to work was based on the mistreatment they experienced at the hands of Mokendji, the capita whom the C.K. had placed at Mweka. The spokesmen of the village claimed that Mokendji did not allow them to cultivate their fields, but forced them to build his house and provide him with goats and chickens; that he beat their

women and held them hostage until sufficient rubber was provided; and that, in one case, he caused a pregnant women to abort when he kicked her in the stomach.¹⁷¹ The Nyimi had gone to Mweka with an armed escort of sixty men, but found the village deserted. After some time, two villagers appeared and, on the Nyimi's request, promised to persuade the chief to come before him. Instead of a peaceful encounter, the villagers returned only to attack with arrows, shouting:

We do not recognize you as our chief anymore; our chief is Mr. Sheppard, we are working for him and praying with him.¹⁷²

The Nyimi did not return the attack, but withdrew to a nearby village, from where he summoned Van Cauteren and Sheppard. Van Cauteren appeared alone and attempted to persuade the Nyimi to return to Mweka with him. The Nyimi refused on the basis that, if he returned, he would open fire on the villagers. Van Cauteren went to Mweka and paid compensation to an amount equal to 54 francs (5000 balls of rubber) for the looting which the Nyimi's men had carried out during their stay in the village.¹⁷³

Krause was never involved in the incident. While Thesiger's report stated that seven armed men were placed in the village to force the villagers to work,¹⁷⁴ Sheppard stated that Van Cauteren placed one armed capita in the village.¹⁷⁵ De Grunne found Thesiger's allegation, that the Nyimi took a hostage, did not arise from this incident, for his investigation revealed that the Nyimi was called to Dungui Munene by

Kocher sometime later to settle some disputes at a time when the Mweka village chief wished to make amends for the previous conduct of his villagers by offering tribute to the Nyimi. The latter refused it, and instead, demanded one of the villagers who had fired arrows at him. The man, Bopipempi, was handed over and imprisoned for six weeks until Sheppard requested his release.¹⁷⁶

De Grunne was not able to comprehend why this incident should have loomed so important to Sheppard in June 1908, when Thesiger toured the area, considering that no mention of it had been made to De Grunne in February 1908 when he visited Ibanche. Furthermore, Thesiger's report exaggerated events at Mweka: there never was an attack by the Nyimi and there were no injuries or deaths.¹⁷⁷ According to the villagers' statements to De Grunne, it was not the Nyimi they opposed but rather the company's armed buyer who mistreated them. De Grunne also found that, although the Nyimi admitted that he went on expeditions to villages which owed him tribute, he denied killing anyone and alleged that villages which were hostile to him reported to the missionaries that he had staged attacks which resulted in numerous deaths. The chief was certain that the underlying motives of the missionaries were to divide his kingdom, weaken his power and eventually replace him with Mishaamilyeeng whom they considered to be the rightful Nyimi.¹⁷⁸ The Nyimi's position was unenviable for, apart from his fears about a Protestant intention to limit his power,

he also feared the State and the C.K. The C.K. won his support by giving him monthly gifts, such as cloth and salt, demanding in return that the Nyimi force his people to produce rubber for the company, because:

If the Bakuba work hard, the State will not make any impositions, but if they stop working they will be heavily taxed. Therefore I believed myself to be working in the interest of the State when I put many people into prison for refusing to work. Many of these were people referred to me by the capitas and company agents.¹⁷⁹

Such abuse of power alienated many Bakuba to the point that they refused to pay tribute to the Nyimi, whom they regarded as an ally of the State. The Bakuba chief also had the support of the State agents. Kocher did not hesitate to invite his assistance to settle disputes in villages dependent on him, even though they refused to pay tribute to him. De Grunne considered the Nyimi to be an enlightened man, whose authority the C.K. had abused but whom the State must support because of his devotion to it. Furthermore, De Grunne posed the question: if he were deposed, who would replace him?¹⁸⁰ Even though the Nyimi was a traditional king, he had become a European imposition as far as his people were concerned, since he could demand tribute from them as a result of the support given to him by the Europeans.

De Grunne also held that the activities of the Presbyterian missionaries were a threat to the Nyimi. The fears of Mishaamilyeeng seizing power were probably not justified by 1908, as long as the missionaries remained in the Ibanche and Luebo areas. However, the fact that both these centres contained large numbers of Baluba and Lulua aliens, who strongly influenced the surrounding Bakuba villages in their role as catechists, tended to influence them against the Nyimi to such an extent that several villages regarded Sheppard as their chief. De Grunne considered the increasing Baluba and Lulua population to be a threat to the peace of the area, especially if new land concessions should be granted to the A.P.C.M. near the Bakuba capital, as the A.P.C.M. had requested. It was De Grunne's strong recommendation that these concessions not be granted, especially since the Bakuba around Ibanche and Luebo were not being evangelized and the A.P.C.M. could not therefore be expected to evangelize more isolated Bakuba communities.¹⁸¹

De Grunne's investigation of the incidents featured in Thesiger's report revealed discrepancies in that report, but also demonstrated that many of the charges Thesiger had made against the C.K. and the State were justified. Satisfactory administration required not only more personnel to adequately staff existing State posts, but also more State posts, for this was the only way to avoid the ambiguous or ad hoc administration which had so clearly arisen in Bakuba country.¹⁸²

Upon receiving De Grunne's report, the Government at Boma sent a stern rebuke to the C.K. director in Africa for allowing the abuses referred to go on unchecked and demanding immediate reforms.¹⁸³ At the same time, the Brussels Government charged that Thesiger's White Paper was a fabrication resulting from listening to the Protestant missionaries for, by the time Thesiger's report was published, the Congo had come under the control of the Belgian Government and Davignon, the Foreign Minister, stated that the accusations referred to the old regime. He also defended the company by stating that Thesiger had interfered in local administration to a point which would not have been tolerated by the British Government in British territory.¹⁸⁴ The events did, however, begin a dispute between the C.K. and the Government over the company's trading rights, which eventually caused the latter to lose its monopoly in 1911.

Even though the State was aware of the brutalities associated with the C.K.'s operation in its exploitation of the people of the Kasai, it was the A.P.C.M. and, particularly Morrison, who exposed them to the world. It was, likewise, the Protestant missionaries who reported on the abuses committed by the State.¹⁸⁵ What really motivated the A.P.C.M. to become involved deserves consideration. The missionaries did not deliberately plan to become the leaders of an extensive reform movement in the Kasai; however, official whitewash of the Zappo Zap incident

disenchanted the Protestants and they became determined to take their case to the world. With the formation of the Congo Reform Association in 1904 they found the medium through which to channel their protests. By this date, the State's association with the C.K. led the reformers to tackle both institutions at once.

The indignation of the A.P.C.M. missionaries, especially Morrison, over the injustices committed by the C.K. and the State towards Africans cannot be over-emphasized; however, to consider the entire reform campaign in this light is, perhaps, avoiding several pertinent questions. Why did the chefferie controversy arise and why did the missionaries wait until 1906 before they openly attacked the C.K.? A general response to both questions is that, when A.P.C.M. interests were threatened, the missionaries retaliated. The Presbyterians allowed the runaways to settle near or at their stations and offered them protection. In so doing they ran afoul of both Europeans and Africans: of Europeans, in that they gave protection to Africans who belonged to a chefferie and to those who, because of their status as slaves, wished to obtain their freedom; of Africans, because they were giving protection to slaves belonging to local Africans, who were losing wealth and prestige as a result of losing part of their property. For the Protestants, these freed bondsmen became important adherents to their mission, since their location, near the Kuba people who resisted their teaching, did not provide them with many converts.

The missionaries' long delay in attacking the C.K.'s trading practices must be regarded in a broader light to include the State's policies of granting land concessions to missions. The Protestants' inability to move into areas other than Luebo and Ibanche because of the State's refusal to give the A.P.C.M. land grants, while granting the Catholics all the land they wished, even at Luebo, meant that the A.P.C.M. could no longer remain silent. The close association between the C.K., State and Scheutists became evident when the Catholic mission settled at Demba and Luebo in areas which the Protestants considered their territory. Even the C.K. realized that this was a major factor in causing the bitter attacks upon their company and Chaltin, the C.K. director in Africa, acknowledged that the company was in error in assisting the Scheutists to establish a mission at Luebo, since the State had respected this as Protestant territory.¹⁸⁶ Since the Protestants had theological differences with the Scheutists, and political and practical differences with both the C.K. and the State, the Protestants had no choice but to refute the combined policies of all three.

The broader moral issue must, however, not be lost sight of. The Protestant missionaries' genuine repulsion over the abuses committed by the C.K. were strong enough to cause Morrison to take his protests to Europe and America in an effort to effect changes. They eventually also led Morrison and Sheppard to Leopoldville to defend themselves, in a libel case, against the charges made by the C.K.¹⁸⁷ Morrison's zealous

fight for what he considered to be just, caused him to be regarded, by some Belgians, as a campaigner determined to undermine King Leopold's position in the Congo. In the Biographie Colonial Belge, J.M. Jadot referred to him as an opportunist who wanted to "create a state within a state" for his mission.¹⁸⁸ On the other hand, the reformers regarded Morrison as one who was determined to go to any lengths to gain a more humane existence for Africans in the Kasai. One of the reformers, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, expressed the opinion that "Morrison in the dock makes a finer Statue of Liberty than Bartholdi's in New York harbour."¹⁸⁹ In conclusion, when judging Morrison and his role in the reform campaign, one must credit him with any amelioration in conditions in the Kasai, as well as recognize that he was instrumental in drawing the attention of the European world to the plight of Africans.

Of all the Africans in the Kasai, the Kuba were most directly affected by the reform campaign and its results. To a large extent, Africans were caught in the middle. The Nyimi of the Bakuba was supported in his position by both the State and the C.K. since the Europeans were too weak to supply an occupying force of their own. Yet this association was sufficient for various groups of Kuba to be alienated from him, since he had become a European puppet. In addition, the Nyimi himself felt insecure, because of the constant fear that Mishaamilyeeng would eventually replace him when, in actual fact, by 1908 there was no longer justification

for such fears. However, this was one of the reasons for the Presbyterians inability to gain entrance into Kuba territory.

The reform campaign in the Kasai thus involved all Europeans and Africans who were caught in the grip of the quarrel between the different European groups. Although injustices were inflicted on Africans in the other areas of the Kasai, and there was an amelioration in conditions as a result of the campaign, it was not conditions in these areas that provided the fuel to keep the reform going. The reform campaign in the Kasai happened only because the Presbyterians were located in the midst of Europeans whom they regarded as exploitive in their relations with Africans and partisan in their relations with other Europeans.

FOOTNOTES

1. The one exception to this was the missionaries' protest against the State's involvement in the Zappo Zap raid in 1899. See pp. 90-92 above.
2. A.E. (A.A.) 65 Luebo, April 5, 1902, S. Gréban de St. Germain to the State Prosecutor.
3. In the early 19th C. one of the Kuba rulers married a slave causing such marriages to be recognized. Jan Vansina, The Children of Woot (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), p. 72.
4. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Luebo, April 5, 1902, S. Gréban de St. Germain to the State Prosecutor.
5. Ibid.
6. Hilton-Simpson, Land and Peoples of the Kasai, p. 76-9, Hilton-Simpson describes three types of slavery: "the slave trade as introduced by the Arabs; the pernicious system of letting out slaves existing among the riff-raff of the big centres; and the often innocuous and very prevalent system of domestic slavery which obtains in the primitive villages." p. 78.
7. Van Zandijke, Pages d'Histoire, pp. 96-7. Père Cambier redeemed slaves at Kalamba's market in 1892-1894 for the prices indicated.
8. Storme, Konflikt, pp. 227-9. These documents were evidently never found. In 1894 Le Marinel, the State Inspector, accused Père Cambier of dealing in slaves. Both the chefferie and the redemption policy made it possible for the State and Missions to ensure labour for themselves by allowing the continuation of domestic slavery under a European master.
9. Ibid., Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 132. Pelzer's policies were not necessarily dictated to him by his superiors in Boma. There were in fact occasions in which official sanction was given to the redemption of slaves. An example came to light in 1910 in regard to an incident which occurred in 1895 when Sarrozyn, a State officer, was appointed to a second term of duty in the Congo. On the eve of his departure the Secretary

of State, Baron van Eetvelde, introduced him to a Catholic priest, Père Van Hincksthoven who was shortly to assume the direction of the Catholic mission at Kisantu near Leopoldville. The Secretary of State told Sarrozyn to obtain as many children as possible for the mission. Later the Governor-General officially wrote to him with the same request. Sarrozyn eventually wrote: "it is at that time that I thought of sending Chief Ngulu de Wangata to Maringa where he redeemed one hundred children who were brought to Leopoldville and entrusted to the Mission of Kisantu. If the archives of that time had been conserved in the Equateur District, one would have found the Governor-General's letter on the subjects; as well as the feuille de route signed by the mission." A.F. -1-1, 1st series, Vol. XVIII Tshitadi, September 9, 1910. Sarrozyn to the Governor-General.

10. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Lusambo, February 7, 1905, Chenot to Hubin.
11. Ibid.
12. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Luebo, January 6, 1905, Motte Martin to Chenot.
13. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Lusambo, October 20, 1904, Bossolo to the State Prosecutor.
14. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Boma, December 27, 1904, Lefranc, State Prosecutor to the Governor-General.
15. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Lusambo, February 7, 1905, Chenot to the Governor-General.
16. Ibid.
17. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Boma, November 2, 1905, Baron Wahis, Governor-General, to Commissaire du District as Lusambo. The State was particularly sensitive to any adverse publicity at this time, since King Leopold's Commission of Enquiry was touring the country. Any official documentation which would tend to indicate a recognition of the existence of any type of slavery would be additional material for E.D. Morel's attacks on the administrative system in the Congo.
18. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Luebo, March 18, 1905, Rapport concernant la libération des esclaves by Hubin.

19. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Luebo, March 12, 1905, Hubin to the A.P.C.M.
20. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Rapport by Hubin.
21. Pruitt, "An Independent People", pp. 139-158. In his discussion of slavery (or Pikahood as the Europeans called it) among the Sala Mpasu, Pruitt states that the slave existed through his links with his master which assured him survival. "This is almost certainly a part of the reason why Christian missionaries found such ready converts among the redeemed slaves handed over to them by colonial authorities.

These bapika had lost their first-class status previously by being cut off from their birthright lineage. Rather than return to what was no longer "home" for them psychologically, they often settled in a multilingual conglomerate around each mission post, becoming enthusiastic and fervent converts. In their own minds, they would have become junior-lineage members of the Jesus lineage, with baptism as the rite de passage," p. 141. Concerning the above paragraph, Dr. Jan Vansina states, "This is specious. Bapika were cut off from knowledge of their lineage. If they knew it and could find it back they regained first class status. The whole trick was that (in Kwilu to this day) people refused to reveal what their original lineage or clan had been." Correspondence from Dr. Vansina, March 29, 1977.
22. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Luebo, January 17, 1905, Hubin to Chenot.
23. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Luebo, March 7, 1905, Hubin to Chenot.
24. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Lusambo, April 4, 1906, Rapport sur la population des environs de Lusambo, by Deputy Governor-General Lantonnois.
25. Ibid.
26. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Boma, June 18, 1906, Wahis, Governor-General to the Secretary of State.
27. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Inkongo, August 11, 1906, Unsigned letter to the Commissaire du District.
28. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Lusambo, February 19, 1907, Gustin to the A.P.C.M.

29. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Lusambo, March 19, 1909, Gustin to the A.P.C.M.
30. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Zappo-Lulua, January 26, 1909, Olivier, Chef de Secteur X to Director at Dima.
31. A.E. (A.A.) 65, Lusambo, February 7, 1905, Chenot to the Governor-General: A.E. (A.A.) 65, Luebo, March 18, 1905, Rapport by Hubin.
32. A.F. -I-I 1st series, Vol. X, Kalala-Kafumba, July 27, 1908, De Grunne to his father. There is the possibility that these were slaves of Zappo-Zap and returning them meant returning them to their owner.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid. In this letter De Grunne states: "The pictures were taken in a native village; no white man, no soldier, and no State representative is visible." An unsigned and undated C.K. report says: "Even though there is no soldier, no white man, nor anyone who can prove that the State was involved in the palaver, whatever it was, these men [the missionaries] are using it to declare that a razzia took place with a State officer and his soldiers in command." C.K. Archives, Brussels, Rapport, unsigned, undated. Received at Dima, October 5, 1908.
36. Slade, English-Speaking Missions, pp. 322.
37. C.K. Archives, undated report from Luebo (1908?). In a later letter to his mother De Grunne wrote: "This Reverend Ch. Bond has never come to Luebo (contrary to what I thought). He has been in the Abir, but now he is not to be found. It seems he has returned to Europe." A.F. -I-I 1st series Vol. XI Luebo, December 1, 1908, De Grunne to his Mother.
38. "Au Congo", La Meuse, Brussels, May 6, 1908.
39. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Undated report from Luebo.
40. Ibid.

41. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. X, Kalala-Kafumba, July 27, 1908, De Grunne to his father.
42. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. X, Luluabourg, August 9, 1908, De Grunne to his father. He also sent a letter with Mahieu which the latter was requested to deliver to E. Vandervelde.
43. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 134.
44. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. X, Scheut, July 30, 1908, Albert Boity, Supérieur General des Missions de Scheut to Count François De Grunne.
45. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Luebo, October 1, 1908, De Grunne to his father.
46. Ibid. Thesiger's activities are discussed below.
47. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Luebo, September 28, 1908, Morrison to De Grunne.
48. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Luebo, September 29, 1908, De Grunne to Morrison. The comparison between the chefferie system in the Congo and the domicile system in Belgium may have been easier for De Grunne, a Belgian, to understand than for Morrison, an American.
49. Ibid. Chefferies were organized in areas where the local population was sufficiently stable to make it possible to designate a chief through whom the State might exercise its authority. The Luebo area had a mobile population as a result of the influx of refugees in the 1880s and 1890s; furthermore, Luebo did not always have a Chef de Poste which would have made the supervision of any chefferies difficult.
50. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Luebo, December 1, 1908, De Grunne to his mother. When De Grunne notified Saut, the Chef du District of Morrison's attitude concerning chefferies, Saut replied: "I am asking you or Mr. Kocher to act in the capacity of police magistrate in regards to the members of the A.P.C.M. if you determine that their actions hinder the application of the State laws. The instructions concerning chefferies are to be followed. You must not tolerate the natives leaving their chefferies to go settle in another without permission. Such tolerance

would soon result in the disappearance of all authority, so it is important that the natives understand their obligations." A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Lusambo, November 3, 1908, Saut to De Grunne.

51. Ibid.

52. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, pp. 137-138.

53. The State had no choice but to support the Zappo Zap in spite of their viciousness. The State was too weak to risk antagonizing their African allies. This experience caused the Presbyterians to recognize the close alliance between the Catholic missionaries and the State, since Père Cambier, the Supérieur de la Mission du Haut Kasai, stated that the Zappo Zaps had acted on their own and Sheppard's version of the event was a fabrication. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, p. 78.

54. H.R. Fox-Bourne, Civilisation in Congoland: A Story of International Wrong-Doing (London: P.S. King & Son, 1903), pp. 259-261.

55. The authorities naturally refused to do so. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, pp. 84-9; Ruth Slade, "English Missionaries and the Beginning of the Anti-Congolese Campaign in England," Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire, T. XXXIII-1, 1955, pp. 41-3.

56. S.J.S. Cooley, Britain and the Congo Question, 1885-1913 (New York, Humanities Press, Inc., 1968), p. 107.

57. Shaloff, Reform in Leopold's Congo, pp. 96-103.

58. The Berlin Act of 1885 stated "The free and public exercise of all forms of divine worship, and the right to build edifices for religious purposes, and to organize religious missions belonging to all creeds, shall not be limited or fettered in any way whatsoever." Keith, Belgian Congo, p. 304. Despite the frequent requests made by the Presbyterians, by 1908 they had only two stations compared to the seven held by the Scheutists.

59. One of these trouble spots was the area to the west of the Loange River and south of the 5° parallel. A post at Atène was established early in 1905 by a group of company agents who committed atrocities ranging from illegal trade practices to beatings resulting in death. The post

at Kandale, founded in 1908, had similar problems. The C.K. investigation resulted in disciplinary action against several agents, but, by and large, the unrest and indiscipline of the local population was blamed on competition from Portuguese traders in the south.

60. C.K. Archives, Brussels, "La campagne contre la Compagnie du Kasai," Unsigned and undated (probably 1908).

61. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ibanche, A.P.C.M. December 2, 1906, Mrs. Edmiston to Van Cauteren, C.K. agent at Ibanche. In a letter dated January 30, 1907, Mrs. Edmiston thanked Van Cauteren for the eggs he sent her. She also extended an invitation to him to have tea with them that afternoon. Similar letters were sent by Mrs. Sheppard to Van Cauteren and Kraus. The latter two were C.K. agents the missionaries later charged with having committed atrocities towards the Bakuba.

62. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ibanche, February 10, 1907, Edmiston to Van Cauteren.

63. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ibanche, October 10, 1907, Sieg to Krause. In the same letter there was an addition by Krause stating that the Bakuba in the vicinity told him that the missionaries did not allow them to collect rubber.

64. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Brussels, November 7, 1904, C.K. General Director to the Secretary of State.

65. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ibanche, April 6, 1908, Krause to Sheppard. Krause states: "I can not let pass this day without sending you all my best thanks for the great help you had given me this morning with giving me so much from your men for transport of my baskets of rubber to Luebo. Another day you has loan me plenty cloths, now you gives me so much from your people; it is very kind indeed from you and I think the C.K. will be very thankful for all this nice helps." This cooperation on the part of Sheppard came three months after he had written his condemnatory article for the Kasai Herald in January 1908.

66. Kasai Herald (January 1, 1908) pp. 12-13.

67. Dreypondt was the director of the C.K. from 1902 until the end of March 1908 when he was forced to return to Europe because of illness. His replacement was Major Louis Napoleon Chaltin who had been active in the campaign against the Arabs. He came to the C.K. highly recommended by the State and after only three months in the C.K. office at Brussels. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Rapport du Comité Permanent au Conseil Général Réuni en Séance le 28 Mars, 1908.

68. A.E. (A.A.) 522, (344); Great Britain, Africa No. 1 (1909) [Cd. 4466] [H.C. 1909, lix] Correspondence Respecting the Taxation of Natives, and Other Questions in the Congo State, pp. 39-40, Dreypondt to Morrison, March 6, 1908, [hereafter cited as the Thesiger Report].

69. The Thesiger Report, p. 39.

70. Ibid., Morrison to Chaltin, April 27, 1908, pp. 40-41.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid., Chaltin to Morrison, May 11, 1908, pp. 41-42.

73. Ibid., The Thesiger Report, p. 29.

74. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Notes, undated (probably 1907) and unsigned.

75. The Thesiger Report, pp. 30-31. The average weight of 1,000 balls was 11 to 14 kilos, ten balls were valued at 100 cowries, about 7 1/2 cents. Thesiger seemingly followed Morrison's valuations in U.S. currency.

76. Ibid., pp. 31-2. According to Thesiger, no individual capita could be blamed for this since he had to procure the rubber quota he had been assigned by his agent or he, himself, would be punished. It was this matter of armed sentries that stirred the greatest protest from the C.K. in the months to come, since Sheppard had also criticized this practice in his article in the Kasai Herald.

77. Ibid., pp. 32-3.

78. Ibid., pp. 33-4. Although these were Thesiger's main accusations against the company, he also had complaints to make against the State. These consisted mainly of accusing the State of condoning the C.K.'s actions because of its financial interests in the company.
79. Ibid., pp. 34-~~35~~.
80. Ibid., Morrison to Chaltin, August 18, 1908, pp. 43-44.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Notes on the Decree of June 3, 1906.
84. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Luebo, September 18, 1908, Interrogatoire de Mr. Olivier.
85. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Luebo, September 19, 1908, Interrogatoire de Monsieur Henri Courtin, Gérant à Luebo.
86. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Zappo-Lulua, September 25, 1908, Interrogatoire de Monsieur Boyle, Adjoint du poste de Zappo-Lulua.
87. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ibansh, October 6, 1908, Interrogatoire de Mr. Krause, Gérant à Ibansh.
88. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Mushenge, October 10, 1908, Interrogatoire de Mr. Fransman, Gérant de Mushenge.
89. These chiefs were presented with all of the statements Sheppard had mentioned in his article.
90. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, November 27, 1908, Rapport sur l'Enquête faite à Propos des Accusations portées par les Membres de l'American Presbyterian Congo Mission contre La Compagnie du Kasai et ses Agents by L. Chaltin, p. 3. Hereafter referred to as Rapport sur l'Enquête.

91. Ibid., p. 4.

92. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Mai-Munene, September 19, 1908, Rapport sur les opérations commerciales des Portugais by Mouton.

93. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Chabongo, September 27, 1908, Rapport sur le commerce des Portugais-Origin des Fusils à Piston by Crick, Chef du Secteur VIII.

94. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Rapport sur l'Enquête, p. 4.

95. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ibanche, March 26, 1908, Rapport by Krause and Olivier, pp. 83-4. These two C.K. agents claimed that Sheppard appeared at the factory on the above date wishing to engage the C.K. agents in a conversation concerning the article. In summary, the missionary's statement was as follows: 1) In 1906 Morrison had questioned him about the Bakuba and even though the tenor of the article was that of Sheppard, the specific accusations were added by Morrison; 2) It was regrettable that Morrison and Vass (who had an uncontrollable temper) continually became involved in political matters instead of concentrating on religious concerns; 3) It had never been his (Sheppard's) intention to become involved in political matters and he had no accusations to make against the C.K. The one exception to this was a dispute he had had with Van Cauteran, the agent at Ibanche in 1906; 4) It was unjust to complain about the Nyimi since he had done so much for the Ibanche mission.

96. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ibanche, March 30, 1908, Sheppard to Krause. The C.K. agents gave Sheppard 20 basins for the girls' school in exchange for a few pieces of cloth. On April 20, 1908, Sheppard sent him a note stating, "I know that you have much work to do at this time and that you need some help. Tomorrow I am sending some natives to Luebo to get salt, would you like them to transport 50 or 60 baskets of rubber for you." Sheppard also traded in ivory.

97. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ibanche, January 23, 1908, Sheppard to Krause. Sheppard considered this the beginning of the softening of the chief's attitude towards the A.P.C.M.

98. The Thesiger Report, pp. 34-35.

99. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Mushenge, October 10, 1908, Interrogatoire du Chef Kweta. The Europeans included Emil Torday, the Hungarian explorer,

Melville W. Hilton-Simpson, the British explorer, and Promontorio, Fransman, and Chaltin of the C.K.

100. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Rapport sur l'Enquête, pp. 6-7.

101. Ibid., p. 9.

102. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Mushenge, October 10, 1908, Interrogatoire de Mr. Fransman.

103. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Rapport sur l'Enquête, p. 9.

104. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Luebo, September 18, 1908, Interrogatoire de Mr. Olivier.

105. Ibid.

106. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Zappo-Lulua, September 25, 1908, Interrogatoire du nommé Molomba, Capita des travailleurs à Zappo-Lulua.

107. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ibanche, October 5, 1908, Interrogatoire de Mr. Lamis, Adjoint à Ditung.

108. Ibid.

109. These included items for the school: cloth, seeds, and tobacco.

110. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ibanche, October 5, 1908. Interrogatoire de Mr. Lamis, Adjoint à Ditung.

111. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Zappo-Lulua, September 25, 1908, Interrogatoire du Chef Zappo-Lulua. Thesiger told the chief that for one piece of strong cloth he should pay 300 balls instead of 500; for a piece of Americani cloth 250 balls instead of 400; for a blanket 200 balls instead of 500; and for a red hat 100 balls instead of 200 balls.

112. Ibid.

113. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ibapehe, October 5, 1908, Interrogatoire de Mr. Lamis.

114. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Sengaboya, October 7, 1908, Déclaration du Chef Bonsa Conjet de Sengaboya.

115. According to Chaltin, Ibanche was the only station where any agent had a corps of armed men: these were particularly Krause's men, who accompanied him on his village tours. Undoubtedly the missionaries' complaints regarding armed sentries also concerned these men, whom Krause was ordered to disarm after Chaltin's tour.

116. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ibanche, October 6, 1908, Interrogatoire de Mr. Krause, gérant à Ibanche. During January or February 1908 Hammond, who was a mason for the A.P.C.M. at Luebo, killed a Bakete woman by striking her with his gun while he was drunk. He was arrested by the Luebo police and his gun was returned to the missionary to whom it belonged. Hammond was released a few days later by De Grunne upon the insistence of Morrison and after paying 30 pieces of cloth to the woman's family. Hammond was then sent to Ibanche and by January 1909 he was on his way back to Accra. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Zappo-Lulua, January 26, 1909, A. Olivier to Chaltin.

117. See pages 383-384 above.

118. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Luebo, September 18, 1908, Declaration du Capitaine Brausart.

119. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Luebo, September 18, 1908, Interrogatoire de Mr. Olivier.

120. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Village near Luebo, October 5, 1908, Declaration du nommé Momba. Rochester was a black American from Alabama.

121. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Ibanche, October 9, 1908, Declaration de Albert Olivier.

122. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Luebo, September 18, 1908, Interrogatoire de Mr. Olivier.

123. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Luebo, September 19, 1908, Interrogatoire de Henri Courtin, Gérant à Luebo.

124. C.K. Archives, Dima, June 5, 1908, Chaltin to C.K. Director in Brussels.

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

127. A.E. (A.A.) 527, District du Lualaba-Kasai. Actes de Mauvaises traitements, 1902-4.

128. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Lubue, February 19, 1908, Inspector Dor, Rapport sur l'indiscipline des travailleurs noirs.

129. These have been referred to in Chapter V above in the discussion on the Bakuba revolt.

130. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Bakete, August 4, 1909, Buysee to the Chef du Secteur de la Lulua.

131. Shaloff, King Leopold's Congo, pp. 102, 121.

132. Ibid., pp. 115-127. Shaloff deals in detail with the proceedings of the trial.

133. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Rapport du Comité Permanent au Consul Général du 6 Mars 1909.

134. A.E. (A.A.) 212, Lusambo, August 15, 1908, Saut to De Grunne.

135. Ibid., Banza-Boma, April 27, 1908, Heer to the Commissaire du District.

136. Ibid., Boma, May 18, 1908, Vice-Governor-General, Fuchs, to the Secretary of State. See also pp. 353-355 above.

137. See pp. 353-356.

138. The incidence of sleeping sickness in certain areas of the Kasai was relatively light. Thesiger noted that in the Bakuba area he had seen only one case and heard of another. At Luebo the A.P.C.M. had constructed a lazaret which was under the direction of Dr. Coppedge and this had six patients in it at the time of Thesiger's visit in 1908. A greater incidence of the disease existed in the Lusambo area, where the Scheutists had a hospital at their St. Trudon Mission which had eighty patients in it when Thesiger visited it. Thesiger's Report, pp. 38-39. These observations are confirmed by the A.P.C.M. and the State in 1908 when the mission requested the State to supply funds to construct a permanent hospital at Luebo for the treatment of sleeping sickness patients even though, Morrison stated, the existing facility was frequently empty. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Luebo, September 23, 1908, Morrison to De Grunne. The State's reply was that the Luebo area was not considered to have the most urgent need for a hospital and a delay in constructing one there would be necessary. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Luebo, De Grunne to Morrison. The C.K. was also occupied with the question of sleeping sickness and, in February 1908, began constructing a hospital at Pangu (on the Kasai near the mouth of the Loange River) which was intended to service the C.K.'s concessionary area. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, February 28, 1908, Dryepondt to Père Cambier.

139. Ibid., Luebo, July 31, 1908, Kocher to the State Prosecutor.

140. Ibid., Banza-Boma, April 27, 1908, Heer to the Commissaire du District.

141. Ibid., Luluabourg, September 12, 1908, De Grunne to the Commissaire du District.

142. Ibid., Luebo, July 31, 1908, Kocher to the State Prosecutor.

143. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. X, Luluabourg, August 9, 1908, De Grunne to his father.

144. A.E. (A.A.) 212, Lusambo, August 21, 1908, Saut to the Governor-General.

145. Ibid., Lusambo, August 22, 1908, Hoornaert to Gréban de Saint Germain, State Prosecutor at Leopoldville.

146. Ibid., Lusambo, August 21, 1908, Saut to the Governor-General.

147. Ibid., Boma, September 14, 1908, Lantonnois to the Secretary of State.

148. Ibid., Lantonnois told Thesiger that his brief visit in one small area was not sufficient to judge the administration of the colony anymore than the assassination of a District Commissioner in Uganda in broad daylight was sufficient to form unfavourable conclusions about the British colonial system.

149. Ibid.

150. Ibid., Boma, September 28, 1908, Lantonnois to the Attorney-General.

151. Ibid., Boma, September 28, 1908, Lantonnois to the C.K. Director at Dima.

152. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Luebo, September 28, 1903, Morrison's Declaration.

153. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Luebo, October 1, 1903, Morrison to Munch L. Naur.

154. Ibid.

155. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XII, Ibanche, October 8, 1908, De Grunne to Sheppard. After De Grunne and Naur completed their investigation around Luebo, they proceeded to Ibanche. They were not accompanied to Luebo by Chaltin as suggested by Shaloff in Reform in Leopold's Congo, pp. 114-115, although Chaltin was at Zappo-Lulua at the time and all three were to meet at Ibanche in early October.

156. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Luebo, October 9, 1908, Morrison to De Grunne.

157. Ibid. Undoubtedly Morrison knew of Sheppard's statement to De Grunne at Ibanche in which he cleared Krause of any part in the attack on Mwaka village in September 1907 (see below), although he did attest to Krause's brutality at Ibanche. Furthermore, Sheppard stated that only some of the C.K.'s capitas were armed (1907) and he had no way of knowing whether the C.K. provided these weapons. Sheppard concluded his declaration by stating that he had no complaint to register against any C.K. agent nor against the Nyimi, A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Ibanche, October 6, 1908. Sheppard's Declaration.

158. Ibid., October 22, 1908, Maur to the State Prosecutor. Maur explains his brief investigation was due to an assignment elsewhere but that, prior to departing, he had given De Grunne the authority to conduct a more thorough investigation.

159. A.E. (A.A.) 522, Luluabourg, October 5, 1909, Avis et considérations of De Grunne.

160. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, General Considerations by De Grunne. Undated, probably November 1908.

161. Ibid.

162. A.E. (A.A.) 522, Luluabourg, October 5, 1909, Avis et considérations of De Grunne. Considering that many Africans who travelled long distances to procure rubber De Grunne considered the C.K.'s prices unjustifiably low. According to the Africans a vine as long and thick as an arm produced three to four hundred balls when pounded.

163. Ibid.

164. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Enquête chez les Indigènes by De Grunne from October 3-13, 1908. During these investigations De Grunne also received many complaints about the missionaries' practices.

165. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, General Considerations by De Grunne. Many of these Lulua and Baluba were actually idle and established themselves wherever they desired. It was a group of these people that De Grunne had attempted to return to their chefferie in February 1908 when he was accused of slave raiding by Morrison.

166. A.E. (A.A.) 522, Luluabourg, October 5, 1909, Avis et considérations of De Grunne.

167. Thesiger's Report, p. 33.

168. A.E. (A.A.) 212, Luebo, September 9, 1908, Kocher to the Commissaire du District.

169. A.E. (A.A.) 522, Luluabourg, October 5, 1909, Avis et considérations of De Grunne, p. 32. These guns bore Portuguese marks.

170. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, October 15, 1908, Déclaration de Lukengo, stated that Mokendji, the C.K. capita at Mwaka came to him on behalf of Van Cauteren, the C.K. agent at Ibanche, to register the complaint. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Ibanche, October 6, 1908, Déclaration du Révérend Sheppard, Sheppard claimed that Van Cauteren himself had called upon Lukengo to assist in forcing the villagers to bring in rubber. This is seemingly a minor detail except that, if Sheppard was right, then the accusation that the C.K. was using the Nyimi to procure rubber by force was justified.

171. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Enquête chez les indigènes.

172. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Déclaration de Lukengo [Nyimi].

173. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Vol. XI, Enquête chez les indigènes.

174. The Thesiger Report, p. 33.

175. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Ibanche, October 6, 1908, Sheppard's Declaration.

176. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Déclaration de Lukengo [Nyimi].

177. A.E. (A.A.) 522, Avis et considérations by De Grunne.

178. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Déclaration de Lukengo [Nyimi].

179. Ibid.

180. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Considération Générales by De Grunne.
181. A.E. (A.A.) 522, Avis et considérations by De Grunne.
182. A.F. -1-1 1st series, Considérations Générales by De Grunne.
183. C.K. Archives, Boma, December 23, 1908, Ghislain to Chaltin.
184. A.E. (A.A.) 522, Brussels, January 23, 1909, Davignon to Hardinge.
185. See pp. 90-92 above.
186. See pp. 390-391 above.
187. See pp. 394-395 above.
188. Biographie Coloniale Belge (1955), Tome IV, p. 633.
189. Arthur Conan Doyle, The Crime of the Congo (New York, 1909), p. iv.

CONCLUSION AND EPILOGUE

The year 1908 marked a change in the legal status of the Congo, for the Congo Free State was annexed by Belgium as the Belgian Congo. Belgian public opinion had been aroused against King Leopold's administration by forces within Belgium and outside it. The report of Leopold's Commission of Enquiry, as well as the writings of Cattier and Vermeersch¹, favoured a Belgian takeover of the Congo; while external pressure came from the Congo Reform campaign, which was active in both Britain and the United States, causing public opinion to favour similar action. The annexation question, which had been discussed from time to time by the Belgian Government since July 1907, was a key issue in the May 1908 election which returned the Catholic party and, in August and September, votes taken in both the Belgian Chambre and the Senate, favoured annexation.² The year 1908, consequently, represents a political watershed, even though it soon became evident that there was no immediate distinction between the Belgian administration and that of the former Congo Free State: within the Congo itself there was merely an intrusion of a new factor.

In the Kasai area, European intrusion in the Free State era had been gradual and limited: gradual, in that there were no defined watersheds;

and limited, in that vast areas of the Kasai region were not brought under European colonial control until the 1920s. The impact of Europeans, however, affected Africans in varying degrees in their social, cultural, economic, religious and political life. This impact stemmed from events connected with Wissmann's arrival in the Kasai in 1881.

Wissmann's expedition was a prelude to a European occupation which, hastened by the formation of the Congo Free State in 1884-1885, by 1891 involved traders and missionaries as well as agents of the State. The active Luso-African trade³ in the Kasai, which preceded European economic penetration, had created the southern access route into the area. The existence of this southern route made State penetration along a viable northern route from within the Congo Basin essential to prevent the loss of wealth from the Kasai into Angola. The discovery that the Kasai and Sankuru Rivers were navigable made access into the Kasai from the north possible, and this made it possible for the State to resist Arab expansion from the east,⁴ the third external interest attempting to intrude into the Kasai area in the 1880s and early 1890s. The defeat of the Arabs in 1894, through the combined efforts of the Congo Free State and its African allies, gave credibility to Leopold's pronouncements about campaigning against the slave trade in general, even though the State did not make the same effort to combat ~~Cokwe~~ slave raiding within the Kasai itself. The State's defeat of the Arabs thus, in one sense, had a marginal impact on the Kasai.

The State was unable to occupy the Kasai effectively. Its manpower was limited and the State was forced to depend on African allies, specifically because the State had to use the Kasai as a springboard from which to defeat the Arabs and occupy the Katanga. The State's choice of African allies was dictated by African politics as much as by European diplomacy, as its relations with Kalamba Mukenge demonstrate. His attempt to create a Lulua kingdom under his own leadership required him to associate with the State in order to exploit the prestige and power that the white foreigners symbolized. Subsequent disenchantment with State officials led to Kalamba's withdrawal from Luluabourg and his union with the earlier Cokwe intruders in the southern part of the Kasai, since the Cokwe were an alternative intruding force which could be manipulated. This association revived Cokwe resistance, and contributed to the continuance of an Angolan-based political and economic threat to the European presence in the Kasai into the 1920s.⁵

The financial burden of creating the State caused Leopold to welcome the participation of private trading companies and missionary societies in his enterprise, in order to "civilize" Africans in the Free State. In the Kasai, trading companies established factories along the Kasai and Sankuru Rivers in order to exploit the rich rubber resources along these rivers. However, by 1901, it was held that competition between the fourteen companies was reducing profits to the companies and the State, so that the companies were amalgamated to form the Compagnie du Kasai, which enjoyed a de facto

monopoly over the Kasai and Kwango areas until 1911. The State owned one-half of the new company's shares and enjoyed managerial control over its operations, so that the C.K. became the State's right arm, a position which hindered the State as much as it helped it, since State assistance was frequently required in areas where the C.K.'s methods created problems. The Kuba provide an example. The incessant demands made by the C.K. on the African for the collection of rubber, and by the State for the payment of imposts, augmented by the general employment of displaced Africans, such as the Baluba and the Lulua, caused a revolt among the Kuba in 1904-1905.⁶ The revolt led to a punitive expedition, which in turn resulted in the full submission of the Nyimi, Kot aPe, and his subsequent collaboration with the colonial system to satisfy Kot aPe's own needs, just as Kalamba Mukenge had done. For the European, the Nyimi's cooperation was an advantage since it obviated a need to occupy Kuba territory which, in the Free State period, was an impossibility in any case because of a shortage of administrative personnel.

Joint action by the C.K. and the State was not as successful in the southern part of the Kasai area as it was in the north, since the Cokwe and Sala Mpasu offered more effective resistance because they could draw weapons from Angola. The C.K.'s methods in Sala Mpasu territory, and the support given to the company by the State when company capitas and agents were attacked, demonstrated the existence of an alliance between the European groups to the Sala Mpasu, while De Grunne's ignorance of relationships

between the Kete and the Sala Mpasu allowed the Kete to use the European to settle an old score with their Sala Mpasu enemies.⁷ The result was to further alienate the Sala Mpasu and to unite them in opposition against the State which, again, was not broken down until the 1920s.⁸

By 1908 the success of the State and the C.K. can be measured in terms of the number of State posts and C.K. factories established throughout the Kasai. For some Africans, like the Sala Mpasu, it meant that by 1908 their independence was threatened by a European administrative structure backed by African auxiliaries, such as the Zappo Zap. Other Africans, such as the Kete and certain groups of Lulua and Lunda, were already subordinated.

The third European influence to have an impact on Africans in the Kasai were the Catholic and Protestant missionaries who, despite their common objective of establishing an indigenous African Church, brought with them the sectarian divisions created by the Reformation, which resulted in local rivalry and bitterness. As far as resources and personnel were concerned, the small Luebo-based Presbyterian mission was no match for the larger Scheutist organization, which was supported by the State and the C.K. For the Presbyterians, frustration resulted, since the Scheutists were seemingly allowed to prosper by securing new land acquisitions and converts, while the Presbyterians were not only refused access to the Kuba by the Africans themselves, but were denied land grants by the State.

Both missions benefitted from the services of the migratory Luba and Lulua, who settled around the stations and became the first converts and catechists.

Conflict and controversy were the life blood of the A.P.C.M. mission, in part because of the character of William McCutchan Morrison, an outspoken Protestant leader, who fought for what he believed was right. Under his leadership, the Presbyterians experienced serious frustration because of conflicts generated by the actions of the State and the C.K. American. Ideas on individual freedom differed from those held by Belgian officials in the service of the State,⁹ a difference in attitude which involved the Presbyterians eventually in a dispute with De Grunne over the chefferie system, in which the missionaries' belief that they themselves were chiefs in the Luebo area was a contributory factor.¹⁰ Similarly, this view of their political role, combined with their belief that they held a monopoly right to evangelize the area surrounding Luebo because of prior entry, led to a conflict with the C.K. when that company facilitated Catholic Scheutist penetration of what had been a recognized Protestant missionary preserve. Presbyterian hostility to the State and the C.K. over these incidents increased their frustration over the obstacles placed in their path in regard to their attempt to evangelize the Kuba, which was not mitigated by their failure to recognize that Kuba hostility to the A.P.C.M. arose because the mission chose to grant asylum to Mishaamilyeeng, and so to become involved in internal Kuba politics, was also a factor.

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The frustrations stemming from the disputes over the chefferie system, the Catholic intrusion around Luebo and the Kuba question explain why Morrison led the attack on the Leopoldian system in the Kasai, once his own inability to compromise and his genuine - if somewhat self-serving - concern over individual rights are recognized. However, although he may have had mixed motives and allowed himself to be influenced by selfish ambitions, particularly over the question of more land for mission stations for the A.P.C.M., it would be wrong to allow this to detract from his genuine interest in and concern for the African.

It was this genuine concern that led Morrison to take up the cause for reform in the Kasai by doing his part to undermine the position of Leopold in the Congo. Morrison's fight for his ideals led him to fearlessly crusade in London, Washington and Brussels in an attempt to gain satisfaction. Nor did he flinch when he was charged with libel by the C.K.¹² for as a result of his vindication, he was in part responsible for the amelioration of conditions in the Kasai.

By 1908 all three European groups, the State, the C.K. and the missionaries, had managed to extend their control over a wider area in the Kasai from their initial small beginnings. Of the three, the missionaries' influence was the least extensive. The Presbyterians remained within the Luebo and Ibanche area, and it was not until 1912 that further land concessions

were granted to them so that they could expand into Lulua territory by opening a station at Mutoto, north-east of Luluabourg.¹³ In the meantime, their attitude towards the new Belgian regime was more conciliatory, but the desire to encourage more Protestant converts led the Presbyterians to encourage the Methodist and Mennonite missions to enter the field and enlarge Protestant influence by establishing stations in the Lusambo area and south of Luebo.

The Scheutists, equally, sought to counter Protestant influence by expansion, especially through close association with the C.K. Père Seghers of Hemptinne expressed the Catholic position very bluntly in 1909 when, after he had arranged for C.K. agents to accept catechists at their factories and to construct chapels and living accommodation for them, so that they might gain greater recognition among the workers, he stated that the purpose was the defeat of Protestantism.¹⁴ Such a close alliance between the C.K. and the Scheutists was designed to benefit the company, since the Catholic mission not only supplied it with porters but also with personnel to direct the affairs of the factories and food plantations. At the same time, the alliance created confusion in the minds of Africans when priests, like Polet, doubled as both C.K. agents and priests. There was no immediate change in the C.K.'s trading methods after the annexation of the Congo: practices, such as the trust system, though declared illegal, were still widely used¹⁵ and were indeed, sanctioned by

Chaltin on the grounds that abolishing the practice would jeopardize trade.¹⁶ Other practices, such as arming company capitas, also continued and, in the Sala Mpasu area, the C.K. methods led to its capitas being killed or fleeing after their tactics provoked local African opposition.

State expansion was hampered after 1908 by shortage of personnel, as it had been through the earlier period. In the Kuba area the State collaborated with the Nyimi by investing him as chief over an area bounded by the Sankuru, Kasai and Lulua Rivers, in which there were about 200 villages populated by various peoples.¹⁷ The intention was to support the Nyimi so that his prestige among his people would result in a recognition of his authority. Although the Nyimi found this to be to his advantage, not all his subjects submitted to him and, by 1910, the State established a post at Mushenge in order to reinforce his authority. In spite of this, some of his peoples, like the Pyaang and Ngeende, remained in rebellion against the State until 1918.

In the southern area, the State's influence extended into the Dilolo area and into Kanlok territory. However, lack of sufficient supervisory personnel made it impossible to maintain a close link with invested chiefs, or even to establish chefferies in those areas that submitted. Furthermore, in many areas among the peoples in the southern region, there were no traditional chiefs through whom the Europeans could govern: in this region,

therefore, finding a politically safe African to act as chief required more time than State agents were able to find. The State's problems in the south were also accentuated by another factor until the 1920s: the Luso-African trade. The State's actions between 1901 and 1908 had checked, but not broken, the Angolan arms' traffic and, until that traffic ceased, African groups near the border with Angola were able to preserve their independence.

Penetration into the Kasai was initiated by Africans from the south, and European intrusion from the north required a redirection of internal influence which was not completed until the 1920s because the State was weak and had more serious problems elsewhere. The companies and the C.K., up to and after 1908, were also weak and only able to exert limited economic and, at times, political influence. The missionaries directed their attention to the territory surrounding Luebo and Luluabourg primarily because that was the area populated by Africans whom they stood some chance of influencing. European political, religious and commercial penetration, from 1886 onwards, caused political economic and religious fluidity or flux to develop in the Kasai, which continued beyond 1908 and into the 1920s. External intrusion into the Kasai area was, therefore, a very gradual process and, by 1908, it is clear that only the parameters of penetration had been defined. The process of penetration did not end with the annexation of the Congo by Belgium, although such annexation did mark the beginning of the end of that phase of European contact with the peoples of the Kasai.

FOOTNOTES

1. Both men were influential in Belgium. Félicien Cattier, who wrote the book Etude sur la situation de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo, was a lawyer and professor at the University of Brussels. His free-thinking and anti-Catholic stand caused him to reject the despotic regime Leopold had set up in the Congo and the only solution, according to Cattier, was immediate annexation by Belgium. Father Arthur Vermeersch, who wrote La question congolaise (Brussels: Imprimerie Scientifique Charles Bulens, 1906), was a well-known Jesuit theologian who defended the Catholic missionaries in the Congo but criticised the administration and, by his writings, insisted that Belgium must assume responsibility for a more humane and just administration in the Congo.
2. Keith, Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act, pp. 142-143.
3. See Chapter II above.
4. See Chapter III above, especially pp. 76-77 and Map II.
5. See Chapter III above, especially pp. 76-78.
6. See Chapter V above, especially pp. 76-78.
7. Pruitt, "An Independent People," pp. 394-395.
8. It was not until 1928 and 1929 that the Sala Mpasu submitted to the State as a result of a campaign led by Alfred Jobaert, the Territorial Administrator in the area. Ibid., pp. 411-412.
9. See Chapter IX above, especially pp. 342-343.
10. Ibid., pp. 353-355.
11. Ibid., pp. 390-392.

12. Ibid., pp. 414-418.

13. Wharton, Led in Triumph, p. 90. In 1913 a land grant was given to the A.P.C.M. at Lusambo and, in 1915, they arrived in the heart of the Kuba kingdom at Bulape.

14. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Hemptinne, March 11, 1909, Père Seghers to the C.K.

15. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, January 4, 1908, Circular no. 99 by Chaltin.

16. C.K. Archives, Brussels, Dima, May 20, 1909, Chaltin to Olivier. In his closing comments Chaltin added "La lettre tue, l'esprit vivifie."

17. Luebo, Renseignements politiques et divers, 1904-1908.

APPENDIX

The Administrative Council of the Compagnie du Kasai on December 31, 1901.¹

Count Jean de Hemptinne, President (formerly director of La Djuma)

Victorien Lacourt, Administrator and General Director (formerly director of the Plantations Lacourt).

Victor Begerem, Administrator

Alexander Delcommune, Administrator (soldier and explorer)

Jules Van Hulst, Administrator (formerly director of Belgika)

Oscar de Bauw, Administrator (formerly director of Est. du Kwango)

Francois Van Mael, Administrator (formerly director of Trafic Congolais)

Emile Delcommune, Administrator

Paul de Clippele, Administrator (formerly director of Centrale Africaine)

G. Philippi, Administrator (formerly director of NAHV)

G. Bruneel de Montpellier, Administrator

Camille d'Heygère, Administrator (formerly director of Lubéfu and SAPV)

Alexis Mols, Administrator

Richard Vlemincz, Administrator (formerly director of La Kassaienne)

J. Wegimont, Administrator (formerly director of La Loange)

The supervisory body consisted of Count Ch. de Broqueville, future Prime Minister of Belgium and Louis Van de Velde, former director of the Comptoirs Velde.

The working capital was set at 1,005,000 francs, divided into 4,020 shares to bearer of 250 francs each. The capital could be increased. This capital was subscribed one-half by the State and one-half by the fourteen companies according to their personal property and real estate. The division is as follows²:

The Congo Free State	fr. 502.500
The "Nieuwe Afrikaansche Handels Vennootschap". . .	85.000
The Limited Company "Société Belge pour le Commerce du Haut Congo".	85.000
The Limited Company "Société des Produits Végétaux du Haut Kasai".	63.750
The "Compagnie Anversoise des Plantations du Lubéfu".	54.250
The Limited Company "Plantations Lacourt".	51.000
The Limited Company "Belgika".	49.750
The Limited Company "Comptoirs Congolais Velde". . .	19.250
The Limited Company "La Kassaienne".	18.750
The Limited Company "La Djuma".	18.500
The Limited Company "Est du Kwango".	15.500
The Limited Company "La Loanje".	14.500
The Limited Company "Centrale Africaine".	13.750
The Compagnie des Magasins Généraux du Congo	7.750
The Limited Company "Le Trafic Congolais".	5.750

In addition 4,020 profit-bearing shares were also issued without any specified value of which half were divided among the fourteen companies in exchange for their contributions and their renunciation in favour of the

Compagnie du Kasai of all import and export trade. The part contributed by the various companies is estimated at 15,000,000 francs. The distribution of the shares was as follows³:

The Congo Free State	fr. 2.010
The "Nieuwe Afrikaansche Handels Vennootschap". . .	340
The Limited Company "Société Belge pour le Commerce du Haut Congo".	340
The Limited Company "Société Anonyme des Produits Végétaux du Haut Kasai".	255
The "Compagnie Anversoise des Plantations du Lubéfu".	217
The Limited Company "Plantations Lacourt".	204
The Limited Company "Belgika".	199
The Limited Company "Comptoirs Congolais Velde". . .	77
The Limited Company "La Kassalenne".	75
The Limited Company "La Djuma".	74
The Limited Company "Est du Kwango".	62
The Limited Company "La Loanje".	58
The Limited Company "Centrale Africaine".	55
The "Compagnie des Magasins Généraux de Congo". . . .	31
The Limited Company "Le Trafic Congolais".	23
Total shares	4,020

1. Taken from C.K. Archives brochure dated February, 1952.

2. The Congo Question. The Kasai Company to its Shareholders. A Reply to Detractors. Brussels, November 1906, p. 10.

3. Ibid., p. 11.

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The bibliography includes only those sources which were the most useful and important in the preparation of this manuscript and begins with a list of official publications and newspapers consulted, followed by a list of unpublished material consulted. The listing of published major books and articles is arranged under headings which correspond roughly to the major themes of this thesis; no work is listed more than once, although some could fit under several different headings.

1. List of Archives Consulted

A. Belgium

1. Archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo et du Ministère des Colonies, Brussels (Archives Africaines A.E. (A.A.)).

The relevant documents in these archives have been described in Mme. Van Grieken-Taverniers, Inventaire des archives des Affaires Etrangères de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo et du Ministère des Colonies, 1885-1914 (Brussels, 1955).

The most useful dossiers for the Kasai are the following:

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 42 Passage de sujets français par le territoire de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 54 Relations de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo avec la N.A.H.V. 1886-1892.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 65 (209): Traite d'esclaves. Zone du Kongo-Kasai, 1888-1908.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 66 Traite d'esclaves. Zone du Tanganika-Katanga.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 72 (210): Faits de traite dans le Kasai, 1910.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 182 Correspondance au sujet de la compagnie anti-congolaise, 1904 (1903); 1906 (1905); 1907-1908.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 184-185 Rapports des autorités locales avec des consuls étrangers.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 212 Correspondance diverse échangée entre le ministère des Colonies et le ministère des A.E.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 293 Portugal: Incidents de frontière, 1887-1900.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 294 (260): Portugal: Incidents de frontière, 1900-1908.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 325 (269): Portugal: Frontière Lunda. Expéditions Wissmann.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 501 (338): Explorations au Congo: Rapports.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 513 Protection des indigènes.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 521-522 Documents diplomatiques anglais.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 524 (345) - 526 (346) Commission d'enquête de 1903-1904.

Dossier A.E. (A.A.) 527 Documents et réponses aux questions de la commission d'enquête, 1904-1905.

2. Archives of the Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Brussels (A.F. series).

The most useful materials included:

Congo; Politique et Administration Générale, 1st series, 1876-1914:

21 volumes containing diplomatic and consular correspondence.

Congo; Politique et Administration Générale, 2nd series, 1880-1919:

5 volumes similar to the above.

Additional useful dossiers include:

A.F. 1, 9, Congo-Portugal, 1884-1921.

A.F. 1, 11, Congo-Mission religieuses.

3. Archives of the Compagnie du Kasai, Brussels. These archives, now used for the first time, were extremely useful. When consulted by me, the material was not in any way catalogued; the papers were simply placed in boxes by year.

4. Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, Tervuren.

The most useful materials were:

The Gillain Papers

The Ed Fromont Papers

The Edgar Verdick Papers

These papers were filed under the name of the individual concerned.

B. Zaire

1. Archives de la Province de Kasai Occidentale, Kananga. Files on ethnographic materials located in the office of the Government of the Kasai, to which I was given access by permission of the Government of the Kasai Occidental. The files consulted were arranged by subject and territorial district and were mainly compiled in the 1920s and 1930s.
2. Luebo Territorial Office Archives, Luebo. The most useful material consisted of the Régistres Politiques and some notes on officially recognized chefferies, and those consulted were compiled between 1903 and 1908.
3. Luebo Commissaire du District Archives, Luebo. These Archives are of limited value for the C.F.S. period since most of the material concerns the Belgian Congo, that is, the period from 1908 to 1960. The files consulted were ethnographic manuscripts, compiled in the 1920s, together with some surviving correspondence from the C.F.S. period.
4. Tshikapa Territorial Archives, Tshikapa. Only a few Régistres Politiques survive from the period 1903-1908.

II. Published Documentary Sources Consulted

Etat Indépendant du Congo. Gouvernement Central. Bulletin Officiel de l'Etat Indépendant du Congo, 1885-1908.

III. Newspapers and Periodicals Consulted

La Belge Coloniale

The Kasai Herald. An annual publication by the A.P.C.M. throughout the Free State era. The most important edition for this study was printed at Luebo, January 1, 1908.

La Meuse, Brussels, May 6, 1908, an article entitled "Au Congo" discussed the chefferie controversy.

Le Congo Illustre

Mouvement Géographique, published bi-weekly in Brussels. Extremely valuable for information on the Congo.

London Times, London, September 17, 1889, an article on indentured labour.

IV. Select List of Unpublished Material Consulted

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